




KANT-STUDIEN

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eine kluge Abhandlung verfaßt, die die systematische Frage nach dem Zusammenhang von Handlungserklärung und Handlungsbegründung mit einer stringenten und gleichzeitig behutsamen Interpretation der philosophiegeschichtlich bedeutungsvollsten Positionen dieses Themas verbindet. Dies ist nicht nur ein großer Gewinn für Hume- und Kant-Forscher, sondern gerade auch für diejenigen, die sich für die gegenwärtig so kontrovers diskutierte, aber zumeist wenig historisch verankerte Problematik praktischer Gründe interessieren. Mit diesem Buch ist ihnen endlich die Möglichkeit gegeben, dieser im Lichte der ursprünglichen Proponenten verschiedener Modelle praktischer Vernunft nachzuspüren und zu erkennen, wie sich bereits im Rahmen dieser Theorien Wege zu einer Verbindung bahnen lassen. Damit kann auch den non-kognitivistischen Vereinseitigungen entgegengewirkt werden, die v. a. die Humesche Position in der sog. Neo-Humeschen Deutung im Rahmen der Debatte um praktische Gründe erfahren hat.

Monika Betzler, Göttingen

Robin May Schott [Hrsg.]: *Feminist Interpretations of Immanuel Kant*. Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press 1997 (VII–XVI/423 pp.).

This collection of essays discusses the centrality of Kantian thought in contemporary debates of philosophical feminist thinking. This centrality shows how Kant's philosophy has taken on a definite form within Western thinking and how the concepts he developed assume even today an essential semiology, not only for modern explanation but also for the formation of the philosophical corpus.

The book is arranged in five theoretical sections: Rationalism, Ethics, Aesthetics, Political Philosophy, Philosophy of Nature and Human Nature. They are not equally weighted. For example, the section on rationalism consists of a single article, while those dedicated to ethics and aesthetics have four each. However, these texts deal with Kant's works from very different perspectives, bringing into discussion the writings which tradition has consecrated as fundamental referents of Kant's philosophy. The different articles are preceded by an introduction by the editor, Robin May Schott, in which she develops the theoretical framework for the themes analysed in the different texts. There is also a preface by Nancy Tuana, general editor of the series titled *Re-reading the Canon*, in which the present work is included. Tuana reaffirms her opinion that it is necessary to reread the canon of philosophical tradition as a woman, with the intention of determining how that canon represents women and at the same time denouncing the purported objectivity of the canon as being selective and biased.

The article by Adrian M. S. Piper, "Xenophobia and Kantian Rationalism", occupies section one. It is a hermeneutical examination of the CPR, attempting to show that Kantian rationalism can be transformed into a useful technique for analysing and defeating the fears of xenophobia, giving human difference a positive expression. The basis of the analysis is the concept of personhood. The author regrets that the debates on Kantian ethics have not taken the first Critique into account. By means of the CPR one can establish a Kantian conception of self that "affords potent resources for understanding xenophobia as a special case of a more general cognitive phenomenon, namely the disposition to resist the intrusion of anomalous

data of any kind into a conceptual scheme whose internal rational coherence is necessary for preserving a unified and rationally integrated self" (p.23). The aim of this analysis is to establish both the possibility of the rational unity of selfhood and the concept of personhood, which allows for the rational and empirical integration of all the different roles that a human being can assume. This allows a distinction between the concepts of personhood, personality und people. On the basis of the CPR she wishes to establish a rational means for legitimizing a genuine xenophilia, while not tolerating a xenophobia disguised as paternalism or mere curiosity towards people who are different. By contrast, "the xenophile acknowledges the disruption and threat to the integrity of the self caused by the other's difference, and seeks understanding of the other as a way of understanding and transcending the limitations of her own self-conception" (note 36, p. 73).

The second section, Ethics, is composed of articles by Sally Sedgwick, Herta Nagl-Docekal, Jean P. Rumsey and Marcia Baron. Here two things should be taken into account: a) the level of interpretative confrontation they occupy as texts that critically subsume a large number of comments on the themes they analyse; b) their either latent or explicit involvement in the horizon of opposition between two ethical perspectives, namely between Kantian duty and Carol Gilligan's concept of care. Nagl-Docekal's and Baron's contributions display what I would call a universal line of analysis. Both articles express the search for an ethics which, while being feminist, is not restricted to the feminine and seeks an integrated approach appealing to all persons. This line of analysis proposes a feminist appropriation of the principles of Kant's moral philosophy. In particular, they investigate the universality of the categorical imperative, whose radical egalitarian basis demands that a person always be regarded as an end and rejects the possibility that any human being be treated as a means.

