Universidade de Évora - Escola de Ciências Sociais

Mestrado em Relações Internacionais e Estudos Europeus

Dissertação

Pelos olhos dos constrangidos: Uma revisão crítica do conceito galtugiano de violência para o Sul Global

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Évora 2022

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Évora 2022

UNIVERSIDADE DE ÉVORA
ESCOLA DE CIÊNCIAS SOCIAIS
DEPARTAMENTO DE ECONOMIA

Dissertação (Trabalho Conclusivo de Mestrado)

"Through the eyes of the constrained: A critical review of the Galtugian concept of violence for the Global South"

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Dissertação de mestrado em Relações Internacionais e Estudos Europeus, da Universidade de Évora, como requisito para a conclusão do programa mencionado.

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Mestrado em Relações Internacionais e Estudos Europeus
Período acadêmico: 2019 a 2021
Área de especialização: Estudos para Paz e Resolução de Conflitos

Évora – Maio, 2022

Ao meu pai,

Meu *Leviathan*, quem desde sempre plantou em mim o que aqui se questiona.

À Luísa,

Quem, com um comentário singelo, regou o que aqui brota.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It was indeed quite a journey. Coming to the conclusion of this piece of work took me time, patience and effort. Nothing surprising, really – meaningful projects usually don't happen in the turn of a single day. What is surprising to me, although, is the amount of people that crossed my path, together with the realization that I did not and could not have done this alone. I did, indeed, "stand on the shoulder of giants". I lay here my gratitude to them.

I would like to express my appreciation to Professor Silvério who, as my advisor, accompanied me with accurate appointments from our very first meeting, rewarding me with the most marvelous conversations and insights. I also would like to express my appreciation to Professor Mario who, also as my advisor, with the kindest heart and deepest attention, supported me in moments of doubt, presenting me different perspectives, paths and readings.

I would like to acknowledge the professors and staff at my institution, *Universidade de Évora* – specially my coordinator, Professor Evanthia – for receiving, nurturing, and teaching me, opening me many opportunities. I extend this gratitude to the *Universidad de Granada* and the *Uppsala Universitet*, for welcoming my curiosity and learning thirst. Beyond those, my eternal gratitude to the *Universidade Federal de Uberlândia*, nest of this bird aiming higher skies.

My special appreciation to those who I had the privilege to call friends in the most singular ways: Luísa, full of light, who accompanied me and encouraged me in my first steps; Louise e Aline, my two Brazilian hearts who kept me going through Portuguese lands; Marina, Pablo and *el Pisipiso*, *personas-hogar* in "*tierras granaínas"*; Danielle, my purest and most gentle example of serendipity; Alicia, my constant reason of artful awe, with whom I keep on learning; Ida, Arina, Marcus and *Kryddhyllan*, for the greatest summer in my northernmost adventure. Those, together with others I may have lapsed here, were and are stones of my pathway.

Lastly, my family. Williams, my dedicated father, Cecília, my inspiring mother, my confidant sisters Yane and Elys, and little Mike: thank you for preparing me for the world – for participating, listening, hurting and healing together. *Amocêis.*

and God, together with my greatest mom, Mary – without faith, I wouldn't be…

RESUMO

Pelos olhos dos constrangidos:
Uma revisão crítica do conceito Galtuguiano de violência para o Sul Global

A presente dissertação busca analisar o conceito de violência nas Relações Internacionais pela perspectiva daqueles que estão às margens do sistema internacional, comumente nomeados Sul Global. A pesquisa parte principalmente das contribuições de Johan Galtung sobre os conceitos de violência e paz na área de Estudos para a Paz, e propõe uma nova perspectiva destes mesmos conceitos pelo olhar teórico do Pós-colonialismo e da Decolonialidade, sugerindo uma compreensão destes conceitos e das relações no sistema internacional que não negligencie Estados periféricos e sua epistemologia. Para atingir estes objetivos foram utilizados métodos bibliográficos e históricos para análise de obras já produzidas tangentes ao tema e então, por um caminho dedutivo, tratar da hipótese de que os países do Sul Global podem apresentar leituras diferentes sobre como emergem a violência direta, cultural e estrutural, suas razões, valores, consequências e relevância, também tratando dos reflexos dessa mudança nas definições de Paz.

Palavras-chave: Violência, Estudos para a Paz, Pós-colonialismo, Paz, Sul Global

ABSTRACT

Through the eyes of the constrained:
A critical review of the Galtugian concept of violence for the Global South

This dissertation analyzes the concept of violence in International Relations from the perspective of those who are on the margins of the international system, the Global South. The research is based on the contributions of Johan Galtung regarding the concepts of violence and peace in the area of Peace Studies, proposing a new perspective of these same concepts from the theoretical perspective of Postcolonialism and Decoloniality, suggesting an understanding of these concepts and the relations in the international system that does not neglect peripheral states and their epistemology. To achieve these objectives, bibliographic and historical methods were used to analyze works around this thematic and, in a deductive approach, address the hypothesis that the countries of the Global South may present different readings about how direct, cultural, and structural violence emerges, its reasons, values, consequences, and relevance, also dealing with the consequences of these changes in the definitions of Peace.

Palavras-chave: Violence, Peace Studies, Postcolonialism, Peace, Global South

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PREFACE

On the 21th day of February 2022, at an official ceremony in the Kremlin, the president of Russia – Vladimir Putin – recognized the independence and sovereignty of the Donetsk People's Republic and the Luhansk People's Republic, two self-proclaimed states in Donbas controlled by pro-Russian separatists in the territory of Ukraine. The recognition occurred simultaneously with a large military build-up along Russia's border with Ukraine, bringing the latter's allies into a situation of tension. According to Putin's allegations, the movement was a response to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) extensive advance eastward, representing a disrespect to European power balance and a direct military threat to Russia's integrity, especially with the possibility of Ukraine joining the organization.

Even after repeatedly denying as late as 23 February the plan to invade Ukraine, on the following day Putin announced a "special military operation" to "demilitarize and denazify" Ukraine, beginning a military invasion of the Ukrainian territory in a major escalation of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict that began back in 2014, but also carrying deep historical roots of cultural animosities that goes back for decades, if not centuries. 'The West' responded with various harsh economic sanctions, trying to diminish Russia's onslaught without getting directly involved. The UN's Security Council finds itself in a deadlock, as one of its permanent members hinders any decision with its veto power. The UN's General Assembly issued a resolution which reaffirms Ukrainian sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, with 141 of its 193 members in favor of it. The International Court, by a vote of 13 to 2, ruled that Russia "shall immediately suspend the military operations". The United States together with basically all of Europe aiding Ukraine in its resistance, while Putin affirms that the operation is proceeding as planned.

It is now the largest military conflict in Europe since World War II, with more than 3.1 million Ukrainians fleeing the country (and currently counting), also causing the largest refugee crisis in Europe since then. Almost a month later, the conflict perdures, as the world watches in shock the atrocities and the attempts to not escalate the conflict to a bigger proportion with the involvement of other major powers. Rounds of peace negotiations keep on occurring, bannering the wishes of all of us who wish for the end of the armed conflict. All of this coinciding with the last weeks to handle this dissertation.

The mainstream media, together with social media platforms and online communication, have added new dynamics to patterns of information regarding warfare. We are seeing this

armed conflict arise and unravel, as a big part of the world have access via internet to information regarding the latest news by the minute. Around me I see people scared and astonished with the very fact of an armed conflict between two countries, with the idea of *war*. Violence, at its pinnacle, is happening before the eyes of society, revealing to many the emergence of something we thought (and wished) had stayed in our past. The word *Peace* is found in banners, screens, mouths and claims, as we chant and ask for it as if it means the resolution of these problems. We want this to cease – we want this violence to stop.

But here I stress a reality check: there are other wars that happened and keep on happening that were and are not object of so much concern or attention. Conflicts and situations that are and were as grave, meaningful and violent as what we are seeing between Russia and Ukraine – the documentary *The War You Don't See* (launched in 2010 and directed by John Pilger) shows exactly that. I could also stress that there are occurrences that are not strictly called war, but make as many victims and destruction as we are seeing. There is violence, in its many types and many forms, happening everywhere, all the time. We just don't see it – we forget or avoid it. It is reasonable to worry about Putin's actions now, but this is not the only thing we should be worried about if we are so truly concerned about peace. It seems the call for peace is only loud when is to resort to war. Again, it is reasonable if you were to appeal to proportionality. Still, peace does not only serve in times of war. Peace means something more than the absence or denial of war, of armed conflicts. But it vanishes from the common vocabulary if we don't consider a situation as we are going through right now. Why keep asking for peace if apparently there is no war?

Why there is *apparently* no war? The reality is veiled by what is apparent. Again: we just don't see it. As if there was a wall blocking our view. The conflict we are watching so attentively now happens before our eyes, in this side of the wall. But if we pay close attention, and listen carefully, and think critically, we might start to consider and acknowledge that these atrocities are also happening just around the corner, on the other side of this structure that blocks our view. A structure that divides us. This wall was not supposed to be here.

Within International Relations I found a *locus* where Peace was the core goal, a common denominator – especially considering the history of it as a discipline. But taking peace as the purpose, lying in the horizon of the future, I looked at the present, at the paths towards it, and I saw something else: violence. Russia and Ukraine are just a small glance at it. This text, then, is my attempt to understand it a little better. To understand violence, International Relations and present times, hoping to learn and build a better path towards what I desire: a peace without a wall. And for that, we might need to start looking at the world through different eyes…

1. INTRODUCTION

"Here's an idea: Violence is the removal of choice."
– Mike Rugnetta, What is Violence? – PBS Idea Channel (2016)

1.1. Acknowledge of the phenomenon

According to Oxford Languages, the adjective ineffable describes the quality of being "too great or extreme to be expressed or described in words" as well as "not to be uttered". The same entry on Merriam-Webster's dictionary states a definition of what is "incapable of being expressed in words"[1]. Synonym for words as indescribable, unspeakable, inexpressible. Nevertheless, this was not quite the word I was looking for at this very beginning. Other than incapable of being expressed or described, what I was searching for was a word to define the quality of being hard or complicated of being described. Another adjective that crossed my mind as a possibility was unintelligible, describing the quality of being "unable to be understood or comprehended" – a synonym for incomprehensible or unfathomable[2]. Yet, again, not quite the word I was looking for. In a way, the word I wanted has the opposite definition, I believe. What can I use to portray both the qualities of being complicated to describe but easily comprehended? Here lies one of the many limits of my knowledge and maybe a space for neologisms.

The particular definition of this unknown word would be of very good use here, as I would use it to qualify violence. More specifically, the concept of violence – violence as such[3]. To me it is something complicated to be described, as it can be approached as a wide and complex term, but easily comprehended, because it is a concept that is, in many ways, universally recognizable. You can approach anyone and ask "When I say violence, what comes up in your mind?", and the collection of thoughts caused by this inquire can present some clues on how that person defines violence. If one was to register the answer to this question after asking it to a large group of people, the complexity of finding a common definition among these answers would emerge. A step further would be making sure this large group of people embraces a

[1] Merriam-Webster. (n.d.).
[2] Merriam-Webster. (n.d.).
[3] Rugnetta, M. (2016).

multitude of ethnicities, genders, cultures, countries, generations, and classes. The level of complexity gets higher as one tries to be universal and inclusive.

If you were to extend this exercise to children, a new layer on the complexity of this concept would emerge even more. Regardless of this not being the focus of the present text, it serves as a warm-up for the discussions I want to have with you. The complexity of the concept and what the term might bring up demands the approach to children being more precautious – it is a sensitive topic, after all (not only to children, I have to say). It might be something many have experienced and seen, even though they do not know how to explain or define it. There is a wide production to help with this approach: the document "Talking to Children About Violence: Tips for Parents and Teachers"[4] provided by the National Association of School Psychologists has been translated to many languages and it is a reference in this discussion; the book "Let's Talk About Living in a World With Violence"[5] published in 1993 by James Garbarino; the academic production of Conrad Hughes[6] "Addressing violence in education: From policy to practice"; the video "What is violence"[7] provided by the Sesame Street In Communities channel in Youtube, published in the beginning of 2021 (a personal favorite).

My starting point here is this: I want to state to you that it is a phenomenon recognizable by all, even by children who may not be familiarized with the concept, but might be quite aware of the phenomenon when it comes experiencing it. I want to acknowledge violence as something we can all relate to, in some level. Everyone experiences it in many different forms, and it is ubiquitous as well. It is present in various levels of our lives, from the most personal psychological level, passing through intra-personal and community level to the most general, societal, international level. I state this here, at the very beginning of this dissertation, with the purpose of establishing a bridge between the reader and myself. Violence is not unknown to both of us – I am sure you have your way of seeing it. My intention with this text, considering even what you already know and think, is to show you a new perspective and maybe, at the end, after questioning you "When I say violence, what comes up in your mind?" you will be more mindful about it, taking into account what I am about to show you.

[4] NASP (2016).
[5] Garbarino, J. (1993).
[6] Hughes, C. (2020).
[7] Sesame Street on Communities (2021).

1.2. Conceptualizing violence

What should we expect as an answer when questioning what is violence? My short response, if this comes to be what you are looking for in this dissertation is: I do not know. I do not know what to expect as an answer to a such broad question – this is what I came to face doing the research for this text. The myriad of possible answers is a direct reflection of the above-mentioned complexity, and here lie the challenges of defining violence. It is complicated to approach such term and give it a clear and universal definition that is going to resonate and live up to the many experiences of people, to the many forms it can take. Attempts are not scarce, nonetheless, as we will see in the course of this dissertation.

A strong example of such endeavor is made by the World Health Organization (WHO), on behalf of the United Nations (UN). On the first World Report on Violence and Health, published on October of 2002, violence is presented as:

> The intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation[8].

This definition remarkably covers the term after the 49th World Health Assembly declaring violence as a major public health issue in 1996 (resolution WHA49.25)[9]. The editors and organizers of the report believed that it comprehended all types of violence, covering "the wide range of acts of commission and omission that constitutes violence and outcomes beyond deaths and injuries". Much of it is seen with the inclusion of the word ''power'', broadening the nature of a violent act and expanding the conventional understanding of it to include those acts that result from a power relationship, e.g. threats and intimidation. Even though the report focuses in one type of violence only, it divides the term into three broad categories – self-inflicted, interpersonal, and collective – while each is subdivided to reflect specific types of violence, settings of violence, and nature of violent acts[10]. The fundamental premise of the report, declaring it as a major public health issue, is that violence is both predictable and preventable[11].

[8] Krug, E. G.; Mercy, J. A.; Dahlberg, L. L.; Zwi, A. B. (2002).
[9] World Health Organization (1996).
[10] Krug, E. G.; Mercy, J. A.; Dahlberg, L. L.; Zwi, A. B. (2002).
[11] Heath I. (2002).

Notwithstanding, violence should be unacceptable not primarily because it undermines health as a major public issue, but because it is, in itself, demeaning, cruel, and unjust. The medical doctor Iona Heath, in a brief article published right after the publication of the first World Report on Violence and Health, argues that anyone should be entitled to live free of violence, "not because it protects their health but because they have a human right to do so". Her main critique, with the purpose of drawing attention to it, is that "the existence of choice is captured in the report in the notion of intentionality included in the definition of violence but thereafter receives scant attention"[12].

This argument resonates with what is mainly presented in a pair of videos at the PBS Idea Channel regarding the same subject. Mike Rugnetta, approaching the question "what is violence?", presents how he thinks of violence as a removal of choice:

> Violence is the interruption of inertia, the removal of possibility and, most importantly, of choice. We've defined violence as the potentially aggressive removal of an actor's choice in a situation[13].

His contribution with these videos, despite not being a primarily academic source, was a fundamental spark for the beginning of this dissertation, as it opened the pathway for the argument I intend to make here. As he explains, the idea of violence being characterized mainly by the inability to choose raised viewer's questions and inspired some confusion. That happened because violence is often spoken and understood as one particular thing – aggressive bodily harm. His argument, although, is that violence "is about choice as much or more so than it is about bodies". He states that "it can, in fact, be passive and that there is an important ethical dimension to thinking of violence as more than just physical violence, which is only one of many different kinds of violence"[14].

Throughout the video Mike Rugnetta makes an argument that encompasses the above-mentioned definition of the WHO. This happens because of his wider approach to the concept in itself, even though it essentially talks about the same phenomenon. When affirming that violence can be presented in many different kinds, it resonates with the categorization of the report, in which it divides violence in self-inflicted, interpersonal, and collective, as presented before. The common denominator here (and as we will see throughout this dissertation) is the

[12] Heath I. (2002).
[13] Rugnetta, M. (2016).
[14] Rugnetta, M. (2016).

interpretation of violence as not being one singular thing, but capable of being categorized and organized according to the characteristics it may have as it presents itself.

The question of choice rises again when Rugnetta approaches the legal discussion around the term, talking about how is not only physical harm that classifies a violent crime, but the position a victim is put in when faced with physical harm or its possibility[15]. The receiving end, in this situation, is usually in a position where it has "little or no agency, little or no ability to act, to make meaningful choices". As he says, "violence would seem to be the whole or partial negation of agency through force"[16].

Laura E. Tanner is mentioned in regards to her book Intimate Violence[17], as she writes about physical violence on bodies which do not invite it[18]:

> While Freud associated scopophilia [which is the pleasure of looking] with the idea of "taking other people as objects", the same process of objectification underlies violence, in which violators "dehumanize their intended victims and look on them not as people but as inanimate objects[19].

Tanner writes about how physical violence constrains the fundamental subjectivity of a body and its consciousness, and uses it to "transform into a thing, something that can't act, an object […] It uses the experience of having a body to deny that body's own agency". Rephrasing all this argument, Mike Rugnetta says that above bodily harm that may categorize physical violence, "there is a violence-as-such that physical violence requires"[20]. This violence as a concept appears as a force which transforms a body detainer of agency into a thing, diminishing or removing its agency.

The video continues and he even comes to cite Slavoj Žižek – one of the many scholars I intend to mention. The point I try to make here surrounds the above presented arguments: we have a broad but concise definition by the World Health Organization, which tries to delineate a phenomenon in a way it can be recognized and thus prevented, and another wider definition brought up by a discussion in a pair of Youtube videos, basing itself in key-words as choice and agency to discuss the ethical limits of the concept. Both of them present different facets of

[15] This under the American Legal structure, minding that it should not be taken as generalized, universally legal.
[16] Rugnetta, M. (2016).
[17] Tanner, L. E. (1994).
[18] Rugnetta, M. (2016).
[19] Tanner, L. E. (1994).
[20] Rugnetta, M. (2016).

violence, each having its utility to the discussion. Those are only two of the many ways one can approach violence with the intention of understanding it deeply – again, it is a direct reflection of the above-mentioned complexity.

Referring in a brief way to the theoretical contributions of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe[21], one could even say that the term violence, as a concept, is an Empty Signifier – what would characterize violence as something that contains an undetermined quantity of meanings, almost transforming itself into a signification void, and thus apt to receive any significance, any definition. Empty Signifiers outlines concepts that turn into nodal points of signification, meaning the concentration of many different demands and interpretations. Carrying a multitude of significances, it comes to partially undo their differential identities, and instead of repelling others meanings it ends up becoming a point of convergence of all these multiple identities, even those that would not articulate with each other, presenting itself as a concept with multiple meanings and definitions[22].

Those two of many possible definitions, together with others, will serve the purpose of this dissertation, but I want to stress here an important point: this text was not made with the intention of presenting a (new) definition for the concept, even though this has been what I have been talking about. I do not want to define what is violence, but to conceptualize it. Not only look to its definition, but advance a step further to work with its conceptualization – in other words, I want to get near the concept with curious eyes, trying to make a new sense of it, trying to understand how it interacts with the world and the uses it has, trying to look it through new perspectives, guided by the preconceived ideas and the constructed hypotheses I have. I believe there is something interesting that can come out of this venture, something that does not focus on defining violence-as-such, but something that will instigate the ways we approach its process of definition and the consequences it has.

1.3. The legitimacy over the concept

By acknowledging the phenomenon, its complexity and approaching the issues of its definition we touch again on the intricacies of trying to give it a clear definition that resonates and lives up to the abundance of forms it can take, specially thinking on how people experience it. Violence-as-such, as the violence that underlies all forms it can take, as a concept to encompass all its variations, has no clear definition. Or does it? I cannot affirm it

[21] Laclau, E.; Mouffe, C. (1985).
[22] My little knowledge of this discussion comes from my experience using Laclau's contributions to the production of my final graduation work, which I used this author to get closer to the concept of identity and conflict.

unquestionably, specially not in the beginning of this dissertation. But it is a fact that the word violence is widely used and it is present everywhere – "The scope of violence today is global and its magnitude immense"[23], being "at once a statistic, an idea, a practice, a reality, and a fantasy"[24]. What is, then, this violence that is most understood and accepted by people? When I say violence, what generally comes up in the minds of people?

At this point we can reach out a second time to the above presented definition by the World Health Organization, the specialized agency of the United Nations responsible for international public health. The UN, created in 1945, has in its founding charter a presentation of purposes and principles (Articles 01 and 02, respectively)[25], in which it is stated the intentions of maintaining international peace and security, of developing friendly relations among nations, of achieving international co-operation in solving international problems, and the intentions of being the harmonizing center for the actions of nations in those regards. Respecting these same principles, The WHO states in its constitution that its objective "shall be the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health"[26], what we now know, since 1996, officially includes the prevention of violence in society and the mitigation of its effects[27].

The UN, and consequentially the WHO, have a power to classify violence as a major public health issue because it is widely accepted – all countries which are members of the United Nations may become members of the WHO by ratifying its constitution, which already appraises 194 countries[28]. With it the resolution WHA49.25 is then covered, and its definition of violence becomes a point of reference for public health policies. More than how people generally define it individually, the acceptation of a stake definition by a majority of countries and institutions, with the aims of recognizing it more clearly so it can be prevented, gives us a tool to understand and approach the consequences and real effects of violence in our society. Having a clear perception of what is the problem permits a better pursue for solutions. The UN, in this regard, has legitimacy.

This quality that the United Nations has is what makes its definition more generally accepted than the one proposed by Mike Rugnetta, for example. In one hand, the actions and choices of the UN are widely accepted and validated by a number of actors and entities around the world that believe in the processes and bureaucracies that function to safeguard the

[23] Di Leo, J. R. & McClennen, S. A. (2012), p. 241.
[24] Di Leo, J. R. & McClennen, S. A. (2012), p. 247.
[25] U.N. Charter art. 1-2. (1945).
[26] World Health Organization (2014).
[27] World Health Organization (1996).
[28] World Health Organization (n.d.).

decisions that are made by the organization, supposedly always according to its principles and objectives, following the directions and words of specialists and scholars – this leverage propitiates reach, which can reinforce the validation that ensures its legitimacy:

> If people perceive the UN to be legitimate, then it could help the organization to get resources, to make policies, to gain compliance with its decisions, and to make an impact on global problems. In contrast, low or absent legitimacy would tend to make the UN a weaker force in world politics[29].

On the other hand, the definition given by Rugnetta in built on his own knowledge and experience, product of his studies of some scholars and their different definitions of violence. The PBS Idea Channel[30], where the video is hosted, was created on February 2012 and finished its activities on September 2017 after 366 posted videos, gathering around 775.000 subscribers and almost 69,5 million video views[31]. It may be complicated to approach those numbers through the lens of legitimacy (the same we use for the UN), but I can affirm that Mike Rugnetta had and still has the validation of his content inside the community that followed his work and productions.

I bring those two again, the UN and Mike Rugnetta, to show how both work around the definition of the same concept, of the same phenomenon, but proposed in different ways as we have seen – and each one is validated differently. One might be classified as the most prominent international organization in the world, and the other a successful content creator on the internet. Even recognizing the argument around legitimacy, if the object would be to have a definition that is universal and inclusive so we can better capture what is violence, how do we know which definition to use? Is legitimacy enough? If we are to take the definition of the WHO, for example, it could be argued that anything with Rugnetta's definition that does not match the latter cannot be taken as violence, in the approach of it as public health issue. The different scenario can give us an even wider perspective: what would change if Mike Rugnetta's definition of violence was the one used to define it as a major public issue? How would this change the approach of UN's members to violence?

The question of legitimacy here is central, as we can see. What differentiates violence from what is not violence depends greatly on who says it so. As a consequence, the validation

[29] Dellmuth, L.; Scholte, J.; Tallberg, J.; Verhaegen, S. (2019).
[30] PBS Idea Channel (n.d.).
[31] SocialBlade (2021).

received has the power to influence on the acceptability of a given concept, and this can have a direct impact on the lives of people, e. g. making it a public health issue and influencing in the making of public policies. This definition of violence has a clear utility and goal, and that is why it is important to have its limits well established. Nonetheless, it is important to say that the UN itself is not in possession of the concept of violence, invalidating and excluding any other definition – the attempt of conceptualizing and defining what is violence has been a topic in development throughout human history, and the UN has not settled the discussions with the presented definitions and its utility. The given example, although, shows how some have more power than others to say what something is and what it is not.

1.4. Brecht's inquiry

Recognizing how the question of legitimacy can influence the concept of violence and how this affects the way it can be perceived by people, in addition to the awareness of the existence of different definitions for the concept, when I say "what is violence?" you could inquire me "to whom?". This reply carries in itself the consciousness of the influence the announcer can have – the consciousness of the issue with legitimacy. The idea behind this questioning reply can be strengthened with an excerpt from a poem credited to Bertolt Brecht, a German theatre practitioner, playwright, and poet from the first half of the twentieth century:

> He asks the property:
> Where do you come from?
> He asks each idea:
> Whom do you serve?[32] [33]

In a first moment, we could approach the idea of violence and ask to whom it serves. In the definitions that were presented here – and among most of the definitions that will be seen throughout this dissertation – the questioning of what is violence leads to the description of a set of actions that can be taken against someone or some people. A more throughout reading of this dynamic would be better presented as a set of actions that are taken by a subject aiming at an object. As will be approached further in this dissertation, some authors question the

[32] Brecht, B. (2012).
[33] I could not find the poem written in English, nor a reliable source to affirm that was Brecht who wrote it. However, many internet sources point to it. This is a personal translation made from the Portuguese, Spanish and German versions. I have found the poem in a collection of poems that can be accessed on the internet, where they reference it to an anthology published in Brazil in 1986, which I had no access to.

portrayal of a subject, so I will leave it for now[34]. In spite of that, violence occurs towards an object – there has to be someone, some people, something which violence can be bestowed upon. Violence can only serve the subject, whichever it may be, if the object is attained by it. From this precept we can retrieve back the question that was presented above as a reply to the first question – "To whom?" can be taken as a double-fold question, a dialectical interrogation if I may, serving the same questioning: According to who this is violence and, as well, who is the recipient of this violence?

In a second moment, the focus returns to the conceptualization of violence-as-such, of the many definitions violence can have, in the many forms it can take. When I say violence, it is impossible for you to conceive it not being towards somebody or something. It is an aphorism that it will always need an object, despite of any considerations regarding the subject – violence-as-such has to have a recipient. Depending on the definition, as we have seen, the way we see violence changes, and with it its subjects, objects and how each part participates in this dynamic. The definition, furthermore, is highly influenced by a question of legitimacy, so it depends highly in who or what has the power to make its definition widely accepted and validated. That which has the power to state its definition of violence will have power over the object violence falls upon, exactly because those only exist as such – objects of violence – due to the definition itself.

On another poem, "On Violence", Bertolt Brecht makes his poetic statement regarding what has been briefly discussed here, as he asks why somethings are taken as violent and other things are not:

> The headlong stream is termed violent
> But the river bed hemming it in is
> Termed violent by no one.
> The storm that bends the birch trees
> Is held to be violent
> But how about the storm
> That bends the backs of the roadworkers?[35]

[34] This taking into account the two definitions that were presented prior to this moment. There are some scholars that questions exactly the roles of the subject and the object of violence, but this will be better approached further in this dissertation.
[35] Brecht, B. (1976), p. 276.

At this point we start to approach the argument I have around this text. In this venture to conceptualize violence, aiming at the best definition that could resonate and live up to the many experiences of people and to the many forms it can take, we reached a point in which we face these parts that build the dynamics of such phenomenon – violence is constituted of a set of actions that are taken by a subject aiming at an object. This alone cannot explain clearly nor define what is violence, but it already gives us a fundamental structure of how it is usually built. Again, the way violence is presented, however each of its parts are disposed, has to be validated and legitimized to be taken as an acceptable definition. Bringing all of this together, we can conceive that any given structure of this phenomenon has the capability of defining what is understood as violence and what is not, and consequentially its objects and its subjects. This capability is dependent of legitimacy to gain power and acceptance. We can only conceptualize what is violence when understanding its structure, what leads to the realization of to whom and to what it serves, its means and its ends.

1.5. A violence to call ours

If an optimal conceptualization of violence is dependent on a definition (or definitions) that best captures the human experience of it, taking to account its complexity and structure, and if in its structure we can assume the essentiality of the object, regardless of the acting subject or the issue with legitimacy, emerges my questioning: the best way to approach violence in this exercise to best conceptualize it is to take the perspective of the object, the essential part of violence, the one that experiences it. Why don't we let those who suffer from the consequences of violence define it?

Well, a starting point to answer this question is identifying who are those who suffer from violence. Prior to that we can already understand the importance a definition has, exactly characterizing the objects of violence. Here we can go back to the World Report on Violence and Health[36], as it identifies different forms of violence in its typology. When regarding young people and violence in the year 2000, for example, the highest rates of youth homicide were found in Africa and Latin America and the lowest rates in Western Europe and parts of Asia and the Pacific. With the United States as an exception at that time, most countries with youth homicide rates above 10 per 100 000 were either developing countries or countries caught up in the turmoil of social and economic change[37]. This is only one statistic from the section about

[36] Krug, E. G.; Mercy, J. A.; Dahlberg, L. L.; Zwi, A. B. (2002), p. 23.
[37] Krug, E. G.; Mercy, J. A.; Dahlberg, L. L.; Zwi, A. B. (2002), p. 13-14.

interpersonal violence, but the report touches on family abuses and sexual violence as well. When it comes to collective violence, the report states that "the 20th century was one of the most violent periods in human history" and "more than half of the people who lost their lives to conflict throughout the world were civilians"[38]. When approaching the dynamics of violent conflict, the report highlights the lack of democratic processes and unequal access to power, social inequality marked by grossly unequal distribution of resources and the control by a single group of valuable natural resources[39].

This data reverberates with data collected by the Uppsala Conflict Database Program (UCDP), which demonstrates that non-state collective conflict from 1989 to 2020 is predominant in the identified regions of Middle East, Africa and the Americas. With battle related deaths by region, again from 1989 to 2020, it is possible to see the prominence of the Middle East, Africa and Asia. In the map presenting fatal events in 2020 by type of violence, considering state-based violence, non-state violence and one-sided violence, it is possible to see the concentration of violence in Central America, sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East, and south and southeast Asia[40].

If we take the Internal Violence Index (IVI), which aims to compare the amount of violence at country levels in 2012, when it was published, it is stated that internal conflicts mainly occur in Africa and Asia, where the majority of least developed countries are located. The descriptive statistics of the index by groups of countries presents us a visual depiction of the geographical distinctiveness in the world when it comes to violence, as the data is concentrated in Central and South America, Africa and Asia[41].

As one last take, we could approach the Peace and Perceptions of Risk section of the Global Peace Index published in 2021. The data gathered for this report in regards to perceptions by regions shows us that when it comes to fear of violence, the regions that are most worried are the Central and South America, Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and the MENA region. These perceptions do not change much when it comes to experiencing violence and taking violence as the greatest risk to people's life. The feelings of safety in these regions are the smallest among all regions in the globe. As it is cited, "In most countries, perceptions of violence match the risk of being a victim of violence. There is a strong correlation between feeling unsafe and having been a victim of violence, or knowing someone who has been a victim"[42]. As the index

[38] Krug, E. G.; Mercy, J. A.; Dahlberg, L. L.; Zwi, A. B. (2002), p. 22.
[39] Krug, E. G.; Mercy, J. A.; Dahlberg, L. L.; Zwi, A. B. (2002), p. 23.
[40] Pettersson, T. et. al. (2021).
[41] Feindouno, S.; Goujon, M.; Wagner, L. (2016).
[42] Institute for Economics & Peace (2021).

shows, “the five countries with the largest proportion of people who experienced violence or know someone who had are all in sub-Saharan Africa”.

The pattern here is quite clear – according to the biggest reports and indexes published since the very first report regarding violence by the WHO in 1992, the areas of the world that most experience violence are those that can be grouped under the label Global South – referring to an international division that emerged after the Cold War, in which the world is no longer divided between the East (communist countries) and the West (Capitalist Countries), but between the North ("developed" countries, industrialized in the 19th century) and the South ("developing" countries, former colonies and late industrialization)[43]. If we are to follow the idea that has been developed in regards to the conceptualization of violence, the people and communities from these areas should be the ones entitled to define it, legitimized exactly by the fact of being, in a global scale, objects of violence in their societies.

This is not what happens, nevertheless. Many people have approached the theme of violence throughout our history, from philosophy to many other fields, such as politics, linguistics, sociology, psychology, and law. If we look in our dictionaries and encyclopedias, history books, researches and articles, we can see that definitions of violence – the most acceptable ones – are epistemologically centered in western dominant countries (like much of science). In other words, violence is mainly studied and defined by groups that are usually not predominantly the objects of violence. This can be explained and explored in many different ways, and from this point many studies could emerge – but there is a gap that can be identified here, if I was clear about the intentions with the conceptualization of violence until this point.

I feel the need to make a consideration here: violence is everywhere, as it was already mentioned. There are people suffering from it at every level of society, in spite of the ethnicity, gender, culture, country, generation and class. Besides, it is not a topic exclusive for current times – violence is everywhere and everywhen. Nonetheless, as it was argued by Di Leo and McClennen, while violence is everywhere more apparent (and here I add again the time viewpoint – everywhen), it is also in every place and every moment ignored and hidden. “The violence that is unseen and unknown must be engaged just as much as the violence that is seen and known”[44]. Definitions of violence are not to be exclusive to the Global South, but coming from a country that does not belong to the epistemological circle that integrates the center of

[43] Gonzalez, R. & Soares, G. (2021).
[44] Di Leo, J. R., and McClennen, S. A. (2012), p. 242.

scientific production, I argue for the importance of having a definition of this phenomenon not using the words and the rationality of others to describe it – we need a violence to call ours.

The study of violence cannot be whole without attention to the ways that it is both material and abstract, here and there, now and ever. The key to a critique of violence is to avoid monolithic analyses. As it is defended by Beatrice Hanssen "violence […] in its many intractable manifestations, ought to be analyzed locally". Di Leo and McClennen, howbeit agreeing with her, point to the trouble of a "wholly local critique of violence", as it could lead to a fragmented critique. "Such fragmentation runs the risk of making it difficult to see the connections between various interconnected social forces, such as racism, sexism, neoliberalism, and imperialism"[45]. Thus, an approach to the concept of violence, as a study

> must avoid the tendency towards the monolithic, while also taking seriously the idea that violence is never a local problem and that even the study of the most concrete instance requires attention to the broader framework from which the violence emerged as an idea, an act, an excuse, and a problem[46].

Why then, when it comes to the study of violence in the pursue of its conceptualization, should we accept a definition that may not reflect the reality of many? Again, why don't we give those who most suffer from violence the opportunity to speak and to be heard, so we can better understand what violence is? Is there violence in taking these concepts monolithically to explain a phenomenon that is so neglected in its plurality?

1.6. Looking for (our) piece in International Relations

The discussion that we had until this point is a product of a question I had when looking for how is violence discussed at international level, in the international society, in International Relations. More than taking it as a concept to apply at domestic level, my reasoning was interested in how the definition of violence is applied among international actors on the international stage. If we take any definition of violence, with all above-mentioned intricacies, can we define international actors as violent ones? Can we define actions of an international actor as violence? With this set of inquiries, I began my research.

[45] Di Leo, J. R., and McClennen, S. A. (2012), p. 247.
[46] Di Leo, J. R., and McClennen, S. A. (2012), p. 247.

An article that caught much of my attention, after my first readings, was "Why don't we talk about 'violence' in International Relations?", written by Dr. Claire Thomas, in which she starts exactly by saying that the study of International Relations is said to be predominantly about violence. To supplement such statement she cites Kenneth Waltz, one of the most notorious names in the field, as he affirms that "The state among states [. . .] conducts its affairs in the brooding shadow of violence", and Campbell & Dillon with the affirmation that "according to modern political thought, violence is the ultima ratio of politics". To Dr. Claire Thomas, it is quite obvious that IR does talk about violence, but then why scholars do not use the term 'violence' more often and, most importantly, why there are no discussions around its meaning for the field of studies? To her, the avoidance of the concept by some traditional scholars when discussing state uses of violence functions to create a discourse in which state violence is accepted as legitimate and a normal part of the functioning of relations between states[47].

On another relevant article for the theme, Dr. Colin Wight focuses on understanding the interplay of continuity and change when exploring the role, place, function and ethical judgement of violence in international society. He affirms that where there is politics, there is both actual violence and the possibility of it, and that a world without violence would be a world without politics, and "such a world is implausible". He brings war to the table, saying that it is not a synonym for violence. Working with Carl Clausewitz's famous aphorism, Wight says that war may indeed be the continuation of politics by other means, "but the reverse is also true: politics is the continuation of violence by other means". He states that violence is not the only source of social change, but it is the most potent[48].

In spite of the two mentioned articles, together with a few others that I found, it was evident to me the lack of production regarding violence in International Relations. Exactly as was pointed out by Claire Thomas, the absence of the concept violence is noticeable in IR, particularly in traditional studies. To her there is a discourse built in euphemisms inside this field of studies to hide the suffering that falls upon individuals[49]. Still, even though not being directly referenced and approached, violence was and still is part of this discipline – a field that centers much of itself in regards to concepts as security, freedom, order and justice, peace, economy, diplomacy, conflicts and law[50]. Violence in this aspect is transdisciplinary, a factor

[47] Thomas, C. (2011).
[48] Wight, C. (2019).
[49] Thomas, C. (2011).
[50] Jackson, R. & Sørensen, G. (2010).

capable of being found in any approach or discussion inside the discipline of International Relations.

Being a transdisciplinary topic and discussion, I had to open my scope and reach out to other fields when looking for references. Expanding my view to Social Sciences and Political Sciences the scenery changed – the production of material regarding violence was considerable larger than in the field of IR specifically. Names as Georges Sorel, Karl Marx, Herbert Marcuse, Walter Benjamin, Jean-Paul Sartre, Hannah Arendt, Johan Galtung, Beatrice Hanssen, Slavoj Žižek and Rob Nixon, just to cite the most referenced ones. All of them giving their personal takes about the same theme. Many from who I could borrow to develop a reading of violence on the field of International Relations. One, however, had my attention in a very particular way since the beginning, as I saw a direct bridge with the field of International Relations: Johan Galtung, known as the pioneer of Peace Research[51].

On 1969 was published the article Violence, Peace, and Peace Research on the Journal of Peace Research, in which Johan Galtung makes an important point when highlighting how the maxim peace is absence of violence should be taken as a fundamental for attaining peace, what brought consensus among people, as it was an end everyone seeks. His objective, ever since the foundation of the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO) in 1954[52] was the organization of Peace Studies as a scientific body of research, advancing the discussions beyond abstract and philosophical debates. Johan Galtung, intertwining the concepts of Peace and Violence, working with their definitions in a theory so they could be clearly identified and studied made his contributions stand out, and as it was mentioned, established the foundations for the concretization of a whole field of studies and research.

According to Galtung himself, the distinctiveness of peace research as a new field of studies was established in part through a broad critique of 'traditional peace thinking', incorporating not only classical philosophical reflections on the problem of world peace, but the modern discipline of international relations, as well, in almost its entirety[53]. His approach did not go without raising some critiques right in his first years, with some questioning his assumption that the path to peace lay in the principles of complete integration and cooperation, accused of a “idealistic universalism”. Much of these critiques would point to the perspective of the oppressed, as the argument for an integration of the international system without addressing the structure was taken as defending a status quo which reflected the interests of the dominant

[51] Galtung, J. & Fischer, D. (2013).
[52] Galtung, J. & Fischer, D. (2013).
[53] Lawler, P. (1995), p. 38.

states[54]. Those arguments echoed words of Galtung when he said that "the center of the Centre, in collusion with the center of the Periphery and the periphery of the Centre, exploits the poorest people, the periphery of the Periphery"[55].

What are the thoughts of those who are exploited then? What do they have to say about violence? In this second part of my initial investigation I started to notice how the majority of the names I had found talking about violence where exactly from the epistemological center, as said before. I found no one talking about violence in International Relations from a perspective outside the European or the American perspective. Again, I had to expand my field horizons, and that is when I came across names as Aimé Césaire, Frantz Fanon, Edward Said, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Aníbal Quijano, Achille Mbembe, Ashis Nandy, Walter Mignolo, Luciana Ballestrin – Names that are imperative to think the Global South. People who talked about anti-imperialism, postcolonialism and decoloniality. People who talked about the perspective of those who are identified as the oppressed, theories and scholars that talked about violence, its consequences and its roots. But again, little from the perspective of International Relations.

So, here is where I try to place my contribution: In this dissertation I intend to address the discussion around the concept of violence in the field of International Relations, grounded in the contributions of Johan Galtung, but presenting a critique through the perspective of Postcolonial theory and Decoloniality to represent the Global South. I choose Johan Galtung for his paramount contribution and relevance, not only to IR, but to studies and research regarding peace, conflict and violence and its reflections to many other disciplines. With the attempt of presenting a novelty I intend to bring the eyes of the oppressed, those who suffer most from what is today identified as violence, those that are constrained by a definition of violence that in itself could be neglecting their experience of this phenomenon. I see the need to highlight the uneven structure that dictates the relations among countries and the violence it reproduces. With a proper conceptualization of this violence, especially for those who suffer most on the international scene (those known as Global South), we could better approach the structure that reproduces it and the manners it is entrenched in our ways of relating. Looking for a voice in this field, Looking for (our) piece in International Relations.

The next chapters will follow the already presented strand of thought, as I believe it can be the most didactic and comprehensible. On chapter 01 we will go through some of the most

[54] Lawler, P. (1995), p. 45.
[55] Galtung, J. (1971).

relevant contributions on the discussion around violence on the twentieth century, understanding how it advanced and led to the establishment of Johan Galtung's theories on peace and violence. On Chapter 02 we shall approach the postcolonial theory and decoloniality to understand the voice of the Global South. On chapter 03 we will collide the contributions from previous two chapters, aiming at a better reading of violence through a postcolonial and decolonial perspective. A fourth chapter was in the plan of this dissertation, in which I would discuss the contributions and repercussions of this new reading of violence on conceptions of peace and its reflections on the field of International Relations. This discussion shall be briefly mentioned in the concluding chapter.

