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Title: Predation and reputation acquisition in debt markets
Authors: Pires, Cesaltina
Keywords: Asymmetric information
Financing costs
Issue Date: 2003
Publisher: Springer-Verlag
Abstract: This paper presents a model of predation based on reputational differences between the entrant and an incumbent. While the incumbent has an established reputation in the debt market, the entrants’s quality is not yet known in the debt market. We show that the incumbent may have incentives to prey in order to interfere with the “reputation acquisition” of the entrant.
Type: article
Appears in Collections:CEFAGE - Publicações - Artigos em Revistas Internacionais Com Arbitragem Científica
GES - Publicações - Artigos em Revistas Internacionais Com Arbitragem Científica

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