In my view Nagl-Docekal's article "Feminist Ethics – How it could benefit from Kant's Moral Philosophy" rightly criticizes what might be termed a fundamentalism of the ethics of care, according to which moral criteria are adopted on the basis of their contextualized application. She welcomes the capacity for universalization and particularization in Kantian morals: "the one formal rule suggested by Kant is both strictly universalist (it applies to all people equally) and radically individualizing (it requires that one perceive and support the specific needs of others)" (p. 118). With her proposal that feminist theory appropriate certain concepts of Kantian ethics like the categorical imperative, Nagl-Docekal expresses her desire to seek a critical instrument of analysis on the basis of which explicit or hidden situations of oppression that burden many women can be denounced as immoral and not merely as conflicts of interest.

In her article "Kantian Ethics and the Claims of Detachment" Baron shares this point of view: "I do think that Kant's theory was *much* more progressive than he was. I deplore much of what he wrote regarding women but I do not think that it impugns his theory. I also think that feminists have reason to look favourably on his moral theory, principally because of its egalitarianism" (p. 147). She systematically undergirds this point of view through the analysis of the concept of detachment, which she characterizes in three dimensions: that of other people, of her own projects and of emotions and feelings. Here we should underscore that the analysis of this concept, taken as a principle for a new interpretive reading of Kantian ethics, is

the reorientation of such Kantian principles as autonomy, formalism and the independence of ethical action from the affective domain. Baron's treatment of the concept of detachment reveals a perspective of Kant's ethics that we might call hygienic. This perspective aids us in guaranteeing the maintenance of lucidity and impartiality, which are essential to moral reasoning. She insists that impartiality does not mean impersonality and that the defense of a border-line between the ethical and the affective can have the necessary, positive dimension of preventing people from succumbing to the temptation of undesired, castrating, paternalist protection and of moralizing domination. Baron states: "One is providing the friend with information that the friend can make use of or not as he will, depending on his view of his own self-perfection. One can provide assistance to one's friend, but cannot do the improving for him. This is the point of denying a duty to perfect another and I see no reason for feminist opposition to it, and much reason for feminist approval" (p. 157).

The third section on Aesthetics includes articles by Jane Kneller, Cornelia Klinger, Marcia Moen and Kim Hall. Moen's article "Feminist Themes in Unlikely Places: Re-Reading Kant's Critique of Judgment" is noteworthy for its systematic treatment of Kant's three Critiques and for its reading of these texts with regard to their possible application to the present. Moen begins by remarking that, given the themes of the first two Critiques, Kant's statement in the CJ that humanity is characterized by the feeling of sympathy and by the ability to communicate its intimacy is almost incomprehensible. Beginning with this perplexity, she interprets the CJ both as a transformation of the earlier Kantian perspectives and as their profound recapitulation. She carries out a series of interactive readings of the three Critiques, whereby the novelty of the CJ remains the pivotal point, and shows not only the reticulated form of the organization of Kant's thought, but also that the third Critique is a kind of maleable development of seeds planted in the abstract and inflexible thoughts of CPR and the CPrR. Moen's analyses lead her to the admission that fundamental themes of contemporary feminism are prefigured in Kant's thought.

The fourth section on Political Philosophy includes texts by Hannelore Schröder, Annette C. Baier and Robin May Schott. The previous sections featured writers, who in spite of their recognition of the limits of Kantian thought towards women, looked for concepts in Kant's philosophy that could be meaningfully employed to give us a better understanding of women and their situations. These concepts were applied in a positive way to feminism. In the fourth section, on the contrary, attention is restricted to exposing those aspects of Kant's political thought that reveal discriminatory dimensions. The fifth and last section of the book, dedicated to Philosophy of Nature and Human Nature, includes articles by Monique David-Ménard, Sarah Kofman and Holly L. Wilson. The first two articles develop themes related to ethics and feminine nature employing the hermeneutical tools of psychoanalysis, the latter seeks to revive Kantian concepts of nature and human nature in terms of an ecofeminist perspective. The introduction to this volume states: "This anthology does not seek to decide the case for or against Kant" (p. 16). One does not need to choose between alternatives but rather understand the complexities involved. The great energy of Kant's thought and its persistent controversial character find expression in this collection of articles. We may add that in addition to the interesting discussion of philosophical debates between Kant and feminism, the book also con-

tains a select bibliography referring to some of the most significant works on this subject.