2. THROUGH SEPTENTRIONAL EYES

"Violence is the last refuge of the incompetent."
– Salvor Hardin, in Isaac Asimov's Foundation (1991)

In the present paper we shall be using the word violence many times. Few words are so often used and abused – perhaps, it seems, because violence serves as an ordinary concept among people, which may serve to bring consensus It is hard to be all-out oblivious of violence, and it is hard to be all-out in favor of it. Take a dictionary definition, for example: Merriam-Webster defines it as "the use of physical force so as to injure, abuse, damage, or destroy" and "intense, turbulent, or furious and often destructive action or force". Other dictionary definitions will not differ much from that, and if going through any thesaurus, one shall find a list of words to describe what is commonly unwanted or avoided by people. Violence is something that we usually want away from us, and its opposite, then, is something that is commonly desirable by people, as "is hard to be all-out against peace"[56]. One concept to be rejected, one concept to be pursued.

As it was mentioned, this dyadic relation was built as a principle to Johan Galtung's argument in one of his most important publication, becoming a foundation to the field of Peace and Conflict Research. According to him, the researcher should be aware of the fact that nobody has any monopoly on the definition of peace, but working around a definition of it is needed, as some level of precision is necessary for the term to serve as a cognitive tool in its studies. To attain it Galtung says, among other things, that the statement "peace is absence of violence" shall be retained as valid. He establishes this as a foundation for his whole argument because of its semantic simplicity, in agreement with common usage, and because it defines this desirable social order as a space in which violence is absent. The entanglement of these two concepts make their definitions, in this case, dependent on the definition of the other. To understand peace and to show how it could be studied and approached, Galtung takes most of said article[57] to talk about the definitions and dimensions of violence. In the opposite way, but still respecting the bases of Galtugian theory, we do the same: with the intention of

[56] Galtung, J. (1969), p. 167.
[57] Galtung, J. (1969).

conceptualizing violence, we shall briefly talk about the definitions and dimensions of peace. Throughout this dissertation we are going to flirt with a few dialectical exercises, so it is important to have a basic understanding of both peace and violence.

2.1. This thing called peace…

A very straightforward question with an uncountable number of answers. To keep the character of this very text I could propose you: "When I say peace, what comes up in your mind?". Just like violence and its definition, this term is notoriously difficult to define, as said by James Page with his contributions regarding the philosophy of Peace. This definitional problem is, paradoxically, the key to understanding what is involved in such discussions. According to him, in general terms peace can be differentiated as negative and positive peace, that is, one as the relative absence of violence and war and the other as the presence of justice and harmonious relations, respectively[58]. When saying that he is referencing directly Johan Galtung[59] as he was the one responsible for broadly presenting this distinction when developing his theory – something we shall approach more thoroughly later in this text.

2.1.1. On Religious Practices

James Page, going through the philosophy of Peace, starts by approaching the religious sources of it. Regardless of the religious practice, there is an obvious problem that emerges when analyzing the divergence between precept and practice, as many religions have been violent or the main cause of violence. Authors such as James Aho and René Girald go a step further and approach religion as the heart of violence, but this is not the focus – what is to be presented here is how major world religions perpetuate teachings about what is peace and its practices[60].

First, it is appropriate to mention indigenous spirituality practices, as those generally approach peace to the "notion of connectedness with the environment, the emphasis on a caring and sharing society, gratitude for creation and the importance of peace within the individual". Regarding Judaism, peace comes from the idea of an absolute deity, what creates a need for ethical commitment – the Torah describes peace as an ultimate goal and a divine gift, and the prophetic literature of the Nevi'im presents a messianic future era of peace with the absence of

[58] Page, J. (2020).
[59] Galtung, J. (1969), p. 183.
[60] Page, J. (2020).

war or suffering. In spite of that peace can be experienced presently, in the midst of adversity, through experience and reflection[61].

Regarding Hinduism, James Page approach the Karma, a view of moral causality, within the Dharma, the moral code of the universe. With it one has the motivation to pursue good deeds and avoid bad deeds, as those can be rewarded or punished within this lifetime or the next, which creates a momentum for peace constructing practices. Ahimsa, the ethic practice of doing no harm towards other living beings, is a strong practice here – taken also as central to the Gandhian philosophy of nonviolence. When it comes to Buddhism Ahimsa is present as well, as a central ethical virtue for human conduct. The avoidance of desire comes as an important peaceful attribute here, as it is often cited as the cause of wealth, war and conflict, counter to the creation of a genuinely peaceful and harmonious society[62].

When it comes to Christianity and Islam the relationship to a philosophy of peace gets more complex, mainly because both are taken as "proselytizing and militaristic" religions by many. Nevertheless, peace as an end and practice is present in both. Within Christianity the life and teachings of its founding figure can be taken as an example of nonviolence, and Islam is itself a cognate word for peace, extoling forgiveness, reconciliation and non-compulsion. As James Page says, this degree of complexity can be found in defining and understanding the exceptions in all of those beliefs. A common conflict within religious perspectives regards the universalism and particularism of its practices, with ideas like "the Chosen People" potentially embodying exclusion and violence[63].

2.1.2. On Classical and Medieval Sources

The possibilities of classical sources for a philosophy of peace, approaching the question of what is peace, are numerous – the possibilities of discussing this based on western and non-western teaching and writings make up a whole different study. James Page settles with only two, but really important names. First, there are aspects of Plato's work (428-348 B.C.E.), based on the teachings of Socrates, which may constitute a source for a philosophy of peace, even though this is not what is normally presented. Yet, when focusing on what makes for justice, Plato approaches a broad concept of peace that would be necessary to the construction of the ideal polis (state). Similarly, Aristotle (384-322 B.C.E.) did not present an obvious reference for a philosophy of peace in his production. Nonetheless, virtue ethics may be

[61] Page, J. (2020).
[62] Page. J. (2020).
[63] Page, J. (2020).

legitimately linked to ethics of peace, mainly because the means of each of these virtues described by Aristotle could be viewed as qualities conductive to peace – one of them being justice, as it was already mentioned. Some writing even has specifically identified peacefulness as a virtue in itself. One figure that could not go without a mention (but was not mentioned by James Page) is Thucydides (460-400 B.C.E.), mainly for his political and historiographical importance on international politics – especially in questions of war and peace. In his work The History of the Peloponnesian War, in which he accounts for the battle between Athens and Sparta, he approached topics regarding the Greek "democratic peace" among many other points, making him a central figure in political theory[64].

Moving to medieval sources for a philosophy of peace we return to religious roots for the discussion, specifically Christianity. Saint Augustine of Hippo (354-430 C.E.) is widely recognized for his integration of classical philosophy into Christian thought. According to James Page the Platonic notion of privation, that evil can be seen as the absence of good, resonates with notions of positive and negative peace – where negative peace is seen as the absence of positive peace in the same way peace, in itself, is the absence of violence, according to Johan Galtung, as already mentioned. As Page says, "The notion of privation also suggests that peace ought to be seen as a specific good, and that war is the absence or privation of that good"[65]. In his major work *De civitate Dei* (The City of God), Saint Augustine contrasts the ephemeral human city, marked by violence, and the eternal divine city, marked by peace. Here, as with many religious writers and teachings, the ideal is peace. Almost contradictorily, but making sense of this temporal human life, he's known for articulating the notion of just war "wherein Christians may be morally obliged to take up arms to protect the innocent from slaughter". It is an idea Saint Augustine laments, contrasting with the way others have used just war theories.

Another relevant name to cite is Saint Thomas Aquinas (ca.1225-1274) with his attempt to synthesize faith with reason, especially Aristotelian thought with his focus on virtues. Here, religious and classical sources collide. In a part of his work Summa Theologica (Summary of Theology) Aquinas examines the nature of peace, and whether peace itself may be considered a virtue – to him it is product of charity and a work of justice. Again, we here see the relationship of peace and justice. Like Saint Augustine, he refined the just war theory articulating for authority, purpose, and just intent when resorting to war[66].

[64] Mara, G. (2013); Robinson, E. (2006).
[65] Page. J. (2020).
[66] Page, J. (2020).

2.1.3. On Renaissance contributions

Most studies that had dealt with Renaissance present it as a period of revival for the European society, mainly for its rediscovery of classical cultures, often identified as a period of transition from the medieval to the modern. It is worth noting how this is centered in Europe as a cultural movement. This period is mainly known for the growth of humanism, as an outlook focusing on human needs and on rational means to solve social problems, and a belief that humankind can shape its own destiny – a rediscovery of classical literature and philosophy, such as Protagoras, who said that "man is the measure of all things". As Page points out, one central problem for humanists was the phenomenon of war, with many humanist thinkers refusing to see it as inevitable and unchangeable. This questioning is "in itself an important contribution to a philosophy of peace" as "an important part of the humanist project is to solve the problem of war and social injustice"[67].

A name to represent much of this humanist thinking, especially in regards to the philosophy of peace, is Erasmus of Rotterdam (ca.1466-1536), who advocated in many of his works for compromise and arbitration as alternatives to war. In his work *De libero arbitrio diatribe sive collatio* (The Freedom of the Will), Erasmus "points out that if all that we do is predetermined, there is no motivation for improvement […] we say that war and social injustice are inevitable, then there is little motivation to change", criticizing this self-fulfilling thought. In this same work he presents peace as a means or a method, and not merely a goal. When striving for moderation in his own arguments, he points out that parties will often exaggerate their own arguments in disputes, and "it is from the conflict of exaggerated views that violent conflict arises". Notwithstanding, the best-known contribution from Erasmus regarding peace is the adage *Dolce bellum inexpertis*, (War is Sweet to Those Who Have Not Experienced It) – quoting the Greek poet Pindar, Erasmus highlight how war may seem superficially attractive, and James Page says that this cultural appeal of war explains much of the complex relationship between war and peace[68].

Citing another leading humanist, Sir Thomas More (1478-1535) has an enormous relevance because of his book *De optimae rei publicae statu deque nova insula utopia* (On the Best Government and on the New Island Utopia), published in 1516 with a presentation of an ideal society based upon reason and equality. In the first part of the book the author articulates

[67] Page, J. (2020).
[68] Page, J. (2020).

his concerns about both internal and external violence, a reflection of European senseless idea of capital punishment and a world-wide epidemic of war between monarchs. The second part proposes a solution to this scenario, describing an agrarian equalitarian society with no private property, educated into pacifism, one which war itself is only a tool for defensive reasons or to liberate the oppressed from tyranny. As Page brings up, the common understanding of the word utopia (coined by More himself) is the connotation of something or a state which is not attainable, and this reflects a broad theory of peace and its description – "one of the interesting ramifications of More's vision is whether such a peaceful society, and indeed peace, is ever attainable"[69].

2.1.4. On Modern Sources

Reaching this point of questioning what is peace and its philosophy, we start to encounter names of huge relevance to the field of social and political thinking, and the number of works that could be here presented grows even more. The selection made by James Page keeps on being quite objective and efficient, so we shall proceed with his highlights. The first name to be cited is Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), whose writings were motivated by a concern about civil wars and the bloodshed and suffering resulting from it. In his most eminent writings, *De Civi* (The Citizen) and Leviathan, Hobbes presents the human nature as essentially self-interested, what would lead the natural state of humankind to a natural chaos – and this egocentric nature is the essence of war. Thomas Hobbes argues that this essence can only be contained by the presence of an overarching law-enforcing authority. "The only way to introduce a measure of peace is therefore through submission of citizens to a sovereign, or, in more contemporary terminology, the state", as Page explains. Thus, a Hobbesian world view holds that the essential condition of humankind is one of violence and inevitably predominant when there is no civilizing impact of the state – for lasting peace to exist, there must be an overarching external and superior authority[70].

Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677) was a Dutch philosopher of Portuguese Sephardi origin who contributed for a philosophy of peace in his advocacy of tolerance in matters of religious doctrines. James Page points out that in his *Tractatus Politicus* (Political Treatise) Spinoza asserts that "For peace if not mere absence of war but is a virtue that springs from force of character" – here, again, a perspective of peace as a virtue, but anticipating expositions similar

[69] Page, J. (2020).
[70] Page, J. (2020).

to the ones made by Johan Galtung. Another name to mention is John Locke (1632-1704), who also advanced the notion of tolerance in his philosophical works – a perspective developed by the author after seeing the destructive religious wars of his time. In his work Two Treatises of Government Locke argues that each individual has a right to not be harmed by another person, and here it is the role of political authority to protect this right. This notion, that could be understood as the right to life, arguably anticipates the later notion of the right to peace[71].

Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) is another great name among modern philosophers, known as a leader and critic of the European Enlightenment. The idea of the noble savage, who lives at peace with fellows and with nature, is often associated with his work, even though it can be found in many ancient Philosophy works. In his writings Rousseau presented human morality as corrupted due to culture, and posits that social and economic developments, especially regarding private property, is what corrupted humanity. In *Du contrat social* (The Social Contract), he proposes how authority ultimately rests with the people and not the monarch, and in Les Confessions (Confessions), Rousseau celebrates the peace which comes from being at one with nature. James Page highlights how Rousseau's ideas anticipate common themes in much of Peace Theory with its conscious rejection of a corrupting and violent society, a focus in a more naturalistic and peaceful existence, with a respect for and affinity with nature. "In short, Rousseau suggests that the way to peace is through a more peaceful society, rather than through systems of peace"[72], themes that would emerge again throughout the end of the twentieth century.

Another great addition to these names is Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) who, "in his universal ethics and cosmopolitan outlook, has provided what many argue is the most extensive basis for a philosophy of peace. Kantian Philosophy approaches ethics as based on duty – particularly the duty to act so that what one does is consistent with what are reasonably desired universal results – what is called the categorial imperative. As Page says, it has been argued by many (including Kant himself), that "we have a duty to peace and that we have a duty to act in a peaceful manner, in that we can only universalize ethics if we consider others, and this at the very least implies a commitment to peace". When Kant suggests an ethical system wherein people are ends-in-themselves, it is implied that each person has an obligation to regard others in this manner, and thus not engaging in violence towards others – every person has a responsibility to act in a peaceful manner. The work most often cited in discussing Kant and

[71] Page, J. (2020).
[72] Page, J. (2020).

peace, *Zum ewigen Frieden* (On Perpetual Peace), is the one that puts forward what some call the Kantian peace theory, in which he suggests more explicitly the moral obligation to peace. As Page lays out, people have an "immediate duty" to peace, and nation-states have a duty to cooperate for peace – Kant here suggests republicanism and a league of nations, among other suggestions. One major point is the public dimension of actions, what can be understood as transparency[73].

One last name to be cited by James Page is Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), an addition to the list to be highlighted by his quarrelsome perspective for a philosophy of peace, as he holds what could be called a statist view of morality. Hegel sees nation-states as the highest evolution of human society, what critics point out as culpable for its philosophical rationalization of authoritarian and even totalitarian states. Page, however, says the reliance on state figure as an object of stability and peace in not necessarily compliance with bellicose national policies – according to page one could argue that the development "towards a supra-national state with the object of world peace may also be consistent with the organic philosophy of Hegel"[74]. In spite of the efforts, it is possible to view Hegel as a source for a philosophy of peace, and his perspective of human history as a struggle of opposites, from which new entities arise – historical dialectic thought – is paramount to think peace and violence critically.

2.1.5. On Contemporary Sources

In regards to contemporary sources of these discussions around the philosophy of peace, James Page starts to approach certain names that had their impact throughout the twentieth century and that still influence discussions and studies on the twentieth-first, almost a hundred years after their first publications, in some cases. The questioning of "What is peace?" advanced towards its complexity and thoughts regarding it began to have a critical perspective of what had been discussed until that point. The first name presented by James Page is William James (1842-1910), a noted American pragmatist philosopher who contributed for a pragmatist philosophy of peace. He saw little value in moralizing about war and the need for peace, as he believed that "it is natural that humans should pursue war, as the exigencies of war provide a unique moral challenge and a unique motivating force for human endeavor"[75]. Rather, in an approach consistent with the notion of positive peace, he talks about the need of a (cultural) challenge to be seen as an equivalent or counterpoint to war – a moral equivalent of war.

[73] Page, J. (2020).
[74] Page, J. (2020).
[75] Page, J. (2020).

Another name to be cited is Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1869-1948), known as well as Mahātmā Gandhi, who is widely regarded as the leading figure of nonviolence and intrapersonal peace. According to him, the importance of nonviolence rested upon the inner commitment of the individual to the truth, and the struggle or the path to it is known as *Satyagraha*. In Gandhism, peace is not taken as "an entity or commodity to be obtained, nor even a set of actions or state of affairs, but a way of life"[76] – not focusing in peaceful ends, but in peaceful means. As James Page points out, the contributions of Gandhi were and are influential in the development of the intrapersonal notion of peace, taking the responsibility and autonomy regarding what is peace and how we can achieve it from those in power, and bringing it to the inner level of every common person. Although Gandhi is recognized as the most prominent figure of the nonviolent movement, other names are of great importance and should be regarded as one praises the work of Gandhi: Henry David Thoreau (1817-1862), essayist and writer of the essay "Civil Disobedience", regarding the nonviolent disobedience to an unjust state; Leo Tolstoy (1828-1910), writer of the books "The Kingdom of God is Within you" and "A letter to a Hindu", both influential in the development and education of Gandhi himself; Alice Stokes Paul (1885-1977), a suffragist and women's right activist who used much of non-violence on her demands regarding sex discrimination and the right to vote.

On another note, the philosopher Martin Buber (1878-1965) is mentioned for his contributions regarding the importance of authentic dialogue in his book *Ich und Du* (I and Thou), "which comes about when individuals recognize others as persons rather than entities". James Page highlights his contributions because of the philosophical reflection of such arguments and ideas on the nature of peace and the ethics of care, as it requires a clear dialogue with others. The lack of dialogue contributes to the dehumanizing or reification process that is necessary to war – understood, in this perspective, as the absence of such dialogues[77].

One that could not go without mentions is Martin Luther King Jr. (1929-1968) – famous for his work as a civil rights campaigner, he also wrote and spoke extensively on peace and nonviolence, as James Page emphasizes. He was responsible for a great dissemination of ideas regarding peace and non-violence in his discourses: loving one's enemies, the duty of nonconformity, universal altruism, inner transformation, the counterproductive nature of hate and the insanity of war, among many other ideas – frequently evidencing racism, materialism and militarism. One last mention of James Page to be presented in this section is Gene Sharp

[76] Page, J. (2020).
[77] Page, J. (2020).

(1928-2018), who was also an important theorist of nonviolence and nonviolent action, being a reference among activists. He believed that the power of the state is clearly contingent upon compliance by the subjects of this same state, and to face this Sharp developed a program of nonviolent action, which works through subverting state power[78].

Reaching beyond the examples of James Page, I would like to bring one last name to this brief summary on regards to peace. I do this quite aware of the mistake of missing other important names that could be presented here, but all of those that were mentioned serve the purpose of an introductory view on peace, and I hope the reader feels compelled to look even further, if these different views on peace foment curiosity. Noberto Bobbio, an Italian historian and philosopher of law and political sciences, believed that the problem of peace was a fundamental problem of "our" time – fundamental in the sense that our very survival depends on solving this problem[79]. Very influenced by the works of Thomas Hobbes and Immanuel Kant, his conceptions of peace are intertwined with human rights and democracy[80].

When defining peace Bobbio takes a lot from Galtung's work, based on Positive Peace, to take it not as an ultimate end, but an end-means to social progress, based on human rights. Here he affirms that these rights are not absolute, as they vary based on time and culture, proof that they are not fundamental rights by nature as well. More than the need to justify them, the problem is found in protecting them – and this is not a philosophical problem, but a political one[81]. Bobbio profoundly connects the question of human rights with the contemporary problems of war and famine, as these hinder the advancement of humankind towards social justice and peace. Vieira makes an interesting reading of Bobbio in regards to his thought on peace when taking about pacifisms. To him, Bobbio insists in many parts of his writings that the possibility of an atomic war changed the ways of thinking about the *peace-war* dyad. His active pacifism "it stands before war as communism before (individual) property and anarchy before the state"[82]. Here, pacifism aims at ordering international relations, based on a positive concept of peace as a permanent arrangement[83].

Following the line of pacifism, the Italian scholar uses Hobbes' legacy in the relation between the modern state and the conditions for perpetual peace, reached through the constitution of a common power. He reminds us that the Hobbesian model is the conception of

[78] Page, J. (2020).
[79] Bobbio, N. (2000).
[80] Vieira, G. O. (2005), p. 340.
[81] Vieira, G. O. (2005), p. 329-330.
[82] Bobbio, N. (2003).
[83] Vieira, G. O. (2005), p. 333.

the state of nature as a permanent state of war, "in which men were all equal in power to inflict the greatest of evils on each other: death"[84], and this state of nature is analogous with the balance based on terror (the negative peace reached by the atomic fear). Vieira explains that Bobbio defends a scenario of a superstrate, generated by and for an institutional pacifism, through a third party between parties, which as well as being stronger than the parties, would not have violence as an option[85]. Peace, here, is presented in the Kantian sense, with this third part being capable of building perpetual peace, found above any parties to any conflict, able to resolve conflict without resorting to violence[86]. Throughout his work, Bobbio never forgot revering active nonviolence as a legitimate form of social transformation, bringing serenity (*mitezza)* to the surface – more as an ethical virtue, it represents the non-violent, the refusal to exert violence against anyone, letting "the other be what they are"[87].

> Bobbio's work has the necessary vigor to put in perspective a "realistic utopia" on the path through the labyrinth of peace and human rights. A vigor based on a pacifist basis, non-violent, far beyond negative peace (…) with radical changes proposed by active non-violence, which he himself considered as one of the highest forms of human wisdom and intelligence[88].

All the authors who have been cited by James Page in his contributions about the philosophy of peace are objects of many critics, and it is important to lay out how there is no clear answer to the questioning of "what is peace", as we can see – peace has been approached, discussed and studied in various forms throughout time and it keeps on developing, especially because the world keeps on changing, as the environment and reality of each of these cited names was different. Much of the chronological development of this constantly changing perception leads us to Johan Galtung, as he makes a great contribution in his attempt to transform all this debate into a structured field of studies throughout the end of the twentieth century.

2.1.6. One final stretch on the definition of peace

[84] Vieira, G. O. (2005), p. 333; Bobbio, N. (2003), p. 71.
[85] Vieira, G. O. (2005), p. 337; Bobbio, N. (2003), p. 101.
[86] Vieira, G. O. (2005), p. 337-338.
[87] Vieira, G. O. (2005), p. 340.
[88] Vieira, G. O. (2005), p. 341.

The contributions of James Page used above were presented in a virtual encyclopedia, and his approach to the chronological development of such concept (through a philosophical lens) illustrates well how the discussion changed throughout the years. It is unquestionable that those are summarized mentions – they serve the purpose of presenting superficially how some prominent names approached the question of what is peace. To add further to this effort without focusing in the scholars answering this question, I would like to mention two books that contributed to my understanding of peace and the way it is approached in this very dissertation.

First, the "Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace and Conflict"[89], first published in 1999 having Lester Kurtz as the editor in chief, is an endeavor to compile information about antagonism and reconciliation in a wide variety of contexts of public and personal life, covering from the interpersonal level to the global level. The section that regards the "Definitions and Concepts of Peace"[90] gets close to much of what has been presented here, but presents some new insights, being the first one the dual function of definitions.

As explained, definitions may have a descriptive or a prescriptive character. The former, widely found in dictionaries, does not intend to settle the true meaning of concepts, but to record meanings found in many places and times – they function to facilitate communication by the use of language. The latter, aimed to organize the formulation of theories, induce formation of attitudes, influencing thought and feelings, presents the "correct" use of a word, making it a tool for theory making, specifically in scientific environments. "The question arises whether prescriptive definitions of 'peace' can be recognized as such"[91], and International Law functions as the space and subject to take on this matter. The main problem, although, is it not addressing peace as such. The example given by Pieper here is the prescriptive definition of 'an act of war' as a clear violent act. What defines an act of war may induce a prescriptive definition of peace, if one considers the absence of it. This, nevertheless, leads to a negative peace conceptualization, propitiating Galtung's "structural violence" to be taken as "peace".

As it has been discussed, a strict definition of peace may force a normative reading[92], and as it is presented, "in the case of a value-laden term like 'peace', the concept of prescriptive definition can be extended beyond technical usage"[93], favoring proselytism for example. Comparing different definitions of peace, among the ones that were presented above, as points of departure for any theory of war and/or peace, will lead to substantially different results, and

[89] Kurtz, L. (1999).
[90] Pieper, C. (2008), p. 1548.
[91] Pieper, C. (2008), p. 1550.
[92] Lawler, P. (1989).
[93] Pieper, C. (2008), p. 1550.

it is exactly in this contextual gap that definitions themselves become instruments of power[94]. When talking about expanded definitions of Peace, this encyclopedia entry talks exactly encyclopedia entries, naming other famous encyclopedias. The change in the size of entries (or the lack of them) in each encyclopedia, differing in publication dates as well, showed how terms like Peace and War changed – the space given to a term here representing how much of attention these concepts received and how important they were[95].

An interesting point comes in regards to the Spectrum of Peace-related definitions, citing a comprehensive survey of classificatory definitions of 'peace' that appears in the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Written by Johan Galtung himself[96], relations between nations is presented in a fourfold classification: war, as organized group violence; negative peace, as the absence of violence but also of any other significant relation; positive peace as the absence of violence and occasional cooperation; and finally unqualified peace, as the absence of violence and a pattern of lasting cooperation[97]. When presenting a "typology of peace plans" Galtung touches on different conceptions of peace, implying ways of achieving it or moving towards it – some of them related to the role of power and others to relations among states. This, coming close to the discussion of World Governance versus World Government, brings the last contribution of this encyclopedia entry when talking about Peace as a Foundation of a World Order. As mentioned, "peace has seen a fascinating evolution and maturation in a short historical span" and it even comes to be ironic to think how the struggles around the definition of peace "will continue to be contentious for the foreseeable future"[98].

My second mention, to present a different perspective, is the "Encyclopedia de Paz y Conflictos"[99], first published in 2004 having Mario López Martínez as the editor in chief, being a collective effort to synthesize many mandatory terms in use inside the field of research for peace and cooperation. This encyclopedia holds a considerable number of articles, being here highlighted the fact of it having an entry just for the word peace, being presented in a wide variety of types of peace in following entries[100]. For the present text, I would like to focus in a few distinctive entries of this encyclopedia, such as Feminist Peace, Gaia Peace, Imperfect Peace, Internal Peace and Neutral Peace.

[94] Pieper, C. (2008), p. 1550.
[95] Pieper, C. (2008), p. 1550-1552.
[96] Galtung, J. (1968).
[97] Pieper, C. (2008), p. 1553.
[98] Pieper, C. (2008), p. 1555-1557.
[99] López Martínez, M. (2004).
[100] López Martínez, M. (2004), p. 885-920.

Peace, here, is related to the well-being of people, recognizable for its wide possibilities of definition and conception – mainly understandable as a situation of conflict management in a certain way so to meet ones' maximum possible capabilities and necessities. Francisco A. Muñoz, scholar responsible for this entry, believes that peace is and has been a fundamental reality at all times, being elemental for human self-recognition. This process, being individual and collective as well, is what propitiated socialization, collectivization, association and cooperation, "From which it follows that, contrary to what we think on many occasions, it is peace that makes us fear, flee, define and identify violence and not the other way around"[101]. This perspective contrasts many of those that conceptualize peace referenced to violence and its definition, e.g. Johan Galtung[102]. Peace is conceived taking into account the reality that everybody has "an idea of peace" based in many diverse experiences and acquired throughout their lives and their socialization processes. This polysemic character, taken as an advantage by Muñoz, approaches peace as something that can be felt, recognized and thought through multiple experiences, moments, spaces and situations[103].

Such phenomenology – taking the circumstances in with peace occurs and intervenes – makes it diaphanous and profound, proposing a different take on a famous sentence: *si vis pacem para pacem*. "That is, to recognize and enhance the realities of peace if we want to make it grow"[104]. Taking from what was above mentioned, in spite of the time or culture, peace supposes a certain degree of abstraction from multiple peaceful social dynamics and practices. Peace appears, in concert, as "preventive vaccine and medicine to maintain the health of individuals, groups and communities". In here, the opposition of this optimal maintainment of the individual and collective health is what leads to conflict and wars, or in a general perspective, to any form of violence. Exactly in face of the spread of conflicts and wars by multiple causes, the need and desire for peace begins to become more noticeable, and therefore ideologies of peace are created and developed, being salient its establishment of bonds with religions, with peace being deified and/or marked as the absolute purpose[105].

Peace, from this point (not being specific in a chronological sense) acquires a particular complexity that makes it, necessarily, an object of investigation for various disciplines that recognize and interpret it in its various scales, forms and areas – coming to be developed in a field of study and later a field of research. Thenceforth, from a philosophical or scientific take,

[101] Muñoz, F. A. (2004), p. 885.
[102] Galtung, J. (1969).
[103] Muñoz, F. A. (2004), p. 886.
[104] Muñoz, F. A. (2004), p. 886.
[105] Muñoz, F. A. (2004), p. 887.

emerges a strong normative nature of peace itself, which, aspiring to be objective scientific knowledge, assumes the challenge of uniting science and ethics[106]. From this point, one of the most significant theoretical advances has been the consideration of the phenomenology of conflict as a part of human condition, one that that might generate peaceful solutions – Muñoz believes in it being most cases – and violent ones as well. Far from a manichaeistic or absolute perspective, which would be a simplification of the condition of conflicts, this development and approach to peace allows a perspective that takes into account many of the actors and fragments of peaceful and violent realities, accounting as well for past experiences, values and behaviors[107].

As mentioned before, when regarding different types of peace, the "Encyclopedia de Paz y Conflictos" presents some concepts that shed light on how different situations and perspectives require different levels of analysis and definitions. Tatiana Moura, when explaining about Feminist Peace, confronts the culture of violence, very closely identified with the interstate system, as an essentially patriarchal system that reproduces a model of domination. Going beyond a Westphalian peace or even the Galtungian definitions of peace, categorizing peace as negative and positive, this peace is not only defined "in terms of the abolition of organized violence (war) at the macrosocial level, but also non-organized violence at the micro-social level (in the domestic space, for example), with some of its supporters even defending that violence, as a resource or a mean, cannot have the achievement of peace as an end[108]. Alfonso Fernández Herrería presents the concept of Gaia Peace, one that sets out the natural and ecological dimension of peace, defending that it is impossible to achieve a global and holistic peace, considering the sustainable development of humankind, without respecting the rights of nature. It appeals to the interdependency of factors, to social ecology, deep ecology and the Gaia theory to defend the need to see peace as not exclusive for humans[109].

Herrería is also responsible for the entry on Internal Peace, that refers specifically to the intra-personal and interior level of peace as part of a triad, together with peace in a social dimension and in an ecological dimension. This approach is characterized for being very personal and subjective, confronting the dichotomy of change starting in the individual or in the collective – this conceptualization highlights the merging and concomitance of both[110]. The concept of Neutral Peace, explained by Francisco Jiménez Bautista, offers the counterpoint to

[106] Muñoz, F. A. (2004), p. 887.
[107] Muñoz, F. A. (2004), p. 887-888.
[108] Muñoz, F. A. (2004), p. 893-894.
[109] Muñoz, F. A. (2004), p. 894-898.
[110] Muñoz, F. A. (2004), p. 903-906.

cultural violence and symbolic violence, concepts developed by Johan Galtung to explain the violence that it is legitimized by "silence and social apathy", and are part of the triangle of violence. With it, Neutral Peace is proposed as the third piece of the Peace triangle, together with positive and negative peace[111].

To finish with the examples, Francisco A. Munõz presents us the concept of Imperfect Peace, understood as "all those situations in which we achieve the maximum peace possible according to the social and personal starting conditions" – imperfect because, in spite of peaceful management of conflicts, it may cohabit with conflicts and even with some forms of violence. There is no exclusion of one in the presence of the other. It assumes that, in understanding deeply violence with all its types, it is extremely hard to achieve a situation with complete absence of any kind of violence. It recognizes the means more than the ends, offering an epistemological turn in peace theory, as peace is not the objective but part of the process[112], and the imperfections in this path are accepted as common and current.

2.2. Peace and International Relations

As we can see, this is a topic that has been developing itself in human studies for quite some time, reaching back to the Hellenistic era and Greek philosophy up to contemporary research. As have been mentioned, there is even a glimpse of this curious discussion in religious dogmas and practices, what makes it even more complex. Peace and violence, as repeatedly mentioned, are related in various ways – it is hard to think of one without taking the other as a reference. I have to say, although, that when thinking of about these concepts' relation people tend to grasp onto the apogee of each one. Peace, in the most utopic representation (according to personal perspectives) is then related to what is normally taken as the most extreme and visible form of violence: war.

Shifting the discussion from the dyad peace-violence to the dyad peace-war generates some important changes – and this is exactly where we start to come close to the level of international relations, as a social phenomenon and as a particular field of studies as well (the distinction is made by the use of capital letters in regards to the latter[113]). Again, maintaining the questioning echo of this dissertation, I propose: "When I say war, what comes up in your mind?". Just like the previous times, the answer for this question can come in many forms, from various places

[111] Muñoz, F. A. (2004), p. 909-912.
[112] Muñoz, F. A. (2004), p. 898-900.
[113] International Relations, with capital letters and commonly abbreviated as IR, references the field of studies. When using lower case writing – international relations – the writer then references the interactions among actors in the international context, usually those actors being countries or international organizations.

and experiences. Nevertheless, a common and clear representation of war regards the bellicose clash of countries in the international stage, a phenomenon easily recognizable throughout human history. Hedley Bull, in his conception of war says that:

> War is organized violence carried on by political units against each other […] We should distinguish between war in the loose sense of organized violence which may be carried out by any political unit (a tribe, an ancient empire, a feudal principality, a modern civil faction) and war in the strict sense of international or interstate war, organized violence waged by sovereign states. Within the modern states system only war in the strict sense, international war, has been legitimate; sovereign states have sought to preserve for themselves a monopoly of the legitimate use of violence[114].

To understand better this relation between peace and war, in the sense presented by Bull, is to approach the very beginning of International Relations as a field of studies. Questioning the role of peace, war and violence, its origins and consequences, approaches us to the ontological understanding of IR, to the most fundamental building parts of this field; that is to say, approach us to what is International Relations, its principle and its purposes.

2.2.1. The birth of a discipline

The beginning of the twentieth century marks the changing relations of the world's greatest powers, bringing to an end what is known as the Concert of Europe[115], a period that started with the Congress of Vienna in 1814 – an international diplomatic conference held to maintain a vague consensus regarding the European balance of power and the integrity of territorial boundaries after the downfall of the French Emperor Napoleon I. The Concert, dealing with many difficulties to sustain itself because of the widespread revolutionary wave – known as the Revolutions of 1848 or Springtime of Nations – saw the unification of Italy and Germany, what remade the political geography of Europe and agitated the balance of power among the great nations. The second phase of the Concert, starting around the beginning of the 1870s, was then marked by a period of relative peace and stability between the European great powers,

[114] Bull, H. (1995), p. 178-179; Jackson, R. & Sørensen, G. (2007), p. 206.
[115] Encyclopaedia Britannica (2016).

propitiating the growth of colonial and imperial control in Africa and Asia towards the end of the nineteenth century[116].

the Concert of Europe then ended with the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, engulfing all the powers of Europe in diplomatic arrangements meant precisely to enhance the security of their members and to deter potential aggressors. According to McDougall, the influence of militarism, mass mobilization, instability in domestic and international politics occasioned by rapid industrial growth, global imperialism, popular nationalism, and the rise of a social Darwinist worldview can be taken as some of the roots of what was then called The Great War. As the author says, the "question of why World War I broke out should be considered together with the questions of why peace ended"[117]. From this point, the first half of the century, the age of the two World Wars and the start of the Cold War, was dominated by the rivalries of those powers.

According to the most common narrative of International Relations origins, the field of studies was conceived to solve, or at least to deal with, the problem of war[118]. Mainly regarding the study of the relations of states with each other and with international organizations and certain subnational entities (e.g., bureaucracies, political parties, and interest groups)[119], the field of IR emerged at the beginning of the 20th century largely in the West and in particular in the United States as that country grew in power and influence, especially after the Second World War (1939–1945). Nevertheless, records point out to the establishment of the first chair in International Relations (IR) at the University of Aberystwyth, in the United Kingdom, in 1919[120]. The growing interest for the academic studies of international relations challenged the view "that foreign and military matters should remain the exclusive preserve of rulers and other elites", as such matters constituted an important concern, interest and responsibility of all citizens, especially after the end of the First World War[121]. The system of States, and how they interact with each other, is a central theme of IR[122], and it needed to be organized in a more effective way exactly to avoid another catastrophe like World War I.

This emerging perspective, that general education should include minimum instruction and knowledge in foreign affairs, was one reflection of many after the end of WWI in 1918. In the international field one figure was the spearhead on the spotlight when it came to this

[116] McDougall, W. A. (2020).
[117] McDougall, W. A. (2020).
[118] McCourt, D. M. (2013), p. 394.
[119] McClelland, C. A. (2005).
[120] McCourt, D. M. (2013), p. 394.
[121] McClelland, C. A. (2005).
[122] Jackson, R. & Sørensen, G. (2007), p. 22.

reorganization of relations among states: even before the end of the war, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson (1913–21) outlined the Fourteen Points declaration proposing principles for peace negotiations in order to end a war that was close to its end. As McClelland highlights, the first of his Fourteen Points was a call for "open covenants of peace, openly arrived at" in place of the secret treaties that were believed to have contributed to the outbreak of the war[123]. It is important to note that "while half of the Fourteen Points addressed specific territorial issues between the combatant countries, the remainder were a vision for peace"[124] – most of the program prescribed transparency in international relations, free trade, reductions in armaments, national self-determination and, in theory, adjustment of colonial claims. Most important, the propositions of Woodrow Wilson aimed at an international organization to guarantee the independence and territorial integrity of all member countries. This would later reflect on the occurrence of the Paris Peace Conference in 1919[125] and creation of League of Nations in 1920[126]. All of this was on the scope of actions of International Relations, as the focus, at that time, was in dealing with the consequences of the First World War, and there was common "conviction among political leaders that not enough was known about international relations and that universities should promote research and teaching on issues related to international cooperation, diplomacy, war and peace"[127].

It is important to note, in spite of all said, how this is the mainstream narrative for the birth of International Relations, but there are different perspectives on it. Due to the globalization and hybridization of IR, there is an explosion of narratives and counter narratives about when, how and why the IR discipline was invented, and according to Mendes[128] this "debate has become even more complex with the need for the discipline to discuss non-Western thinking and to try to include other geocultural traditions in its theoretical discourse". He sees this with positive eyes, as this approach challenges the dominant canonical views "by introducing new and plural debates into the history of the discipline's theoretical great debates".

For some revisionists, according to McCourt[129], the first theoretical debate (idealists against realist) never really happened within the field, and "the IR discipline should be dated to the post-Second World War and not post-First World War period". Also, they defended that early international theory developed not only in the academy, and that the prevailing narrative

[123] McClelland, C. A. (2005).
[124] Encyclopaedia Britannica (2020).
[125] Encyclopaedia Britannica (2021).
[126] Encyclopaedia Britannica (2019).
[127] McClelland, C. A. (2005).
[128] Mendes, P. E. (2019), p.19-20.
[129] McCourt, D. M. (2013), p. 395.

silences an uncomfortable racist history[130]. Still, the preoccupation with peace and war matters were a social fact – historical sources point out how various peace movements sprang up to counter the spirit of militarism and the anxiety around the arms race even before 1914[131], highlighting how one could not simultaneously prevent and prepare for war[132]. Oliver P. Richmond, at the very beginning of his book Peace in International Relations, raises the question: what is the discipline of International Relations for, if not for peace?

2.2.2. The lacking debate of Peace and War in IR Theory (?)

Richmond introduces his book addressing a major issue in International Relations and how the field has been developing ever since its birth – "Mainstream International Relations theory has been in crisis, if not anomie, for some time", he says. He affirms that IR has found difficulties to attract the attention of those working in other disciplines, in spite of IR scholars being increasingly drawn on other disciplines. Even those working with Peace and Conflict Studies, a field closely bonded with IR, have turned away from IR theory. This, according to Richmond, happens because the latter neglects the development of an account of peace, focusing almost with exclusivity on the dynamics of power, war, and assuming the realist inherency of violence in human nature and international relations[133].

At this point we should be aware of a triangle that functions within these debates of International Relations. How can we properly differentiate war, peace and violence? To some, it may appear as obvious any distinction of peace from war. Peace and violence might also seem quite clear, but we will see throughout this dissertation that most distinction might come as problematic. And how about violence and war? The boundaries here get even blurrier. I could reference an artistic representation to elucidate some differences, like *Guerra e Paz*[134], two paintings made by the Brazilian painter Candido Portinari between 1952 and 1956 that are now part of the permanent exhibition at the Headquarters of the United Nations in New York, or a historical romance novel such as *War and Peace*[135] published by Leo Tolstoy, a praised classic of world literature published in 1869, or even the register of the little-known "Why War?"[136], correspondence exchanges between Albert Einstein and Sigmund Freud, in which they debate on the reasons behind war, violence, peace and human nature.

[130] McCourt, D. M. (2013), p. 395.
[131] McDougall, W. A. (2020).
[132] Richmond, O. P. (2008b), p. 1.
[133] Richmond, O. P. (2008b), p. 1.
[134] Portinari, C. (1956).
[135] Tolstoy, L. (1993).
[136] Seitenfus, R. & Ventura, D. (2015).

The relations between peace and war in these are evident. However, to dispose a more scientific perspective, we could reference Victor Davis Hanson who argues that war is unchanging and tragically persistent through the ages. He says that, while technology improves and strategies adapt, human nature remains the same[137]. Using the Peloponnesian War as the original model of a "war like no other"[138] and drawing from Thucydides, he approaches this phenomenon as part of human nature, and thus, part of politics and International Relations. "War," he writes, "is an entirely human enterprise", and "the father and king of us all"[139], echoing Heraclitus writings in ancient Greece. Hanson is strongly influenced by the contributions of Gaston Bouthoul, in regards to the unavoidability of war, and this is established coming from the ideas of aggressiveness and violence. Bouthoul was a French sociologist who is known for founding a particular sociology known as polemology[140]. Molina remarks how the French sociologist was sceptical about pacifism and critical in regards to the juridical illusion of the international regulation of the peace-phenomenon, especially after the First and the Second World Wars[141]. With polemology he studied the phenomenon of war without moralising prejudices, focusing on the social function of war, "the most important institution of destruction", as a natural phenomenon. The study of major wars enabled him to raise a hypothesis that foresees the periodicity of wars, later repeated by Hanson[142] and also present in Freud beliefs[143].

