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    <dc:date>2026-04-06T13:01:53Z</dc:date>
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  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10174/37128">
    <title>An OLG model approach to climate change with intergenerational concern and Game Theory</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10174/37128</link>
    <description>Title: An OLG model approach to climate change with intergenerational concern and Game Theory
Authors: Rocha de Sousa, Miguel; Pica, António
Abstract: Udalov 2014 extended a collective goods problem through an Overlapping Generations Model where there&#xD;
is a decision regarding the type of energy use either fossil fuel versus renewable use energy Udalov&#xD;
introduced a politico economic equilibrium contingent on the effort or commitment on renewable energy We&#xD;
provide his framework but further extended it, by using an eta parameter which provides intergenerational&#xD;
concern among different generations, old versus youngsters We depart from non existent Udalov non&#xD;
concern of intergenerational generations, and extend it to use a parameter eta which reflects this concern&#xD;
We further provide a game, in the sense of game theory, where the politico economic equilibrium is&#xD;
contingent on the intergenerational concern, which reflects strategic interaction among youngsters and old&#xD;
people Some politico economic results at hand As higher intergenerational concern eta parameter a tribute&#xD;
to Stern’s 2004 report the faster the pace of recuperation of a global common good the lower level of&#xD;
pollution and politico economic equilibria recovers the fastest ( the investment in renewable energy</description>
    <dc:date>2023-07-20T23:00:00Z</dc:date>
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  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10174/37125">
    <title>Kant vs Nash: Solving the Global Commons Goods Problem</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10174/37125</link>
    <description>Title: Kant vs Nash: Solving the Global Commons Goods Problem
Authors: Rocha de Sousa, Miguel; Duarte, Vanessa
Abstract: We provide the notion of Kantian equilibrium versus Nash equilibrium, and try to recover the efficiency of Pareto&#xD;
allocations within public goods (global commons) and external effects (like pollution) Nash 1950 a,b) provided the first solution to&#xD;
a non zero sum non cooperative game through a fixed point theorem Nevertheless, market efficiency is not recovered when there&#xD;
are either externalities (like pollution, or the global common problems), or common public goods Ostrom 1989 provided a&#xD;
solution in small numbers through cooperation in small lake ponds and lobsters aquaculture production and local water provision&#xD;
Roemer 1992 studied theories of distributive justice and came forth with a solution to global commons problem of environment&#xD;
and pollution ( 2019 Nevertheless, Roemer’s solution, while solving the global commons incentive problem, by thinking&#xD;
out of the box, and providing a new framework provides a too much collective solution We provide instead a communitarian&#xD;
solution, inspired by Christian ethics, namely Economics of Francis, Laudatio si which also recovers the global incentive problem,&#xD;
but provides a different politico economic perspective.</description>
    <dc:date>2023-07-16T23:00:00Z</dc:date>
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  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10174/37124">
    <title>Kant vs Nash: Solving the Global Commons Goods Problem</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10174/37124</link>
    <description>Title: Kant vs Nash: Solving the Global Commons Goods Problem
Authors: Rocha de Sousa, Miguel; Duarte, Vanessa
Abstract: We provide the notion of Kantian equilibrium versus Nash equilibrium, a try to recover the efficiency of Pareto allocations within public goods (global commons) and external effects (like pollution). Nash (1950a,b) provided the first solution to a non zero-sum  non-cooperative game through a fixed point theorem. Nevertheless, market efficiency is not recovered when there are either externalities (like pollution, or the global common problems and goods), or common public goods. Ostrom (1989) provided a solution in small numbers through cooperation in small lake ponds and lobsters aquaculture production and local water provision. &#xD;
&#xD;
Roemer (1992) studied theories of distributive justice and came forth with a solution to global commons problem of environment and pollution (Roemer, 2019). Nevertheless, Roemer’s solution, while solving the global commons incentive problem, by thinking out of the box, and providing a new framework provides a too much collective solution. We provide instead a communitarian solution, inspired Christian ethics, namely Economy of Francis, Laudation si, which also recovers the global incentive problem, but provides a different politico economic perspective.</description>
    <dc:date>2023-07-19T23:00:00Z</dc:date>
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  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10174/32734">
    <title>Inclusion and political participation in the age of post-democracy</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10174/32734</link>
    <description>Title: Inclusion and political participation in the age of post-democracy
Authors: Fontes, Paulo
Abstract: In the last few decades, we have been witnessing the deflation of the ideal of participative democracy. If, on the one hand, we go back to the original formulations of the 1960 and 1970, we can observe that these indicated the need to expand the spaces of collective democratic management in everyday life, particularly in the workplace. But, on the other hand, the models of the following decades accepted the circumscription of democratic practices to the state. In a parallel movement, the critic to the representative institutions and the political passivity that they promote was set aside, in favor of a perception that the difference between participation and representation is practically annulled. With that, the radicalism of the criticism to the deficit of participation in liberal democracies is lost.&#xD;
In a context of postmodernity, in which the maladies of modernity have not been remedied, along with the widespread disinterest in public affairs, especially in the younger strata, it is urgent to revitalize dormant democracies, mostly in the Western world. It becomes pertinent, as an objective for our work, based on existing scientific knowledge, to imagine and conceptualize new forms of inclusion and social and political participation that may renew the democratic system.</description>
    <dc:date>2021-06-20T23:00:00Z</dc:date>
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