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(Translated by Elvira Gonçalves and James Jakob Fehr)

Michael Oberhausen: Das neue Apriori. Kants Lehre von einer ‚ursprünglichen Erwerbung‘ apriorischer Vorstellungen (= Forschungen und Materialien zur deutschen Aufklärung, Abt. II, Bd. 12). Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: frommann-holzboog 1997, 295 Seiten.

Gegenstand der vorliegenden Arbeit, einer an der Kant-Forschungsstelle der Universität Trier bei Norbert Hinske entstandenen Dissertation, ist die Frage nach der Herkunft der apriorischen Vorstellungen bei Kant. Woher stammen eigentlich die verschiedenen in der *KrV* aufgewiesenen apriorischen Momente menschlichen Erkennens, also Raum und Zeit als reine Anschauungsformen der Sinnlichkeit, die Kategorien als reine Verstandesbegriffe und die Ideen als reine Vernunftbegriffe? Bei dieser Thematik handelt es sich ersichtlich nicht etwa um eine der zahllosen Spezialfragen der Kant-Exegese; sie führt vielmehr ins Zentrum der kritischen Philosophie. Doch so naheliegend wie grundlegend die Frage nach dem Ursprung apriorischer Erkenntnis auch ist, Kant hat sich kaum ausdrücklich zu ihr geäußert. Die noch ausführlichste und wohl ausgereifteste Antwort findet sich auf ein paar Seiten der schon recht späten Streitschrift gegen den Leibnitio-Wolffianer Johann August Eberhard aus dem Jahre 1790 *Über eine Entdeckung, nach der alle neue Kritik der reinen Vernunft durch eine ältere entbehrlich gemacht werden soll* (A 68–71). Danach stehen die apriorischen Vorstellungen dem Menschen nicht von Anfang an als gesicherter Besitz zur Verfügung, sondern müssen erst schrittweise ausgebildet oder ‚erworben‘ werden. Dabei handelt es sich jedoch um eine ‚Erwerbung‘ ganz eigener Art: es ist selbstredend kein Erwerb, der sich aus der Erfahrung ableitet, keine ‚acquisitio derivativa‘, sondern eine ‚ursprüngliche Erwerbung‘, eine ‚acquisitio originaria‘. Was hier als Besitz zuwächst, ist nicht von einem Anderen, Fremden genommen, sondern aus dem Inneren des erkennenden Subjekts selbst: von den logischen Gesetzen des menschlichen Erkenntnisvermögens. Kant hat auch in diesem Fall, wie so oft, eine Begrifflichkeit, die eigentlich einer ganz anderen Sphäre entstammt, nämlich hier der juristischen, auf den erkenntnistheoretischen Bereich übertragen. Apriorische Erkenntnis, so möchte er mit diesem naturrechtlichen Begriffspaar zum Ausdruck bringen, wird nicht als schon bestehendes Eigentum von dem einem an einen anderen weitergegeben, sondern erstmalig angeeignet, darin eben Dingen vergleichbar, die bislang noch überhaupt niemandem gehören.

Obwohl das titelgebende Stichwort von einer ‚ursprünglichen Erwerbung‘ apriorischer Vorstellungen in den Druckschriften einzig an der genannten Kardinalstelle vorkommt, liegt Oberhausen zufolge das dort skizzierte Lehrstück der Sache nach bei Kant als eine Art ‚Hintergrundtheorie‘ schon mindestens seit 1770 zugrunde. Bereits in Paragraph 8 der Inauguraldissertation sei, wenn auch in frappierender Kürze, der vollständige Entwurf zu einer solchen Aprioritheorie enthalten (vgl. S. 59). Den allgemeinen Grundgedanken seiner Lehre von der ‚acquisitio originaria‘