As noted, and taking as a premise the dyadic relation peace-war, one can see how much of the debate about war and power that dominates IR is also indicative of assumptions about what peace is or should be. As should be seen throughout this text, this ranges from the pragmatic removal of overt violence, crossing matters of ethical peace and ideology, to a debate about a self-sustaining peace. The mainstream can be found, for example, with conceptualizations of peace through strength[144], collective security, peach through law[145], revolutionary pacifism[146], just to cite some examples. Hedley Bull viewed peace as the absence of war in an international society, as above mentioned, though of course war was the key guarantee for individual state survival. In spite of all this tendency, going on a different direction of Hobbesian and

[137] Hanson, V. D. (2010).
[138] Hanson, V. D. (2005).
[139] Hanson, V. D. (2010).
[140] Bouthoul, G. (1991).
[141] Molina, J. (2007).
[142] Hanson, V. D. (2005).
[143] Seitenfus, R. & Ventura, D. (2015).
[144] Richmond, O. P. (2008b), p. 4.
[145] Richmond, O. P. (2008b), p. 4; Raymond, A. (2003), p. 703-736.
[146] McDougall, W. A. (2020).

Machiavellian assumptions, of the supposed Freudian death instinct that resonates through the discipline[147], it is possible to find a vast range of anthropological and ethnographic evidence showing that peace, conflict avoidance and accommodation can be taken as the strongest characteristics in human culture[148]. This is also noted and reaffirmed by Steven Pinker in his book The Better Angels of Our Nature, in which he affirms that "violence has declined over long stretches of time, and today we may be living in the most peaceable era in our species' existence"[149].

Scholars like Raymond Aron note that humans have killed and will continue to with whatever instrument is at disposal, regardless of the situation. Because of that, he defends that a "formal typology" of wars and peace may be illusory, especially for sociological purposes like diplomatic and strategic behaviour. Nevertheless, whatever the goal of foreign policy, this goal is not and was not war itself. War can only be a means, being peace "rationally the goal to which societies tend"[150]. Colin S. Gray, within the context of strategic history, asks why and how modern strategic history took the frequently bloody course that it did. War can be taken as instrumental, but it also demands to be interpreted as the necessary consequence of a host of preceding conditions, trends and events, as he reminds us, wars shape international relations for decades after their occurrence, as this is a common IR expectation reflected in within "the notion that, in some inescapable sense, anticipation of those great wars dominated their antecedent periods"[151].

International Relations, focusing so much in power and war discussions, ends up being caught in "Thucydides fatal triptych of fear, honor and interest" leading to epistemologies based in maxims like the Thucydides' trap[152], referring "to the natural, inevitable discombobulation that occurs when a rising power threatens to displace a ruling power", resulting in a structural stress that makes a violent clash the rule, not the exception[153]. Exactly observing these trends, Richmond proposes an inquire as to whether aspects International Relations and its orthodox approaches (he means positivist debates derived from realism, liberalism and Marxism) are anti-peace, sometimes purposively, and sometimes carelessly. This, as has been mentioned, goes against how peace has preoccupied a broad range of scholars, "thinkers, activists, politicians and other figures in various ways, often to do with an interest

[147] Richmond, O. P. (2008b), p. 2.
[148] Richmond, O. P. (2008b), p. 13.
[149] Pinker, S. (1999).
[150] Raymond, A. (2003), p. 150.
[151] Gray, C. S. (2013), p. 4.
[152] Gray, C. S. (2013), p. 9.
[153] Allison, G. (2017), p. xv-xvi.

in, or critique of, violence, influence, power and politics"[154] – Yet, there remains a surprising lack of an explicit debate on peace in IR theory.

Discussions regarding peace have been relegated to a space in the periphery of IR theory, almost to the point of being ignored. It develops concepts of peace indirectly, as constituent of other debates. Richmond highlights how the avoidance of a debate on peace "in favor of reductive and expedient debates on war, power, conflict and violence, is dangerously anachronistic if IR theory is to be seen as part of a broader project leading to viable and sustainable forms of peace". But peace is dealt implicitly, through its theoretical readings of international order, of war, and history. The empirical events that mark IR tend to be associated with violence, rather than peace. What is peace to International Relations, after all? At times it is taken as too obvious, so there is no need for debates. Other times it seems too subjective, effacing any possibility of scientific objectivity[155].

The Realist theory, taking security as the most fundamental value of International Relations, supported by authors as Thucydides, Hobbes, Machiavelli and Schmitt, for example, implies a peace found in the state-centric balance of power, perhaps dominated by a hegemon[156]. It offers a domestic peace limited by the constant demand to be prepared for war, and victor's peace at the international level[157]. Mainly based upon relative power and alliances derived from shared interests rather than shared values, with peace being conceptualized as a very basic utopian ideal form, which is clearly unobtainable. The Liberal theory, differently, depicts an achievable general peace derived from international institutions and organizations that represent universal agreements and norms via cooperation, in spite of being centered around power dynamics. Shared values at the international level indicates a community of states rather than merely a system of states, opening space for conceptions like democratic peace, resembling a Kantian 'Perpetual Peace', and liberal peace[158]. Beyond the canon of the first debate, Structuralism and Marxist approaches see peace as lying in the absence of certain types of structural violence, often in structures which promote economic and class domination, so peace is found as social justice and emancipation[159]. Those are just a few mentions, and the discussions could even go further if we were to take contributions of neo-realists and neo-liberal, English School thinkers and constructivist and even some critical theorists.

[154] Richmond, O. P. (2008b), p. 4.
[155] Richmond, O. P. (2008b), p. 8-9;
[156] Jackson, R. & Sørensen, G. (2007), p. 24; Richmond, O. P. (2008b), p. 9.
[157] Richmond, O. P. (2008b), p. 56.
[158] Richmond, O. P. (2008b), p. 9.
[159] Richmond, O. P. (2008b), p. 58.

What is then brought up by Oliver Richmond, making a detailed approach to many of International Relations theory, is how peace is seen to be something to aspire to, though it is perhaps not achievable. Peace is seen as an ideal, rather than "reflecting a pragmatic engagement with the problems if IR"[160]. The scientific thinking about peace is dominated by a set of key assumptions, and with it most theorists, policymakers and practitioners assume that the concept of peace they deploy is ontologically stable, because of a limited definition, based on a set of given assumptions. The orthodoxy of peace in IR take it as a long-term process, probably not achievable, as mentioned, but worth working towards – this because peace can be engineered in environments where it may not be sustainable, being constructed according to the preferences of those actors who are most involved in its construction[161]. Based on all of that, Richmond says that war and peace are taken as separate and opposite concepts, but this separation is always is, in its orthodoxy, weak. Peace, then, becomes the pursue not for equality or freedom, but rather for security and stability on the terms of liberal-realist peace, a sort of hybridization that propitiates the maintenance of the status quo in regards to this subject inside the field of International Relations.

2.3. Violence as the Reference

Colin Gray affirms that with Thucydides' immortal formula, the likelihood of politically motivated violence ceasing to exist entirely is limited and small[162]. Again, as we were discussing war, the author says that it is all about the threat or use of organized violence carried on by political units against each other for political motives, taking a lot of influence from Hedley Bull as well. Peace then appears to be the more or less lasting suspension of violent modes of rivalry between political units, but built in the "shadow of past battles" and in the "fear of future ones". As Aron sees, peace is then not so different from wars, in its nature – following a principle for peace, "peace is based on power, that is, on the relation between the capacities of acting upon each other possessed by the political units"[163].

This power, on the given context, is specially understood through the perspective of Max Weber, which has its origins in classical political philosophy and especially Hobbes' thought[164], who in his essay *Politics as a Vocation*, defines the State as the only human social structure which lays claim to the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. This monopoly, however,

[160] Richmond, O. P. (2008b), p. 12.
[161] Richmond, O. P. (2008b), p. 13.
[162] Gray, C. S. (2013), p. 9.
[163] Raymond, A. (2003), p. 151.
[164] Bobbio, N.; Matteucci, N.; Pasquino, G. (1998), p. 1293.

is limited to a certain geographical area, and it is exactly this limitation to a particular area that supports what defines a State[165]. Such a monopoly must occur via a process of legitimization, but it comes clear that the decisive instrument of politics is violence[166]. At its pinnacle, violence, as a decisive instrument of politics, becomes war.

As I have argued, the experiences with war across the twentieth century created a scar in humanity, and people were motivated to avoid it, to construct the means to hinder it – the creation of the field of International Relations was, supposedly, one attempt to do it. Wars had shown violence in its point of excellence, and throughout the middle of the twentieth century this fear gave space to what Aron referred to as Peace by terror, one peace stablished between political units each of which has the capacity to take violence to an absolute level, making the cost of engaging in a conflict, in all rationality, seeming superior to the advantage of victory because of the magnitude of such destruction[167]. Peace and Violence became so clearly related, to the point of peace becoming centered in violence in certain situations and perspectives, as above mentioned.

To better understand how those two concepts came together to propitiate the birth of the field of Peace and Conflict research, centered around the figure of Johan Galtung (as we will see more thoroughly afterwards), I would like to approach how the discussions around the concept of violence were being developed to give us an opportunity to grasp into various sources and understandings of a concept that became so latent in the past century, in International Relations and in various other fields. The reader should be advised, beforehand, that there is a myriad of scholars to approach and study, many perspectives to take, being the following the ones I found most relevant for the current analyses.

2.3.1. George Sorel and his Reflections on violence

Our first figure dates back to the beginning of the twentieth century, and this is important to take into account. As we have mentioned, a lot of the paradigm around violence changes with the emergence of the First World War, but George Sorel comes before that. As Martini proposes in his work regarding George Sorel's take on violence[168], from the perspective of conceptual history, the hypothesis is that there would be a resignification of the concept of violence, which until then belonged to the assumption, produced in particular by Enlightenment

[165] Weber, M. (2003), p. 9.
[166] Weber, M. (2003), p. 98.
[167] Raymond, A. (2003), p. 160.
[168] Martini, J. T. S. D. (n.d.); Sorel, G. (1999).

thought, that its use would decrease in the resolution of political conflicts. In his book *Reflections on Violence*, George Sorel, a French theorist of revolutionary syndicalism, strives to reframe the concept of violence based on the apology to the myth of the general strike of the working class. This would be due to the idea that humanity was going through a civilizing process that would always move towards progress, where the use of violence would not fit. The strong presence of violence in the WWI provoked a crisis of these revolutionary beliefs and, at the same time, provoked the reinsertion of violence in the European self-reference about human nature[169].

The content of the book exposes in a more fruitful way what we can refer as the Sorelian conception of violence. Through his own conceptual framework, Sorel distinguishes it from the raw physical strength with which it is usually associated with, and equates this raw physical strength with the threat of inaction manifested in the myth of the general strike. He argues that ideas about violence in his time were based on old concepts and not on contemporary conditions. In this sense, Sorel strived to expose the historical role of violence and move it away from the abstract conceptions that condemn it, as if he was trying to take away the negative moral valuation of it. He understands that these negative concepts have become useless and that the reflection on violence must pass to the material plane – as if he was referencing historical materialism – giving this concept a leading role in the "salvation" of the modern world. As it becomes explicit, therefore, there is an open and clear apology for violence[170].

On building violence through a mythical approach, Sorel talks about the importance of this myth for the revolutionary effectiveness, looking for references in early Christianity, the Protestant Reformation and the French Revolution. He clothes violence (not as raw physical strength) with this mythical understanding because in his syndicalism approach and organization, he tries to present it as something effective, as myths are understood as expressions of the passionate wills of the masses[171]. General Strike is functions as syndicalist's weapon against the State and the Structure. The threat of it constitutes the (threatening) myth, the historical role of the proletariat's violence – a violence that goes beyond the raw use of physical force. This appears reinforced in another of Sorel's work, *Les Illusions du Progrès*[172], in which he criticizes theories of progress as illusory, beneficial only to the growing

[169] Martini, J. T. S. D. (n.d.); Sorel, G. (1999).
[170] Martini, J. T. S. D. (n.d.); Sorel, G. (1999).
[171] Sorel, G. (1999), p. 62.
[172] Sorel, G. (1911).

bourgeoisie – those theories, based on ideals of politics, morality and law would identify in violence the opposing barbarism of a good and calm civilization – To Sorel, however, violence is then only used to refer to what comes from the proletariat[173]. The influence of Marxism and Socialism in his work is noticeable, as well as anarchical influences.

Contrary to the conception of the philosophies of the late 18th century and the 19th, which saw this concept as a barbaric and primitive characteristic[174], the mutations of the political concept of violence on the beginning of the 20th century reviewed its historical experience, building up to its legitimization and spectacularizing capacity after the start of WWI. Sorel's revolutionary take, especially on the beginning of the century, placed his work as controversial. Different from commonly understood violence, proletarian violence would be "a very nice and heroic thing", serving "the immemorial interests of civilization"[175]. Reflections on Violence remains controversial book[176], most obviously from the fact that Sorel not only takes violence as his subject but, more importantly, he equates it with life, creativity and virtue – opposing it to bourgeoisie violence and their intellectual ideologues through the State. One last thing to notice, in spite of all, is that the violence endorsed by Sorel was not very violent at all, as it appealed to little more than a few heroic gestures, violent in non-physical ways.

2.3.2. Walter Benjamin and his Critique of Violence

The main affirmation of Walter Benjamin, with this text, can be translated in the idea that violence is only recognizable when it enters into moral relations, and these relations are defined by law and justice[177]. This to say that it is only through law and justice that we are capable of recognizing harm as violence. "Critique of Violence" (*Zur Kritik der Gewalt*), first published in 1921, is notorious for its obscurity, partly due to the difficulties that emerge in the attempt to translate many key terms into English – a difficult I had in reading such a dense text. The German word *Gewalt* – understood as (public) force, (legitimate) power, domination, authority and violence – loses a lot of its meaning with the English translation into violence, and this is particularly important here. The objective of this text is to be understood as an attempt to clarify the relationship of violence (*Gewalt*) to law (*Recht*) and justice (*Gerechtigkeit*). Walter

[173] Martini, J. T. S. D. (n.d.); Sorel, G. (1911); Sorel, G. (1999), p. 108.
[174] Sorel, G. (1999), p. 175.
[175] Sorel, G. (1999).
[176] Sorel, G. (1999), p. 279.
[177] Benjamin, W. (1921), p. 236.

Benjamin is thus not interested in force or violence of nature (*Naturgewalt*), but the violence found within the framework of society, and ultimately, the state[178].

The author believes that a proper critique of violence can only be undertaken through the philosophy of the history of violence. In other words, a proper deconstruction of the relation between violence, law and justice, highlighting some aspects of each and relating them among themselves. One opposition that he presents is between what he calls natural law (*Naturrechts*) and positive law (positive *Rechts*), with the former meaning that if the ends are justified so are the means, and the latter suggesting that if the means are justified, therefore the ends must be justified – both of them stablish a relationship of justification, and for this reason the two categories, somewhat, agree that violence as a mean will be justified if it is in accordance with the law. Benjamin is more focused in positive law, I can say, as it is the one that regards what humans have agreed upon. Here, the question of whether violence in principle can be a moral means even to a just end is made impossible to address[179]. In other words, in the name of law, violence cannot be fully criticized as violence is housed within law, and then law sets the condition for violence. In these dynamics, how does violence and law relate to each other? As Larsen explains, it is a two-fold relationship. Firstly, violence is the means by which law is instituted and preserved, harnessing it. Secondly, domination (violence as *Macht*, power) comes to be the end of the law, by controlling it: "Law-making is power-making, assumption of power, and to that extent an immediate manifestation of violence"[180]. We can understand that as law trying to have a monopoly on violence. For that case, it presents itself in different forms: Law-making and law-preserving violence, and in here he approaches the function of military and police, for example.

Benjamin advances to approach the relation of law and justice, as the intrinsic relation of law and violence has been established. At this point he starts to set the ground to develop two key concepts of his theorization, that are Divine violence and Mythic violence – and I will try to lay them down here in a cognizable way. We can see Benjamin being really critical here, to the point of skepticism, mainly in regards to any attempt to supplant or replace one structure of laws with another with the objective of mitigating violence, as this would only replicate violence, as a principle, in some respect, mainly because this would still be happening within the confines of law. It is worth nothing as well that if violence does not serve the end of law making nor preserving, it basically loses its validity, and to him this represents that a totally

[178] Larsen, S. (2013).
[179] Larsen, S. (2013).
[180] Benjamin, W. (1921), p. 248.

non-violent resolution of conflicts can never lead to a legal agreement. An institution that neglects its violent ethos, that is to say, its violent character, falls into decay. Here lies a big difference: He believes that, non-violent resolution is possible only among private citizens, and not between government apparatus, as the state is the structure that functions to maintain the law and its power of violence[181].

The ideas of rights in itself, for Benjamin, is just to masquerade the fact that the law is bound up with violence – rights are just an effort to maintain citizens subordinated under an state structure so that they could be better controlled, and this goes all the way back in human history, to the most ancient myths, in which the figure of deities would implement order, law and justice – The legal structure then is equated to the mythic violence that it uses to maintain itself. The way to oppose this mythic characteristic of law comes through what Benjamin refers to a pure immediate violence, and this is what he calls divine violence. The latter has the capability to confront the former. That is to say, "if mythic violence is law making, divine violence is law destroying"[182].

According to prof. James Martel, "mythic violence is Benjamin's term for the way that illicit economic and political power has asserted itself over all human life, projecting a form of authority out into the world that then becomes accepted as reality itself". He believes that, in the reading of Benjamin, it maintains its violent character because, without a genuine or ontologically legitimized basis for its authority, "mythic violence must endlessly strike out, killing and hurting over and over again to establish its power and even its reality"[183]. He also states Benjamin's definition of divine violence as a way for powers higher than law to reject the fetishism and mythic violence, not creating new laws and truths, but merely acting to remove false ones.

> Divine violence is, in this account, what offers human beings a chance to act in ways that are not constituted by mythic violence, that is to say, to act in ways that are nonviolent. The General Strike is an example of such nonviolence, a way to say no to the entire apparatus of mythic violence[184].

[181] Larsen, S. (2013); Benjamin, W. (1921).
[182] Benjamin, W. (1921), p. 249.
[183] Evans, B. & Martel, J. (2020).
[184] Evans, B. & Martel, J. (2020).

At the end of the text one can understand that Benjamin's Critique of Violence is a political demand for a revolution: "the existence of violence outside the law, as pure immediate violence," Benjamin writes, "furnishes proof that revolutionary violence, the highest manifestation of unalloyed violence by man, is possible, and shows by what means"[185]. One may understand that it is an argument aiming at a state of pure positivity, one that seeks to do away with all the mythic violence, what some critics refers to as his prophetical stance, stating the end of law, as humans wouldn't need violence to maintain the law – what he calls sovereign violence, because it is so strange to what was known, in the very last sentence of the text[186].

For the importance of mentioning, even though I haven't come to the point of reading it, Beatrice Hanssen is the author of a book named Critique of Violence: Between Poststructuralism and Critical Theory[187], in which she uses Walter Benjamin's essay "to conduct an investigation of the heated controversy between poststructuralism and critical theory", according to its own abstract. In it she conducts an exploration of social and political theory, using contributions of Hegel, Fanon, Arendt, Foucault and more, all through the prism of the question of violence. Her contributions would be of much appreciated here, as I can imagine that this reading would propitiate new perspectives for my analyses.

2.3.3. Herbert Marcuse and the Problem of violence

As an offspring of the first generation of the School of Frankfurt, which focuses on the critique of modernity and capitalist society, the definition of social emancipation, as well as the detection of the pathologies of society, Herbert Marcuse presents his contribution to the current discussion in his essay The Problem of Violence and the Radical Opposition, published in 1967. He starts the text in affirming that radical opposition could only be considered in a global framework, as an isolated attempt would fail and falsify its nature from the very beginning. Interest to highlight, He considers the student's opposition as a decisive factor of transformation, not being an immediate revolutionary force, but a potential one. This potential force of opposition comes to be what he designates as "the new left", including a broader group of people that goes beyond the "classical" revolutionary force. This integration of the dominated class, on a very material basis, comes as a result of oppositions concentrating within the established order[188].

[185] Larsen, S. (2013); Benjamin, W. (1921), p. 252.
[186] Benjamin, W. (1921), p. 252.
[187] Hanssen, B. (2014).
[188] Marcuse, H. (2005).

Marcuse believes that the question of violence must be separated in two parts, having as corollary the concept of counter-violence. This occurs because the violence that emanates from a dominant group is different, on a sociological and instinctive level, to the counter-violence, which is used as defense to liberate against given domination. The idea of a counter force to the dominant violence is essential in Marcuse's contributions, as he believes that the concept of violence alone is not enough to explain dynamics in society. Matching to the idea of counter-violence the author affirms that in opposition is concentrated among the outsiders within the established order. When questioning what is this opposition directed against, Marcuse mentions what is considered violence, in his conception: "opposition to a democratic, effectively functioning society"; "against the system's ubiquitous pressure, its repressive and destructive productivity"; "against the system's hypocritical morality and values"; "against the terror employed outside the metropolis" [189].

It is interesting to mention, as a form of counter-violence, his appeal to non-violent protest. I note that here as touches on the violence of the system. According to his words, anything that was legal can become illegal from one moment to the next just because of a completely peaceful demonstration, especially if it trespasses on private property. In situations of confrontation with state power, the most effectful is when "opposition becomes a harmless ritual, a pacifier of conscience, and a star witness for the rights and freedoms available under the status quo", making allusions here to Civil Rights movements and student opposition. He reinforces that so much as he argues that "right of resistance, namely civil disobedience, belongs to the oldest and most sanctified elements of Western civilization" as a potentially liberation violence. In regards to this right to counter force the dominant violence, even though he mentions it as a right, becomes meaningless to speak of the legality of resistance: "no social system, even the freest, can constitutionally legalize violence directed against itself"[190] – There is violence of suppression and violence of liberation; there is violence for the defense of life and violence of aggression. Assuming this antagonist relation as naturally given, he affirms that from the start the opposition is placed in the field of violence, and the status quo has the right to determine the limits of legality.

2.3.4. Hannah Arendt and her Reflections on violence

[189] Marcuse, H. (2005).
[190] Marcuse, H. (2005).

Hannah Arendt appears to make one of the most recognized contributions in regards to violence in the last century. Her name comes to be constantly mentioned Her many books and articles have had a lasting influence on political theory and philosophy. Arendt is widely considered one of the most important political thinkers of the 20th century. Her book *On Violence*, first published in 1970, is described as an analysis of the nature, causes, and significance of violence in the second half of the twentieth century, also examining the relationship between war, politics, violence, and power. To complement and better understand the reading of such an important text I used as a support Darian Swan's *A Criticism of Arendt's "On Violence"* and Annabel Herzog's *The concept of violence in the work of Hannah Arendt*. In spite of not being used as a reference for my reading of Hannah Arendt, I came across the work of Bruce B. Lawrence and Aisha Karim, the book On Violence: a reader, published in 2007, which would have been a great addition to this topic. For this topic, I'll try to summarize the Arendt's arguments, clear that they will be referenced later in this text.

For Hannah Arendt, violence is not part of the essence of the political, as it is merely instrumental. To better understand that she argues on the clear distinction of political power and violence, noting that the latter can be used by the former. Taking as a background the contexts of the events of 1960s, as Civil Rights movements and the War in Vietnam, she saw the need to distinguish keywords such as power, strength, force, authority and violence. Politics is the manifestation of power, not of unorganized action – "Power corresponds to the human ability not just to act but to act in concert. Power is never the property of an individual; it belongs to a group and remains in existence only so long as the group keeps together"[191]. What makes power powerful, as it were, is thus not the content of specific actions, or even the common will and agreement that they express, but the willingness to act in common[192].

It's interesting the way she opposes the affirmation "all politics is a struggle for power; the ultimate kind of power is violence", as she believes in the first part but not the second. Politics, as based on group cohesion, is considered a struggle for its character of a never-ending process, but this group formation has nothing to do with violence. Power is a central concept in Arendt's phenomenology of human life, while violence is essentially an instrument[193]. This instrumental character, like all means, is always looking for guidance and justification for the end he seeks, and in a different manner, Power does not need justification, but legitimacy. The latter is based

[191] Arendt, H. (1970), p. 44.
[192] Herzog, A. (2017); Arendt, H. (1970), p. 52.
[193] Herzog, A. (2017); Arendt, H. (1970), p. 51.

on an appeal to the past, while justification concerns an end that lies in the future[194]. Thus, power is never "justified", but it acquires legitimacy from the coming together of the group. Indeed, since it consists in the ability to act in concert, it is by definition legitimate but never justified. Violence, on the other hand, can only be "justified", because it draws validation only from its use as an instrument to achieve future aims[195]. To make an example, Arendt puts that Violence can only be justified for the sake of survival.

A note that Herzog makes regards how the very definition of tool leads to the thought that all tools consist of violence, as the purpose of any tool is to multiply the strength of whatever or whoever is using it. Ultimately all tools appear to constitute the category of violent means – everything made with the use of tools is made violently as we kill a tree in order to obtain wood and then destroy the wood to make a table. A critique made her in Arendt's reading, regards the equivalence of violence and instrumentality, and because of that, this instrumentality is always formulated negatively in Arendt's work. Herzog defends that every tool can represent a certain danger (potential violence), from totalitarian domination to modern technology, but they are not identical, nor equally threatening[196].

Another important point that Arendt presents in her text is on regards to violence having the capability to strengthen, weaken or destroy power, but it can never create it. Only when the violence ends can real politics begin. Violence tends to destroy power and from violence power never flourishes. Arendt affirms that "the practice of violence, like all action, changes the world, but the most probable change is to a more violent world"[197]. With this perspective, she continues to say that violence has no political consequences, because it does not lead people to act together. To the contrary, it tends to divide people from each other, and thereby to diminish or dilute their power[198].

Arendt then takes a space to discuss the public and the private sphere. This is important because her conception of violence is what allowed the creation of the categories that constitute her political philosophy, but it occurs that her discourse on violence as non-public and non-private generates the need to define and redefine these terms[199]. In using violence, politics becomes something that it is not – a kind of fabrication, and with it power is corrupted and often destroyed. Violence as instrumentality should therefore be kept outside the public sphere.

[194] Herzog, A. (2017); Arendt, H. (1970), p. 28.
[195] Herzog, A. (2017).
[196] Herzog, A. (2017).
[197] Arendt, H. (1970), p. 80.
[198] Herzog, A. (2017); Arendt, H. (1970).
[199] Herzog, A. (2017).

It's worth noting, as Herzog defends, that it would be wrong to think that Arendt is justifying the use of violence in the private sphere. She also notes that not being political does not mean it belongs to the private sphere – to her violence characterizes things that are part of neither the public nor the private sphere. It is therefore only by contrast with violence that we can think about those things which are either political, as long as not reified, or private, as long as not turned into fabrication (using someone or something else – people or tools – in the performance of labor). One last stance in Herzog work regards how, to Arendt, the public and private spheres are defined by their rejection of violence, and "without violence Arendt's philosophy would not be"[200].

One last important thing to highlight about Arendt's take on violence is its relation to nature, as a natural response. She mentions aggressiveness as a natural instinct, and for that violence is neither animalistic nor irrational. She mentions some authors as Sorel and Fanon to state the view of violence as a life-creating force and creativity as man's greatest common good. In spite of that, to her nothing is more dangerous than the tradition of organic thought in politics in which power and violence are interpreted as a biological agreement.

Arendt, on her own clarified definitions of power and violence, argues that "power and violence are opposites; where the one rules absolutely, the other is absent"[201]. Ultimately her conclusion is that "Violence can always destroy power. Out of the barrel of a gun grows the most effective command, resulting in the most instant and perfect obedience. What never can grow out of it is power". In a meaningful critique, Darian Swan[202] says that:

> On Violence is an attempt to advance our understanding of power, war, and violence by viewing these terms through "updated" definitions. Many within the field of social and political sciences would benefit from reading this text, but it is important to note that the theories presented may not stand the test of time (…) Additionally, Arendt cites past understandings on power and violence, but does little to cite contemporaries that don't somehow support her perspective[203].

[200] Herzog, A. (2017).
[201] Arendt, H. (1970), p. 56.
[202] Swan, D (2010).
[203] Swan, D (2010).

Hannah Arendt, On Violence, writes about violence at the end of the 1960s, arguing mainly that communal action can interrupt unjust structures, whereas violence can do so only very rarely, and for very short periods of time.

2.3.5. Slavoj Žižek on Violence

Taken as a having a peculiar approach and quite a popular appeal, Slavoj Žižek is a taken as a scholar responsible for many contributions in the field of philosophy, critical theory and social sciences, endeavoring into politics and popular culture to project his ideas, gaining relevance in the last decade of the twentieth century and throughout the twentieth-first. In regards to violence, he is responsible for one of the most significant works of the last twenty years – the book *Violence: six sideways reflections*[204], published in 2008, is an analysis dissecting the violence inherent in globalization, capitalism, fundamentalism and language itself. Having most of his contributions in regards to the theme in this book, one should not dismiss, however, how the author has touched the same theme in various other productions and medias.

For example, I could mention his affirmation that "the problem with Hitler was that *he was not violent enough*, that his violence was not 'essential' enough"[205], or that in some sense, "crazy as it may sound, Gandhi was more violent than Hitler"[206], sentences that, taken out of context by many (according to him), forced his explanations on his provocative and ironic tone. To better understand his ideas and how these sentences are supposed to be interpreted, I will lay down here some of his main contributions. First, we could approach his typology of violence, in which he distinguished three different types: Subjective violence, the more visible type with clear and identifiable agents (subjects), taken as disturbances of the quotidian life; Systemic violence, inherent in the normal state of affairs, elaborated by the catastrophic consequences of the foundation of our economic and political system; and Symbolic violence, violence-as-such in the realm of language, the most fundamental of all for its power of imposition of a certain universe of meaning[207]. Žižek argues and repeats that there is a violence, not direct nor visible, but as insidious and perverse as subjective violence. It is a violence that takes place in the symbolic field; in the way people embody and act to mask the understanding and visibility of this most founding violence[208].

[204] Žižek, S. (2008).
[205] Žižek, S. (2009), p. 151.
[206] Žižek, S. (2017).
[207] Modena, M. R. (2016), p. 21.
[208] Modena, M. R. (2016), p. 22.

The author, criticizing the modern capitalist structure of society, highlights the cynical conscience of our time as the conscience of a world in which the capital beholds humanity and reiterates the idea that only a minority in power will attain wealth, contingent to the suffering of the majority. In face of this reality, violence expresses itself violently in our conscience, often, not by denying it, but by tolerance – a systematic exercise of violence[209]. Symbolic violence is only effective when it is incorporated into and by the oppressed himself, the suspension of symbolic efficiency, in which a person could say "I know what it is, but I don't want to know, because this hinders my capability to survive in face of this reality – I rather act as if I did not know"[210]. By presenting many arguments and allegories, crossing different field to identify how violence permeates everything in its symbolic stance, the central argument of his book *Violence* regards the excessive focus on subjective violence, which functions to neglect the acknowledgement of this invisible systemic violence. What is normally taken as violence is merely a disturbance of the stablished order. His major questioning, at this point is: Are we aware of how much violence goes on just to keep things going on the way they are[211]?

Exactly because of that he criticizes this "horror to violence" saying that it is part of a liberal ideology of tolerance, coming from an apparent antiviolent liberalism that works unrelentingly to keep its violence (here as an instrument) hidden. In this sense, if one entity is really interested in changing the basic functioning of the existing established order it will be, by definition, taken as violent, does not matter where it comes from or its justifications or legitimacy. Here he makes a connection with Walter Benjamin, as the latter draws attention to the necessary excess of violence from the state and no true power exists without this excess. Divine violence, in this scenery, is the counterviolence to this excess. At this point, with this line of thought, Slavoj Žižek positions himself in favor of violence, in the sense in which he says Gandhi was more violent than Hitler[212]. He explains that the violence coming of the latter was reactive, bestowed upon the *other* (here, the Jews) to maintain the structure, contrary to the violence of the former – although Gandhi was against (subjective) violence, the way in which he starts a movement to boycott and strike affects the whole structure of the colonial India, giving us the possibility to analyze that as extremely violent for going against the *status quo*[213]. It is exactly in this context that social systemic change is violent, a kind of violence he advocates for, and that is why he proposes this idea of "not being violent enough". Exactly with

[209] Modena, M. R. (2016), p. 22; Žižek, S. (2008); Žižek, S. (2017).
[210] Modena, M. R. (2016), p. 27.
[211] Žižek, S. (2017).
[212] Roda viva (2009).
[213] Roda viva (2009); Žižek, S. (2017).

this thought, thinking about how people commonly interpret violence, he affirms in the last sentence of his book: "Sometimes doing nothing is the most violent thing to do"[214].

In order to shift a little of his perspective to give you more complexity on it, I bring as well a couple critical viewpoints of his contributions. I would like to start by mentioning Abigail Thorn's critiques on the book. The first point addressed by her highlights how Žižek mentions that a proper conceptual development of a typology of violence must be dispassionate, ignoring its traumatic impact by definition[215]. Regarding his analysis on religion, terror and Islam at the end of chapter four she points out a lacking argument, one in which he doesn't subject his critical methods to his own critique[216]. Thorn points out how Žižek contributes bringing up discussions without necessarily adding something novel to it, e.g. the topic of extra-legal violence, which was previously approached by Carl Schmitt, or the critique on liberal communists being the main threat to liberation, which was brought up by Kwame Ture, or even his criticisms on the philosophy of human rights, presented in a very similar way to Hannah Arendt's. Her point, with this critique, is that these topics were not very well stablished in Žižek's *Violence*, making his arguments on what builds his typology of violence theoretically weak. Her final stance regards the conclusion of the book, in which she perceived Žižek advising that the proper response to violence and violence in politics is to "withdraw"[217], neglecting the fact that some people cannot ultimately do this – being this the very violence he addresses but doesn't dive deep enough into it – in a chapter he starts by affirming how the circle of investigation is closed, travelling from the "rejection of false anti-violence to the endorsement of emancipatory violence"[218].

Another critical perspective is presented by Harry van der Linden, in an article in which he argues that "revolutionary violence is only justified to counter subjective violence inflicted or organized by the state", thus rejecting "Žižek's further defence of revolutionary violence as retributive and as "shock therapy" necessary to disrupt the old society". He argues that the main practical problem of the notion of systemic violence is its appeal to the widely accepted idea of permitted violence in self-defence, what could turn into a "too-easy and rather broad justification of revolutionary violence as counter-violence to systemic violence"[219]. Linden positions himself in regards to Žižek's reading of Walter Benjamin, as the former proceeds to

[214] Žižek, S. (2008), p. 217.
[215] Thorn, A. (2017); Žižek, S. (2008), p. 4.
[216] Thorn, A. (2017); Žižek, S. (2008), p. 129-139.
[217] Žižek, S. (2008), p. 216-217.
[218] Žižek, S. (2008), p. 206.
[219] Van der Linden, H. (2012), p. 33.

interpret revolutionary violence as divine violence, the one that is destructive of law rather than confirmative of law. Divine violence is, in reality, the people's violence, a violent popular self-defence[220], with an emphasis on its retributive component. Žižek takes divine violence as the "Judgment Day for the long history of oppression, exploitation, suffering,", following the motto "*fiat iustitia, pereat mundus*"[221].

Following this strand of thought, taking that violence is only justified as counter-violence, divine violence as retributions comes as indiscriminate according to Linden. To him, revolution with the retributive character is subject to dangers similar to fighting war as retribution to aggression, with excesses and disproportionate actions being excused. In both war and revolution, punishment should take place under legal instruments after the end of the conflict, as "divine violence as a sudden burst of retaliatory anger by the oppressed people is inevitably harming both to the guilty and the innocent"[222]. Linden inquires: "Once the notion of violence is extended, where do you draw the line?", later disagreeing with Žižek's aspects of (revolutionary) violence as "shock therapy", claiming that "it is difficult to be really violent, to perform an act that violently disturbs the basic parameters of social life"[223]. His main critique, then, surrounds the problem that emerges when "Žižek connects having the guts to seek real change with having the guts to use 'shock therapy' as including physical violence as terror". Violence, in any circumstance, should not be justified without limits and discrimination[224].

2.3.6. Mentioning Sartre, Clausewitz, Weil, Marx, Engels and Nixon

At this point, I hope that the reader can acknowledge the existence of multiple ways to look at violence, just as we have seen with peace. It is also important to keep in mind that those are definitions that orbit International Relations, Politics, Sociology and neighboring areas, limiting our spectrum of conceptualizations – the possibilities to interpret the dynamics and elements that build violence beyond these limits makes such task even more complex and, in a way, unrealistic. Still, for the purposes of this dissertation, my intention is that you can see how the phenomenon of violence has been and is interpreted, starting to think for yourself how these different definitions influence our relations with the world and our perspectives in regards to the absence of violence, looking underneath all of this to grasp for a common link to underpin the conceptualization of violence-as-such.

[220] Van der Linden, H. (2012), p. 50; Žižek, S. (2009), p. 478.
[221] Van der Linden, H. (2012), p. 51; Žižek, S. (2009), p. 162.
[222] Van der Linden, H. (2012), p. 51-52.
[223] Van der Linden, H. (2012), p. 52.
[224] Van der Linden, H. (2012), p. 52-54.

The above-mentioned names are here for their recognized importance, but there are still a few names I would like to refer to, as they bring much relevance to the discussion. For the sake of the size of this dissertation, and to not extend my analyses *ad infinitum* (imagining the bibliography I found and the possibilities), I will make an even briefer summary of their contributions, taking into account the possibility of referencing them again in the pages to follow. To begin I would like to mention Jean-Paul Sartre, known for quotes as "violence, in whatever form it manifests itself, is a failure"[225], but much more recognized for his controversial defense of violence, in the political and academic field. When talking about oppression, as the exploration of people by people, he highlights the existing violence in the legitimization through law[226], as in the legal structure violence will claim to be recognized as legitimate and justified in itself. If those holding the power determines what is legitimate, the oppressed is characterized as such not only for being the object of violence, but for not being able to recur to it in a legitimate form. The hypocrisies of modern oppression then are having legal freedom and rights without really having access to them. Referring to scarcity (material, but subject to other readings), violence appears again as retaliation, and what the law states as violence is actually always counter-violence[227].

Sartre is also known, in regards to violence, for addressing racism and colonialism in the preface of Fanon's book *The Wretched of the Earth*[228], defending violence against the oppressor as emancipation. Therefore, although defending revolutionary violence, he ends up recognizing that violence coming from the hegemonic structure terminates the freedom of subjects. There is an appeal to commitment –violence as an end is unjustifiable, because there is no desire for the world to be violent. But violence can be legitimate, as a violence that represents the destruction of oppression. For that he does an impressive reading of subjective violence instead of structural violence. It is important reinforce here: Sartre comes to be more tolerant to the idea of violence as he comes to understand the human condition in respect to the material conditions of scarcity and necessity throughout his life[229]:

> Sartre's ambivalence about violence therefore stems from the recognition that in the world of violence in which we live counterviolence may be the only way

[225] Sartre, J. P. (1948), Original: "*La violence, sous quelque forme qu'elle se manifeste, est un échec*".
[226] Fleming, M. (2011), p. 24.
[227] Lopes, V. S. (2016).
[228] Fanon, F. (2007).
[229] Fleming, M. (2011), p. 33.

> to overcome current forms of structural violence, although the result may merely be a reconfiguration of structural violence, not authentic humanity[230].

Another important name to be mentioned here it is that of Carl von Clausewitz, a general from the Kingdom of Prussia famous for his book *On War*, written and published in 1832. I come to cite his name to bring about the discussion of peace and war, and how this is related to violence. He hasn't written much about violence, although much of his work talk about it indirectly. Clausewitz is an essential name to understand war and strategic studies, international relations and politics, especially for being so referenced and quoted for his affirmation that "war is a continuation of politics by other means"[231]. It's important to note, regarding how this saying touch on discussions of power and politics, that the idea of war as is instrumental to Politics comes later. Violence appears as a mean for conflict resolution. War therefore, is taken as an act of violence to compel the opponent to fulfil one's will, being this violence the means of war to reach an end that is solely political: the subjection of the opponent. Raymond Aron, who has been mentioned, presents Clausewitz wanting the politics to continue in times of war, not violence to continue in times of peace, and viewing it as a means, violence or the use of forces remains a component of interstate relations, but it is neither its ultimate end nor its exclusive means to do so. This reality was taken as common, being idealistic to conceive that relations between states could be promoted only by peaceful means. Even in these cases of peace, the threat, the potential use of weapons, is present. Clausewitz's perspective affirms the all of this does not imply mitigation of the violence of war, but it does imply the disclosure of violence in politics itself[232].

The next name to be mentioned is Eric Weil, a French-German philosopher known for his efforts to develop a theory that places the conceptualization of violence at the center of philosophical reflection[233] – right here emerges an essential duality in his work: violence and reason. To him, human society supersedes what is solely animal because, beyond needs, people have desires. Humans live and act to respond to these desires, to overcome a state of dissatisfaction. Language plays a big role here, permitting the clear definition of what is and what is not. In face of this reality, mankind bases itself in its capacity to reason, desire and communicate. In midst of this capabilities emerges violence – before reason, violence is a

[230] Fleming, M. (2011), p. 35.
[231] Von Clausewitz, C. (2008).
[232] de Macedo, P. E. V. B. (2018).
[233] Nodari, P. C. (2017), p. 189.

choice[234]. According to Perine's readings on Weil[235], humans are the only ones to recognize violence because they are the ones to build a reason for life and for the world[236]. Violence only exists in a context in which there is reason and discourse. One can negate or accept violence, but this decision is made through reason. Because of this duality, the history of philosophy would be the history of the denial of violence, as this is what a real philosopher wants. Whatever impedes the realization of reason, "it is the desire for what is not legitimate, what is not reasonable, in a word: violence"[237], and for this, the nature of violence is not found in reason[238]. It's important to note here how the choice between reason and violence is intrinsically connected to freedom, as he argues there is freedom for this choice. Together with that, far from a manichaeistic, one should note that the reason, when malicious and directed, can also be of unspeakable capacity for violence[239]. Finally, we must know that the extinction and extirpation of violence in and from the world is completely impossible, due to the freedom that is inherent to human beings, always configuring violence as a threat, as latent[240].

Shifting the perspective to another analysis, one should not forget the contributions of Marx and Engels, especially because the discussion about violence here is part of their philosophy. Why they rejected achieving socialism by democratic and reformist methods? Why the insistence upon violent revolution? For those who read and study Marxist traditions, it appears a necessity of violent politics in Marx's philosophy. Stephen Hicks point out one set of reasons is simply about the impatience with political change in a democracy or a republic, in their current models. There's a long way and takes much time to advance with small steps, and this considering that those in power will always hinder the change of the *status quo*, coming to a point of bribing whomever to stay in power or using the police and military to suppress threats[241].

Still, some scholars will affirm there is a stronger philosophical reason that rules out democratic reformism: environmental determinism. This reading of Marx doubts the human nature, explaining that humans are plastic and shaped by their circumstances. He wrote that "it is not the consciousness of men that determines their lives, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness"[242]. The social aspect here is very important, to

[234] Nodari, P. C. (2017), p. 188-190.
[235] Perine, M. (1987), p. 56.
[236] Perine, M. (1987), p. 126.
[237] Perine, M. (1987), p. 57.
[238] Paviani, J. (2016), p. 17-18.
[239] Nodari, P. C. (2017), p. 191-192.
[240] Nodari, P. C. (2017), p. 202.
[241] Hicks, S. (2013).
[242] Marx, K. (1859).

highlight that the determining circumstances are fundamentally social. What humans are, "therefore, coincides with their production, both with what they produce and with how they produce. The nature of individuals thus depends on the material conditions determining their production"[243] – this sets his philosophy as a collective and economic determinism. Making this analysis of the modernity, Marx holds that capitalism – the ruling model – divides people into polarized economic classes, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Within it, members of the two classes are born and raised in fundamentally different and opposed economic circumstances. Hicks affirms that given their conditioning, there is no way for individuals of different classes to communicate effectively with each other, to understand the other's position, to change the other's mind. Each side has been molded to embody an opposed set of beliefs[244].

Democracy would presuppose the effectiveness of reason, but Marxism, however, rules that out on a different epistemological principle: knowledge is conditioning, not rational judgment. Because of that socialists cannot argue capitalists into socialism, as they cannot objectively present reasons or appeal to reason. They can only take over by violence and remove their social enemies[245]. This take on Marx and Engels is contested by Nick Hewlett[246], as he places emphasis on the humanizing aspects of their work, moving beyond dehumanization and mere violence, arguing for an ethics of violence in revolt. His questionings are extremely valid and important: under what circumstances (if any) is violence justified? If and when violence is legitimate, what are the limits to permissible violence? Is pacifism or quasi-pacifism an appropriate means of effecting change in some (or all) circumstances[247]?

Marxism, as a body of thought, does not have a properly-formed theory of violence, whether the customarily under capitalism or violence in revolt. This fact goes against how "the legacy of Marx and Engels regarding violence is often interpreted as justified violence against the profound and structural injustices of capitalism"[248], as one could even argue bringing up the closing lines of their *Manifesto of the Communist Party*[249] declaring that their objectives could "be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions". In his readings, Hewlett tries to approach the question of violence in a different fashion, going beyond the traditional "violence for just ends" without abandoning a broadly Marxist framework or advocating for a pure pacifist stance – it's an attempt to work the theoretical contribution of

[243] Marx, K. (1859).
[244] Hicks, S. (2013).
[245] Hicks, S. (2013).
[246] Hewlett, N. (2012).
[247] Hewlett, N. (2012), p. 882.
[248] Hewlett, N. (2012), p. 883.
[249] Marx, K. (2013)

historical materialism without devaluing the more ethical aspects of their thought or even the potential for exploring these aspects[250].

In regards to the ethics of violence in revolt, Hewlett points out three main categories. The first concern pacifists, arguing that "no violence is justified in struggles for transition from one type of regime to another and that violence is bound to have a dehumanizing effect on those who perpetrate it and therefore on any political arrangement emerging from a violent struggle". Names as Mahātmā Gandhi, Martin Luther King and Sara Ruddick are placed here. The second group argues that violence in defense of broadly-speaking liberal-democratic values, goals and achievements is justified under certain conditions, finding some examples in Michael Waltzer, Albert Camus and, according to some critics, Hannah Arendt. The third group category argues that violence "in favor of extreme oppression of some description is justified and that little more discussion is necessary on the subject". It being legitimate, this group is lenient with violence in revolt, given the illegitimacy of the enemy's own violent struggle. Marx and Engels philosophy would fit here together with names as Sorel, Fanon, Jean-Paul Sartre, and more recently Slavoj Žižek[251].

Taking Engel's *Anti-Dühring*, which is the most explicit treatment of violence in the foundational texts of Marxism, violence is presented almost as an inevitable byproduct of historical change in its political process. Hewlett proposes an approach that, through the ethics of freedom as the core of classical Marxism together with their critique of the economics and politics of capitalism, it is possible to conceive all violence as being antithetical to the notion of progress and freedom, but tragically necessary in certain circumstances. He argues that "any violence, to some degree at least, flies in the face of the goal of moving beyond exploitation, oppression and alienation" being either non-violence or minimum violence in any situation a goal in itself. It's interesting to point out how, according to Hewlett, this approaches Ruddick's 'feminist maternal peace politics', exploring the tension between maternal nurture and women's support for violence in certain circumstances[252].

Taking into account environmental discussions on the beginning of the twentieth-first century comes on to the scene the concept of Slow Violence, product of Rob Nixon's *Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor*. Using time as a provocation, the author explains that by slow violence he means "a violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an attritional violence

[250] Hewlett, N. (2012), p. 883.
[251] Hewlett, N. (2012), p. 884.
[252] Hewlett, N. (2012), p. 896.

that is typically not viewed as violence at all"[253]. It provokes us to expand our imaginations of what constitutes harm, appealing to forms of violence that have, over time, become unmoored from their original causes. "From gradually acidifying oceans, to the incremental horrors of climate change, to a myriad of other 'slowly unfolding environmental catastrophes', slow violence demands we look beyond the immediate, the visceral, and the obvious in our explorations of social injustice"[254]. Having pervasive but elusive impacts, this violence described by Rob Nixon is profoundly linked to Johan Galtung's structural violence (to be seen shortly). Coming in many forms, including climate change, deforestation, the ecological and health consequences of war, fertilizer and pesticide use, nuclear and industrial accidents, oil spills, resource extraction, and toxin releases among others, Nixon's work becomes an important and fascinating study of environmental injustice, the clearest example of what slow violence ultimately is[255].

2.4. Johan Galtung and Peace Research

One name has been mentioned multiple times throughout the sections of this chapter, one that represents a paramount theoretical and disciplinary turn in discussions regarding what is peace, its connection to philosophy and practice, its structure and the means to achieve it. From the very beginning of this dissertation Johan Galtung has been named, being here a central piece of my argument. Some of the names that I mentioned above have influenced him, while other have been influenced by him. In regards to the main two concepts we have been working with – violence and peace – Galtung appears as a fundamental piece in any analysis, not restrained to International Relations. His contributions have expanded in such a manner that a new field of studies was created and structured: *Peace Studies* is nowadays a discipline, but also a lens of analysis, giving the field its vertical and transdisciplinary character[256].

After all that we have seen until now, with all the names crossed in regards to peace and violence, comes the moment to understand better who was Johan Galtung, what he did and why is it so important. I opted to dedicate a space to him at this point of my work because I wanted the reader to cultivate and develop one's own perspective on the presented concepts as we advanced. As echoed by me throughout these pages, I questioned you what came into your

[253] Nixon, R. (2011).
[254] Davies, T. (2019), p. 2.
[255] Scanlan, S. J. (2014), p. 172.
[256] Webel, C. & Galtung, J. (2007), p. 229.

mind when I talked about peace, war and violence. Now, in order to advance, we shall understand better why Galtung's response to such questions were so innovative.

2.4.1. The Father of Peace Studies

Johan Galtung's family and ancestor were mainly from the medical field, so the story tells that when he was born, one of his uncles congratulated his parents by saying, "Today a new doctor is born!". Dietrich Fischer affirms that he had indeed became a kind of doctor, "but rather than treating individuals, his patients are entire societies with their pathologies, for which he developed diagnosis, prognosis and therapy"[257]. Being born in 24 October 1930, his childhood and adolescence were marked by reflections of the First World War, the Great Depression, the whole Second World War and the beginning of the Cold War. His father, working as doctor, was in direct contact with many people, civils and soldiers, and this direct contact propitiated young Galtung the opportunity to see the effects of war and conflicts in the lives of people. In 1951, while studying in Helsinki, he found a gap in the academy: there were thousands of books about war and military strategy research, but there was a lack of research for peace[258]. In his endeavour to occupy this blank space he has contributed with original research and insights in many areas of intellectual inquiry, writing many books, chapters and articles. He developed a method of peaceful conflict transformation called TRANSCEND and also helped mediate over one hundred international conflicts throughout his life, working frequent as a consultant to various United Nations agencies and as a lecturer in many universities[259].

On 1st of January 1959, Johan Galtung and his then wife Ingrid Eide founded the *International Peace Research Institute in Oslo* (PRIO), the world's first research institute with the word peace in its name. After the establishment of this first institute, he was present at the foundation of many other peace institutes around the world. Then, in 1964 he founded the *Journal of Peace Research*, which remains one of the leading journals in this field. Throughout the years of his adulthood, Galtung's work had a major impact in many conflicts, especially those that were a reflection of the Cold War (1947-1991). In many situations, as described by Dietrich Fischer in the introduction of the book *Johan Galtung, Pioneer of Peace Research*, the contributions of the Norwegian scholar were usually taken as (too) avant-garde. However, as author mentions the question of "the time not being ripe", as Schopenhauer said, "every new

[257] Galtung, J. & Fischer, D. (2013), p. 3.
[258] Galtung, J. & Fischer, D. (2013), p. 3-4.
[259] Galtung, J. & Fischer, D. (2013), p. 4-10.

idea will first be ridiculed, then violently opposed, and finally taken as self-evident". Fischer adds that Schopenhauer neglected a phase before all this: "the big silence. Countless proposals are dying by being silenced to death; that is why we need peace journalism"[260].

To better understand his impact as a scholar and practitioner, we can start to approach more mindfully some of his contributions. As will be developed in the following sessions, we can start by mentioning the impact of his article *Violence, Peace, and Peace Research*, published in 1969, in which he advocates for the clearer definition of peace and the importance of Peace Research. In 1971 is published *A structural theory of imperialism,* one of his most cited articles, in which he argues how the center of the Center, in collusion with the center of the Periphery and the periphery of the Center, exploits the poorest people, the periphery of the Periphery – an article that was product of his time as a visiting Professor at the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO) in Santiago, Chile. To complement his arguments on direct and structural violence (to be better explained), in 1990 Galtung published his article *Cultural Violence*, establishing his triangle of violence. Fischer also notes his contributions with the article *Peace economics: from a killing to a living economy*, published in 2012, regarding the promotion of a living economy, with its main focus on the satisfaction of basic human needs of those most in need, as opposed to today's killing economy[261].

To Galtung, one particular endeavor of those working professionally with peace, "besides conciliation (healing the effects of past violence) and peace building (preventing future violence), is conflict transformation"[262]. Analyzing a conflict through what he called the ABC triangle (not the same as the violence triangle), a peace worker could observe the attitudes ('enemy images' and 'friend images'), behavior (violent or nonviolent, verbal or physical) and contradictions (incompatible goals). He fiercely advocated that conflicts can rarely be completely 'resolved' to the point of disappearing, "but they can and must be transformed from being fought with violent means to being conducted by peaceful means, e.g. through dialogue".

> In analogy to medical terminology, conflicts are analyzed in terms of diagnosis (sources of a conflict), prognosis (likely trends without intervention), therapy (proposed interventions to prevent or reduce violence) and also therapy of the

[260] Galtung, J. & Fischer, D. (2013), p. 11.
[261] Galtung, J. & Fischer, D. (2013), p. 11-12.
[262] Galtung, J. & Fischer, D. (2013), p. 13.

past, or 'counter-factual history' (what could have been done differently in the past, by whom, to prevent or reduce violence)[263].

Through these many years of observation, research and practice, he developed the already mentioned TRANSCEND method of peaceful conflict transformation. Fischer explains that Galtung observed how simply "bringing the conflict parties to the table" for face to face negotiation could be counterproductive, considering the situations that started with a stream of mutual accusations and a shouting match, what would often exacerbate a conflict instead of resolving it in his experience. With his method, he would divide the process in three steps: first, stablish individual dialogues with all the many parties to understand their goals, fears and concerns and win their confidence, listening to what they say but also always carefully listening to what people do not say. Secondly, the mediator, knowing the demands of the multiple sides, would distinguish between legitimate goals, which affirm human needs, and illegitimate goals, which violate human needs. Lastly, Bridge the gap between all legitimate but seemingly contradictory goals. Clearly, this is a simplified explanation of a complex method that took years of experience to develop[264]. Galtung firmly believed that we need many more trained mediators who can help transform conflicts peacefully before they lead to violence, different from most governments which wait until a conflict erupts in war and then intervene with military force, instead of seeking a peaceful solution long before it leads to violence. "Violence is to an unresolved conflict like smoke to fire. To get rid of the smoke, it is necessary to extinguish the fire. And to prevent or end violence, it is necessary to transform the underlying conflict"[265].

With all his practice as a proficient mediator and peacemaker, as a researcher and professor with a highly creative, original mind, as a prolific author, Galtung has made significant contributions aiming at a better world as a peacebuilder. He has encouraged many people, young and old, to work for the same ideals, spreading the idea of peace being more than just philosophical thinking. For all these reasons, Johan Galtung is widely regarded as the principal founder – or father – of the field of Peace Studies[266]. For the purpose of this dissertation, aiming at understanding well how Galtung approached the question of violence in his work, we shall go through two of his most important articles.

[263] Galtung, J. & Fischer, D. (2013), p. 13.
[264] Galtung, J. & Fischer, D. (2013), p. 13-16.
[265] Galtung, J. & Fischer, D. (2013), p. 16.
[266] Galtung, J. & Fischer, D. (2013), p. 22.

2.4.2. A typology of peace, a typology of violence

The first article – *Violence, Peace, and Peace Research* – was published on the Journal of Peace Research in 1969. It starts by noting how the word peace is overused. To him, this happens because "seeking for peace" brings consensus, as it is an objective everybody wants to achieve. After all, it's hard to be against peace. Thus, when we think about policy making, it is rational and sound to think that, in addition to other merits it may have, it will also serve to achieve peace. If done thoughtlessly, however, it can neglect past experiences and justify dubious theories as a reasonable expectation for the future. Still, Galtung argues for its relevance, as it "provides opponents with a one-word language in which to express values of concern and togetherness because peace is on anybody's agenda"[267]. One must always recollect the fact that no one has any monopoly on the definition of peace – for that, understanding what peace means for each side brings a greater comprehension and meaning, leading to better conflict management.

Those who use the term frequently in a research context, as a cognitive tool, should at least gather some experience when it comes to definitions that should be avoided for one reason or another. This attention regards how the frequent use of the word 'peace' commonly gives an unrealistic image of the world. Exactly to tackle this amorphous definition of peace, with the objective of clarifying it to stablish a common ground when approaching it, Galtung proposed three simple principles: First, "the term 'peace' shall be used for social goals at least verbally agreed to by many, if not necessarily by most". Secondly, "these social goals may be complex and difficult, but not impossible, to attain". Thirdly, "the statement *peace is absence of violence* shall be retained as valid". In other words, peace must be understood as acceptable by many, attainable and in negation to violence. The last principle, taken as the most essential, defines a peaceful social order not as a point, a monolithic state, but as a region, a space from which violence is absent[268].

Consequently, the thought presented above requires a definition of violence. As he says, it is an unavoidable question with suggestions that will surely be unsatisfactory to many. But Galtung doesn't go directly for a definition or a typology – for there are obviously many types of violence. Before that he wants the reader to acknowledge "theoretically significant dimensions of violence that can lead thinking, research and, potentially, action, towards the most important problems". Why he does that? Well, if actions for peace conform as actions

[267] Galtung, J. (1969), p. 167.
[268] Galtung, J. (1969), p. 167-168.

against violence, one must understand violence in a broader sense to include its most significant varieties. This creates an understanding of violence as a region, as a spectrum, just like peace – specific enough, all the same, to serve as a basis for research and concrete action. With all of that, the "definition of 'peace' becomes a major part of a scientific strategy". Here it is interesting to note how Galtung presents it as a challenge when saying that it will probably not be agreed by most people, as it does not consent to common sense, but it should as well not be agreed my many, keeping its construct far from any subjectivist basis. It should not be utopian, as an impossible objective, yet not focused solely on the political agenda, as it is complex and a difficult thing to attain. Most important, it should work as a concept for a more political, intellectual and scientific perspective, for the present and for the future[269].

On regards to the second section of the article, Johan Galtung is very precise and straightforward: as a referential definition, an Archimedean Point to his theory, "violence is present when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations"[270]. In other words, violence occurs when a human being is hindered from achieving one's potential realization. Developing a little further, "violence is any avoidable insult to basic human needs, and, more generally, to sentient life of any kind, defined as that which is capable of suffering pain an enjoy well-being", understanding that it lowers the real level of needs satisfaction below what is potentially possible[271]. The reader should be aware, going through this definition, of its extension – an extended concept of violence is indispensable, but it should be scientifically and logically built, to not be taken merely as a list of undesirables. Another note should mind the difference of *actual* and *potential*: violence is here defined as causes of difference between the potential and the actual, between what is and what could have been or can be. Violence increases this distance, or avoids the decrease of it. So, when the *potential* is higher than the *actual* and this difference could be avoided or diminished by human interference, then violence is present[272].

When examining the dimensions of violence, it is useful to understand violence in terms of influence. With that, it is necessary to presuppose an influencer, an influencee, and a mode of influencing. Looking at dynamics of people, in other words, we can assume a subject, an object, and an action. Every dynamic of violence will have these parts, with changes that are covered by six different dimensions according to Galtung[273]. The first dimension on the mode

[269] Galtung, J. (1969), p. 168.
[270] Galtung, J. (1969), p. 168.
[271] Galtung, J. & Fischer, D. (2013), p. 35.
[272] Galtung, J. (1969), p. 168-169.
[273] Galtung, J. (1969), p. 169-172.

of influence (action)between physical and psychological violence, with one "that works on the body and the one that works on the soul". The second dimension to be made is between negative and positive approach to influence, through punishment and reward. The third dimension regards specifically the influencee (object), whether or not there is an object that is hurt. The fourth distinction, taken as the most important by Galtung, is to be made on the influencer side (subject): whether or not there is a subject who acts. To quote him directly, "we shall refer to the type of violence where there is an actor that commits the violence as *personal* or *direct*, and to violence where there is no such actor as *structural* or *indirect*"[274]. To not overwork the word violence Galtung proposes the referral to structural violence as social injustice. The fifth distinction to be made is between intended or unintended violence, bringing into focus the fact that a system, looking only for intentional violence, will fail to capture structural violence as a whole. Lastly, the sixth distinction to be made is between manifest and latent violence, between the identifiable and the imminent, in which the level of actual realization is not sufficient to protect against the worsening of the current situation by upholding mechanisms[275].

Taking into account all these possibilities when thinking about violence, and if peace is regarded as absence of violence, then thinking about peace (and consequently peace research and peace action) should be structured in similar ways. Again, Galtung emphasizes the differentiation between personal and structural violence: the object of personal violence perceives the act, and can complain about it, but the object of structural violence may be persuaded (without knowing it) to not perceive the violence at all. In other terms, personal violence is visible and dynamic, while structural violence is silent, it does not show. "In a static society, personal violence will be registered, whereas social injustice may be seen as about as natural as the air"[276]. The current take of these two kinds of violence, through the perspective of static and dynamic moments, conceives structural violence as something stable, whereas personal violence has a fluctuating presence over time. One may be more easily noticed, even though the other contains tools for a bigger violence[277].

Then Galtung approaches the means of personal and structural violence, trying to make this distinction less abstract, conducting the reader to explore how personal and structural violence, are, in fact, carried out. Thinking about *personal* or *direct* violence, there is a well-specified task to be done: to do bodily harm unto others, and in this dynamic the subject and

[274] Galtung, J. (1969), p. 170.
[275] Galtung, J. (1969), p. 169-172.
[276] Galtung, J. (1969), p. 173.
[277] Galtung, J. (1969), p. 173-174.

the object are clear and essential. With the introduction of refined tools and differentiated social organizations the process of inflicting damage developed and got complex, having its reflections on weapons, arms and armies. In all this process, to perceive a more systematic view the reader must look to the target: a human being. Taking a human as the object of this kind of violence, Galtung develops a typology of personal somatic violence – and we know about its functions anatomically (crushing, tearing, burning, poisoning) and physiologically (denial of air, water, food, movement). In other words, violence aimed at one of two possibilities: trying to destroy the entity itself or trying to prevent it from well-functioning. Here emerges the question: is it possible to construct a corresponding typology for structural violence[278]?

Well, factors as inequality and power distribution can be measured. within this context, one may ask: which factors, apart from personal violence and the threat of it, tend to uphold inequality? At this point, the sciences of social structure are indispensable for understanding structural violence. Galtung notes that, coming from the perspective of international relations, the reader could perceive nations as being part of a (international) structure, but nations can be structures themselves in their own rights. This explains the take on levels of actors, going from international to intrapersonal. In all these systems there is interaction, and where there is interaction, the author says that value is exchanged. Considering these interactions, there are factors that serve to maintain inegalitarian distributions in these systems, and they can be seen as mechanisms of structural violence[279].

Social systems will have a tendency to develop all necessary mechanisms unless deliberately and persistently prevented from doing so. Inequality, as mentioned by Galtung, "then shows up in differential morbidity and mortality rates, between individuals in a district, between districts in a nation, and between nations in the international system". All of this deprives the underdogs to organize their power to bear against the topdogs, like their voting, bargaining or striking power, mainly because they are partly atomized and disintegrated. The consequences of all of this are easily perceived as bodily harm, but structural violence may be recorded as psychological violence. With that, it is possible to see that different means lead to highly similar results[280].

When approaching the relation between personal and structural violence Galtung proposes a series of questions, and I invite the reader to really think about the answers to such inquires. First, is there really a distinction between personal and structural violence at all? If there is,

[278] Galtung, J. (1969), p. 174-175.
[279] Galtung, J. (1969), p. 176.
[280] Galtung, J. (1969), p. 177.

does not one type of violence presuppose the manifest presence of the other? Assuming that pure types exist, could it not nevertheless be said that they have a pre-history of the other type? And, if this is not generally the case, could it not be that one type of violence presupposes the latent presence of the other? Or could it not be that one is the price we have to pay for the absence of the other? Lastly, could it not be that one type is much more important in its consequences than the other? Johan Galtung separates a whole section of his article going through each one of these questions, and they are indeed essential as they propose an analysis of the relation between the two stablished types of violence[281].

To begin, on regards to the distinction between the two types of violence, if one person takes those them as two completely distinct things, it disregards the influence and presence of one upon the other. Scilicet, there is a little element of personal violence in structural violence and *vice versa*. Galtung, however, sees the need to affirm: this does not mean there is no difference. There is a direct result from actions taken and there is the violence that hits humans indirectly because of repressive structures. There is a qualitative difference between these actions. The objective consequences, not the subjective intentions are the primary concern. From that emerges another set of questions: Is it possible to determine the distinction of violence empirically? On another note, is it possible to have one without the existence of the other, like a pure form violence? Is it possible to conceive a situation where the structure is violent, but there is no violence in personal level and *vice versa*? Can a structure be violent regardless of the existence of one type of violence[282]?

Galtung proposes a positive answer to all of them, noting how they are empirically independent. Although they are related, one does not presuppose the other. This assumption, however, cannot confirm that there is no causal relationship between them. It's not hard to take, for example, that structural violence breeds structural violence and personal violence breeds personal violence. In spite of that, Galtung points to the perspective of cross-breeding. Considering this, it is hard to conceive pure cases for types of violence. This assumption, however, does not invalidate any research regarding history, causes, consequences and the future of any of these types of violence. This view-point, more than anything, considering this cross-breeding theoretical perspective on types of violence, begs the questions: How did it started? Is there an initial point? Can it be spontaneous, or all violence comes from a common and singular type of violence, like an 'original sin'[283]?

[281] Galtung, J. (1969), p. 177.
[282] Galtung, J. (1969), p. 179-180.
[283] Galtung, J. (1969), p. 179.

The author mentions that even considering *Tabula Rasa* conditions – individuals are born without built-in mental content, and, therefore all knowledge comes from experience or perception – one may argue that an organized structure, that may be violent, would come naturally because individuals are naturally different and these differences are, somehow, relevant for their interaction behavior. Galtung, hence, points to the need of special measures to prevent the formation of these structures, as structural violence seems to be more 'natural' than structural peace, with the same happens with personal violence, perhaps it being more 'natural' than personal peace[284]. Advancing on the argument, even considering that one type of violence does not presuppose the manifest presence of the other type (Synchronically or diachronically), one should consider, nevertheless, the situation of that manifest structural violence presupposing latent personal violence.

When this stablished structure (which normally benefits a group) is threatened, those who benefit from the structural violence it creates, will try to preserve the *status quo*, built to protect their interests. Here it is possible to rank members in their interest in maintaining the structure, and the reader can note how the relationship and its main characteristics, which does not appear clearly in controlled times, is brought up to the surface when there is turbulence. So, until this point, Galtung discusses the ideas of one type of violence being used to obtain or sustain the other type, whether manifest or latent. Again, proposing more questions to lead the argument, he applies the same logic to construct another problem: Is one type of violence necessary or sufficient to abolish the other type? From this very question rises four assumptions that are central to contemporary political debate: First, the idea that structural violence is *sufficient* to abolish personal violence; then, secondly, you could take structural violence as *necessary* to abolish personal violence. Changing the order but applying the same logics, personal violence is *sufficient* to abolish structural violence or, personal violence is *necessary* to abolish structural violence (being this last one part of famous revolutionary propositions)[285].

The conclusion of the section about the relation between the two types of violence is that both are very complex and none of them should be object of reductionism or should be studied singly, ignoring the other. It is, by some definition, a dialectical relation. As Galtung say, there is always the possibility to argue that one is much more important in its consequences than the other. This is not impossible to analyze, empirically speaking, as one can support such arguments in data regarding mortality, morbidity and exploration, for example. The numbers

[284] Galtung, J. (1969), p. 179.
[285] Galtung, J. (1969), p. 181.

could appear as the difference between the potential and the actual, being even possible to calculate the costs of the joint operation of the two forms of violence. One feature to highlight in researches such as suggested, like study cases, regards how their results can evidence the empirical costs and gains in investments on personal and structural violence. Conclusions here could serve well to back up statements and arguments in such empirical approaches[286].

Despite the attractiveness of those results, Johan Galtung argues that those researches do not serve for simply accepting cost-benefit analysis as basis for political action. One must keep in mind that those are not "Cold numbers", so it is important to be aware of what is behind them and what they represent. An approach of these numbers as a whole statistical analysis will hardly arrive at any general judgment to which type of violence is more important. "There is a range of examples in the world to be studies; examples of structural and personal level violence, manifest and latent[287]".

Arriving at the last section of his article, Johan Galtung finally touches on the discussion of definition of *peace* and *peace research*. After all that has been discussed above, we should be able to understand that an extended concept of violence leads to an extended concept of peace. In other words, peace is two sided, being the absence of personal violence and the absence of structural violence. From this point, Galtung refers to these as negative peace and positive peace, respectively. The reader should be mindful that the absence of personal violence does not lead naturally to a positively defined condition, while the positive character is given because of the absence of structural violence as a positively defined condition. Peace conceived this way is not only a matter of reducing the possibilities of violence, but stablishing a path towards a more peaceful structure. Here, the reader should already understand that peace theory is linked with conflict theory and development theory. Those two sides are intertwined and connected, as a complexity. One may attempt to approach only one side, but we have already discussed how they are profoundly related to each other, risking any analysis to be shallow, lacking or misleading. "We may summarize by saying that too much research emphasis on one aspect of peace tends to rationalize extremism (…), depending on whether one-sided emphasis is put on 'absence of personal violence' or on 'social justice'[288]".

Also, implying that a moderate course between the two biased analyses could be the better way to attain peace is Wrong, as Galtung affirms. If done incorrectly, efforts to avoid one type of violence may even lead to the acceptance of the other type, or even both types in a

[286] Galtung, J. (1969), p. 182-183.
[287] Galtung, J. (1969), p. 182-183.
[288] Galtung, J. (1969), p. 184.

manifest/latent dynamic. Here emerges the questioning: if we are interested in social justice, for example, but also in the avoidance of personal violence, does this constrain our choice of means in a way that it becomes meaningful only in certain societies, or impractical on other societies? This begs the question:

> Thus, if our choice of means in the fight against structural violence is so limited by the non-use of personal violence that we are left without anything to do in highly repressive societies, whether the repression is latent or manifest, then how valuable is this recipe for peace?[289]".

As an answer to the problem risen above, Johan Galtung says that peace research has to reject and renew its definition of peace constantly. Again, following the basic assumptions for the Galtungian definition of peace, it has to be attainable and this could be an absence of any type of violence depending on where the priorities are. The approach given in this paper suggests that the two shall be approached in a completely symmetrical manner, considering their relation. However, one is not an adornment to the other, and prioritization in any analysis may come as unavoidable, in research and empirically. Another answer would be to give up the use of the word *peace*, as it already encompasses so much and this usually creates problems. It would be better, for example, to be more objective and straightforward when stating interests. The use of the word should be mindful, being replaced or not using it unless it is necessary[290].

The best answer, although, would be to value both goals as significant, noting that it is probably a disservice to try, in any abstract way, to say that one is more important than the other. In face of that, "the view that one cannot meaningfully work for both absence of personal violence and for social justice can (…) be seen as essentially pessimistic". Peace research is concerned with the conditions for promoting both aspects of peace, and there are already many forms of social work that combines both of them. Alongside, the fields of study and research, together with pragmatic and empiric peace work, are expanding and evolving. Galtung closes his article by reminding us that ""there are more than enough people willing to sacrifice one for the other – it is by aiming for both that peace research can make a real contribution"[291].

[289] Galtung, J. (1969), p. 183-184.
[290] Galtung, J. (1969), p. 185-186.
[291] Galtung, J. (1969), p. 186.

2.4.3. The triangle of violence

The second article to be thoroughly mentioned here – *Cultural Violence* – was published on the Journal of Peace Research in 1990, two decades after the presentation of his typology around direct and structural violence. It basically starts by defining cultural violence as those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence, that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence. t does not represent a whole culture, although, as he points that entire cultures can hardly be classified as violent. What happens is that cultures can have not only one, but a whole set of violent aspects. Considering this, it may be challenging to differentiate cultural violence from a violent culture. To avoid committing this mistake, a researcher needs a systematic research process[292]. Followed by this, studies of violence deal with two problems: the use of violence (made clear by his 1969's article) and the legitimization of that use. This cultural violence works hanging the moral color of an act, or making reality opaque, making difficult its acknowledgement and thus its analysis. That is why peace studies rely on a violence typology, now being expanded with this third category.

Galtung explains that in order to understand better the concept, one could start by approaching its negation – cultural peace – as a set of aspects of culture that serves to justify and legitimize direct and structural peace. Considering this, just like the possibility of a label for a "violent culture", one could find the means to label a "peace culture". Within this frame, the author affirms that "the major task of peace research is that never-ending search for peace culture". This could be problematic, however, because of the temptation to institutionalize (and universalize) such culture, what could become a cultural imposition, thus a violent act. The reader, coming in contact with this concept of cultural violence, should understand that it makes direct and structural violence look right, feel right – or at least not wrong. As Galtung says, "the study of cultural violence highlights the way in which the act of direct violence and the fact of structural violence are legitimized and thus rendered acceptable in society"[293].

Just for the merit of mention, Galtung returns to his definitions on direct and structural violence in the second section of his text. As most of it has been presented above, I will only point out some commentaries that called my attention. For example, when combining the distinctions between direct and structural violence four classes of basic needs can be recognized[294]: survival needs, well-being needs, identity needs, and freedom needs. Followed

[292] Galtung, J. (1990), p. 291.
[293] Galtung, J. (1990), p. 292.
[294] Galtung, J. (1990), p. 292.

by that, the author notes how this table is anthropocentric[295]. Considering this, he assumes that "the rest of Nature", could be added. Violence towards "the rest of Nature" could then result in ecological degradation, breakdown and imbalance. Therefore, the sum of survival, well-being, identity and freedom needs with mentioned ecological balance can be identified and defined as "Peace"[296].

One should note that this ecological balance is a very broad term encompassing biotic (non-life) and abiotic (life) characters. Violence, from the human perspective, would normally touch the second, being defined as an insult to life. Using his medical allusions, Galtung reminds us that like pathology (studies), violence studies must reflect a reality to be known and understood.

For example, attacking survival needs with killing, maiming, and similar types of aggression are clearly identified as direct violence. This is very present on war, but the direct opposite of that should not be identified as peace. A different kind of violence could be attacking well-being needs with sanctions and blockades, leading to a slow but intentional killing through situations like malnutrition and lack of medical attention, or attacking identity needs with alienation, though unwanted socialization, meaning the internalization of culture with a violent purpose – a desocialization from one's own culture and/or resocialization into another culture, but forced, without choice. We could also consider attacking freedom needs with repression though detention (locking people in) and expulsion (locking people out)[297].

When approaching exploitation, one of many types of structural violence, the topdogs get much more out of the interaction with the structure than the underdogs, what could lead to a situation that is so disadvantageous that the oppressed may die, or left in a permanent, unwanted state of misery, considering malnutrition and illness. As should be noted, A violent structure does not only leave marks on the human body but also on the mind and the spirit[298]. Other strategies can be used to impede consciousness formation and mobilization, two conditions for effective struggle against exploitation. Galtung mentions attacks on identity needs via penetration (invade space) and segmentation (keep uninformed), or attacks on freedom needs via marginalization (keep outside) and fragmentation (keep separated). As he notes, they all can be seen as variants on a general theme of structurally built-in repression. The reader should remind that exploitation and repression go hand in hand. When addressing the above-

[295] Galtung, J. & Fischer, D. (2013), p. 36.
[296] Galtung, J. (1990), p. 292.
[297] Galtung, J. (1990), p. 293-294.
[298] Galtung, J. & Fischer, D. (2013), p. 38.

mentioned issue with nature, direct violence could be identified in acts such as slashing and burning, as they are visible and clear. Structural violence, on the other hand, are seen on pollution and depletion, killing nature slowly, reflexes of industrial activity and a world-encompassing commercialization[299].

So, in an exercise to relate the three types of violence, one should consider a typology of violence (direct and structural) as being related with general basic human needs (those necessary to achieve potentially possible satisfaction levels). Adding Cultural Violence in a third corner it is possible to construct an image of the violence triangle. Such image can be showcased in six different positions (three pointing downward, three upward), and each one represents a different story, a different perspective, on how these relations can be stablished. Independent of their position, there is a basic difference in time relation of the three concepts of violence: direct violence is always an *ad hoc* event, a phenomenon, while structural violence is a process, with ups and downs. With this new analysis, emerges cultural violence, characterized for being (almost) invariant, given the slow transformations that cultures go through[300].

Advancing on the discussion, Galtung reminds us, as both direct and structural violence create a deficit of needs, that when this happens the analysis on it can start talking about trauma. It can sediment into the subconscious and become raw material for major processes and events. The underlying assumption is simple, according to the author: "violence breeds violence". Another way to put this is understanding that violence is, mainly, needs deprivation, and this being a serious as it is, one reaction that can be waited is direct (responsive) violence. Obviously, this is not the only reaction that can be accounted, for there is boiling and violent responses and freezing and apathetic responses. As a given example, the author presents us how the topdogs tend to response accordingly with the latter. They prefer "governability" to "trouble, anarchy". "Indeed, a major form of cultural violence indulged in by ruling elites is to blame the victim of structural violence who throws the first stone, not into a glasshouse but to get out of the iron cage"[301]. In this case, structural violence is what makes cultural violence transparent.

Building this Strata Image of violence as a triangle helps us in the analysis of their relations, assuming that all three stances may start at any point, proceeding to another corner of the triangle and then moving to the last one. You have six possibilities, carrying six different

[299] Galtung, J. (1990), p. 293-294.
[300] Galtung, J. (1990), p. 294-295.
[301] Galtung, J. (1990), p. 295.

perspectives, telling six different stories. In face of that, Galtung even questions if it there could be a genetically transmitted predisposition for aggression (direct) and domination (structural). Well, the potentiality for it is certainly there, as for direct and structural peace. Galtung's argument against biological determinism postulating a drive in human nature for aggression and dominance is the high level of variability in aggressiveness and dominance. He does not agree to take it as a drive, as the pursue for food, rest or procreation. One could argue that the drive is there, not only strong enough to assert itself under all circumstances. Before that, he affirms that one of the duties of a peace researcher would then be to know more about those circumstances, and to explore how to remove or identify them[302].

Throughout a whole section of his article Galtung dispose several examples of cultural violence. His objective is clear: to identify the cultural element and show how it can, empirically or potentially, be used to legitimize direct or structural violence. To do this, he goes through several issues: regarding religion, he mentions the case about a figure of a transcendental and almighty God and the Manichaeism that comes from it in the division of the chosen and the unchosen people; regarding ideology, a successor of religion, mainly in form of political power, in which God now takes the form of the modern state. Emerges nationalism and ideologies around nation-states; regarding language, it is taken as a foundation of culture, as it is used functionally to build it. Without language, little can be done, and even less studied. Being so essential, its defects are deep rooted and hidden from most eyes. Language can have clear cases of discrimination in its structure, like Latin languages and its sexism, as well as drawing rigid modes of thinking with very specific vocabulary for communication, hence the western pride in being so logical; regarding arts, Galtung shows how it perpetuates history and language, building up images and discourses in the minds of people. The example given by the author shows how art helped on the construction of the self-image of Europe. Here the reader could extend this impact to perceive how this image of Europe, constructed by art, was part of colonialism and continues to serve as a tool for it[303].

Regarding empirical sciences, he mentions neoclassical economic doctrine, as it legitimizes a world market structure in the division of labor. This can be seen as violent as it, as a science, serves as a justification for a rough division that reproduces Capitalism and its problems in processes of globalization the international division of labor. It could be changed, mainly by the countries negatively affected by it, choosing only to change its production

[302] Galtung, J. (1990), p. 296.
[303] Galtung, J. (1990), p. 296-300.

choices. But to do so is not easy when there is a structure that already privileges those on top that make use of this division; Regarding formal sciences, there is the case of how even a mathematical thought can be violent – not it as an object of a discipline, but the influences it has in our society. Its logical workings lead us into a particular mode of thought (mostly, binary and polarizing). The way this affects in personal, social and world spaces became a problem; Lastly, Galtung presents how the cosmology concept is designed to harbor that substratum of deeper assumptions about reality, defining what is normal and natural. He argues that in this level occidental culture shows so many violent features that the whole culture starts looking violent. It binds all the violent aspects of existence. In here, we return to the problem of the transitions from cultural violence to violent culture. The whole culture possesses a tremendous potential for violence that can be expressed at the more manifest cultural level and then be used to justify the unjustifiable[304].

When questioning how to deal with the above-mentioned problems, Galtung reaches out to the contributions of Mahātmā Gandhi to address the different types of violence. According to Gandhi, direct and structural violence should be addressed with two axioms: Unity-of-life and Unity-of-means-and-ends. Galtung explains that no life should be used as a means to an end. Considering this, if the end is livelihood, then the means has to be life-enhancing. Unity, within these axioms, represents the idea that all forms of life, particularly human life, should enjoy closeness (against separations) and not be kept apart by Self-Other gradients, that is to say, the idea of distancing the other, what is not *Self*, neglecting alterity. He also argues that the means must be good in themselves, avoiding terms of distant goals, giving us the example of the millions sacrificed in the name of 'growth/capitalism' and 'revolution/socialism'. The author affirms that "any Self-Other gradient can be used to justify violence against those lower down on the scale of worthiness; any casual chain can be used to justify the use of violent means to obtain non-violent ends"[305]. Gandhi takes from these two axioms the respect for the sacredness of all life and the acceptance of the precept "take care of the means and the ends will take care of themselves"[306].

Concluding the article, the reader should have clear that from an institutionalized violent structure and an internalized violent culture emerges direct violence as something common and acceptable. Galtung argues that violence can start at any corner in the violence triangle, and is easily transmitted to the other corners, in a self-sustaining dynamic. A virtuous change in this

[304] Galtung, J. (1990), p. 300-301.
[305] Galtung, J. (1990), p. 302.
[306] Galtung, J. (1990), p. 302.

vicious triangle should be obtained by working on all three corners at the same time, not assuming that a basic change in one will automatically lead to change of the other two. It is interesting to note that the inclusion of the cultural aspects on regards to peace broadens the agenda for peace studies and research considerably[307]. As said before, the opposite of cultural violence would be a 'cultural peace', not in utopic terms, meaning aspects of a culture that serve to justify, legitimize direct peace and structural peace. If many and diverse aspects of that kind are found in a culture it can be referred to as a 'peace culture'[308]. As taken many times by Galtung and the group of scholars that follow his steps and develops his contributions, "violence is a pathology, to be treated as such"[309].

2.5. Challenges on Conceptualizing Violence

By this point, I hope the reader has understood the main arguments in Galtung's contributions, mainly about how peace is related to war and how the definitions on violence play a big role in developing an understanding of Galtungian theory. Having the biggest contribution in field of peace studies and being the biggest reference in the field as well[310], many of the people that came after him advanced with his work, and together with that, many came to criticize and present counter arguments on what Galtung defended. This is of uttermost importance here, because this very dissertation intends to present a critical perspective on the contributions of Johan Galtung, and it has to be highlighted that many critiques rose ever since Galtung started presented his 1969 article. Challenges on the conceptualization of violence appeared, especially with the world changing in such a pace as it happened in the last years of the century. Much had to be revised, and Galtung tried to keep himself updated, being an example of that the connection between his famous text from 1969 and the other one from 1990, as both have been previously mentioned and presented. Coming to this point of the text, it is important to understand the critiques that appeared, as they pave our path to the next chapter.

As already mentioned, the text *Violence, Peace, and Peace Research*, published by Johan Galtung in 1969 is taken as the founding framework in which the author introduces the terms to define the field of Peace Research. The article begins by dealing with how the term Peace is overused, without prudence. The argument is that such a concept is on everyone's agenda, so

[307] Galtung, J. (1990), p. 302.
[308] Galtung, J. & Fischer, D. (2013), p. 39.
[309] Galtung, J. & Fischer, D. (2013), p. 40.
[310] Galtung, J. & Fischer, D. (2013), p. 5.

it's common ground for conflicting sides and groups. For that, understanding what peace means for each side can bring a greater understanding and meaning of its extension. The fact is that no one has a monopoly on the definition of the concept. Thus, to provide a foundation for this new area of research, it is clear that the search for a scientific definition that will serve as a basis to guide concrete actions becomes one of its main objectives[311].

Also, as already presented, in order to achieve this goal, Galtung proposes a definition for the concept of violence, as its understanding would be essential to the conceptualization of peace. In the second part of his text, the author tries exactly to explore this definition and its dimension. One of the most relevant excerpts is that I take from the author is saying that "violence is present when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental achievements are below their potential achievements". Here there is a difference between the real and the potential, and violence lies precisely in the difference between these two. The author develops an understanding of the dimensions of violence, dealing with six points that helps its understanding, being the main point the differentiation between personal (or direct) violence, in which it is clear who committed it, and structural violence (or indirect), in which it is not clear who acted violently. For the latter, violence is intrinsic to the structure and presents itself as an inequality of power and, consequently, as unequal possibilities of life[312].

Further on the text, Galtung explores the possible means for carrying out personal and structural violence, in addition to developing some thoughts on the relationship between the two types. As presented above, a whole line of reasoning is developed in which the author shows how both terms are independent, but highly interconnected, trying to propose a reflection on the possibilities of abolishing one type, and what the effects would be on the other, and *vice versa*. It is a fact, with everything proposed, that it is hardly possible to reach a general judgment about which type of violence is more important, and there is not so much clarity on how to deal with them for research purposes[313]. In the fifth and last part, dealing with the definitions of Peace and Peace Studies, Galtung argues that an expanded concept of violence leads to an expanded concept of peace. Thus, it can be said that peace has two sides as well, reflecting the absence of personal violence and the absence of structural violence. The absence of each violence is referred to as negative peace and positive peace, respectively[314], and both

[311] Galtung, J. (1969), p. 168.
[312] Galtung, J. (1969), p. 170-171.
[313] Galtung, J. (1969), p. 182-183.
[314] Galtung, J. (1969), p. 183.

are significant, making it impossible to say which is more important or deserves more attention. Peace Studies is concerned with the conditions to promote both, and it is precisely by focusing on this that a real contribution from this scientific area will be achieved[315].

Due to its relevance and the prominence it gained, especially after 1969, Galtung's productions were the target of several criticisms and provocations as I said at the beginning of this section. The text *A Question of Values: A Critique of Galtung's Peace Research*, written by Peter Lawler in 1989, is one of the most notorious I found. The author claims that Johan Galtung's works attracted a small number of comments, despite the extent of his productions. It is important, for the present case, to note that this comment was made twenty years after the text referenced above. For Lawler, having been the only prominent figure in the field in all this time required Galtung's work to be approached more critically[316]. His main argument focused on the weaknesses of the so-called integrity of Peace Studies, since, according to him, there was a lack of greater self-contemplation in its normative character, which contributed to a perspective in which values were already presupposed and research started from this point on. As for Lawler the field of studies developed by Galtung did not have clear values, it had a prerogative for its questioning, as well as in any field of studies. All this because, in his perspective, there should not be possibilities for a foundation of universal values or critical principles, such as those presented by Galtung[317].

Lawler's text is very enlightening as it presents a direct criticism to different points in the arguments of Johan Galtung's work. The second part of the text highlights the sociological basis of the Norwegian author, in which he points out a path built on positivism and how this approach transfers some of its flaws and vices to Peace Studies. Peace tries to establish itself as a science and it is also about the definition of peace. A point that Lawler highlights and that serves the purposes of this project is how, contrary to the traditional focus on relations between States, the field of Peace Research began with a global focus, with its field of identification being "global problems in a global perspective"[318]. When dealing with the definition of the term Lawler points out several aspects already mentioned in this dissertation. A point that deserves close attention, however, is his assertion that the premises of the functions on which Galtung built Peace Studies could not disguise the fact that he assumed that the pursuit of positive peace was a self-evident and universal normative project[319].

[315] Galtung, J. (1969), p. 185-186.
[316] Lawler, P. (1989), p. 27.
[317] Lawler, P. (1989), p. 29.
[318] Lawler, P. (1989), p. 40.
[319] Lawler, P. (1989), p. 44.

Lawler's criticism points to an analysis of what Galtung defends, from a more critical perspective. A large part of his notes are somewhat methodological, especially when it comes to focusing on the question of values and the reasoning bases on which Galtung builds his theory. When questioning about peace, following the reasoning of Peace Studies, it is possible to extend its criticisms to what is interpreted as violence, and this is more evident in the sixth part of the text, in which Lawler shows how part of the Galtugian argument was criticized by Marxist perspectives, for example, especially with regard to structural violence[320].

For those, Galtung's approach neglected the relevance of political-economic issues in the relations between the developed and underdeveloped worlds. Thus, in his attempt to preserve a symmetrical approach to violent conflict, the author was accused of an "idealistic universalism". From the point of view of the oppressed, an argument that favored greater integration of the international system was one that defended the maintenance of a *status quo* that reflected the interests of the dominant states and those benefiting from the world capitalist economy. Against this, the defenders of such criticisms called for an area of Peace Studies that would side with the exploited and violated by the various latent conflicts of interest that characterized global politics[321].

At the beginning of the new century, about two years after the episode of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Jean Cartier-Bresson published the text *Understanding and Limiting Violence, an introduction*. At the beginning, the author points out that, according to several other authors, the end of the Cold War should have allowed for more friendly relations between States, and this would have occurred by limiting the exploration and exploitation of conflicts in third world countries. Much was expected from the World Bank and the UN in conducting a new diplomacy: one that included networks of non-state actors, and rejected alliances with dictators who financed conflicts as a means of raising resources, which included the right to intervention by the UN, endorsed by NGOs with a technical and apolitical approach, and which allowed the transition of states for the liberal democratic model. As the author puts, this was a "utopian agenda from the early 1990s"[322].

Despite this, cases of interstate conflict, internal conflicts such as civil wars, genocides, rebellions, disputes over the control of the UN's right of intervention, and resurgent terrorism coexisted. All this while the issue of violence in underdeveloped and developing countries

[320] Lawler, P. (1989), p. 45.
[321] Lawler, P. (1989), p. 45.
[322] Cartier-Bresson, J. (2003), p. 249.

gained prominence in forums on good governance in a globalized world economy[323]. In light of this analysis, Jean Cartier-Bresson proposes to initiate a debate on the relationship between different types of violence and the issues regarding development from the beginning of the 1990s. The text ends up, among its conclusions, illustrating hypotheses, questions and analytical tools developed as a result of the end of the confrontation between the eastern and western blocs, which was a prominent theme at the time.

The text goes on how to deal with methods for studying different forms of violence, citing perspectives of rational choice and fieldwork, as well as dealing with economic, political and ethnic causes to explain what triggers acts of violence. It deals with the consequences of political acts that can be configured as violent, and what means exist to end these acts and rebuild societies. Cartier-Bresson advocates an approach that rejects a monolithic and aggregating concept of violence that contributes to ideological constructions of the main threats to security issues today. This argument ends up asserting that the greatest threats are the result of ideological constructions, which in turn are the result of a monolithic and aggregating interpretation of the concept of violence[324].

Advancing the present discussion, the text *Why don't we talk about 'violence' in International Relations?*, published by Claire Thomas in 2010, presents in its own title one the author's main questions. She states that it is obvious that International Relations is about violence, but she reformulates her question to inquire why the word violence is not used more often and why the meaning of this concept is not discussed more often. All of this after stating, at the beginning of the text, that "the study of International Relations is said to be predominantly about violence", citing Kenneth Waltz, Campbell and Dillon as names who have claimed the same. Despite this, the author's argument is that the concept is clearly absent in traditional studies of International Relations. Older texts are said to use other terms to replace violence. Even so, the concept is there, only omitted or hidden[325].

One of the most elaborated points is precisely on the argument that these alternative words, to avoid the use of the word violence, are not just a vocabulary whim. The author claims that this strategy helps to fend off the destructive, dangerous and highly personified idea of violence. Thus, it is possible to cover up the fact that an individual (or several) is harmed and injured by this use of violence, and this often contributes to making the actual use of violence more palatable. As already mentioned, my reasoning for this dissertation: violence is a concept

[323] Cartier-Bresson, J. (2003), p. 250.
[324] Cartier-Bresson, J. (2003), p. 250.
[325] Thomas, C. (2011), p. 1815-1816.

not clearly defined, and therefore disputed. Addressing the issue of how the term is used, in addition to focusing on discussing its definition, is highlighted because "The language used to 'tell the story' about violence is important not only to communicate this story clearly, but also because it affects the story itself"[326].

Claire Thomas' work sets out to highlight the various ideas and definitions associated with the concept of violence, and the problems with some of these. There is a focus on the fact that the author seeks to open a debate about the meaning of the concept, but also seeks to identify where, how and why this concept is so contested. Furthermore, despite focusing on the descriptive issue, there is no way to deny, from the author's perspective, the normative character of the concept and the issues it raises[327]. Importantly, the author arguments in favor of a particular, stricter definition of the concept. This point ends up making up a large part of her conclusion.

When dealing with how the concept is working in traditional International Relations schools, Claire Thomas argues that the authors of these schools rarely used such a term as they already considered the implicit illegitimacy of violence, while concentrating and dealing with the "legitimate" uses of violence by the State. For that, she dealt with the definition of direct violence, as something illegitimate, and also as a generalized condition (*state of violence*)[328]. Then, when approaching the meanings behind the term, the author raises the problem of its normative character, as although most people agree that violence should be condemned, a problem arises when questioning whether all violence should be equally condemned. In certain cases, violence is perceived as legitimate, and is often referred to differently, leaving the term violence to imply illegitimacy[329]. The question of legitimacy, on the other hand, creates an opening for disagreement over which authorities, or which uses of violence, are legitimate. There are critics who argue that state violence is illegitimate and that violence used to prevent state oppression is legitimate, as I have mentioned before[330].

In dealing with an instrumental approach to violence, Claire Thomas argues that the use of violence is not focused as a purpose, but as an instrument in order to achieve a certain objective, very much like Arendt. This perspective favors the idea that the act of violence is perpetrated by an agent, who at some point has the option, with their reasons, of getting involved in the

[326] Thomas, C. (2011), p. 1816.
[327] Thomas, C. (2011), p. 1817.
[328] Thomas, C. (2011), p. 1818-1821.
[329] Thomas, C. (2011), p. 1822-1823.
[330] Thomas, C. (2011), p. 1823-1825.

violent act or not, which places a greater scope in what represents the concept of direct violence compared to structural violence.

The author says that the latter must not be dismissed, and that it is important to recognize the structures and beliefs (cultural violence) that allow the use of violence to continue so easily. However, this does not mean that violence is not instrumental. For her, recognizing the structures, institutions and beliefs that perpetuate violence can be done while recognizing that violence has to be an act performed by someone or some people. Thus, violence cannot be compared as inverse to world peace or social justice, as they are in completely different categories – the latter being an end state to which one can choose to aspire. Consequently, the study of violence in international politics should treat the concept as an instrument, always used to achieve another objective[331].

The conclusions point to a need to recognize that violence harms individuals, and that hiding this behind euphemisms or the use of other terms makes it easier to forget the aforementioned fact[332]. Claire Thomas argues that while these broader definitions of the concept play the role of highlighting the fact that poverty and disease lead to more deaths than war, for example, including these things in the concept of violence may not be helpful. It is important for her to establish links between structural injustice and violence, but this does not require labeling all these things as violent. Thus, she advocates a more restricted definition of the concept. Conceiving violence as the use of physical force to inflict injury or damage to a person or property is most useful in international politics[333]. A research agenda looking at violence needs to encompass the violence of daily life as well as the violence of war. What is obvious to the author is that the effects of each one result in the suffering of individuals, and that the expansion of the concept to also include social injustice ends up opening the discussion to deal with everything and, hence, with nothing[334].

To conclude with the bibliographical contributions, I found regarding critiques to how violence is taken in International Relations, seeking to present a very up-to-date work, the text by Colin Wight, published in 2019, entitled *Violence in international relations: The first and the last word*, is considered. The work begins with a quote by Max Weber, in which he states that the decisive means for politics is violence, and that politics can only be carried out by the application and use of it[335]. Thus, Colin Wight mentions that much of the academic discipline

[331] Thomas, C. (2011), p. 1828.
[332] Thomas, C. (2011), p. 1835.
[333] Thomas, C. (2011), p. 1834-1835.
[334] Thomas, C. (2011), p. 1836.
[335] Wight, C. (2019), p. 172.

of International Relations revolves around the concern with the prevalence of war and the search for peace. Working from *The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined*, published by Steven Pinker in 2011, Colin Wight argues that the claim that violence in the world has declined is somewhat audacious, and points to Pinker's purely quantitative analysis. For the author, Pinker's approach fails to understand the interplay between continuity and change when exploring the role, place, function and ethical judgment of violence in international society. The analysis may point out that incidences of violence have decreased, but it fails to understand the nuances of how violence has been reconfigured or how attitudes towards it have changed[336].

Given this scenario, therefore, an opportunity arises to reconsider the role, place and function of violence in International Relations. In this article, the author focuses, in the first part of the text, on dealing with his perception of change. According to him, the discipline has a limited understanding when it comes to theorizing about change. At this point, one more criticism of Pinker's work is made, as he claims that a quantitative analysis is not able to say how change is experienced, the meanings that are linked to it and cannot say how and why people react to changes in the way they do[337]. Throughout the text, the author deals with the continuity of violence in society, briefly describing what he understands by violence and explains why violence is a constitutive part of the political[338]. After that, he deals with what has changed when considering violence in international relations[339].

Among his concluding arguments, he highlights that the control of violence and the ability to subject those who use it to moral evaluations and standards is perhaps one of the most significant transformations in international relations in the last century. He claims that where there is politics, there is also violence and the possibility of it. Thus, violence accompanies politics not as something additional to it, but as the last resort over which otherwise intractable political disputes are resolved. The continuity of political violence also undergoes changes, as wars along the old lines are inadmissible and, to fight them, new reasons are created for new conflicts to emerge. As such, violence remains an option. The problem lies precisely in the fact that the entities responsible for building a global institutional order are the ones that perceive violence as their last resort[340]. In politics, according to Wight, violence will always have the

[336] Wight, C. (2019), p. 173.
[337] Wight, C. (2019), p. 174-178.
[338] Wight, C. (2019), p. 178-185.
[339] Wight, C. (2019), p. 185-189.
[340] Wight, C. (2019), p. 189.

last word[341]. For that reason, violence is not the only source of social change, but it is certainly the most potent[342].

At this point, my intention is that the reader of this dissertation starts to recognize some of the existing theorical gaps that the above-mentioned critiques point out to previous ideas of violence – and consequentially peace – in the field of International Relations and its object of study. This should, for example, present some justifications for the arguments I will bring up throughout this text. I can say that the texts presented here do not comprise the entire discussion on the concept of violence in International Relations, but they present a structural framework for understanding how such discussion has evolve ever since our main reference, that is the establishment of the Galtugian concept of violence, after Galtung's 1969 article. The selected texts cover an interval of fifty years, which allowed for an expansion and deepening of several questions about the theme presented here, and my intention here is to raise some aspects that could be further explored.

The interaction between the first two texts presented here already allows for an initial critical analysis, since while the first is intended to expose a new perspective and support its arguments in order to convince the reader of the novelty it presents, the second is clearly intended to present a critical approach on some pillars that support the first. It should be said that Galtung was very successful in his endeavor, and this can be verified by everything developed after his contribution. Despite the importance of Galtung's contribution, Lawler manages to be reasonable in stating that all of Galtung's work demanded critical analysis after so long being the main reference in the field of Peace Studies[343].

The arguments for the construction of the relation between peace and violence are well developed, and Galtung goes deeper by detailing several details and specificities around the concept of violence. As already mentioned, there are three entire sections reserved to discuss the definition of the concept, its dimensions, the means by which it takes place and the relationship between the types of violence, with great emphasis on the distinction between structural and personal violence[344]. This pair of concepts will be carried throughout the development of the Peace Studies area, being part of this work as well. By counterpointing these violences, Galtung develops the ideas about Positive and Negative Peace[345], and deals

[341] Wight, C. (2019), p. 173.
[342] Wight, C. (2019), p. 189.
[343] Lawler, P. (1989), p. 27.
[344] Galtung, J. (1969), p. 170-171.
[345] Galtung, J. (1969), p. 183.

with the challenges and questions that will be encountered on the way to achieving each of these.

When it comes to theoretical contributions, the importance of Johan Galtung for the field is undeniable. Many of his interpretations, concretized in conceptual readings of reality, laid the foundation for everything that would later be developed. In spite of all, anyone who has the opportunity to read the article can perceive the enormous breadth of the Galtungian argument, and a somewhat idealistic character, as it does not deal so clearly with how the points defended would be reached. While the text neglects the methods for achieving the ends, it ends up taking a very positivist and normative perspective, as Lawler well argues. The problem raised, bringing up the question of the values behind how peace and violence are defined, is the impossibility of having universal references or common principles. For Lawler, there is no such perfect perspective that can assess and analyze the rationale behind any attempt to build a universalizing discourse[346], and this point is to be maintained in this very dissertation as well. The questioning that can be proposed is this: if values change, do the definitions of what peace and violence change as well?

Based on Jean Cartier-Bresson's contribution, we approach an analysis that openly considers a relationship between the types of violence and what is understood by development, especially at the beginning of the 1990s. Here, a very clear chronological cut is exposed, starting from the period of the end of the Cold War. As the text presents in its introduction, after the end of the conflict, attention turned to developing and non-developed countries[347]. This differentiation, throughout the text's arguments, highlighted how political, economic, social and ethnic differences contribute to the emergence of violence.

With these conclusions, it is possible to assume that the same types of violence (both direct and structural) present themselves in different forms, depending on whether they are analyzed in a context of developed, non-developed and developing countries. Cartier-Bresson takes a broad approach to violence that manages to contemplate all the possibilities of difference he raised. That is why he rejects a monolithic and aggregative concept since, according to him, this rigid perspective is what contributes to the construction of ideological structures that fuel the greatest threats in the field of security[348]. By pointing to the construction of ideological structures, the author reverberates with Lawler's arguments, as he raises the question of values again. Thus, it is possible to create a line of reasoning that questions how the construction of

[346] Lawler, P. (1989), p. 28-29.
[347] Cartier-Bresson, J. (2003), p. 249-250.
[348] Cartier-Bresson, J. (2003), p. 250.

value structures has contributed to the way in which violence emerges and to the way in which this violence is analyzed.

Finally, the texts by Claire Thomas and Colin Wight advance the discussion even further, and manage to make a very interesting cut into the area of International Relations. The first focuses on further questioning the use of the term within studies in the area, clarifying its value and what it represents, while the second deepens the relationship between violence and politics, and how the ways of interpreting the two have been changing. To outline this dissertation, based on the texts presented and covering a period of fifty years of research in relation to peace and violence in International Relations, it is certainly possible to affirm that the readings of the world have changed. Thus, to consider what violence is in a satisfactory way in current times, it is necessary to understand the changes that have taken place.

Both texts have a characteristic that is worth mentioning, which is the favoring of direct violence in comparison with structural violence for International Relations analyses. Claire Thomas advocates a lot for the perspective of violence as a tool, and how it is always felt by individuals[349]. Their reasoning favors a more rigid concept, arguing that other authors use it when referring to what they believe to be legitimate violence, and therefore there is an opportunity to use violence as a concept for any actor (depending on who writes). To avoid this, a consistent use of the term in its narrow sense would have the potential to overcome these problems[350]. Colin Wight is already more thoughtful in his reading. He does assume the existence and importance of structural violence, but criticizes a broad term by pointing out the dangers of a conceptual expansion. According to the author "damages produced by hate speech and structural violence, as articulated by Johan Galtung, should be subject to scrutiny and research in the Discipline", but should they be considered violence?[351].

Bringing together and organizing the points raised by these above-mentioned authors, it is possible to question whether in the International Relations analyses, by favoring the perspective of direct violence over the perspective of structural violence, it does not end up neglecting countries considered to be developing and not developed (Global South). The question of the values that underlie how peace and conflict are conceptualized meets the relationship between development and types of violence, echoing what was presented by Lawler and Cartier-Bresson. Thus, the question of the values behind the analyzes carried out (which find their basis

[349] Thomas, C. (2011), p. 1835.
[350] Thomas, C. (2011), p. 1834.
[351] Wight, C. (2019), p. 178.

in political, economic, social and ethnic aspects) directly affects the way in which what is understood as direct violence and structural violence is interpreted and constructed.

The gap to be highlighted here is precisely the lack of texts that address this interest in analyzing the concept of violence in International Relations, but from the perspective of the Global South, which suffers more directly from this (epistemological and empirical) structural violence, as defined by Johan Galtung and highlighted by Lawler[352]. On the margins of a highly globalized international system is the group of countries that suffer from the bad distribution of resources, both internally and internationally. As Galtung puts it, it is possible to approach the distribution of resources to better understand structural violence when the power to decide on the distribution is unevenly distributed. In such a social structure, the situation of poor distribution is aggravated, as it affects all social fields (health, security, education). In this way, violence is embedded in the structure and shows itself as an unequal power and, consequently, favoring unequal life opportunities[353].

An analysis that takes the perspective of the subaltern (in the international system) can bring further clarification on the concept of violence, and consequently the concept of peace, highlighting the values behind these, as values in the Global South are different compared to those in countries belonging to the North. As Lawler points out, for some critics the argument for the integration of the international system, presented in the epistemological beginning of Peace Studies, may amount to defending a s*tatus quo* that reflects the interests of the dominant (developed) states and keeps the subaltern states repressed and dependent[354], even in a system that apparently works to avoid that. Thus, research on the issues raised is justified, opening our path to the following chapter.

[352] Lawler, P. (1989), p. 44-47.
[353] Galtung, J. (1969), p. 171.
[354] Lawler, P. (1989), p. 45.

3. NEW LENSES FOR NEW EYES

"Eu não sou da paz. Não sou mesmo não. Não sou. Paz é coisa de rico. A paz é uma desgraça. Uma desgraça (...) A paz nunca vem aqui, no pedaço (...) A paz é muito branca. A paz é pálida. A paz precisa de sangue."
–Marcelino Freire read by Naruna Costa, Da Paz (2008).

Through the eyes of those who look from above, we had the opportunity to see how violence – and consequentially peace – has been an object of a constant pondering throughout human history and human philosophy. These two fields, capturing humans throughout time and the development of human thought in regards to itself and the world, are observers and witnesses of the influence of violence and peace in the shaping of the social reality. As we have seen, the two terms (and the questionings about it) are a ubiquitous constant and have a great influence on our world and the ways we approach, build and conceive it. Not unquestionably, although – here starts to sprout our critical character. As I expect, the reader must have understood, by now, that there are aspects to be pondered in how we understand violence and peace, and even how they are related. The question of values must not be neglected, as those are not universal – the one that conceives and dictates what is violent and what is not, what is peace and what is not, will have a great influence over how it is understood, practiced and reproduced, and this must be critically approached.

There are things beyond the reach of the eye, beyond this perspective of an "I" that does not represent the plurality of *selves*. Hitherto, as have been mentioned, the viewpoint was of a group of peoples located within a very specific boundary – geographically speaking, Europe and the United States, and conceptually speaking, "the West" or "the Global North" (we will dive more on those terms later). Going beyond these boundaries (that are not merely geographical, of course) the reader might contemplate that there are different ways to see, to interact and understand the world. International Relations, as a field of study and research, have been walking towards this proposal, as we shall understand better in the course of this chapter. In the attempt to better comprehend the world emerged anti-hegemonic and decentralized epistemologies, taking different perspectives to consideration, accepting analyses that propose

distinctive readings of the reality, beyond what is proposed by the mainstream body of IR theories.

In the questioning of the conceptualization of violence we came across the need to inquire who builds and stablishes this concept and how it is done, with what prerogatives and foundations – the process, the values and the background must be critically approached as we now have seen the impact it can have. The carelessness in regards to it can be understood and converted into a form of violence in itself, and this is why it acquires a complex level of importance. All this questioning that I propose reverberates Robert Cox's argument on how a "theory is always for someone and for some purpose"[355]. A deeper investigation into what can be found outside the mainstream of IR shall present us new lenses, new manners of observing and conceiving the issue at stake: violence. Accepting that there are different eyes looking at the same object, and respecting such perspectives as valid points of view just as what is conventionally standard, will help us to conceive alterity, to not neglect other *"I"s* than our own, other perspectives other than ourselves.

Our ideas, beliefs and preconceptions work as lenses and just like glasses, if you change the lenses, you might see what is in front of you in a different way (and even better). Here the proposition lies in the attempt to present new theoretical lenses so we can later see the work that has been developed until this point differently (critically, I may say), with new eyes. As we have discussed before in this dissertation, International Relations, as a scholarship, approaches the world, the reality and the dynamics of international relations (as a set of practices, an object of study) through a set of mainstream theories. There are, although, different methods to theorize this field of studies, and I argue that Postcolonialism and Decoloniality studies can offer us exactly the new lenses we so much need to approach the issue of violence. In this chapter we shall understand how the Global South was built and how it recovers its voice to start not only speaking but being heard, reclaiming the (epistemological and empirical) space that had been appropriated and disrespected.

3.1. The voices behind the wall

3.1.1. A prerogative invitation

To begin, the reader must acknowledge what I refer to "the voices behind the wall", a reflection of all the problematics that we have discussed here. I do believe this is a prerogative

[355] Sarı, B. (2014).

to the argument of this dissertation. The reader, or any observer, may not recognize it, and this may happen for a couple of reasons: maybe you don't really have knowledge of it, so I cannot ask you to accept, validate or agree with something you don't see; maybe you're being kept from seeing it, because there is an added value to someone else, other than you, in your disregard of it; maybe you don't want to see it, because there is an added value to yourself in your disregard of it.

My invitation to engage with the notion of acknowledging "the voices behind the wall" comes exactly as a prelude to the understating of violence (in our case, specifically for the field of International Relations) while, in this very process, we also engage in the undoing of it. This distinctive character of this dynamic, in engaging with the object of study at hand, is already an aspect of the proposed shift of lenses: looking at the phenomenon of violence (how it is conceptualized and how this conceptualization impacts reality) through the theoretical perspective of Postcolonial and Decoloniality studies will not be merely an observant analysis, as I will argue for its impossibility – the very fact of acknowledging it, with the proposed theoretical background, turns the observer into a participant in this analysis, especially in the field of International Relations.

If the invitation is accepted, emerges a myriad of queries, that are essential to the analysis to be made: What is this wall? What does it represent? Why is it here? And the voices, why are they on the other side? What are they saying? Who are they? For each one of these questions, there is fruitful soil for investigation, with researches that have been done and that could be done, both in International Relations and in other areas. I here again reaffirm the exercise to be made with this dissertation: we are looking at the concept of violence in International Relations, and there is a tendency to fall into the mainstream while doing it – what is very common and understandable. Trying to avoid this tendency, so we can come up with a distinctive analysis, we must engage critically with different perspectives. At this very point, we are about to undertake this proactive detour from the mainstream path of investigation.

3.1.2. Can you hear it?

This mental picture of a wall works well, as an introduction, to the understating of the dynamic and the relations to be here investigated. I'm quite aware, although, that my discourse might be lacking substance, for this beginning. You might be wondering about what do I actually mean when I talk about "the voices behind the wall". To illustrate it well we shall start by leaning on Göran Hugo Olsson's *Concerning Violence: Nine Scenes from the Anti-*

imperialistic Self-Defense[356], premiering in the World Cinema Documentary Competition at 2014 Sundance Film Festival on January 17th. The documentary offers "a bold and fresh visual narrative on Africa", based on archival material covering the struggle for liberation from colonial rule in the late 1960s and 1970s, accompanied and strongly influenced by Frantz Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth*[357] and with a preface by Dr. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak[358] – two figures that will be mentioned again in the course of this text.

The synopsis of the production highlights how it is both an archive-driven documentary, as it covers the most daring moments in the struggle for liberation in many countries in Africa (what was then referred to as "the Third World"), as well as an exploration into the mechanisms of colonization and decolonization thought, an exercise the writer and director makes strongly based, as mentioned, by Frantz Fanon's landmark book, "a major tool for understanding and illuminating the neocolonialism happening today, as well as the violence and reactions against it". The people captured by the archive…

> Fought with their lives at stake, for their and others' freedom. The unique archival footage features a nighttime raid with the MPLA in Angola, interviews with the guerrilla soldiers of FRELIMO in Mozambique, as well as with Thomas Sankara, Amílcar Cabral, and other African revolutionaries. The imagery is fantastic: clear, crisp, and unique films that convey a sense of urgency and dedication that was at the heart of the decolonization movements[359].

As the director affirms, the documentary tells the stories of the people and ideas behind the most urgent struggles for freedom and change in the second half of the 20th century. The organization of the film into nine chapters, as presented in the subtitle, connects abstract ideas with concrete images and real people who embody and carry the story. Fanon's humanist, postcolonial vision is introduced through a cinematic journey that takes the spectator to the grassroot level of experience, "face to face with the people for whom Fanon's writings on decolonization were not just rhetoric, but a reality". Olsson presents in his work "a re-

[356] Olsson, G. (2014).
[357] Fanon, F. (2007).
[358] Olsson, G. (2014).
[359] Olsson, G. (2014).

examination of the machinery of colonialism that is at the root of much of the violence we see breaking out in parts of the world today"[360].

Spivak's contribution must not go without mention here, especially because of her academic relevance in what the documentary approaches – she is best known for her contemporary cultural and critical theories to challenge the "legacy of colonialism" and the way readers engage with literature and culture. "She often focuses on the cultural texts of those who are marginalized by dominant western culture: the new immigrant, the working class, women, and other positions of the subaltern"[361]. She opens the film talking about Frantz Fanon, who enjoyed many (class) privileges in the land he grew up, the Martinique, but then moves to mainland France. There, "in the land of the colonizers", his class and academic privileges meant very little – "he was nothing but a black man". From the experienced shock, he builds strength and interest in understanding colonization all over the world.

Spivak emphasizes how Fanon was not just a scholar or a physician, but actually engaged in many ways with the change he so much fought for – "He gave his time and skill to the healing of those who suffered from violence". When criticizing Sartre's reading of Fanon, Spivak reinforces that the Martinican insisted that the real tragedy is "that the very poor is reduced to violence, because there is no other response possible to an absolute absence of response and then absolute exercise of legitimized violence from the colonizers"[362]. She ends her preface with what she refers to as "Fanon's own way", turning around for the use of non-Europeans what a European philosopher wrote for the use of Europe over 200 years ago, referencing Immanuel Kant: "anything which the people (i.e. the entire mass of subjects) cannot decide for themselves and their fellows, cannot be decided for the people by the sovereign either"[363]. She notes that the people under colonization have had no practice of freedom, and the lack of that means the lack of choice. The people that are seen in the documentary represent just a small part of the people, "the poorest of the poor", mobilized into violence by sovereign powers, with such going on in "all armies, all resistance movements, in the name of nation and religion"[364].

As has been mentioned, the documentary is made by the gathering and organization of some footage that has been put together by Olsson. Amidst the first part, which presents images of the *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola* (MPLA) in 1974 – at the time organized

[360] Olsson, G. (2014).
[361] Olsson, G. (2014).
[362] Olsson, G. (2014), prefaced by G. Spivak.
[363] Kant, I. (1999, p. 97.
[364] Olsson, G. (2014), prefaced by G. Spivak.

as a guerrilla fighting against the government. To account for what is being seen, the scenes are accompanied by the reading of some of Fanon's words: decolonization will happen by the shock of two protagonist forces, and within its means, there is violence. In the interview with Dr. Tonderai Makoni, in 1970, we're being reminded that "the black man was on the bottom of everything". Some scenes then depict Rhodesia at the end of the 1970s, what is currently the territory of the Republic of Zimbabwe. Then moving to some footage of black people serving white people, some words of Robert Mugabe being part of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), and scenes of a strike at a mining company in Liberia, 1966. What is highlighted here is the struggle against the company, which ends up putting two groups of black people antagonizing each other. The scenes show one of the workers being left in the road with his family and his belongings after being fired for organizing a small manifestation asking for better salaries. Again, led by Fanon's words, it comes clear that "it is evident that what defines one's place in the world is the fact of belonging to, or not belonging to, a given race, a given species"[365].

In some scenes from Tanzania, an interview with a white man and a white woman talking about their religious mission "changing people". The woman talks about marriage, family structures, the prohibition of monogamy by the new arriving religion – the interviewer notes how the building of the church, in this specific place, is happening before the construction of schools or hospitals. Scenes of a raid with black soldiers wielding machetes are narrated talking about the colonized gaining notion about their subjectivity and individuality. The shown violence depicts the colonized being aggressive, first among themselves. "To the settler, this is the sign that the colonized are not reasonable". The seventh set of scenes depicts the *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* (FRELIMO) in 1972, showing that to some of the fighters the "armed struggle is the only way for the Mozambique people to achieve their divine right". a Highlight goes to the women fighters saying how their movement of liberation got them in the same level as men, with no difference of rights. One of the most shocking scenes identifies the Black Madonna[366], a mutilated young woman breastfeeding a mutilated baby at a hospital, with what the documentary suggests being the result of an explosion or a bombardment.

In one of the scenes featuring Amílcar Cabral, leader of the *Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde* (PAICG), the documentary goes through the defeat of white men in the Guinea-Bissau War of Independence. He talks about their independence and

[365] Fanon, F. (2007), p. 39.
[366] Cieplak, P. (2017).

how it will allow the development of the people and culture – the narration then reminds us, by the words of Fanon, that (sic) "the colonized men finds his freedom in and through violence". In the last scenes Thomas Sankara, President of Burkina Faso in 1987, criticizes what is democracy and questions which country the IMF had success. "We don't want food, we want the means to produce the food ourselves", he says. There the "people are the true raw material; the colonized was the main material for achieving the wealth of the settler, the colonizer". The conclusion closes the documentary talking about how is better to not look at Europe as the role model, as the United States was a former colony, and tried to imitate Europe, becoming "a worse monster":

> If we want to turn Africa into a new Europe, let us leave the destiny of our countries to Europeans. They will know how to do it better than the most gifted among us. But if we want humanity to advance a step further, if we want to bring it up to a different level than that which Europe has shown, then we must invent and we must make discoveries. For Europe, for ourselves, and for humanity, comrades, we must turn over a new leaf, we must work out new concepts, and try to set afoot a new human being[367].

Piotr Cieplak points out how the movie sets out to illustrate and converse with many extracts from Franz Fanon's book, with the many scenes of colonial and early postcolonial life, oppression, and exploitation across Africa. He highlights the violence and oppression that lies at the very heart of the colonial project, with the tragedy of violence being the only available response to colonization for the situations that are presented in the documentary. It's quite interesting to keep in mind the words of Spivak when taking this famous text of Franz Fanon into consideration – at the beginning of the documentary, Spivak criticizes Sartre (who is the preface writer of the edition published in 1961) for reading the book as 'an endorsement of violence itself', rather than "a contemplation of the impossible position of the colonized who is reduced to violence as the only viable response to the colonial project"[368], a critique also done by Homi K. Bhabha in his foreword of the 2004 edition[369].

Another point that is raised by Cieplak regards the discussions of gender introduced by Spivak in her preface to the documentary, presenting a small take of a different perspective on

[367] Fanon, F. (2007), p. 317.
[368] Cieplak, P. (2017).
[369] Bhabha, H. (2004), p. vii-xli.

subjects that are appointed in the movie but are not touched by Fanon. Spivak challenges Fanon, providing historical and theoretical background and speaking about "the often overlooked gendering of both colonial oppression and liberation struggle, about how revolutionary activity can emancipate women and then return to their subjugation"[370], something that could be analyzed in the above-mentioned scene in Mozambique 1972. The conclusion of the documentary emerges again as containing one of the most impacting excerpts of Fanon's book, warning Africa not to try to emulate Europe but to choose a different path. "The U.S. is invoked as an example of a former colony that followed the example of the colonizer and became an oppressor of others itself"[371].

3.1.3. The Necessary Concern

The documentary mentioned in this previous section works as an appropriate portraiture of the proposed imagery for "the voices behind the wall". The footage gathered by Göran Hugo Olsson works properly as a depiction of the many types of violence we discussed, especially from the theoretical perspective of Johan Galtung[372] – The idea of a wall serves to create differentiation, to establish frontiers and boundaries, to keep what has to be out in the outside and what has to be in, inside. It serves to keep the parts from interacting in a constructive and healthy way, and from all of that emerges direct, structural, and cultural violence. The documentary shows all of that in detail, and it is quite hard to not acknowledge it when paying attention to what is being shown in the footage and connecting with the reality and precision of Fanon's words. It was the best portrait I found of violence in an audiovisual reference – a proper perspective of "the voices behind the wall" image. It is, in spite of all, just one perspective of a bigger picture. The documentary portrays distinct scenes from the 1960s to the 1980s, but the reader can go back to session 1.5 of this dissertation (*A violence to call ours*) to recapture how there are more examples of this complex reality spanning across the 21st century. The main concern, when concerning violence, must find its roots in history and its epistemology. The present picture of violence can only be acknowledged, and afterwards understood, when assuming its historicity – to properly comprehend the voices behind the wall, one must inquire how this wall came to be.

[370] Cieplak, P. (2017); Olsson, G. (2014), prefaced by G. Spivak.
[371] Cieplak, P. (2017).
[372] Galtung, J. (1969); Galtung, J. (1990);

Oscar Guardiola-Rivera opens his article *The people are Missing: Concerning Violence*, *Part 1* affirming that "not even God would bother coming to look in here"[373] when referring to Bogotá amidst the Colombian conflict, ongoing since 1964 and historically rooted in the previous conflict known as *La Violencia* in Colombia[374]. In his text he explores the ambiguity of what he refers to the apotheosis of war. In his perspective of the modern world, destined to nauseate and dissatisfy, "the new regime of good and bad or winners and losers has been established between the gray disciplines of law and the economy". Both disciplines, as constituents of the structure of the modern society, emerged to "fill the vacant place left by the withdraw of the sacred". According to him, all these manichaeistic regimes aimed to contain violence. Guardiola-Rivera underlines the word 'contain' in his text, directing the attention of the reader to the fact that "this term is plagued by ambiguity":

> to contain means both to keep at bay and to conserve within. Economy and law erect a wall around the city to expel violence and keep it without, against violence, with the means of violence. So, you see, the city affected me in the very precise sense that its violence came from within and only from within it came out and up; then it came crashing down, it came upon us[375].

This differentiating relation is what propitiates distinctions between 'bad' or apolitical violence and 'good' violence, instrumental to judges and police in a daily basis. He knows, in spite of that, based on his experiences with the Colombian conflict, "that good violence and bad violence may very well be one and the same". Oscar Guardiola-Rivera continues in the following article, *Fanon and the Intelligent Machine; Concerning Violence, Part 2*, recounting a conversation he had with Gayatri Spivak addressing exactly her preface to Göran Olsson's celebrated 2014 documentary[376]. She reminds him that while many take the Martinican as a reference in counter-violence, reading the initial chapters of *The Wretched of the Earth*[377] as an apology of violence, Fanon is actually asking to be treated as equal, to treat as he was treated, "claiming complicity with what was surrounding him"[378]. That is, the violence of colonization.

[373] Guardiola-Rivera, O. (2017a), p. 155.
[374] Caballero, A. (n.d.).
[375] Guardiola-Rivera, O. (2017a), p. 167.
[376] Olsson, G. (2014).
[377] Fanon, F. (2007).
[378] Guardiola-Rivera, O. (2017b), p. 178.

Guardiola-Rivera highlights how the strength of the kind of postcolonial and decolonial theory that Spivak is well known for, together with names such as Homi Bhabha or Walter Mignolo, comes from the fact that they criticize those frames that erase and hide particularities, subjectivities and contingencies, what is a strong character of mainstream theories[379]. In doing so, postcolonial and decoloniality theories engage with the reasons and tools used to support the differentiation between the mainstream, what we can recognize as being European (by now), and what is not mainstream, not European. Taking the viewpoint of the hegemonic perspectives it is natural to look at one's own and characterize it as *the self*, and everything that differs from, discords with or antagonizes it comes to be characterized as *the other*. From the process of establishing the line that differentiates these two entities emerges the dangerous and violent problem of "othering"[380] – where the "wall" starts to being built.

Taking one step deeper in Galtung's approach to violence, there is this epistemological violence (outcome of structural and cultural violence) that erases the *other* side, in this attempt to keep *the I* (*the self*) distant and unreachable from *the other*. It invalidates and silences the attempts of *the other* to stablish its critiques in relation to *the self*, the very process that creates this differentiation and the very structure that supports it. As Guardiola-Rivera points out, it is a delusion to think that one should first think Western philosophy (bulwark of *the self*) purely through its own sources and only then situate it in relation to a thought from the Global South[381]. There is an innate violence, stablished by the self-named *self,* that is fomented when *the other* uses the lenses of *the self* to look at oneself. Taking the epistemological approach of International Relations here, *the self* is usually centered in Europe and North America perspectives. The alternative to that (the Global North) is taken as the Global South[382].

This epistemological violence neglects the ontologies of what is not the mainstream, as Guardiola-Rivera affirms that "the black man (also the Amerindian, the Asian, and so on) has no ontology", referencing Fanon when he says that colonial society makes subjectivity and consciousness impossible for the colonized, "so there can be no such thing as a black man insofar as being black means you're not human"[383]. Spivak, when talking with professor Oscar, reminds him (and us) to not construct Fanon as "a black man and a problem". She recalls that Fanon, understanding philosophy, deliberately reads Hegel as a historical narrative, disobeying his "simple injunction that if you read it that way you would stall the philosophical project of

[379] Guardiola-Rivera, O. (2017b), p. 178.
[380] Guardiola-Rivera, O. (2017b), p. 180-182.
[381] Guardiola-Rivera, O. (2017b), p. 183.
[382] Hollington, A.; Tappe, O.; Salverda, T.; Schwarz, T. (2015).
[383] Guardiola-Rivera, O. (2017b), p. 183-184.

phenomenology". In what she refers to as an 'Affirmative Sabotage', he occupies the place of the normative subject – "Fanon decides to read Hegel in just such a way, placing himself in the position of the Hegelian subject"[384]. Here, specifically, she refers to the differentiation of *the self* and *the other* conceptually founded in a dyadic relation of Hegel's Master-Slave dialectic[385], where he seeks to approach the development of self-consciousness as an encounter between what are two distinct, self-conscious beings.

Guardiola-Rivera, referencing to the ongoing and everlasting Israeli-Palestine conflict, hears "the point that Fanon makes, which nobody bothers to read carefully, is that when you weigh lives so that one Israeli life, for instance, becomes equal to a hundred and fifty Palestinian lives, then violence emerges as the response"[386]. Violence emerges from an uneven and unbalanced process of differentiation. At this point Spivak explains one of the reasons why she refers to Fanon as 'a healer', when Guardiola-Rivera asks her views on the Martinican author and decolonization in general. Spivak, based on her readings of Assia Djebar, says that

the point that Fanon makes, "which nobody bothers to consider carefully, is that it's no use accusing anybody of violence when there is this kind of weighing of human life", just as above mentioned between one Israeli life and one Palestinian life:

> "Not even accusing the perpetrator of such violence and weighing?" I ask. "Yes, of course," says Spivak, "but Fanon is not talking about the colonizer. He is talking about the colonized. He is saying that from the perspective of the one whose life has been so [weighed and] devalued, this is how violence comes"[387].

It comes clear to professor Oscar that there is no relativism in Fanon's words and perspective, as the issue emerges exactly from the "weighting judgment of the colonizer, of his assumed discursive mastery over law and order". The self-proclaimed authority over the proper understanding of "the rule of law" is also one of the Western bulwarks, "the mark of our rights-based, so-called post-colonial, post-class and post-racial societies". Guardiola-Rivera, although, highlights that it is exactly this paradigm that leaves no space for proper and respectful distinctions between justice and what a certain society considers as just at some point

[384] Guardiola-Rivera, O. (2017b), p. 185.
[385] Hegel, G. W. F. (1992); Thorn, A. (2018).
[386] Guardiola-Rivera, O. (2017b), p. 188.
[387] Guardiola-Rivera, O. (2017b), p. 190.

in time, considering its values[388] – a description of today's historicist relativism but altogether a prescription for totalitarianism and decisionism[389].

Fanon says that the violence that emerges in response to the perception of the way of life of the colonized as weighting less than the colonizer's is not to be judged on the same grounds. Here Fanon does not say that we should make allowance for and excuse violence. What he means, above all, is that we should be aware that there is no 'absolutist standard' unless we consider a situation in which human lives are taken as equal[390]. Fanon's words appear, to Guardiola-Rivera, as a counterpoint to a modern world dominated by an abstract normative creation and establishment of laws or rules on violence that leaves no room for proper ethical distinctions, for acknowledging otherness without necessarily appealing to relativism. This counterviolence that emerges as an inescapable response to violence is then characterized as revolutionary.

Spivak points out to Guardiola-Rivera how, in an absolutist way, revolutionary violence is taken as outlawed. "We do not know anymore what is revolutionary violence", she adds. Emerges from this topic the fact that the act of revolution is not by necessity a violent act. Spivak explains that from the background taken from many of her models (Marx, Rosa Luxembourg, Gramsci as she mentions) "the idea is not to see revolution as necessarily a site of violence except reactive violence". She highlights how one must not take exclusively a Fanonian discourse to analyse this, as he was not a 'clay model':

> Fanon's project is something that we should take forward in newer conjunctures. He already knew that decolonization was not the kind of unquestioned good that a film like Concerning Violence, which I introduced, makes it out to be[391].

She also reinforces that, despite the focus on his real-life experience of blackness, he is looking into colonialism rather than just racialism. His arguments were headed into new junctures, and to make an example of that she makes a reference to *Violence at the International Level*, a subsection of the chapter *On Violence* of Fanon's so mentioned book[392], where he challenges growing financial capitalism and how the former colonial world fits into it (to be

[388] Guardiola-Rivera, O. (2017b), p. 191.
[389] Laclau, E.; Mouffe, C. (1985).
[390] Guardiola-Rivera, O. (2017b), p. 191.
[391] Guardiola-Rivera, O. (2017b), p. 192.
[392] Fanon, F. (2007).

addressed in the next session). One of his biggest affronts was exactly his declaration of "being (becoming) an Algerian" when supporting Algeria's War of independence (1954-1962) from France as a member of the Algerian National Liberation Front – not necessarily in a nationalistic way, but in a strictly anti-colonial stance. He was clearly saying something with these actions and statements, but something "we do not know how to hear", or worse: something we may not want to hear[393].

Both Oscar Guardiola-Rivera and Gayatri Spivak, coming to an end of their discussion, agree in an identification made with Aimé Césaire's *A Season in the Congo*, a play about the tragic assassination of the leader of Congolese independence, Patrice Lumumba, in his pursue for the "question that no one wants to hear". When everything seems to be harmonious and under control, emerges a figure alike Fanon and Lumumba in the role of the 'discomforter' – "that is, the one who interrupts the straight story. Such is the lesson of tragedy: history does not follow a straight line"[394].

3.1.4. In pursue for Lumumba's answers

Echoing Oscar Guardiola-Rivera's conclusive words, after reading about his conversation with Gayatri Spivak, we could begin to look at Fanon as a 'healer' – very well fit with his professional career as a psychiatrist. This perspective goes against the common purely violent and eliminative Fanon's and Lumumba's picture "that we get from Arendt and Sartre and from the neoliberals and the(ir) official story that represents [them] solely as purveyors of destructive violence"[395]. Fanon, together with all the names that have been mentioned in this section, in their investigations and queries, are questioning about "the voices behind the wall".

As I hope to have come clear at this point, the acknowledgment of these voices and the wall comes from a process of recognizing a violence that is not exactly the one portraited in the second chapter of this dissertation. Inquiring about the epistemological violence in the conceptualization of violence itself opens new readings, new possibilities. The need for that comes unequivocally if one is to question more about what Fanon presents in his text and what can be seen in Olsson's documentary. Who dictates what really is violence? When concerning violence, we must understand how the *status quo* came to be established – how this violence came to be settled and naturalized. To achieve that, we must look at history, now aware of the

[393] Guardiola-Rivera, O. (2017b), p. 194.
[394] Guardiola-Rivera, O. (2017b), p. 194.
[395] Guardiola-Rivera, O. (2017b), p. 197.

lenses we use to do it. We shall do it as Lumumba: "Everything is under control and then comes a *discomforter*"[396].

3.2. A New World, a new wall…

I have to begin this section well aware of its limitations. The first one being that I am definitely not a historian, so my attempts here are merely a scratch in what this analysis could be in the hands of someone specialized in what we are about to dive. The second limitation regards the space for such endeavor – this is only a small section of a whole dissertation in which I will try to build a summarized historical analysis solely for the purpose of developing this chapter's object: colonialism and postcolonial theories. I believe that in the comprehension of the history behind it, we might find the tools to better understand violence in international relations and the field that studies it.

Attempting to look at history with the lenses that have been proposed in this chapter, we surely will be paying more attention to some details than others. I am trying to be prudent here because, if you understood part of the argument until this point, you will be mindful to consider that the method I used to tell this "story" may grant me power over your understanding. To deal with that and the mentioned limitations, I invite the reader to look at it critically and, when further questions arise, you are encouraged to look for more references to take different perspectives and complexify your reading of what we are about to see – I would personally recommend *História da America Latina* (2014), *Las venas abiertas de América Latina* (1971), *Colonialismo e luta anticolonial: Desafios da revolução no século XXI* (2020), and the four books in the "Age of…" series written by Eric Hobsbawn, to cite a few. On another note, it is important to say that the choice of more palatable sources for this section is deliberated, as I strive for simplicity.

From Olsson's documentary, Spivak's observations, Oscar Guardiola-Rivera's articles and Fanon's highlights from one of his most praised works we have been shown the existence of a very violent reality that goes beyond its physical and direct aspect, approaching its structural and cultural character and going a little beyond that, through some different perspectives from what we have seen in chapter two (*through septentrional eyes*). The Global South, as I argue, will have a different take in regards to the conceptualization of violence, and to understand that better we shall grasp into the history of the Global South, and how it has come to be defined in

[396] Diagne, S. B. (2005).

that way. My highlights here are the building bricks of this path that will lead us to the next session, and I hope it makes sense for the reader.

3.2.1. Ecce sic diviserunt terram filii Noe post diluvium…

Or from its translation to Latin, "Lo thus did the sons of Noah divide the world after the Flood". This prophetic statement is placed right beside what is believed to be the first and oldest map naming Europe, found in the extensive production of 7th century scholar Isidore of Seville, more specifically in his most notable work *Etymologiae*, published around 600-625 CE. This map, known as Noachide Map or Isidoran Map, is a type of early world map that represents the physical world as a mass of solid land circled by a flowing body of water, called Ocean, with the dry land divided in three parts, one part being called Asia, the second Europe, and the third Africa. For the eyes used to the maps made in the twentieth century, the one presented by Isidore might come as a quite simplistic representation with a circle surrounding a T shaped delimitation, representing the Mediterranean, the Nile, and the Don. Is worth noting that, although not included in the first Isidorian representations, it is now known that a later manuscript added the names of Noah's sons – Sem, Cham and Jafeth – for each of the three continents (Asia, Africa and Europe respectively), according to biblical interpretations on the terminology for races[397].

I begin by first mentioning the Isidorian map to create a conformity with what has been shown here as the mainstream. I do believe it is quite remarkable how one of the prime characteristics of this map is its mention of Europe for the very first time. Together with it, and from this point onwards, the entanglement of Christian mythology (from then catholic influences) with physical representations of land already serves to tell and legitimate a story to the peoples who were to make use of this kind of map. For example, at the very center of it one could locate Jerusalem, revealing what is central for those who used maps heavily based in Isidorian representations[398]. I start my argument towards the development of colonial history with maps specifically because this is the most straightforward way to begin addressing perspectives of the world.

In Geography "maps are used to study, analyze and interpret spaces, places and human-environment interactions […] Formally, it is a symbolic representation of a real space, that can be used to compare places on earth and beyond or shape our sense of reality"[399]. By helping us

[397] Williams, J. (1997).
[398] Meyer, H. J. (1894).
[399] Carrère, A. (2020).

to visualize data and facts across space, maps have the capability of shaping our perception of reality too. For any cartographer, the map making process is a challenge with many solutions. They need to start by deciding which information they want to convey and focus on, "and the type of map they pick often depends on what story they want to tell". By thinking about what a map was supposed to be used for, one can spot these choices made by their creators. "We like to think of data and numbers as being objective, but how data is displayed on maps can affect what people believe about the world"[400].

Going back to the Isidoran Map, we can start noting the choice of placing Jerusalem at its center and the meaning it has. Also, as we shall see later, the establishment of each continent as being related to each descendant of Noah will have implications on the legitimacy of different peoples throughout history, all based in what has been written in the Bible. Nonetheless, in the pursuit for different perspectives here, we could refer to the contributions of Claudius Ptolemy, a Greek scholar living in Alexandria around 150 CE, when he wrote the book *Geographia*, containing what many would eventually use to create (what they thought was) the map of the world. Also, there was a lot of meaningful geographic advances before his book and between when Ptolemy published his calculations and when Byzantines rediscovered them 1145 years later[401]. Most of them, centered in what we can identify as European territories and some Christian features later on, already presented *Terra incognita* (for regions that have not been mapped or documented) and mentioned names as Asia and Lybia (referring to Africa), as it can be seen in the map of the world according to Eratosthenes (276–194 BCE)[402], who drew an world map incorporating information from the campaigns of Alexander the Great and his successors.

Jerusalem was not always taken as the center of the world, in spite of all. Not for everyone, at least. A strong example of that is The *Nuzhat al-mushtāq fī ikhtirāq al-āfāq*, commonly known in the West as *Tabula Rogeriana*. It was created by the Arab geographer Muhammad al-Idrisi, after it being commissioned around 1138 by the Norman King Roger II of Sicily. "Over the course of nine years, and drawing on earlier works by Ptolemy, Arabic sources, firsthand information from world travelers and his own experience, al-Idrisi in 1154 completed what became one of the most detailed geographical works created during the medieval period"[403]. It was written in Arabic, containing maps showing the Eurasian continent in its

[400] Carrère, A. (2020).
[401] Carrère, A. (2021).
[402] Bunbury, E. H. (1959), p. 667.
[403] Mahendra, S. & Tucker, N. (2021).

entirety, but only the northern part of the African continent. An interesting feature is how the map is oriented with the North at the bottom and Arabia, being the site of Mecca, was depicted centrally[404] – a completely different way to see and represent the world.

Another example to be mentioned as an alternative view of the world from the mainstream can be found in the contributions of the *Huayi Tu*, a map engraved as a stone stele in 7th year of Fuchang era (1136 CE)[405], and the *Da Ming Hunyi Tu*, a composite map of the Ming Empire believed to have been completed around 1389[406]. The former is the earliest surviving map of China that relates China with other foreign states, while the latter it is one of the oldest surviving maps from East Asia depicting Eurasia, placing China in the center and placing Mongolia, Java, Japan, Europe and north Africa around it, making with it a geographical and political statement. No so different from it we could reference to the *Honil Gangni Yeokdae Gukdo Ji Do*, a world map created in Korea, produced by Yi Hoe and Kwon Kun in 1402[407]. As a world map, it reflects the geographic knowledge of China during the Mongol Empire. At this time, geographical information about Western countries became available via Islamic geographers and nomadic merchants[408].

Each one of these maps, being those just a few in a multitude of possibilities, tell us a story of how the world was seen by a certain person or by a certain group of people. Each one of these perspectives had its functions, its reasons. A map is a projection of the physical world and its reality, and even considering a scale from the least to the most precise representations, they are merely depictions of what is real. The lenses we have been talking about have influences in the determinations of what is most important in these projections and what should be left out. They all tell and reproduce a story, and assuming their plurality we can acknowledge the existence of these different narratives, even when they are trying to approach the same object.

3.2.2. The essentiality of trading

Looking at all the above-mentioned maps I would like to highlight a point to the reader posing a question: How people had the information about the(ir) world to start building world maps? And what were their purposes? The answers for these specific questions open a whole different possibility of research, what is not to be done here. Still, they are valid inquires to

[404] Houben, H. (2002); Ahmad, S. M. (1992).
[405] Rossabi, M. (2013), p. 151.
[406] Cao, W. (1994), p. 51-55.
[407] Ledyard, G. (1994), p. 235-245.
[408] Nokiro, M. (2006).

lead the path we are here making. One of the answers to the first question is undoubtedly found in the importance of economic and trade activities and the establishment of major trade routes throughout human history.

Trade has existed for a thousand years. Beginning with simple local exchanges, the distances gradually extend and the first trade routes began to be built[409]. Trade has been going on for as long as humans have needed or wanted something that others had and they did not. Bartering developed into more sophisticated forms of exchange using commonly agreed commodity currencies[410]. From around 1800 BCE we could mention one of the earliest known routes in history, called the Incense Route, in which navigators travelled alongside the coast between the Indian subcontinent and the southern part of the Arabian Peninsula. The products from these trade areas would head to Alexandria, in the north of the Egyptian territory, making the city a great warehouse[411].

The route known as the Silk Road, however, is the one in which we should focus here, also paying attention to it historical placement. Trade routes reaching from the East to the West were already existent before the establishment of Silk Road, as one could see in registers of relations between the Roman Empire, the Arsacid Empire and the Han Empire around year 01 of the common era. Silk, also, was not traded exclusively via the Silk Road – although its production remained confined as a secret to China until the Silk Road opened around 114 BCE, there are registers of knowledge of silk production being spread outside of China, with the Koreans, the Japanese and, later, the Indian people gaining knowledge of sericulture and silk fabric production. Again, the Silk Road did not begin trade, nor was the only existing route for Silk at that time, but its importance comes from it radically expanding its scope, "and the connections that were formed by mostly unknown merchants arguably changed the world more than any political or religious leader"[412].

We shouldn't think of the Silk Road as only one route, but rather a network of trade routes that expanded from the East to the West, via land and via sea, benefiting Europe, Asia, the Middle East and Africa. For that, the best way to refer to it is the Silk Roads, in plural[413]. With the growth of the Silk Roads the nomadic people of central Asia suddenly become much more important to world history as they were well fitted, for their lifestyle, at moving around making them great traders at that time. With the Silk Roads taking off around the second and third

[409] Histoire Géo (2021b).
[410] Cartwright, M. (2019).
[411] Histoire Géo (2021b).
[412] Muller, S. (2012a).
[413] Muller, S. (2012a); Carrère, A. (2021).

century of common era, the Middle East and southwest Asia made huge profits from trading activities, with the cities founded by nomadic tribes becoming extremely important. With trade, there was a way to become wealthy without being a king or a lord – The merchant class that grew along with the Silk Road came to have a lot of prestige[414].

It is important to note that the wealth that roamed along the trade relationships stablished by the Silk Roads not only impacted the rich, but a great part of the societies that were part of its routes and relations. For example, relatively few people could afford silk, but a lot of people devoted their lives to making it and transporting it. Also, the Silk Roads did not just trade luxury goods – "in fact, arguably the most important thing traded along the Silk Road: ideas"[415]. "With the increased contact between cultures caused by trade, so too ideas and cultural practices spread, particularly in the areas of language, religion, and art"[416]. For example, it was the primary route for the spread of Buddhism. Many merchants on the Silk Roads became strong supporters of monasteries which in turn became convenient weigh stations for caravans. "Exploring the Silk Roads can tell us a lot about how worldviews and other ideas spread along those trade routes and eventually beliefs of billions of people throughout time and space"[417].

As an additional point, I would like to give prominence to the Indian ocean trade routes. It was very much like the Silk Roads – just like the latter was not just a single road, there were lots of Indian trade routes connecting various port-cities around the Indian Ocean basin. Ne might even consider it part of the greater network of routes that are referred to when speaking of the Silk Roads. What is important to note here is how "the Indian Ocean trade was bigger, richer and featured more diverse players"[418].

This "Monsoon Marketplace" was already recognizable around 700 CE, but it climaxed between 1000 CE and 1200. It declined a little during the *Pax Mongolica*, when overland trade became cheap and safe, but then it rose again around the 14th and 15th century. Africa's East coast and Islamic empires in the Middle east, together with India, China, Southeast Asia benefited directly from it, but not Europe. Predicting the seasonality of Monsoon winds made trade a lot less risky, which meant cheaper and more frequent trade. Also, the market here was self-regulated and was not focused in luxury goods, as seaborne trade works better for bulk goods, propitiating a mass market. Also, sailing technology spread thanks to cultural relations, e.g. the magnetic compass, the astrolabe, boats using stern-post rudders and triangular lateen

[414] Muller, S. (2012a).
[415] Muller, S. (2012a).
[416] Cartwright, M. (2019).
[417] Muller, S. (2012a); Carrère, A. (2021).
[418] Muller, S. (2012b).

sail, and the above-mentioned information to build more precise maps. Lastly, just like mentioned with the Silk roads, ideas also spread out because this Monsoon Marketplace. A clear example of that is Indonesia, being the largest Muslim population in a country by 2022, a direct influence of Muslim Arab trades and economic relations[419].

Throughout the timespan of around 1600 years, the Silk roads, via its maritime and terrain routes, function as arteries for the history of international relations between different civilizations and communities. The history of the Han and Qin Dynasty, Japan and Korea in the far East, the history of the central Asia Turks, India, Arsacid and Sassanid Empire, Rashidun and Abbasid Caliphates in southwest Asia and the Middle East, the history of Egypt, Libya and Almoravid dynasty in North Africa and also the Swahili coast in West Africa, and the history of the Roman Empire, the Byzantines, Franks, Italian Republics and even the territories part of the Hanseatic League in the north of Europe, all of them have been influenced by the economic and cultural impacts of the Silk Roads[420] – The history occurred between the first and second century BCE until the late XV century was profoundly marked the contacts and relations propitiated and catalyzed by the Silk Roads, with its end being a central point to the argument I'm here trying to make.

3.2.3. The Mediterranean merchants

Turning the discussion on the essentiality of trade to the European continent, narrowing our historical scope, we approach again what is taken by many as the mainstream. We'll focus here again as the XV century comes to be a turning point in the history of colonialism. Many important factors (as usual in History) account for the immense changes at that period, but only the most prominent will be here displayed. As it was presented in the previous section, the commerce and the trade routes of the Silk Road and the Indian Ocean were propitiating a great exchange of good, technology and ideas among many different civilizations from the East to the West. In the big picture, Europe just was a little Christian continent that constituted a small space in the edge of the Asian-led global economy[421]. Constantinople, the Capital of the Byzantine Empire and also known as the *Caput Mundi* because of its prime trading position between the European West and the Asian East throughout the middle ages, had a major importance in the land routes of the Silk Road. By sea, the Red Sea and the Mediterranean were

[419] Muller, S. (2012b).
[420] Histoire Géo (2021b).
[421] Hobson, J. M. (2013).

the main connections to all the above-mentioned trade routes, being the latter the main space of trading and maritime commerce for the south Europe and north Africa[422].

Here we can focus in one relationship in particular to understand the development of merchant activities in the Mediterranean. Again, considering the preponderance of advantages of maritime routes over land routes for the reasons that were above presented, the Republic of Venice represented the most prominent of the merchant republics of the Mediterranean Sea throughout the history of the Middle Ages. Keeping a close relationship with the Byzantine Empire and thanks to the immense fortune collected through sea and land trade with the entire then known world, Venice became the most powerful of the four Maritime Republics of the Italian peninsulas, establishing commercial dominance of the Mediterranean Sea routes. At the beginning of the XIII century, Venice reached the peak of its development, monopolizing the trade in the Mediterranean and European countries with the East[423].

Then, in May of 1453, after almost two centuries of conflictive relations, Constantinople was sieged and captured by the Ottoman Empire, commanded by Sultan Mehmed II. The fall and conquest of Constantinople marks the effective end of the Roman Empire and, in History perspectives, can be considered a watershed of the Late Middle Ages and the end of the medieval period. Around that time and over the next few decades, The Ottoman Empire extended its reach covering basically the whole east Mediterranean, taking valuable territories over Mesopotamia, Egypt, Anatolia, Eastern Europe and some parts of the Caucasus, thus securing control over the western parts of the Asia trade – both overland and overseas[424].

They basically controlled about half of what the Romans controlled at its peak, but it was much more valuable because of the opportunity to access easily the already mentioned Indian Ocean trade routes. After the Ottomans capture Egypt, they basically controlled the flow of trade through the Mediterranean, "but the Venetians had centuries of expertise as mariners and a great fleet of merchant boats". For some part, the Ottomans let the Venetians carry on with their commercial activities, basically making money from taxes. Venice profited much from this relationship, transforming it in one of the main cities for the beginning of the Renaissance Movement. Together with the rise of Renaissance, "perhaps the most crucial result of the Venetian and Ottomans control of trade was that it forced other Europeans to look for different paths to the riches of the East"[425].

[422] Histoire Géo (2021b); Muller, S. (2012a); Muller, S. (2012b).
[423] Muller, S. (2012c); Histoire Géo (2021b).
[424] Muller, S. (2012c); Histoire Géo (2021b).
[425] Muller, S. (2012c); Histoire Géo (2021b).

3.2.4. America, a serendipity to whom?

With the Ottomans controlling much of the southeastern Europe, they stablished a navy in the seas of the region. Ottoman domination meant that European kingdoms and empires needed to find different paths to Afroeurasian trading routes. Shifting perspectives to the opposite side of the Mediterranean, in the Iberian Peninsula we find Portugal – a not so rich country directly suffering from the ottomans contesting their access to overland trade, but a country which was investing in the study and the development of new tools for navigation. By mid-XV century, Portuguese navigators were venturing southward along the Atlantic coast of Africa, a continent already famous for its richness in food, salt, gold and slaves. In the pursue for such riches, the Portuguese gradually made their way down the African Coast, dotting it with stone fortresses that doubled as trading stations. In 1488 the Portuguese rounded the Cape of Good Hope, venturing even further into the Indian Ocean. In 1498, reaching India, the Portuguese found a highly developed Indian commerce with sophisticated trading posts run by Muslim merchants. Also reaching Southeast Asia and China, the Portuguese found a bountiful variety of goods that Europeans would come to crave[426].

The Portuguese started to build, at first anyway, a trading empire, with small and agile ships patrolling ports and collecting large fees. The wealth would be extracted from controlling shipping and trading routes. Many European men would partner with local women, starting families. Again, most European explorers were poor, and many of these women were already wealth and successful traders. From their perspective, Portuguese traders offered them access to new markets and new goods. In contrast, the Spanish empire, which begun in 1492, was based in colonies – rather than controlling trade routes, the empire would control the land itself and the people who lived there, to extract wealth from them to enrich the empire. In the pursue to find new routes and participate directly in exchange activities with the Indian Ocean trading routes, the Spanish attempted to cross the Atlantic hoping to arrive directly in China – ever since the contributions of Ptolemy, the knowledge of the earth being round was staple in navigation. The miscalculations happened in overestimating the size of Asia and underestimating the size of the Atlantic Ocean[427]. The first Spanish colony, La Isabela, was established in an island named Quisqueya, nowadays known as Hispaniola, part of the Caribbean[428].

[426] Muller, S. (2019a).
[427] Muller, S. (2019a).
[428] Histoire Géo (2021b).

After the discovery of new lands, many Portuguese and Spanish ships voyaged to explore what they soon realized was not Asia, but a new continent. From the perspective of European explorers, these lands were completely new and potentially lucrative, and the colonization model that Spain adopted and that Portugal soon begun to adopt as well, and that the rest of European empires would eventually use, was built on the idea that colonies existed for the benefit and enrichment of the colonizers. Also, there was the objective to convert autochthonous peoples to Christianity. The majority of the wealth that was generated by these empires was done so by claiming human beings as a form of property (slave trade, forced work – a system built to extract wealth and convert people[429].

Again, in the exercise of shifting perspectives, from the indigenous people living in colonized communities, colonization meant impoverishment in various forms, with the loss of land, freedom, culture, and all sorts of community assets. From the colonizer's perspective, however, it meant the possibility of getting rich, what encouraged growing waves of sailors searching both North and South America for extractable wealth. Iberians were incentivized by their poverty and catholic faith, but they were disadvantaged by a comparative lack of manufacturing skills when it came to trade – as one could say after the encounters in the Indian Ocean and the Americas. What they did have, at first, was sailing prowess and weaponry on their side. The use of canons on ships and the combined use of sails, together with navigational instruments, makes a proof of the cultural exchange among Mediterranean cultures and sciences for the development of maritime technology[430].

In Europe all of these new interactions with this new world became a source of contention – all of this conquering and traveling produced chaos between the Iberian kingdoms. A treaty signed in 1494 and another in 1529 sponsored by the church eventually settled disputes between Spain and Portugal over territories that each was claiming, in the new continent and also in the Indian Ocean and Pacific Regions. By this time the first the English had already accomplished their first voyage as well, arriving in the coast of the North America, and by the end of the XVI century, other European powers such as France and United Provinces of the Netherlands start to seize opportunities in the Americas[431].

It is worth mentioning that around 1550-1551 happened the Valladolid debate, the first moral debate in European history to have discussed the rights and treatment of indigenous

[429] Muller, S. (2019a).
[430] Muller, S. (2019a).
[431] Muller, S. (2019a); Histoire Géo (2021b).

people by European colonizers in the conquests of America[432]. None of that prevented the death at the hands of European weaponry and the diseases that contact brought. As highlighted, in the Western hemisphere, the local's lack of resistance to European diseases was probably a more important factor in conquest than weaponry was. In the long run, violence, enslavement and European diseases led to the death of perhaps as much as ninety percent of the indigenous American people. Meanwhile, colonization proved extremely lucrative, mainly to Spain and Portugal, which within a century went from being poor kingdoms to remarkably rich ones. "This huge influx of wealth to Spain and Portugal would reshape power in Europe and also life everywhere else, as everything from microbes to ideas suddenly had a truly global reach" in this era of Columbian Exchange[433]. What people thought was one world turned out to be two, and the collision of those worlds wrought devastation and opportunity on an unprecedented scale. When looking at the consequences of this European expansion, one should consider how those consequences change depending on where you find yourself.

3.2.5. The foundation of Modernity

By the end of the XVI century, Spain had long expanded its colonies throughout Central and South America lands, and England, France and the Netherlands were already beginning to make its incursions in the continent as well, which promised many opportunities for its vast undiscovered lands. By the end of the XVIII century, however, most of the American territories were already taken, with colony frontiers delimitation being a constant source of animosities. In the year of 1784 comes to a closure the American Revolution, almost coinciding with the French Revolution, which begun in 1789, and later the Haitian Revolution, which begun in 1791. During these three centuries, Europe witnesses the Renaissance, the establishment of mercantilism, the reformation and counter-reformation, the end of many important wars, the supposed establishment of the modern international system of sovereign states, the rise of illuminist thought. There is much to cover, and as I said, this is not the purpose of this dissertation.

Nevertheless, behind all these events lays a foundation that propitiated, directly and indirectly, most of the historical and societal development that happened throughout these three centuries: Colonialism. To approach it better we must have some clarity over two other concepts that are complementary to this one. The first is Empire, referring to a single authority,

[432] Histoire Géo (2021b).
[433] Muller, S. (2019a).

as a political unit, controlling multiples territories, states, and countries. In the variety of forms it can take, an empire can function ranging from intrusive to rather hands-off. But when an Empire also creates unequal economic or power relations, that relationship is considered Imperialism – our second concept – though this relationship can eventually be more hands-off too. "Imperialism describes the domination and subordination of one state over others, and is often motivated by the acquisition of land, resources, or strategic positions". From there we can look at different types of colonization, often implying settlement of people in an area with a degree of control in addition to control of land and resources[434].

As it can be recognized, the concepts of Empire, Imperialism, and Colonialism are all "interrelated tactics of geopolitics that are used to achieve similar goals of one state maintaining economic, political or cultural dominance over other territories, often for economic gains". The impacts of Colonialism and Imperialism can be noticed all over the globe, even though many of those systems have formally ended. In the early XXI century, when referring to Colonialism usually is to address European Colonialism, which happened globally between the XV century and present days, as have discussed before. In spite of that, throughout History many (non-European) civilizations built empires as well, e.g. the Chinese, the Japanese and the Mongols. "In these cases, we talk about imperialism because of the way they expanded through force, and each had elements of extraction of resources and control of local politics"[435].

Modern economic relationships have deep connections to colonialism, which we have been following since the establishment of the first colony by Spanish settlers, developing from this point onwards. One way to think about lasting impact of colonialism on the landscape is through Dependency theories, which could be summarized to the idea that the long history of extraction between a colony and its colonizer creates an economic situation that is difficult to escape. It leaves those former colonies still economically reliant on the colonizer after gaining independence. Also, To further explain the relationship between those with global power and those without, World Systems Theories categorizes the world into "core areas with a lot of wealth and power, periphery areas that send raw materials to the core and rely on the core for economic support, and then semi-periphery areas which rely on the relationship with both the core and the periphery and some wealth and power"[436].

Going back to the historical account, after the series of revolutions that happened at the end of the XVIII century, the following decades are marked by many independentist

[434] Carrère, A. (2022).
[435] Carrère, A. (2022).
[436] Carrère, A. (2022).

movements happening in the American continent. By the end of the XIX century, just a few small territories are still dependencies of their European metropolis. In spite of all the changes that happened in the course of a century, with slavery being abolished in much of Europe and the Americas, with the First and Second Industrial leading to massive urbanization and much higher levels of productivity, profit, prosperity and quality of life, the economic model based in colonial exploration was not terminated. European XIX century's Imperialism brought much of South Asia, Southeast Asia and almost all of Africa under colonial rule[437], headed by the United Kingdom and the establishment of "the empire on which the sun never sets". A clear example of that was invasion, annexation, division, and colonization of most of African territory after 1881, known as the Scramble for Africa, officialized by the 1884 Berlin Conference.

This Imperialist model built in the XIX century would persist for decades to come, only formally finishing after the end of Second World War but dealing with its consequences and the pressure of the Cold War still – The processes of decolonialization of Africa and Asia. One clear example is the year of 1960, when a series of important events in those regards took place, mainly the independence of seventeen African nations, what also highlighted the growing Pan-African sentiments in the continent. Olsson's documentary approaches much of those events. So much of the world has spent time in one form of empire or colonial structure or another that we can also find the imprint of colonialism even in places that were never colonized. Even the language that was used to refer to countries, places or people reflected (and still reflects) that, as the so-called "civilized", "developed" and "modern" cultures were either the colonizer's or the colonizer's preferred cultural group. In counterpart, derogative language like "uncivilized", "primitive" and "backward" would refer to the people being colonized or the more marginal groups or cultures[438].

3.2.6. Exploration and Slavery: Colonialism's Core

In the American colonies during the XVI century, to sustain enterprises such as mining, metallurgy, sugar refining, lumbering, Iberians initially used the forced labor and know-how of autochthonous peoples, as the practice of *Encomienda* comes to prove. To recollect a point a made earlier, The Valladolid Debate (1550-1551) is a remind that the cause of human rights always needs people who have them in order to press it forward. Nevertheless, the people who

[437] Carrère, A. (2022); Histoire Géo (2021b).
[438] Carrère, A. (2022).

are responsible for expansions in human rights and its institutionalization are those who are denied them, but insist upon their humanity anyway. It's interesting to point to some Europeans advocating for human rights around that time, but many people without those rights were advocating for them also[439].

For the case of indigenous people in the New World and the contact with European, "to present one story of their response to colonization would be inaccurate" – at times resisting, at times cooperating. It is hard, although, to overstate just how destabilizing it was to these communities to lose, in many cases, close to 90% of their population. As mentioned before, it was not too long before European countries other than the Iberians, seeking huge amounts of profits, sought to literally capture Spanish wealth in the endeavors of Atlantic piracy. Those same powers (English, French, Dutch as main examples) also began to imitate Portuguese and Spanish in global exploration, trade and eventually settlement. For all cases in the American experience of colonization, such activities rested upon slavery and the slave trade. Also, to address XIX century's Imperialism, even though such activities were formally abolished by the West, their consequences were still much visible and present in every-day life[440].

Initially, as explained, Portuguese sailors sought to capture Africans along the coast and then sell them as slaves in Europe – an activity that was not so haunting or uncommon to Europeans. However, by the end of XVI century, the capture of Africans for sale to Europeans became routine, eventually turning into a massive business for both African slave traders and for Europeans after 1650, as prior to that the labor in the colonies was performed by indigenous people, but the *Encomienda* crumbled mostly due to the diseases and the devastation of colonization. With new rulings prohibiting native's slavement, Spanish, Portuguese and British land and mine owners started to import African and Asian slaves to stay within the law. Life expectancy of slaves were extremely low, "all manner of mistreatment was common; and legal protections were almost nonexistent". As reinforced in the material, "It is very important to consider those perspectives too. And also, why traditionally those perspectives have been ignored"[441].

To have a proper account of that we must see and understand slaves both as they were, as human beings, and as they were viewed, as an economic commodity. The first records on people's slavery dates back to 3500 BCE, in the region of Mesopotamia – the Code of Hamurabi already established the parameters for slavement, covering life conditions and

[439] Muller, S. (2019b).
[440] Muller, S. (2019b).
[441] Muller, S. (2019b).

origins of those slaved (bought, war prisoners, and debtors or criminals). In the ancient Roman empire, the conditions were very similar, however also including the possibility not to just buy freedom, but also citizenship (by military service, for example) – this has been recognized as a universal mechanism, without ethnic or geographic restrictions. Among American indigenous people, slavement was practiced as a result of conflicts or by debts. Not so differently, Chinese, Nordic, Mongol and Japanese societies also had slavement as a custom. In the African continent, practically all the cultures and societies practiced slavement by reasons of conflicts or debts[442].

When we bring this discussion towards religion, we are caught in centuries of discussions, with many internal debates regarding religious traditions – just as we saw with the Valladolid debate, one side usually against slavery while the other side being in favor of it. Turning towards Christianity, we can take the story of Noah in the Bible as an example on how a narrative influences this discussion regarding slavery, as it had been understood that Noah himself damned and cursed African people, as descendants of his son Cham, as he determines that Cham's generations to follow would forever serves his other brothers' descendants, Sem and Jafeth. Also, in the Bible there are many mentions on slavement, both in the old and new testaments. several patriarchs owned slaves, while some texts regulated and valued when a person freed others from slavery, especially through religious dedication. If we turn to Islam, slavement was permitted for non-Muslim taken as war prisoners or bought from non-Muslim merchants. Also, the manumission of slaves that converted to the Islam was stimulated. In Arab societies of the north of Africa and Middle East was entirely common, and just like was mentioned about the Roman empire, it is recognized that there were no ethnic or geographical restrictions, and there was also the possibility of social ascension[443].

Being attentive about the historical record, even with the little that has been presented here, it is possible to realize that until the turn from the 19th to the 20th century the slavement of people was "tragically common", among many cultures and places. In these regards, it is important to note how the critique about these practices is as ancient as the practice itself. I raise all of this information, as Figueiredo also explains, to highlight how in some rounds of discussions it is presented the practice of slavery in the Antiquity or by Muslim or Asian people as a counterpoint or even to diminish and justify the slavement practiced that occurred in the

[442] Figueiredo, F. (2019).
[443] Figueiredo, F. (2019).

Americas through the colonialist project and in the Imperialist endeavor in Africa and Asia, together with its effects[444].

It is important to understand two points of distinction here, as they make such comparisons disproportionate and inappropriate. First, it can be stated that the model of slavery implanted in America by Europeans has its origins in practices that date back to the Middle Ages, with the Crusades and its religious and geopolitical roots. The word 'slave' has in its etymological history the crusades that happened to the east of Europe, with the capture and subjugation of Slavic and Baltic peoples. In the conflicts that happened in the Mediterranean during the crusades, the practice of slavement happened by both Muslims and Christians. Fast forward to the second half of the XV century, the Portuguese, encouraged by the *espírito cruzadístico,* begin their ultramarine expansion of the Atlantic, southward along the African coast as we saw – this impetuosity in voyaging and conquering many foreign African ports and coasts was endorsed by the papal bull *Dum Diversas*, issued in 1452 by Pope Nicholas V, authorizing Afonso V of Portugal to conquer Saracens and pagans and consign them to 'perpetual servitude', homologous to slavement by defeat in war. Within this war context, from the 16th to the 19th century, up to a million of Europeans were enslaved by Muslims. It is important to note how this religious war character and the slavement that happened because of it was restricted to the Mediterranean and Europe, with no registers of this practice in the Americas[445].

Africa is the continent that most suffered with the slavement of peoples, from different regions and ethnics. According to the historian Elikia M'Bokolo, other thirteen million Africans were enslaved by Muslim reigns, up to four million were enslaved by westerns and Arabs in the Indian Ocean, and up to twenty million African natives were enslaved and taken to the America through the Atlantic, with around two to four million dying during the trafficking activities, before arriving in land. For example, it is registered that 4.8 million Africans arrive in the Brazilian coast only in the year of 1538 – having its growing presence in the African coast, and a strategic and privileged geographical placement in the Atlantic, Portugal becomes the biggest slave trader in Europe, strongly compromised by the economic benefits of the commerce of enslaved Africans. Following Portugal, other European powers start to invest in this trade of people in the 16th century. This Atlantic Slavery is its own phenomenon, mostly different from other practices of slavement[446].

[444] Figueiredo, F. (2019).
[445] Figueiredo, F. (2019).
[446] Figueiredo, F. (2019).

This slavement of peoples was not done as a consequence of some kind of 'just war', but merely as a mercantilist process. The African subject, treated as an object, was treated as a product in itself, source of profit directly or indirectly – it was not a slavement by debt or criminal punishment, for example. Even more, there is no register of slavement by these reasons being legal in the Americas. This chattel slavery, as noted, was a "wide-ranging in large-scale, extremely organized, profitable activity and basis for the economy" of these American regions and their metropolises, the product of Tobacco and Sugar, for example[447].

As Elikia M'Bokolo also mentions, this phenomenon in the Atlantic is the only one that is ethnically specific towards black people, even those that converted to religious faiths. This is the second reason to invalidate any arguments that compare the slavery that happened in the Antiquity and the Atlantic. Contraire to practices in Ancient Rome, the ethnic component that is added in the Atlantic activity creates a racial structure – as a consequence of it "there is a group of people that, because of its skin color, is taken, fated and damned as slaves, and this is inherited perpetually". This structure officially lasts for more than three hundred years in America, and this ethnic component of slavery created a series of barriers and harmful effects that lasts until present days – in a similar way, Colonialism created a series of noxious and damaging consequences to societies in Africa and America, just as Imperialism created in Africa and Asia[448].

3.3. The need for Postcolonialism

As we should know by now, European Colonialism formally ended with the wave of decolonization that happened in America during the end of the XVIII century and throughout the XIX century, starting with the American Revolution in 1776, a process by which many American colonies gained their independence from European rule[449]. Also, we now know that European Imperialism had a similar fate, dealing with a wave of Afro-Asian decolonization that started in 1945, with the end of the II World War, resulting in the independence of many nations that had no self-determination by then – a direct consequence of the changes and challenges posed by the conflict and by its end. From what was presented in the previous section, we should understand that there were three main reasons for these processes of decolonization: the material and ideological decline of the metropolises; the rise of a new political and economic order in the post-war period; and the rise of national liberation

[447] Figueiredo, F. (2019).
[448] Figueiredo, F. (2019).
[449] Histoire Géo (2021a).

movements in former colonies. A strong example of that, highlighting this relation with the end of the II World War, is the first great wave of decolonization (first of four) officialized by the Bandung Conference, in 1955, in which was written a ten-point declaration of on the promotion of peace and cooperation against colonialism[450].

Not every aspect of this decolonization process was equal – actually, each had its idiosyncrasies and it is important to have that in mind. In some cases, before self-determination, we could identify pacific processes, with independences being established through agreements between metropolises and local representatives of these former colonies. The independence of India in 1947 can be seen as an example of that – such path for self-determination permits the preservation of economic ties and investments. Another path, however, is through independence wars, with examples as the conflicts in Argelia against the French in 1962, and the conflicts in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau against the Portuguese in 1975[451]. With the end of the Cold War in 1989, many spheres of post-independence conflicts calmed. Certainly, after around five hundred years of history, since the establishment of the first colony in America until the last decades of the XX century, these colonialist and imperialist structures have been finally overcome by the world community… Is that right? Can we really affirm that all of that was left behind? Are we really aware of the long-lasting consequences of this past in our present lives?

Postcolonialism is built on (philosophical) perspectives and (academic) approaches that focus on the legacy of colonialism and imperialism deeply entrenched in the structure of our society today – its history and its culture. It touches on the direct and indirect consequences of the control, exploitation and exploration of those who were colonized. Nowadays, a way to identify many of these countries, nations and peoples is under the concept of the Global South. Postcolonialism's critical analysis propitiates a non-mainstream perspective on history, literature, culture and discourse, shedding light on certain characteristics that build our society but that are not that much talked about, or even willfully ignored. Here we shall establish the theoretical foundation of development for the next chapter: With these theoretical tools we should be able to recognize and acknowledge many types of violence but with a different take from what we previously saw, from a different perspective, in addition to understanding how such violences are necessary to keep the foundation of this obnoxious othering structure that lives on this ubiquitous and constant "building of walls".

[450] Figueiredo, F. (2021).
[451] Figueiredo, F. (2021).

It comes as a challenge setting a proper approach to explain what is Postcolonialism and even before that, its history, where does it come from. Even though I tried to present the historical background that brought us here, defining the moment of its birth may be an erroneous task to attempt – especially because it does not serve us here. What has to be noted, in this very beginning of an explanation, is the following: first, Postcolonialism is a school of thought and it covers a wide range of disciplines and perspectives, and exactly because of its extension I must come clear that my approach may come as insufficient here. Second, to deal exactly with the first issue, is that my intention is to focus on the application of such perspectives in the field of International Relations. With what has been presented up till this point, the reader might have an idea of what came before Colonialism and what happened during it. Now we shall move to the third question…

3.3.1. What comes after Colonialism?

As Seth affirms, a proper definition cannot be summarized, or easily explained. More than knowing what it is, the reader shall understand it throughout the process of uncovering it. To avoid misconceptions, nevertheless, a good way to approach a definition is by setting some boundaries to establish what postcolonial theory is not. A first point to have in mind regards the prefix 'post' that is placed before the word 'colonialism'. One may interpret that as simply describing a system that comes after colonialism, but goes beyond that. It comes closer to being an ideological response to colonialist thought and structure, a reaction to or departure from colonialism in the same way postmodernism is a reaction to modernism[452].

More importantly, the 'post' signifies not the period *after* colonialism came to an end, but the period after it began, somewhen around the last decades of the 15th century, as we saw. Stuart Hall points out how "Different temporalities and histories have been irrevocable and violently yoked together" the mainstream perspectives of RI. This makes the attentive reader realize that it is not about colonialism belonging to the past and being overcome in the present, merely dealing with its consequences. Colonialism is taken as a human phenomenon, and Postcolonialism highlights how the world has been deeply shaped by it. With this basic assumption, it is perceptible how one cannot begin to understand the contemporary situation without acknowledging colonialism[453].

[452] Seth, S. (2013), p. 01.
[453] Seth, S. (2013), p. 01.

As noted by the author, in this attempt to avoid possible misconceptions, it is important to understand that Postcolonial theory is not an attempt to elaborate a theory of the world as it would look from the perspective of the Global South. It does have much of anti-colonial nationalism, anti-imperialism, and third worldism in its theoretical genealogy. Still, it is not only that – it is not a continuation, a contemporary version of it. Interesting to note, Postcolonialism, in its epistemology, is critical of all and any "essentialism", of any national or ethnic identity taken for granted. As Seth points out, it is critical about anything being *fixed*, *natural* or *primordial.* If the world as we know it is the product of the violent and coercive linking together of different histories within the same temporality, then there should be no 'pure' identities to hold onto to. Postcolonialism must be critical with any essentialism behind claims of nationalism, anti-colonial or not. It seeks to deconstruct sovereignty, not to establish the equality of those. It is critical with discourses of *development, modernization* and *catching-up*[454].

Also, Postcolonial thought is not an attempt to foster a "non-western IR". The discipline of IR, as has often been observed, is mainly an Anglo-American affair, with a strong base in Europe. It naturally became a western discipline throughout the history of its development. Criticizing that, Postcolonialism is not about reflecting the plurality of voices in the discipline, as it goes beyond. A non-western IR would still be IR, working its key concepts (state, national interest, sovereignty) from the viewpoint of the Global South. Postcolonial theory goes further, as "it has at its heart an epistemological concern, namely to question the universality of the categories of modern social scientific thought". It comes as a challenge and critique of disciplines, including International Relations, in their epistemological basis. It calls for a rethinking of categories. Many fundamental concepts (as peace and violence) emerged in the course of seeking to understand the world, in a particular slice of history, from the viewpoint of a region called "Europe" or "The United States of America". Thriving against that, "postcolonial theory is in part a project to explore the capacities and limitations of certain European social and political categories in conceptualizing political modernity". To write about all these concepts cannot be done critically without engaging the discipline which works with it and highlighting the need to go "beyond"[455].

Another way to look conceptualize Postcolonialism regards five common conceptions people may have when thinking about it. As it has been mentioned above, it can be interpreted

[454] Seth, S. (2013), p. 02.
[455] Seth, S. (2013), p. 02-03.

in reference to a time period, subsequent to the end of colonialism, or as it was presented above, subsequent to its beginning. It may be understood as a condition, in general, referring to the state of things after the end of colonialism. Also, as presented in the beginning of this session, it can be understood as a theoretical tradition – about relations between power and knowledge, touching in topics as race/ethnicity, identity and gender. To many scholars it regards a body of Literary Criticism, as it interrogates the traditional representations about colonized, colonizers and previous colonized people. This fourth interpretation is closely associated with Edward Said's *Orientalism*, published in 1978, taken as a fundamental and foundational text for this school of thought. Some scholars will take it as a reflection of anticolonialism, merely as criticism of all forms of colonial power, be it cultural, economic and political, past or present[456].

As it is noted, the position Postcolonialism occupies in international studies is growing steadily in this century, supported by scholars interested in rethinking dominant conceptions about the genesis, the organization and the logic of the modern international system. With it emerges broad and new possibilities for analysis and criticism of modes and devices for domination in world politics, propitiating a bigger quantity of articles referencing post-colonial theories and the issues of coloniality in European periodicals and others of the Global North, representing a greater concern even in the space occupied by the mainstream. From that is rising a certain normalization of the postcolonial analytical framework in research articles on precariousness, migration, social movements, resistance, security, among others themes and subfields, Working a lot with concepts such as domination, discrimination, and exclusion[457].

This field ranges from cultural studies to history, from political theory to psychoanalysis, and everything fits into International Relations. Postcolonialism in IR can be taken as a relatively fluid discourse or aggregate of knowledges influenced by Marxism, by Poststructuralism and by Feminism, focused in the studies of the relations of dominance and resistance, epistemological issues associated to the conditions of the production of knowledge and alternative forms of engaging in political action[458]. The author João Pontes Nogueira reminds us that, when mentioning Postcolonial Theory, one should not think in terms of paradigms or concepts and methods solely aimed at the analysis of processes and problems circumscribed to specific spheres of life in modern societies – it stretches farther, exactly

[456] Toledo, A. G. (2021), p. 19-24.
[457] Toledo, A. G. (2021), p. 7-16.
[458] Toledo, A. G. (2021), p. 9.

dealing with the distinct, hidden and avoided spheres that should be interconnected in any analyses[459].

It should be mentioned here that even with greater diversity and plurality inside the discipline of International Relations, the topics relating to the colonial still not having a great insertion in the formulation and analysis of the objects of International Relations, such as problems of international politics, for example – and this happens even among those said to be reviewing the mainstream. However, historically speaking, Postcolonial theories have influenced movements of criticism to the dominant conceptions of the international since, at least, the 1980s, when happened what is known as the 'critical turn'. Examples mentioned by Nogueira regard the meeting between exponents of critical and postcolonial thought that allowed the introduction of the issue of ethnocentrism as a constitutive feature of the modern international, and the reviews of the World-System of Wallerstein, criticizing the modern representations of modernity based on the superiority of the West. This 'spatial turn' mobilizes the concepts of critical geography to rethink the place of spatial representations of the territory, as we did when thinking about maps. These are just two examples of how Critical Theory and the Postcolonial Thought met many times over the course of the past four decades. Even with this, some critical theories have been object of analogous critics for their Eurocentric epistemes, in a dynamic of "who criticizes the critique?"[460].

Just like is pointed out by Nogueira, it's important to observe how the criticism of the supposed intellectualism of postcolonial high culture is related to the greater emphasis that is given to political engagement and the formulation of strategies of resistance to the diffusion of new forms of violence and exploitation experienced, mainly among populations of the Global South. In this attempt to insert the postcolonial in the mainstream, the European context emerges with two processes: first, an effort to incorporate the colonial question in researches coming from a greater self-critique about the excluding and provincial character of Eurocentric narratives; secondly, as a consequence, increases the prevalence of references to postcolonial and decolonial theories coming from the *locus* where the mainstream is centered, like Europe and the United States. From this fact, emerges the pondering: what is the real potential of the criticism made by those? Should it be differentiated from a criticism made directly from the Global South? Is Postcolonialism geographically bounded[461]?

[459] Toledo, A. G. (2021), p. 7-16.
[460] Toledo, A. G. (2021), p. 7-16.
[461] Toledo, A. G. (2021), p. 7-16.

Philip Darby[462], as referenced by Nogueira, points out to the incorporation of postcolonialism as a norm in research practices and intellectual records in the discipline, warning about the generation of new forms of objectification of subordinate subjects and knowledge and, consequently, often unintended, forms of romanticizing, exoticism and eurocentrism. Going beyond the epistemic issue, this fact highlights the possibility of detachment of academic practices from the experience of struggles in the Global South and the relationship between theory and practice. This point, in specific, comes to be of enormous relevance to the argument of this dissertation[463].

3.3.2. Fundamentals of Postcolonialism

Prior to understanding how this school of thought(s) finds a fertile ground in the field of International Relations we must comprehend how it grew and advanced, attentive to the most relevant productions and the most referenced names. There are several authors and scholars that could be featured in this section, however just a few of them will be mentioned here. Postcolonial studies have been growing throughout the last decades, highlighting the perspective of the subalterns, most represented by the contribution of famous Caribbean, African and Indian authors (mainly francophone and anglophone texts), but not bounded exclusively by geographical terms. As was above mentioned, the contribution of Edward Said's *Orientalism* (1978) brought up the discussion about how the Orient was approached by the West, mainly as an institutionalized western way for dominating, restructuring and building authority over this oriental *other*. Said's critiques, mainly in cultural and literary terms, how the West would deal with the East "by making statements about it, authorizing view on it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it"[464]. The author proceeded with his critical perspectives on the theme on later texts, such as *The world, The text, and the Critique* (1983) and *Culture and Imperialism* (1993)[465].

Even before Said's texts, works such as Aimé Césaire's *Discourse on Colonialism* (1950) and Albert Memmi's *The Colonizer and the Colonized* (1957) recaptures the political and social challenges presented by Patrice Lumumba, Thomas Sankara, W. E. B. Du Bois and even Toussaint Louverture to address the struggle of racialized communities against the structures of colonialism and imperialism that were established and exploited by the West since the 16th

[462] Toledo, A. G. (2021), p. 13.
[463] Toledo, A. G. (2021), p. 7-16.
[464] Burney, S. (2012), p. 23.
[465] Burney, S. (2012), p. 39.

century[466]. It is of utter importance to understand a little more about their critiques, and we shall attempt to do it here.

Aimé Césaire disavows colonialism, racism and Eurocentrism through the introduction of the concept of *Négritude*, with which he built, together with many other francophone intellectuals and scholars, a framework of critique and literary theory, like Said. His aims were at raising and cultivating 'Black consciousness' across Africa and its diaspora during the 1930s. Evoking the valorization of black culture and the rejection of French racism, Négritude expressed a revolt against the speeches carried by the capitalist world of white supremacy. He wanted to address the hierarchical discursive relations between the colonized and the colonizer, built throughout centuries of western culture hegemony. The western concepts of 'civilization' and 'rationality' are dependent on the construction of an (the) Other, according to Césaire. Very influenced by Marx and Engels, he "believed that the previous step to action, to anticolonial movement, was unalienation and the recognition of difference"[467]. This requires a process of unlearning and also a strong process of identity building through emancipation, only possible considering the dismount of the artificial and oppressive nature of the epistemological structures of the colonizer.

> "Only when the black ceased to be seen as a 'thing' and became aware of the processes of 'reification' and dehumanization carried out by the colonizer, could he be empowered as a political subject, ceasing to be a mere 'instrument of production' at the mercy of capitalism"[468].

After the "unalienating process, the Black Identity should go through a process of affirmation, to recover the merit of its culture and singularities. And how is this carried out? Aimé Césaire defends that fundamentally this is done through the Hegelian dialectical process. This would achieve the equality among human beings in the form of a reviewed universalism, one which would not diminish difference, but include the rights of multiple cultural realities. At this point, we see Césaire denouncing the inconsistency between the French colonial policy and its republican "universal values", exposing its provincialism and selectivism. For that, the recognition of the black community would not be an antithesis, but a step towards the true humanist universalism. He affirms: "The West told us that in order to be universal we had to

[466] Burney, S. (2012), p. 39.
[467] Fernández, M. (2021), p. 38.
[468] Fernández, M. (2021), p. 38.

start by denying that we are black. I, on the contrary, said to myself that the more we were black, the more universal we would be"[469].

At some point Césaire addresses the "colonial holocaust", mainly in his *Discourse on Colonialism* (1950), what is defined by Robin Kelley as a "War declaration". One of the main arguments of the text was about how colonialism could not be understood as a "zero-sum game", with unilateral affects, impacting just the colonized societies. Césaire points to the effects of colonization on the colonizers as, in the process, they become brutes, "as animals". He argues that colonization "uncivilized the civilized", impacting not only the people, but the concept of civilization itself. To him and Fanon, the brutal actions practiced by the colonizer would affect his public and private life – and this goes against Hannah Arendt. To Césaire, this "boomerang effect" is what caused the degradation of Europe itself, and following this line of thought one of his best examples is the Nazi experience: not a monstrosity, an anomaly, but a logical development of western civilization. Basically, Nazism is read as the colonial totalitarian experience brought back to Europe. Césaire says that what Europeans "cannot forgive Hitler for is not the crime in itself, the crime against man […] but it is the crime against the white man"[470].

His main objective and contributions were to highlight the ambiguities and limits of European universalism Césaire wants us to look at (post)colonial people, and from it problematize notions of human rights (that were mainly born from the occurrence of the Holocaust), but did not cover the colonial reality, for example. It is a call for the decolonization of Eurocentric epistemological structures, which even in present days promote the superiority of the West vis-à-vis its Others. Césaire, through the lens of *Négriture*, focus on the racist nature of European knowledge, regarding even notions on Marxism, Surrealism and Hegelianism, that were part of Césaire intellectual formation. Césaire invites his readers to "pluriverse" the world that was presented as one, versing about other worlds, their pluralities and their dynamics"[471].

We couldn't move forward without also regarding another name that has been mentioned multiple times throughout this dissertation, requiring a little more attention especially for the intended objective of presenting the fundamentals of Postcolonialism. Frantz Fanon, author of masterpieces such as *Black Skin, White Masks* (1952) and *The Wretched of the Earth* (1961), also preceded of Said, being himself a pupil of Césaire's thought. With Fanon the discussions

[469] Fernández, M. (2021), p. 41.
[470] Fernández, M. (2021), p. 51.
[471] Fernández, M. (2021), p. 56.

get amalgamated with anticolonialism, anti-imperialism, antiracism and Marxism, but maintaining a Postcolonial character in itself. Much of his main ideas were presented in Olsson's documentary[472], with many excerpts from his 1961's book giving the tone for what was being presented and criticized.

One way to introduce him in a broader perspective in through the discussion of freedom, taken as one of the main ambitions of modern politics (if not the main). As multiple groups call for it, emerges the fact that most discourses for freedom can be contradictory. It is not hard to perceive this when addressing how fighting for freedom can lead to the multiplication of violence and disrespect to freedom in itself. Discussions around this topic usually touches on the violence that appears when the freedom of some signifies diminishing the freedom of others. These contradictions are taken as structural to how Liberalism defines freedom as a "universal value" (for the west). This can easily be seen in the colonial roots of the Liberalism defended by John Stuart Mill. Lara Selis and Natália Souza, in their chapter[473], highlight how his "universal" values, as part of his liberal political project, would comply with the imperial and colonial project, advocating of the English imperial project in India, for example.

Amidst that, fighting for a different take on freedom and criticizing liberalism, anti-imperialist movements of the XX century were strongly motivated by a desire of self-determination. This would come, in given circumstances, only by recovering national liberty/freedom. Here we recover what was presented in the historical section regarding imperialism in Africa and Asia. From this background emerges Frantz Fanon, who promoted the defense of the need to decolonize not only the bodies, but also the minds of colonial subjects marked by the violence of colonization. In his book *The Wretched of the Earth* (1961) – featured in Olsson's documentary – he addresses the hypocrisy of liberal humanism, shedding light into the dehumanization of the colonized subject through violence. To fight that, Fanon argues for the colonial violence against the colonizer, as political resistance. His arguments are usually taken as very polemical, taken as extreme, but they remain relevant with the constant realization that the end of the processes of formal colonization of peoples and communities did not represent the end of colonial violence onto bodies and minds scarred by coloniality[474]. To overcome that, the reconstruction of a new humanism would involve the violent exorcism of the colonizer.

[472] Olsson, G. (2014).
[473] Selis, L. M. R. & Souza, N. M. F. (2021), p. 57-59.
[474] Selis, L. M. R. & Souza, N. M. F. (2021), p. 59-61.

Frantz Fanon's book proposes violence as a way for liberation. In his book Europe is no more the subject, but the object: it is analyzed and condemned to unveil, to those that are subalternalized, its mechanisms of alienation. From the relation between oppressors and oppressed, death is (was) the only foreseeable future. For those (colonized) the death of such relations **(**emancipation**)** is what would dissolve the original domination. It is quite menacing to read such affirmations, but Fanon works his way into the text so we can have the same astonishment with the contradictions and abuses of colonialism. Jean-Paul Sartre**,** in the preface of the same book, writes how the system of colonial domination managed to "claim and deny, at the same time, the human condition". For that, in front of such contradictions, Selis and Souza remark how the author's proposal could not admit a less dramatic resistance than the irrepressible violence of those colonized[475].

The authors Selis and Souza, addressing the question of freedom, presents us Fanon's contributions vis-à-vis Ashis Nandy's contributions to create a discussion that offers two different takes on the question of resistance, violence and the anti-colonial approach. What has to be noted is how colonial oppression paved the way to resistance. Part of the intellectual legacy of colonization are work such as the above mentioned, focused in social transformation and taking freedom as a central historical need. To Fanon, subversion is practiced in the form of exorcism. Selis and Souza remarks how the specificity of the colonized subject affects directly the way of analysis – in the cases regarding Fanon's contributions, the black slaves are taken as objects, negated to any consideration of their humanity. This perspective explains how, to Fanon, with no humanism, there is no chance for reconciliation. The Martinican, balances himself between the Hegelian-Marxist dialects and the Freudian psychoanalysis, working a lot with the concepts of "Self/I" and "the Other". Based in his project of national emancipation for Argelia, and the construction of the figure of the "new man", his emancipation by dialectics begs for the necessity of the colonial subject being presented as the anti-ethical figure**.** It's an endless game of "Self/Other"[476]**.**

The conclusion shows us that resistance, through conciliation, would be found in the mutual education, negotiation and politization of the limits that draw the opposition between the Self and the Other. Race, gender, class, among other categories, now intersect in a mosaic of identities, whose diversity is projected on the field of possibilities for policies of liberation.

[475] Selis, L. M. R. & Souza, N. M. F. (2021), p. 61-63.
[476] Selis, L. M. R. & Souza, N. M. F. (2021), p. 77-80.

This opening for the political imaginary – one that resist universalizing models – must go through the incorporation of the epistemological analysis like the ones done by Frantz Fanon, with experiences and resources that do not assume the Western superiority, making their reflections available as an instrument[477].

There is still a myriad of important names and texts that could be mentioned here, and I do intend to mention in a timely manner other contribution. As was above mentioned, Ashis Nandy approached the topic in his books *The Psychology of Colonialism: Sex, Age, and Ideology in British India* (1982) and *The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self Under Colonialism* (1983), Bill Ashcroft with *The Empire Writes Back: Theory and Practice in Post-Colonial Literature* (1990), Homi K. Bhabha with *The Location of Culture* (1994), Stuart Hall with his cultural studies in *When was 'the post-colonial'? Thinking at the limit* (1995), Partha Chatterjee with *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories* (1994). Other important names are Ernesto "Che" Guevara, with his *Colonialism is Doomed* (1964) and also Achille Mbembe, author of texts such as "On the postcolony" (2001) and the famous *Necropolitics* (2003), in which Mbembe introduces this concept to picture how States hold the "license to kill" in the name of a discourse of order, also addressing those bodies and minds that, because of that, remain in a constant state between life and death. However important, I do not have the proper space to introduce how each one of these names contributes to the discussions on the foundations of Postcolonialism.

Notwithstanding, there is one last name that I would like to accentuate here, one that should not go unnoticed in this section. As mentioned before, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak has an important contribution in regards to Postcolonial theory with her article *Can the subaltern speak?*, published in 1985. The original name of the text was "Power, Desire, Interest", what communicates well her intentions for such an important text. In it, she addresses how questioning the role and the place of the researcher still being taken as meaningless in various critical movements focused on the sovereign subject. Here, emerges the question of how the subject of the third world – better named as Global South – is represented in western discourse. Her argument is based on how western intellectual production is, in many ways, complicit to the West's international economic interests[478].

Spivak's article works to transform the analysis of colonialism through the affirmation of the contemporary relevance of Marxism, exploring the international division of labor and how

[477] Selis, L. M. R. & Souza, N. M. F. (2021), p. 77-80.
[478] Spivak, G. C. (1985), p. 19-20.

capitalism approaches and influences the world. She is very categorical in affirming that exists an interest in maintaining the West as a subject, as 'the' subject. There is the construction of a 'subject of knowledge' that covers the undermined sovereignty. To deal with that, scholars and intellectuals must attempt to disclose and learn the discourse of *the Other* in society. She makes some appointments about other authors to affirm how "Neither Deleuze nor Foucault seems aware that the intellectual within socialized capital, brandishing concrete experience, can help to consolidate the international division of labor"[479]. I do think it is essential how she makes ponder about how the relationship between global capitalism (based in exploitation in economics) and nation-state alliances (based in domination in geopolitics) is so 'macrological' that it cannot account for or address properly the 'micrological' texture of power[480].

Using her strong language, she affirms that "the clearest available example of such epistemic violence is the remotely orchestrated, far-flung, and heterogeneous project to constitute the colonial subject as Other"[481]. By referencing Foucault and bringing up the concept of epistemic violence – as a brute and forceful complete revision of the episteme – Spivak highlights how the existence of subjugated knowledge already serves as an explanation and narrative of a reality that was established as the normative one. Again, she argues that Foucault and Deleuze assume that the oppressed, if given the chance, and on their way to solidarity through politic alliances, can and will speak from a place where they know their conditions. Because of this perspective she looks on the other side of the international division of labor, "inside and outside the circuit of the epistemic violence of imperialist law and education supplementing an earlier economic text", to then inquire: can the subaltern speak[482]?

Even going through the contributions of Gramsci regarding "subaltern classes" and, from it, the intellectual role in cultural and political movements of the subaltern in face of hegemony, Spivak believes that approach must be attempted to determine the production of history as a narrative that intends to grasp into truth. Spivak's proposition regards how the phased development of the subaltern is complicated by the imperialist project, what comes to be the object of study of a group of intellectuals that focus on subaltern studies. With it, even those postcolonial intellectuals learn that their privilege of creating knowledge and attempting to being heard "is their loss"[483]. In midst of that, to propose another layer of complexity, Spivak highlights how "within the effaced itinerary of the subaltern subject, the track of sexual

[479] Spivak, G. C. (1985), p. 30.
[480] Spivak, G. C. (1985), p. 42.
[481] Spivak, G. C. (1985), p. 47.
[482] Spivak, G. C. (1985), p. 54.
[483] Spivak, G. C. (1985), p. 65.

difference is doubly effaced", touching on the fact that inside the context of colonial production the subaltern subject cannot speak and has no history, but even less has or speaks the feminine subaltern[484].

The author also makes an argument of the nostalgia for lost origins and how this can be detrimental to the exploration of social realities within the critique of imperialism. She aims at hindering the ethnocentric subject establishing itself when it defines *the Other*, being this very commonly assumed as a program of the benevolent western intellectuals. According to her, there is a prejudicial effort to maintain at the center of the *logos* the Christian Judaic God. This, furthermore, is kept to give the myth a status of geopolitical history. Here she uses Derrida, who has this capability to enunciate the tendency of the European subject to constitute the Other as being marginal to ethnocentrism[485].

Her contribution remains around the purposeful questioning: can the subaltern speak? Turning the question to the other side, she also questions what must the elite do to what out for the continuing construction of the subaltern. She speaks from the issue behind the conscience of being a woman and subaltern in the "third world". From this perspective she points to many symptoms of this enduring imperialism, mentioning how "white men are saving brown women from brown men" and how "the very first legislation upon Hindu law was carried through without the assent of a single Hindu"[486]. To ignore the subaltern today is to continue the imperialist project. When addressing this being a woman in this scenario, Spivak brings up Imperialism's image as the establisher of the good society highly associated with the espousal (adoption) of the woman as *object* of protection from her own kind. When addressing this not being a white person, she brings up how Imperialism goes further than Cromatism (prejudice against color). In face of all she concludes: the subaltern cannot speak (yet).

3.3.3. What Postcolonialism has to teach in IR?

Sanjay Seth, in the first chapter of his book, outlines the three core elements of any postcolonial critique of the discipline of International Relations. First, we should note that the international society is not a European invention that was radiated outwards, encompassing the world. For example, the Peace of Augsburg (1555) and the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) coincide with the subjugation of the Americas, slave trade, colonization. The latter processes, that happened outside of Europe, are significant to the development of the international order

[484] Spivak, G. C. (1985), p. 66.
[485] Spivak, G. C. (1985), p. 77-84.
[486] Spivak, G. C. (1985), p. 48-49.

as well. To understand the expansion of the international system it is necessary attention to its colonial origins[487]. We can begin with the very idea of Anarchy in the international order as a transhistorical fact, an axiom. Kenneth Waltz is categorical with addressing this enduring sameness through the millennia, from which emerges international politics as the eternal struggle of multiple sovereign states.

The English School here appears with a new proposal, almost ignoring anarchy as a defining feature of the international order. They have the "considerable merit of enquiring into the historical origins of the contemporary international system". Still, Seth argues that their reading is still Eurocentric and mistaken[488]. The author says that they all account for a sanitized version of 'expansion'. Conquest, being violent and bloody, appears as an orderly and regulated affair. Accounts for some changing facts, but elides much of its history, emptying its meaning. It blurs the history of decolonization – changes happened because the protagonist, the White Man, eventually decided for inclusion rather than exclusion.

For some time, there have been alternative accounts for this process, ones which the development of capitalism and modernity is not endogenous to development of Europe. What happened was much more on the side of historical exigencies rather than any traits of European exceptionality. Much of what was observed in Europe, for example, could be found already in Asia. Trade was not an inter-European phenomenon, and the conquest of the Americas is what gave financial leverage for capitalism to advance in Europe. Here, is Europe's relation with the world that comes as relevant[489]. Still, the 'expansion of international society' narrative was not being really challenged. A rare exception is mentioned by Seth, accounting for how "fundamental normative principles of the colonial and imperial systems beyond Europe were not equality and sovereignty"[490]. Main events in the history of IR coincide with non-European subjugation; the development of capitalism coincides with the colonial conquest and trade.

The relation between post-Westphalian Europe and the Non-Europe world cannot be disregarded. Any satisfactory account regarding this case should explore "the ways in which international society was shaped by the interaction between Europe and those it colonized". In Postcolonialism, the colonialism is not left as a footnote regarding the past, an episode in a larger story. It is a central part of that story, constitutive of it. The 'Post' marks the effects of this era in shaping the current world. It's not about the 'awakening' of one side, but "the course

[487] Seth, S. (2013), p. 15.
[488] Seth, S. (2013), p. 16.
[489] Seth, S. (2013), p. 18.
[490] Seth, S. (2013), p. 19.

of multifarious (unequal, hierarchical and usually coercive) exchanges, such that neither was left untouched". Seth suggests that is it is necessary to dig deeper into how the international society was affected, and decisively shaped, by colonialism and imperialism[491].

With the second core element, we should know that the historical account of the emergence of international society and the explanation of its functioning and nature is deeply Eurocentric. Stuart Hall notes that Colonization made a world of separate and self-sufficient cultures, economies and identities yield to homogenizing paradigms[492]. Seth argues that these ideas (law, diplomacy, state sovereignty) are not neutral, and work to reinforce the dominance of some nations over others. As a reflection of that, IR dealing with the international *relations* fails to signal what is above mentioned, being part of this vicious paradigm – for example, to realists and neo-realists, culture is irrelevant in questions of the functioning of anarchy and given pursue of interests; The English school, still being Mainstream IR, at least recognizes questions of culture being central to international politics. Still, to Seth, it is an historically incongruous take.

To deal with the heterogeneity of the world's people, the international system established principles such as equal state sovereignty, self-determination and non-intervention, but they function procedurally, rather than substantial, not as values or essentially commitments. A solution to balance domestic objectives with international common norms. Here, it is important to keep in mind that procedure governs interactions, while not belonging to no one. Liberalism, in this modern political order, thrived and became the official face of this new order, but just as in the domestic field, the international found many problems. Seth points how what is taken as purely 'procedural' was in fact highly substantive and normative. Far from being neutral, the established norms were biased, favoring groups over others. The development of liberal political theory has in part been a process of seeking to 'purify' these procedures and norms of their content[493].

What is an insuperable problem for 'domestic' political theory is no less so for IR theory. International Law and Diplomacy are not European creations that became universal. We have every reason to doubt universality. It is no argument to suggest that the acceptance an ubiquity of these norms/procedures by non-Western states renders these norms/procedures universal, purging them of their particularistic, Western origins. when International Theory seeks to equate procedural with mere form, devoid of any particularistic content, it acknowledges at the

[491] Seth, S. (2013), p. 21.
[492] Seth, S. (2013), p. 21.
[493] Seth, S. (2013), p. 23.

same time it disavows the importance of culture. In case of IR, it naturalizes what is historically produced. The naturalization of the nation-state and the world order is not stable or secure, and axioms are hard to define in the field of the international[494]. Mainstream IR serves as the agent of such naturalization, obscuring rather than illuminating what is interesting about the international[495]. IR goes even further in this problematic issue when assumes that cultures or civilizations are isomorphic with nation-states, assuming that this diversity is embodied by the nation-state in a violent manner.

The third element of Postcolonial theory concerns Eurocentric epistemology. It critiques *knowing (knowledge)*, as it does not simply "mirror" what represents the "real", but it has the power to shape "what is and what is not". The problem rises in the many instances in which European knowledge is inadequate to non-european objects. Primarily Seth notes that, in spite of the discussion on the section above**,** we cannot treat collectivities, whether cultures or nations, as if they were like individuals, even by analogy**.** That does not mean that individuals are natural, while cultures and nations are historical and constructed. The free, equal, rational and unitary individual presumed by the social sciences in not an uncontestable fact**.**

Seth shows how many authors and scholars argue for the discovery of the knowledge by mankind, as it was already there waiting to be unveiled. Coming from Nietzsche and crossing Foucault, there are now accounts which trace the creation of this individual through various historical processes, including social, economic and discursive transformations. These authors, calling this seeming naturalness and incontestability into question, fall under the work of Non-western scholars, who simply deal with their empirical inadequacy. Postcolonial writings, working at the junction of a keen awareness of this empirical mismatch on the one hand, and with a receptivity to the linguistic turn and to post-structuralist insights on the other, have been especially open to the idea that knowledges [*in plural*] may serve to constitute the worlds that they purportedly 'represent', 'mirror', 'render' or 'portray'[496].

The free, equal, rational and unitary individual is not a fact of the world, the starting point of knowledge, but rather, a consequence or product which has been naturalized such that it can seem to be a fact**.** It is not that the individual is real and that culture and nation are cobbled together and contingent, but rather that the former has stabilized, and the marks of its manufacture have, over time, been erased. This is not the case with State and Nation. Liberal

[494] Seth, S. (2013), p. 23-24
[495] Seth, S. (2013), p. 16.
[496] Seth, S. (2013), p. 26-27.

political theory, one could say, has had more success in naturalizing the individual than mainstream IR theory has had in naturalizing state, nation and the international order[497].

As the author notes, he is not claiming the postcolonial theory to himself. He notes how postcolonial theory has been especially sensitive to the role of knowledge not simply as a 'mirror' which represents the 'real', but as a potent force for shaping what is 'out there. The international is a realm where endless and seemingly irresolvable contestations testify to the fact that few things have become so naturalized that they are not potentially subject to contestation. Seth mentions Hobbes' *Leviathan,* arguing that sovereignty is the name and form of a capacity to impose and stabilize meanings. Still, in the international realm, no one really achieved it, and this is what makes it especially interesting. Exactly the discipline which makes the international the object of its enquiry is, for the most part, is an obstacle to a recognition and exploration of this, rather than a guide to it[498].

Another important contribution to better understand Postcolonialism in IR is presented by John M. Hobson, in an essay in which he approaches the Emergence of sovereignty and the modern system of states being taken products of the Eurocentric Big Bang theory of world politics. This assumes that it emerged in Europe and then it was exported to the rest of the world. Hobson challenges it by highlighting the crucial role played by the East and by the 'discovery' of the New World. His argument points for the mistake of taking the Sovereign state as a model that was globalized, arguing that, in reality, Globalization as precondition for the rise of sovereignty[499]. Globalization did not start in Europe, but got there...

Take one of Mainstream IR axioms: the modern era of world politics emerged with the birth of the sovereign state at Westphalia in 1648, as mentioned. From this point, then, it was globalized. In this very preconception rises the problem of IR's underlying Eurocentrism. Hobson argues against most theories that shared Eurocentric consensus, which posits that the Europeans single-handedly created the sovereign state in the absence of any Eastern input, what he calls the *Eurocentric Big Bang Theory* of world politics, a two-step narrative of the rise and spread of sovereignty. Hobson argues that European political modernity was not purely 'Self-made' but was to an important extent 'Other-made'[500].

He seeks to downgrade the monopoly of autonomy of Eurocentrism and upgrade the agency of the East. Is not about inverting Eurocentrism into Occidentalism, but account the

[497] Seth, S. (2013), p. 28.
[498] Seth, S. (2013), p. 28.
[499] Hobson, J. M. (2013), p. 32-48.
[500] Hobson, J. M. (2013), p. 33.

participation of both. It was the Oriental Globalization, centered around trade routes from the Muslim West Asia and China, that gave Europe, a small player in it all, access to material, technological and intellectual resources, critical to the emergence of its sovereignty states model. With that, (European) Sovereignty is the historical outcome of a globalizing process that includes the West, the East and the New World, with the East playing a lead role. Recognizing that goes with the fact that a Eurocentric (mis)understanding of the past has as its correlate a misunderstanding of the character and functioning of the present. A conclusive note is that, only recognizing the wider global context, with a dialogue of civilizations, is that one can understand the sovereign state in particular, and world politics in general[501].

I would like to raise the question of "inventing America and Europe" in the construction of this sovereignty. Hobson reminds us that IR theory on the idea of Sovereignty rests on contributions of people as Francisco di Vitoria, Hugo Grotius, Albert Gentili, Emerich de Vattel, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, to cite a few. Their main motivation can be understood as the pursuit to solve the problem of international conflicts *within* Europe. Here, the imperial aspect of the rise of sovereignty is not merely something that followed it but that preceded it as well. For it was the imperial encounter with the Americas that retracked Christendom onto a new path that would culminate in a new Eurocentric identity within which sovereignty was embedded. Hobson mentions how this "discovery" constituted a massive epistemic threat, especially in the sense of "Catholic norms which framed European perceptions of non-European peoples and places". What America means in the division of land to the sons of Noah? How should be the application of Catholic Christian norms to interpreting the Amerindians[502]? From this contact starts to emerge a nascent conception of "standard of civilization" through the implementation of international law, but with a bipolar image of the international.

Another topic of enormous important regards the practice and the study of international politics and war, and Postcolonialism has much to contribute here. When approaching war, in general, "it has been a consistent if usually undeclared feature of international politics that the lives of non-Western peoples have been assumed to be less valuable than those of Westerners"[503]. Christine Helliwell and Barry Hindess helps us to question what makes this thought possible. To them, it comes from the combination of two ideas, both deep-rooted in Western intellectual tradition: the Denial of Coevalness and the presupposition that the

[501] Hobson, J. M. (2013), p. 32-48.
[502] Hobson, J. M. (2013), p. 41-42.
[503] Seth, S. (2013), p. 6.

'individual' is a figure who becomes fully visible only in the present, as it represents chronologically western modernity. From this logic, societies and peoples who belong to the past (or have stayed in the past), even if they inhabit the present, are not composed as individual subjects (they don't know individuality). The othering here happens with the consequent though that, from the western perspective, "they are not like us" because "they don't value life as we do"[504]. The quote from Westmoreland goes as: "The Oriental doesn't put the same high price on life as does a Westerner. Life is plentiful. Life is cheap in the Orient".

Helliwell and Hindess focus on this differential valuation, between Western and non-Western, arguing that it is in large part a function of what Johannes Fabian calls 'allochronism' or 'the denial of coevalness' – the 'persistent and systematic tendency to place the referent(s) of anthropology in a time other than the present of the producer of anthropological discourse'. It is the tendency, borrowed from anthropology, to treat spatial travel to different places as if it were a travel to (earlier) times. This denial of coevalness makes those being studied (a contemporary Other, in fact) not exist in the same time of the studier (anthropologist), transmuted into some kind of past/primitive ancestor. This anthropological practice reflects a practice since the Enlightenment era in Western societies, one practice of reading history sideways, explicitly underpinning systems of categorization as "modern and traditional", "developed and developing". Used in many social sciences, it also features in politics, international relations, economy, and other fields of study. We should note that in discourses of modernity, modernization and development, the contemporary world is divided into societies that are fully of modern time, and others that remain at greater or lesser distances behind[505].

In the broader field of contemporary social thought comes as evident a distance not only between observer and observed, but also between observer and a plurality of Others – a multiplicity of distinct groups of people, whose membership of the present is both denied and affirmed by contemporary social thought, all of them located somewhere behind the time of the 'modern' observer. The authors cite Lila Abu-Lughod, as she makes clear that discourses of difference like these, whatsoever, are rarely disinterested. She argues that this works essentially as a tool for constructing "the Other", and it goes further than mere ethnocentrism commonly associated with cultural difference[506]. Helliwell and Hindess suggest that in contemporary Western social thought, those who are seen as belonging to the present assume

[504] Helliwell, C. & Hindess, B. (2013), p. 70-84.
[505] Helliwell, C. & Hindess, B. (2013), p. 71.
[506] Helliwell, C. & Hindess, B. (2013), p. 72.

a greater moral and political significance than those who are seen as belonging to the past. Mind that this is not an easy claim to establish, as much of Western social thought (even more nowadays) appear to entail a positive and inclusive perception of non-Western others[507].

If we engage in a discussion of the conventional distinction between past and present, on the one hand you have the present, taken as an open field of human action and much of what happens within it is seen as resulting from the choices and actions of its inhabitants. On the other, the past is seen as a field in which action has already taken place with results that are able to be known, in principle. However, no matter the debates and choices, nothing can be done to change it – it is unalterable. This unbridgeable break is crucial to this devaluation of Others "living at an earlier state" of Western history. They are place in a different place from the modern west. They, the others, are Anachronistic, somewhere (somewhen) they should not be**.** those who seem to live in the present are perceived as free agents in a way that those who seem to live in the past are not[508].

The discussion advances to the connection of the present and the individual. What is found living "in the past" is placed under an objectifying mode, a preservation mode. The authors show a parallel made between aboriginal peoples and endangered animal species, affirming that "Like campaigns to save animal species, campaigns to save endangered tribes focus less on the survival of individuals than on that of the way of life/culture to which those individuals are said to belong"[509]. This neglect of the individual is highly significant, as it builds the foundation for Westmoreland's thoughts – that it is acceptable to sacrifice individuals under certain conditions, but only certain kinds of individuals are able to be sacrificed in this way: those from societies that range 'lower and lower in development', that is, further and further in the past.

It is a perspective that supports the view of "less developed societies" as characterized by a lack of individuality, dominated by group tradition, lacking self-knowledge and the imaginative capability required to know others. With it, they can only be objects of knowledge. This contrasts with more advanced societies "who are able to know them, and therefore also to know what is best for them"[510]. If one takes the conceits of the West, is not hard to understand that objected people will benefit from being governed by agents of imperial power. Also, it is not difficult to believe that the lives of those people count as less compared with those of real

[507] Helliwell, C. & Hindess, B. (2013), p. 73.
[508] Helliwell, C. & Hindess, B. (2013), p. 75.
[509] Helliwell, C. & Hindess, B. (2013), p. 76.
[510] Helliwell, C. & Hindess, B. (2013), p. 78-79.

individuals in the West. Living with the residues of such imperial fancies, one should expect perceived temporal backwardness to be associated with the lack of individuality, granting less value[511].

Moving forward we can address another topic of major importance when discussing Postcolonialism in International Relations, now following the contributions of Tarak Barkawi about the studies of war and peace. Postcolonial thought can shed light in questions regarding war and armed forces, going beyond traditional and critical thought. Here, Barkawi argues that the study of war in IR is subordinated to the study of security and strategy, mainly by states, reinforcing IR's 'nation-state ontology of the world', a world already divided into discrete, bounded units. To offer a different viewpoint, Postcolonial Theory presents a relational ontology (imperial encounters, colonized and colonizer), what Barkawi defends to be more appropriate for the study of war. He argues that it is not simply that war is one of the consequences of a world divided into discrete units, but that war has helped produce a world divided into discrete states. We should consider that it goes beyond mere confrontation, that it leaves none of the participants, losers or winners, unchanged[512].

As traditionally rendered, IR originates seeking to account for the causes of the II World War and the sources of interstate peace. Then, with the Cold War, the "American" discipline focused on National Security, bipolarity, nuclear strategy and low-intensity conflict. Since then it seems that the discipline mainly focuses on questions of force and war and their implications for world politics. Barkawi points out that IR does not study war per se, but rather strategy and security. War, then, cannot be considered the central object of any social science. If it were to be, it would have to take into account relational ontology, as proposed by Postcolonial theory. Postcolonialism critiques how this concern with War and Armed Forces in a self-generated property of the West, exported to the rest of the world. War and the military also play an important but underacknowledged role in Eurocentric constructions of modernity. Modern, regular armed forces are conceived as embodying nationalism, rationality and high technology. – organically connected to the idea and concept of nation, it serves as the epitome of modern social organization, securing the core construct of IR: the modern and national Western state[513].

Questioning this Eurocentric perspective questions as well the nature and character of the human potential for violent conflict, and as Barkawi argues, "as always with the postcolonial, the journey out to the periphery helps understand better the metropole". Insisting in how the

[511] Helliwell, C. & Hindess, B. (2013), p. 80-81.
[512] Barkawi, T. (2013), p. 87.
[513] Barkawi, T. (2013), p. 88-89.

modern world was formed in and through imperial encounters, Postcolonialism draws attention to the international processes by which the (divided in units) world was formed. Barkwaki argues that this absence of war studies is consequence of modern social and political thought favoring peace over war, a reflection of Enlightenment thinking that shaped universities and disciplines. Still, we could also focus on Clausewitz's conception of war, as "the continuation of policy by other means", vastly exceeding war as an instrumental approach. For Clausewitz and many other major thinkers, a key dimension of war is its socially generative properties**.** Working as a strategist and staff officer, Clausewitz could think carefully about ends and means of war (instrumental action) – note that his theorization of 'total' and 'absolute' war highlights his attention to the relation between ends and means. Barkwaki notes that this perspective comes from Clausewitz experience of violent social transformations from the Napoleonic way of war. "He repeatedly emphasizes war's capacity to unmake certainties, in chaotic and unpredictable ways"[514].

We can question, with the postcolonial in mind, what could we take from Clausewitz's efforts. First, the ontology of war is inherently relational, in a way that polities and societies in this relational dynamic that is unpredictable. The essential activity of war, *fighting*, addresses the "reciprocal organized violence" that is taken as "war's inescapable means". Drawing from it, war has a pervasive tendency to destroy expectations and truths, transforming orders of public reason and redefining political identities. it is the site of a key power/knowledge complex. After Napoleonic wars and Clausewitz's experience, it is understood as a phenomenon that moves the whole society, different from just the military field. "War is shaped by, and shapes, social context". War exceeds the clash of arms, and it breaks down conventional distinctions between peace and war[515].

Much of mainstream history narrates the story of clashing nation-states. In the limited imaginings of nationalism, many were willing to die for war. "Such imaginings seem so natural because wars, and representations of sacrifice in war, are engines of reification"[516]. A world composed of nation-states propitiates a geography of war and identity. Barkawi argues that, in this relational logic, war should be seen as a form of social interaction through which identities (in all sides) and polities are made and remade. War becomes a product of political and cultural difference, rather than the result of a shared human potential for collective violence, a potential activated by a transnational institution: the regular military. The proposed shift here is to not

[514] Barkawi, T. (2013), p. 90.
[515] Barkawi, T. (2013), p. 92.
[516] Barkawi, T. (2013), p. 103.

see war as a product of other social relations and processes, whether economic, cultural or political, but also as itself a generator of those relations and processes. War then is taken as a general form of human interaction, a sphere of life with its own dynamic. War becomes a common human property, not that of warlike peoples or states, or merely an occasional interruption in the peacetime processes of social development and political intercourse[517].

One last contribution that I would like to present leads to a re-examination and critique of the disciplinary configurations through which knowledge of the modern world is produced. Siba N'Zatioula Grovogui addresses the assumed moral centrality of the West, as this centrality ascribes universality to moral categories that bear the mark of their parochial histories. It is interesting how he points out that liberal understandings of Justice and Morality do not escape the historical and cultural circumstances of their production. Racial assumptions and racial thinking have a great importance here. In the chapter in which he argues for that, he uses a case to study Hannah Arendt's disapproving judgment on a case in Little Rock, Arkansas. Grovogui's critical reading regards how the 'civil rights movement' of black Americans should not be seen as a struggle to 'extend' civil rights to those who had not been brought within their purview, but rather is best seen as 'a practice of freedom aiming to redefine freedom itself within new moral, political and institutional political boundaries'. The main point is touches how we should not seek a better universality, but constantly self-critical, expansive notions of freedom and justice that are subject to negotiation and redefinition[518].

Thinking about a possible dialogue between moral theorists and postcolonialists, the latter would visit disciplinary canons for the purpose of re-examining their faithfulness to the formative events of modernity, the impact of western orders in modern trajectories and international order. To avoid such venture, Western liberal and progressive intellectuals have positioned themselves as proprietors and guardians of supposedly universal moral precepts. One should note that many of these positions are also placed against postcolonial. At this very point Grovogui focuses "on the manners in which liberal cosmopolitans have appropriated the theories of history, justice and science" to reposition Europe and the West as "legislator and adjudicator of universal values and, therefore, the ultimate authority in world affairs"[519].

To illustrate that, Grovogui will revisit views on recognition of the individual, freedom and justice expressed by post-war figures. Many authors explicitly deploy race and racial categories as a basis for justifying their own moral claims. Mentioning Gayatri Spivak,

[517] Barkawi, T. (2013), p. 103-105.
[518] Grovogui, S. N. (2013), p. 103-106.
[519] Grovogui, S. N. (2013), p. 103-106.

Grovogui shows how she has suggested that a postcolonial criticism should not take for granted that the perspectives taken from disciplinary conventions necessarily contain valid and justified truths, values and institution. Spivak also draws attention to how disciplinary common sense and regimes of truth may be based in questionable assumptions. It's interesting here how all of this connects with Grovogui's primary concern: the reproduction of systems of values, norms and institutions that are intended to preserve vested interests under the guise of truth, what Spivak calls 'axiomatics of imperialism'. The author wants to specifically focus on the status of race in all of that, in their views and what inspired them. Much of moral thought today reflexively places faith in regimes of truths advanced by historical figures who should have been questioned but were not[520].

Grovogui himself admits that even his observations are not clear from his same criticisms. But he establishes that his critiques are on the assumption of "a uniform West with a unique talent for science, technology and reason". These and related propositions and suppositions are advanced without due regard to the historicity of the West, its role in the modern human drama, and the existence elsewhere of valid moral, intellectual and institutional resources bearing on peace, security, justice and other key disciplinary concepts. The appropriate postcolonial response is to debunk their modes of representation and signification by revisiting the prevailing narratives of history, literature and philosophy among others. He defends that this exercise must be complemented by the expansion of disciplinary archives to include moral thought suppressed or lost in the wake of conquest, imperialism and colonialism, implementing the validation and acceptability of local memories, arts and forms of knowledge[521].

3.4. Decoloniality: Modernity/Coloniality

As we saw, the decline of the European capacity to maintain its power over the colonies, especially after the Second World War, together with the changes in the structures of international power, propitiated a pursue for emancipation in the Global South and the emergence of theoretical reflections in the body of Postcolonial theories. As well presented by Rosevics, most of postcolonial research followed the trajectory of literary and cultural studies, through the critique of Eurocentric modernity, the analysis of the discursive and representational construction of the West and the East, and its consequences for the construction of post-independence identities. As we came to understand, with its various

[520] Grovogui, S. N. (2013), p. 108.
[521] Grovogui, S. N. (2013), p. 108.

theoretical approaches, the concern of postcolonial studies was centered on understanding how the colonized world is discursively constructed from the colonizer's point of view, and how the colonized is constructed based on the colonizer's discourse[522].

Around the 1990s, much inspired by the processes of (re)democratization in the American continent and by the post-colonial debate that had reached American universities in previous decades, a group of Latin American intellectuals who lived in the United States decided to found the Latin American Group of Subaltern Studies – inspired by Ranajit Guha's group. However, the participating group of researchers, despite being Latin American, lived in the United States and reproduced in their research USA's epistemology of regional studies. Also, much like the Asian subaltern studies, the main theoretical references were from European authors, such as Foucault, Derrida and Gramsci[523].

The political changes that brought up theoretical questions regarding the contemporary Latin America, the theme of identity, multiculturalism, together with the historical analysis of the Americas, the exclusionary formation of our nation-states, as well as the questioning the colonial heritage within the current patterns of power propitiated the foundation of a distinctive approach. From this reflection, part of Latin American social theory and its representatives claim the Decolonial turn, a break with Western-centrism and its reflexes on knowledge and the critiques over knowledge, a demand that arises from the expansion of the postcolonial argument and of subaltern studies[524]. There is a dissolution from previous mentioned 'schools of thought', with the proposal of a distinctive perspective: The use of epistemologies originating mostly from European authors came to be felt as dissonant with the main objective of subaltern studies of breaking with the Eurocentric tradition of thought. It is in this sense that the Decoloniality arises, bringing the need to decolonize Latin American epistemology and its canons, mostly of Western origin. As noted by Grosfoguel, it is necessary to decolonize not only subaltern studies but also postcolonial ones[525].

While Postcolonial theory drifted closer to postmodernist and poststructuralist theoretical schools, Decoloniality studies turned to a project similar to those of critical leftist theorists, as Rosevics points out. This means that, like left-wing critical theorists, decolonial intellectuals seek emancipation from all types of domination and oppression, in an interdisciplinary dialogue between economics, politics and culture. Among the main differences between Asian and

[522] Rosevics, L (2014), p. 187-188.
[523] Rosevics, L (2014), p. 188-189.
[524] Aguiar, J. D. N. (2016), p. 274.
[525] Rosevics, L (2014), p. 189.

African postcolonial scholars and Latin American decolonial scholars is the colonialist experience that each of these regions experienced and its consequences for later theoretical reflections. Imperialism in Asia and Africa was mostly linked to the Anglo-Saxons and French and is distinguished in time and space from the action of the Portuguese's and Spaniards' Colonialism in Latin America. It is important to notice the herculean effort of completely overcoming the Eurocentric epistemological model, and such process takes time, especially in Latin America where it is so deeply rooted with its idiosyncrasies. In this section we shall understand more about it, what Grosfoguel sets as a "frontier critical thinking", capable of bringing epistemological responses from the subaltern to the Eurocentric project of modernity to overcome the relations of oppression, exploitation and poverty, perpetuated in international power relations[526].

The *red Modernidad/Colonialidad/Descolonialidad* (M/C/D) is the name of a group that gathered some of the most important names in critical thinking from Latin America During the first decade of the 21st century – the group in which the concept and idea of Decoloniality was created and developed. It is a multidisciplinary and multigenerational network of intellectuals, including sociologists like Aníbal Quijano and Ramón Grosfoguel, semiologists such as Walter Mignolo and Zulma Palermo, the pedagogue Catherine Walsh, anthropologists such as Arturo Escobar and philosophers like Enrique Dussel and Nelson Maldonado-Torres, just to name a few. As above cited, the review of the historical constitution of modernity and its transformations in Latin America was the locus from which central questions were articulated, in the light of the category of coloniality as the reverse side of modernity[527]. It would be hard to capture and reproduce, in a summarized manner, the contribution of each one of those, or the contribution of the M/C/D network as a whole. Considering that, we will approach just a few of them, starting with one of the founding figures of the *red Modernidad/Colonialidad.*

Decoloniality perspectives, in a general aspect, share a systematic set of theoretical statements that revisit the question of modernity. The first aspect is that the origins of modernity lie in the conquest of America and Europe's control of the Atlantic, not in the Enlightenment or the Industrial Revolution. The second aspect regards the special emphasis on structuring power through colonialism and the dynamics of the modern and capitalist world-system, its forms of accumulation and exploitation on a global scale. The third aspect highlights the understanding of modernity as a global phenomenon constituted by asymmetrical power

[526] Rosevics, L (2014), p. 190-191.
[527] Azevedo, W. F. (2018); Elizalde, P. C.; Figueira, P.; Quintero, P. (2019).

relations, and not as a symmetrical phenomenon produced in Europe and later extended to the rest of the world. The fourth aspect regards how the asymmetry of power relations necessarily implies the subordination of the practices and subjectivities of the dominated peoples. The fifth aspect touches on how subalternization is established from two structural axes based on the control of work and the control of intersubjectivity. Finally, as the sixth aspect, Eurocentrism/Westernism is designated as the specific form of production of valid knowledge and accepted subjectivities in modernity[528].

3.4.1. Aníbal Quijano and the Coloniality of Power

Aníbal Quijano is a Peruvian sociologist who left an important legacy to the field of decolonial studies, seeking to understand the formation of modernity. From a historical analysis of the formation of capitalism based on colonialism and its expansion to the globalization on the 21st century, he developed essential categories and concepts for the understanding of the Western European system of thought. According to him, there is no way to conceive modernity without coloniality, but there is also no coloniality without talking about race. Quijano is a central figure to the project of identifying and criticizing Eurocentrism and decolonizing the social sciences in Latin America – he saw colonization as a continuous process, beyond even political independence. The bureaucratic rupture of the metropolis-colony relationship perpetuated other structural forms of domination, with different subjects. Eurocentric modernity built *the Other*, black and Latin American, through a new form of domination[529].

Fernanda Bragato, regarding Quijano's contribution, argues that albeit liberal-individualism starts from a supposed abstract equality between all individuals, the concept of freedom that defines it is intrinsically linked to the concept of property/appropriation. There is no space for everyone to prosper or accumulate, nor the slightest possibility that the world will support the model of accumulation that has guided human societies since Europe projected itself as the leader of the so-called civilizing process. We should remember that Colonialism, as an economic and political system, is no longer central since the decolonization of Africa and Asia after the II World War and the last decades of the 20th century, but what Quijano points out is a race-centered colonial matrix that remains since the first colonial wave in the Americas and since the imperialist waves in Africa and Asia, persistent to present days. Together with

[528] Elizalde, P. C.; Figueira, P.; Quintero, P. (2019), p. 5; GESCO. (n. d.).
[529] Azevedo, W. F. (2018); Elizalde, P. C.; Figueira, P.; Quintero, P. (2019).

other authors, Quijano leaves a legacy that is "key to understanding modernity and capitalism in their center-periphery relationship"[530].

The concept of Coloniality of Power presented a new paradigm for social sciences constituting, with other theories such as Liberation Theology/Philosophy and Pedagogy of the Oppressed, part of a scientific turn. This concept unveiled what was hidden by a reading committed to the exaltation of modernity, revealing how coloniality is its imperative counterpart. In his article *Colonialidad del poder, eurocentrismo y América Latina*[531], published in 2000, Quijano points out fundamental aspects of capitalism and eurocentrism, and the categories created by those are the foundation for a model of exploration, being at the same time sustained and reproduced by it. Exploration requires domination, and Quijano argues that the categorization of Race came to be the most effective instrument of domination – a universal classificatory. The vicious discursive (mis)representation of different subjectivities (something being a subject, broadly meaning an entity that has agency) admits the classification of many as being "less". As Bragato points out, colonial discourses that represent the non-European *other* as an inferior being keep a large part of humanity excluded from its real capacity to be free[532].

In spite of this position, Quijano does not preach for a centrality in Latin American. With the Decolonial turn, the aim is to insert Latin America in a more radical and positioned way in the postcolonial debate, which is often criticized for an excess of culturalism and even Eurocentrism due to post-structural and post-modern influence. He is considered a fundamental author for highlighting how racism is made invisible in Latin America, how the colonial process is fundamentally racist and how social classifications are made, based on the processes developed and established by the coloniality of power. César Baldi highlights how Quijano had a very refined perspective on the dependence of the region, but avoiding economistic reductionism and recognizing the importance of the idea of race and racism in its structure, beyond ethnicity, in the organization of the modern world-system and its societies. With Quijano, undoubtedly, emerges an issue that erodes the blind belief in Eurocentric values so rooted in academic work, inaugurating a more lucid perception of the close link between racism, Eurocentrism, capitalism and modernity, characteristic of the articulation that has been presented her as Coloniality[533].

[530] Azevedo, W. F. (2018).
[531] Quijano, A. (2000).
[532] Azevedo, W. F. (2018).
[533] Azevedo, W. F. (2018).

It is important to emphasize how the concept of Coloniality of Power is taken as the main epistemic node of the Decolonial theoretical body. From that we can understand that the focus of the critiques rests on the process of undoing this perceived coloniality – this analytical framework of power formations "that no longer exercise their hegemony through the colonial regime or through direct forms of political and economic domination, but still reproduce themselves through devices of knowledge, modes of subjectivation and cultural control"[534]. It is about unraveling the connection between knowledge and power that constitutes colonial geopolitics, and this does not regard Latin America only. Coloniality, Globalization and Capitalism are built collectivity, propitiating an unprecedented system of social domination and exploration, and, together with it, a new model of conflicts[535].

Another point to mention is the debate these discussions create with Marxism. It is quite evident that the epistemological foundations of the Decolonial theory have Marxist influences – to verify that, one must only check the intellectual biography of the above-mentioned names participating in the M/C/D network. Decoloniality is not an alternative or negation of Marxism, but it is critical to understand that, if someone takes the latter only based on Historical Materialism, in a reductionist way, then emerges an epistemic conflict. This happens because this reductionist perspective may limit the various areas of human experiences to an economist ontological approach, focused solely on the control of labor forces. As it is defended, critically questioning historical materialism, Stalinism or expanding the analysis of capitalism and imperialism cannot be equated with rejecting to Marxism[536].

3.4.2. Expanding perspectives on Coloniality

It must be obvious to the reader that Colonialism precedes Coloniality as a structure of power, as the latter comes as a response to the former. Coloniality, nevertheless, outlives Colonialism[537]. According to the historical account, at the beginning of the 19th century there were several processes of independence across Latin America, but there were no practical processes of un-coloniality. The new republics got rid of the hegemony of the European centers, but the Coloniality of power and its fundamental effects still order Latin American societies. Different from Europe, which went through its own processes, the coloniality of power in Latin America historically made real democratization impossible. Indeed, Latin American history is

[534] Nogueira, J. P. (2021), p. 16.
[535] GESCO. (n. d.).
[536] GESCO. (n. d.).
[537] Elizalde, P. C.; Figueira, P.; Quintero, P. (2019), p. 6-7.

characterized by the partiality and precariousness of Nation-States, as well as managing and maintaining conflicts inherent to their societies[538].

Such complexity, in face of the concept of Coloniality being so present and ubiquitous, propitiated the development of new perspectives on the concept. The expansion of the conceptual and theoretical framework, within the Modernity/coloniality network itself and with later researches, allowed the use of the substantive Coloniality in other ways. As a first mention, the Coloniality of knowledge, introduced by Edgardo Lander, represents the Eurocentric character of modern knowledge and its articulation with forms of colonial/imperial domination. In this sense, Eurocentrism works as an epistemic locus from which a model of knowledge is implemented – on the one hand, it universalizes the European local experience as a normative model to be followed and, on the other hand, designates its knowledge devices as the only valid ones. A second mention, the concept of Coloniality of being, proposed by Nelson Maldonado-Torres, expands on Quijano's readings, as it understands modernity as a permanent conquest in which the category of 'race' comes to justify the prolongation of the non-ethics of war, which allows the total domination of the humanity of the other. Maldonado-Torres points out to the relation between the coloniality of knowledge and being, arguing that it is from the centrality of knowledge in modernity that an epistemic disqualification of the other can be produced. Such disqualification represents an attempt of ontological negation[539].

As a third entry, the concept of Coloniality of nature, which seeks to systematically address the ecological issue, considering the environmental dimension in the patterns of conformation of coloniality and the construction of modernity. Héctor Alimonda worked to articulate the Decolonial perspective with Latin American political ecology and environmental history. His recent formulations allow us to understand how nature is affected by coloniality, since it is seen as a subaltern space or object that can be explored or modified according to the needs of the current capitalist accumulation regime. The Coloniality of gender (and sexuality), as the fourth mention, has certainly been one of the least addressed issues in current decolonial studies, despite the many points of contact that exist between some of the central propositions of Decoloniality perspectives, contemporary Latin American feminist theory and postcolonial trends. Names such as Zulma Palermo and Rita Segato seek to articulate part of the Decolonial proposals, visualizing some contributions of feminism and trying to weave connections and critical networks between both theoretical perspectives. Among the advances in theoretical

[538] GESCO. (n. d.).
[539] Elizalde, P. C.; Figueira, P.; Quintero, P. (2019), p. 7-8.

expansion, there are also several attempts to recover and update Latin American critical thinking in critical lines and specific contexts. It is possible to point out a transversal trend in decolonial studies, particularly interested in revisiting older works of critical thinking from the "south", such as Waman Puma (1534-1615)[540].

Beyond the academic universe, it is possible to perceive the influence of the Concept of Coloniality on state policies developed in Latin America in organizations of indigenous peoples and social movements. Rita Segato argues that the impact this perspective and its vocabulary can be seen in a variety of documents such as the *Declaration of the Children of the Earth* (2008), "in which 1500 sisters and brothers of the Quechua, Aymara, Kichwa, Lafquenche, Guambiano, Toba, Colla, Poccra, Asháninka, Shiwiar and other peoples from Abya Yala" – a self-designation of the continent's original peoples as a counterpoint to the name America – announced that there is no integration without the process of unmaking Coloniality of power, knowledge and being[541].

3.4.3. Boff, Dussel and Coloniality on violence

Even considering the relevance of the Coloniality of power as a concept and the contributions of Quijano, together with the other contributions that were above mentioned, there is still a couple other names that could not go without mention. First, Leonardo Boff, a Brazilian theologian, writer, philosopher, an exponent of the Liberation Theology (*Teologia da Libertação* in the original), which proposes the premise that the Christian Gospel demands the preferential option for the poor and specifies that theology, in order to make this option real, must also use human and social sciences. Secondly, Enrique Dussel, an argentine philosopher considered to be the main name of the Liberation Philosophy, a field of Philosophy that analyzes what processes can make an oppressed individual free. He argues that the Liberation currents emerged as a reflection from the praxis of liberation of the oppressed, with many Christians politically committed to the liberation movements. An ethical theology and philosophy thought from the periphery, from the marginalized; a 'barbaric' approach, conceived beyond the borders of colonizing Europe.

The substructure of both currents of Liberation – philosophy and theology – are out of my reach and also out of the intended discussions in this dissertation, so I present them *en passant*. Both of them, however, communicate well with what is proposed by the Decolonial Theory

[540] Elizalde, P. C.; Figueira, P.; Quintero, P. (2019), p. 8-9.
[541] Azevedo, W. F. (2018).

(Dussel is part of the M/C/D group, for instance). Most importantly, for the present case, I take this space for the attention given by these authors to the concept and idea of violence. We can start by noting how Boff analyses René Girard's attempt to explain our main object. A distinctive point from his perspective is how he sees human beings acting violently towards not only other humans, but also towards nature – "in the Anthropocene, the great grazing meteor threatening life on the planet is the human being himself". Girald, knowing Boff's work and his approach on the Liberation Theology, found in the purposes of this type of theology the possibility of overcoming the logic of violence[542].

Girald's *La violence et le sacré* (1972) and *Des choses cachées depuis la fondation du monde* (1978) introduces his distinctiveness through his philosophical-psychoanalytic perspective claiming that desire is one of the structuring forces of the human being, and because desire is indeterminate, human beings do not know how to desire. From desiring what is unobtainable or what belongs to the other, conflict arises creating rivalry among all. To Girald, this is a societal paradigm. What happens is that, commonly, many unite against one or a few, creating a scapegoat to judge and subjugate a certain set of desires. By uniting against the scapegoat, as an object, the many forget the violence between themselves and live with a minimum of peace and /or harmony. The scapegoat, however, only hides social violence, as common rivalry continues – society enjoys a fragile balance. From time to time, with or without an explicit scapegoat, violence manifests itself especially by those who feel wronged and seek compensation[543].

The constant and manipulated creation of scapegoats transform the event of social violence into structural violence, and Boff defends that it is the ruling classes the ones responsible for this structure, accumulating for themselves at the expense of the impoverishment of others, a vicious logic of desire. They are the main causes of a permanent situation of violence that impoverishment implies. The mimetic desire to take possession of the good of the other fuels the logic that perpetuates violence. But desire does not have to be just competitive, says Girard. Boff agrees that it can be cooperative, with humans acting together to share the same object. This purpose generates a more cooperative than competitive society and a participatory democracy. Here Girard meets Boff on regards to the political meaning of Liberation Theology because it proposes an education that does not imitate the oppressor, but makes itself free and teaches not to create scapegoats but to take on the task of building a more egalitarian and

[542] Boff, L. (2017).
[543] Boff, L. (2017).

inclusive society. The understanding of desires and the common exercise of it shall propitiate more peace than violence[544].

In another article Boff goes even further to explore violence, presenting his contribution to various interpretations of this object of analysis – Here again using the support of Girald's thoughts. Here, various situations of undeniable direct violence throughout the twentieth first century, international and nationally, are connected to a highly predatory model of uncivilized capitalism, leading to an accumulation of wealth at the expense of the degradation of the workforce, lack of social justice and the devastation of nature. In such a excluding model, "It is a luxury today even to be exploited by the capital system", and this is already a state of violence – More than regarding acts of violence, it has to do with permanent and ongoing structures of violence. To interpret that better, Boff takes his time to explore various causes of this system, structure and reality[545].

When regarding historical causes, we learn about our slavery and colonial past. In the historiographic figure of Brazil we are able to project a history that is common to Latin America as whole and even with other cases contemplated by colonialism – the violence of invasion and conquest was organized, systemic and continuous throughout the timespan of centuries. Against a totalitarian power there was always a counter-power, so we do not fall in the tale of a pacific domination. The history of Brazil, like in many other cases, is in continuity with its past. In present days, living with an aggravating factor: analogous to a slave mode of production, reducing the people who produce to a piece, an object, a slave. A society of contradictions, in which the unemployed are punished, but there are no employment opportunities. This historical violence, on the basis of the domination of the other, formed the collective subjectivity of the elites in which the other must be treated with violence. Here, the mechanisms of social violence reside primarily in the mental structures of the ruling class[546].

When regarding cultural causes, bring us closer to violence as a structuring axis of culture, of the interest in power and domination. Direct violence serves to maintain it, but light violence serves to guarantee it. Socially is accepted mainly by the dominant culture, and in face of it we should submit, resist or pretend to accept. As a product this, a culture of fear was created, present in all areas of society – a logic of veiled total war. In another stance, the political causes of violence a society of exclusions – organized in the violent exploitation of the surplus value of work and in the exclusion of a large part of the population. The real conflict is established

[544] Boff, L. (2017).
[545] Boff, L. (2016).
[546] Boff, L. (2016).

between capital and labor. This affects the economic, political, cultural, religious, educational and health areas of society. Such political process it has the effect of prolonging the tragic inheritance[547].

When regarding psychosocial causes of violence, Boff points to the desire of compensation. Authoritarianism linked to impunity and, therefore, to corruption, which covers everything, can be understood as one of the origins of violence. The dominated classes assume and internalize the violent, unjust nature of the situation. An anti-violence arises, because violence is also used to defend itself. The dominated classes assume and internalize the violent, unfair and unequal character of the situation. An anti-violence arises for the purpose of defense. Here, the psychoanalytic approach of this violence stands out: it is reaction (from the unconscious), search for compensation and revenge. Here part of the social thought is built from social criminality, from the definition of what is legal or not, what is a crime or not. Underneath it, a strong basis of this criminality comes from the inequality that causes poverty. Boff reminds us that the attempt to exert individual force characterized as a crime can be psychologically understood as a pursuit for compensation of private interest – an individual who seeks compensation through violence, without actually changing the system[548].

To deal with this, the need for organization arises in the sense of transforming societies through processes of awareness and creation of organic organizations with transformative practices. Boff, however, points out that the bourgeoisie and the State fear this reasoning, using the dramatization of (counter)violence through the media, raising the phenomenon to levels of national security. At this point we regard the individual causes of violence, based on the perspective of human aggressiveness, seen for viewpoint of subjective reasons of individuals or groups. It is not unusual to regard discussions about the origins of "human aggressiveness" throughout historical human thought. Boff mentions Freud and Konrad Lorenz, but rapidly moves to the "archeology of social violence" proposed by the above-mentioned René Girald. The author stresses a rational perspective: subjective factors sustain objective violence. This can be minimized, controlled, but not eliminated. To better understand that, the original root of violence is explained through the structure of human desire[549].

Boff looks to the profound cause of violence through the hypothesis of mimetic desire. The bedrock of human social life is found in the structure of human desire, a driving force of transformations and progress. A great particularity of Girald's analysis is the construction of a

[547] Boff, L. (2016).
[548] Boff, L. (2016).
[549] Boff, L. (2016); Girard, R. (2014).

situation of desire formed by three parts: the desiring subject, the desired object, and the desiring other. Because the human being does not know well what it desires and how to desire, it finds concreteness in the desire of the other, and that is why desire is mimetic. Rivalry then emerges, generating conflicts and propitiating violence. As I mentioned before, appears the figure of the scapegoat – among aggressors, peace and harmony appears in the as society and cultures build up. The scapegoat serves as a *pharmakós*, a sacrifice to guarantee this optimal state. The questions that rises is: who are the scapegoats of the present moment? Who must be sacrificed for the maintenance of the *status quo*? Boff indicates how the market and the economic systems functions as a sacrificial structure – the market, to self-regulate, requires sacrifices. The violence of the marginalized, the poor and the oppressed is a mimetic reflection of a primary and modeling violence of the ruling classes – only dominating because it uses violence and constantly creates scapegoats[550].

The alternative is found in a better relation between desiring subjects, aiming for a solidary and communitarian desire. Here, Girald is the one to reach for Leonardo Boff, as the former sees in Christianity a phenomenon for overcoming sacrificial practices: the figure of Jesus, according to Christian culture, appears as a self-sacrifice, disrupting the logic of violence. Homologous to the notion of sin to Boff, violence should not be reduced to a moral question or a Freudian slip – it is a global question, subverting all human relationships. Through the biblical viewpoint, men want to place itself above all other beings and in this arrogance to be like God, finds the fundamental root of aggressiveness, what leads to violence: the desire of everything. Even coming to mention the Anthropocene view, humanity comes to be violent and aggressive even towards the "space of creation", specifically nature. As Girald defends, and Boff reiterates, the logic of mimetic desire can be driven towards solidarity and alliances, and only from that violence would be overcome[551].

The author believes that this can be achieved by the establishment of social-participative democracies built on pillars of participation, equality, respect of differences, and the acknowledgement of subjectivities. Again, this could only be built on a foundation of a better relation with nature, a very ecological stance – as he affirms, the current system found its limits in the limits of Earth, compelling a new paradigm of production, consumption and distribution. Leonardo Boff invites the reader to not accept the resignation of Freud, who in a letter exchange in 1932 with Einstein wrote on the persistence of violence in human relationships: "They

[550] Boff, L. (2016); Girard, R. (2014).
[551] Boff, L. (2016); Girard, R. (2014).

conjure up an ugly picture of mills that grind so slowly that, before the flour is ready, men are dead of hunger". Contrary to Freud, the author says that the mill exists and persists because there is flour, and flour for everyone. It is sufficient not only for all humans, but also for other living beings who share this common space[552].

At this point we can proceed to meet the perspectives of Enrique Dussel, as his perspectives with Liberation philosophy converge with Leonard Boff and the Decolonial theory. He defends that what sustains violence is a certain social Darwinism making people believe that human beings are selfish, competitive, just like in the market – different from what Hobbes reproduces from Pliny with the Latin proverb *Homo homini lupus est*, Dussel defends that wolves are amicable towards other wolves, as humans should be harmonious towards other humans. If mankind were like a wolf is for another wolf, he would be a completely supportive being. He does not agree with the implicit anthropology of liberal capitalism that makes us believe that we are individual, competitive beings[553].

One of his important contributions to this chapter's topic regards his reading of Walter Benjamin's text[554]. To recapitulate, the text approaches critically the question on violence from the viewpoint of the predominant bourgeois philosophy of Law, presenting its contradictions; From it, advances to oppose the concept of Mythical violence with the Semitic one, Divine violence. Enrique Dussel, in this brief article, uses Benjamin's text to clarify a few points and to present an understanding of the current and Latin-American view on the theme of violence, coming from his Liberation philosophy. According to Dussel's reading, in predominant bourgeois thought violence (as a concept) appears as the foundation that establishes law and that gives it permanence. With it we can find the bedrock of the State's power. Benjamin notes how the violence in law is different from Justice, as this discussion comes close to means and ends, principles and criteria, drawing prerogatives from naturalist and positivist theory of law. Summarizing, law basically seeks justification of certain aspects that constitute violence[555].

From a positivistic view of law, Dussel highlights some delicate situations between the interpretations of what is violence and what defines rights. For example, taking the case of class struggle, the right to strike guaranteed to workers may be taken as an act of violence (in reality omission, to Dussel) taken exactly to avoid the need for major examples of violence. Benjamin comments on the contradiction of qualifying a right as violent, when violence is the

[552] Boff, L. (2016).
[553] CEFIME (2012).
[554] Benjamin, W. (1921).
[555] Ambrossini, E. D. (2014), p. 43-44; Benjamin, W. (1921).

base to establish what is a right. Another interesting case is the right to war, as it disposes on the use of violence between two or more States – a situation of what kind of violence and how violence can be used, that can only be guaranteed by violence itself. That is exactly how Benjamin comes to address the two functions of violence: to establish and to maintain law – the origin of law is found in violence, exerted on life and death as the center of the legal system. In the figure of police and death penalties sentences we can clearly see the function of violence in modern States. In face of that, emerges a moral questioning of whether it is possible to regulate antagonistic human interests without the use of violent means[556].

As has been mentioned in the previous chapter, inspired by George Sorel, Benjamin picks up the question of political general strike and proletariat general strike. The first might be seen as political pressure, but the second aims for the "destruction of State Power" – the display of the true violence of revolutions. Analyzing both situations, Benjamin concludes that on the justification of the means and on the justice for the ends, *reason* is not what defines nor decides law, but the aims of the violence that is used. Above these aims of violence and above the idea of reason, Benjamin proposes a metaphysical interpretation through the figure of the divine – he presents the concept of Mythical violence and Divine violence. The former translates the modern experience, in which power must be guaranteed by all the violence that establishes law, and this to a greater extent by the excessive obtaining of properties, according to Dussel (approaching capitalist and Marxist readings). Mythical violence is the one that established Law. Divine violence is the one that extinguishes it. The former imposes limits, while the latter extrapolates it. The first accuses and absolves, while the second redeems, restore, emancipates[557].

The critique of violence is already the philosophy of its own history, in its capacity as establisher and maintainer of law by the means of mythical violence – this shall remain until a new or an oppressed violence overcomes the one that was established by current system, however maintaining the same logics. To disrupt this, a revolutionary violence, Divine. From this point, Dussel proceeds with an analysis from a viewpoint of the political philosophy of Liberation and from the viewpoint of the Latin-American situation. Using the categories applied in the political philosophy of Liberation he proposes, in order to have an analytical basis, a minimal description of the concept of violence: coercion exercised against the rights of the Other. But what are those rights? Well, they are covered by predominant (bourgeois) law

[556] Ambrossini, E. D. (2014), p. 45; Benjamin, W. (1921).
[557] Ambrossini, E. D. (2014), p. 46-49; Benjamin, W. (1921).

but also consider the *new* rights that appear as collective conscience grows – proposed and defended by those that are victims of this same set of laws. Dussel draws on the idea that established governments, when fulfilling the interests of citizens, builds consensus – the foundation of legitimacy – allowing social peace and not exhorting to violence. However, when a social group requires recognition of interests that are not fulfilled in the current political project, or that certain oppressed rights are not recognized by the ruling groups, they enter into dissidence because of the critical consensus (of the dominated/victims), disrupting social consensus and social peace/harmony[558].

Social consensus is sustained by those historically in power. They do not recognize the new rights proposed by dissidents. To deal with this, political coercion appears as an option, a violent act according to Dussel's definition of violence. The "leading class" becomes the "ruling class", in the sense of being violent, repressive, using the coercion of the institutions against the rights of those oppressed, aware of the injustices of the current situation, avoiding the critical consensus. The dissident action, exercising its *new* rights, also uses coercion with proportionated means of violence, reproducing what the oppressed suffer under the oppressing groups. The coercion for liberation, for emancipation, revolutionary in its character, is understood as legitimate and not taken as violent by Dussel, even though it might be armed and/or against the law. The bedrock of legitimacy finds root in the critical consensus of the oppressed, and not in a violence accepted by those ruling. As the proposal of a new order is legitimate, so are its coercive institutions and instruments. The state, the institutions, the structure is dependent on legitimacy (that comes before legality), changed by the dissident members of the previous *old* order. The new State is based on the legitimacy of the revolutionary community, whose praxis is not violent according to the conceptualization presented here.

Revolutionary law is not violent. If, on the contrary, the dominant group represses the dissidents, who have reached a critical consensus, through the use of police force for example, such act is violent, because it is exercised against the new legitimate right. In a war, the army that assaults and attacks the other, that invades and occupies aggressively the foreigner, opposing the other that defends itself – the first is violent, because it is unjust. Dussel defends that groups, classes, movements, oppressed nations that rise up against domination, fulfilling a praxis of legitimate liberation, exercise what Benjamin identified as Divine violence. This messianic moment (of Divine violence) consists of an unexpected moment, the "now", in which

[558] Ambrossini, E. D. (2014), p. 50-51.

the movement of the people, as a collective actor, works to the establishment of a new order, of a new right, of a new law. It is a "time of danger", a *Kairós* that annuls the quotidian life of the systematic exercise of dominating violence. As the author closes, “The normative principle justifies the right to use a legitimate coercion proportional to the dominating and unjust attack suffered, in defense of a massacred innocent people, a praxis that is in no way “violence”[559].

Dussel’s texts and theoretical perspectives can also propitiate further discussions on the theme, as we can see in Antunes’ dissertation on the progressist perspective of history and the issue of violence, also based on a discussion between Walter Benjamin and Enrique Dussel. Here, progress is connected to the exercise of violence. Dussel articulates a critique of the eurocentrism of W. Benjamin, denouncing failures of Benjamin’s perspective in detecting violence in the historical constitution of such asymmetry. Dussel’s view on modernity appears as a counter point, considering the concealment of the other and the alleged justification of colonial violence as constituents of European modernity. Benjamin has critiques to the notion of technical development as emancipation and critiques to historicism and universal history, composing a perspective sensitive to the costs of progress. The redemptive remembrance of the past comes to be a political action that breaks with a continuous and deterministic time of history. Dussel, on a different take, presents his conception of modernity, in which in the colonial phase of the process the concealment of alterity and the justification of colonial civilizing violence takes place. With Dussel we have a non-existent contribution to the critical thinking of progress in Benjamin, that is, that of a geopolitical theory of modern progress as a violent world-historical process[560].

For Dussel, modernity is based on a covering apprehension of the Other, in which the “Amerindian” other is arranged within Eurocentric projects as an object that was discovered, conquered, explored, evangelized and “peacefully” found, a scenario in which the conquering *self* precedes the Cartesian solipsism *ego cogito* in the figure of the *ego conquiro*; According to Dussel, Sepúlveda (Valladolid debate, 1550-1551) established the classic justification of European colonial violence, an irrational myth that blames the victim of violence, which has repercussions on the philosophies of Locke, Kant and Hegel, which starts from the assumption of the superiority of Europe and that the path of development of every culture would only be the one already covered by that culture considered the superior; Dussel presents the subversion of the modern/colonial order as a critical alternative to the violence of the Eurocentric (western)

[559] Ambrossini, E. D. (2014), p. 51-53.
[560] Antunes, G. S. de A. (2015).

capitalist world-system, postulating a worldwide project to overcome modernity as a co-realization of different forms of life, which he conceptualizes as Transmodernity[561].

The perspective from both authors on history and modernity are connected to the types and manners of violence that are integrated to the philosophical thinking of analyzed moments, against which they invest their philosophical efforts. In the first chapter Antunes seeks to present cases of modern violence that are presented in discourses from various historical sources together with justifications of the processes in which these cases of violence take place. The accomplishment of moral and political ends has been present throughout history as a justification to Colonization and, later, to the Enlightenment. The supposed development and diffusion of theoretical conceptions held as superiors (the "progress on science") as well as the implementation of technical innovations in the economic sphere were part of this type of optimistic discourse[562].

The author notes how Benjamin critiques this posture on modernity interested in dimensions he could not even approach – looking at Latin America, whose historical specificity does not allow an immediate and organic transposition of philosophical discourses from other parts to think about it, incites the curiosity of what kind of criticism of the contradictions of modernity could have been articulated from the region. This is exactly where Decolonial Studies emerge, and Antunes uses Dussel to approach it. I think it is extremely interesting how the author approaches the justification of colonial violence with the sacrificial myth of modernity, an idea proposed by Enrique Dussel in his readings of the Valladolid Debate and the arguments of Sepúlveda as the "the explicit beginning of modern philosophy, at its level of global, planetary political philosophy"[563].

In the conclusion of his work, Antunes explains that he identified the exercise of violence in historical processes such as classification, instrumentalization, evangelization, academic formation and the inclusion in the technical development of alterities by modernity. Many times not seen as violent, or when identified, justified by the narrative of the "better ends" for those neglected. Such perspectives were also present in Enlightenment and Marxism, impacting the Latin-American reality up to present days. Antunes uses of Benjamin's theoretical structure to critique his own reading of modernity, identifying conceptual gaps in his thoughts on history, going beyond an identifiable eurocentrism in Benjamin's philosophy. Here Dussel appears as the ideal counterpart to Benjamin's readings. Antunes goes a little further when suggesting

[561] Antunes, G. S. de A. (2015).
[562] Antunes, G. S. de A. (2015).
[563] Antunes, G. S. de A. (2015), p. 135.

how the comprehensive production with reference to Critical Theory (of which Benjamin was a part, with Horkheimer, Adorno, among others) would be strongly enriched by establishing relationships with the group of intellectuals who produce decolonial thought (which Dussel was part of, together with Mignolo, Quijano, Castro-Gómez, among many others that were mentioned)[564].

3.5. An appeal to the Epistemologies of the South

Before proceeding to the next chapter, concluding these sections on Postcolonial and Decolonial theory, I would like to dedicate a brief space solely to a scholar who offers us a nuanced reading of the discussions above presented and introduces us to different perspective and concepts on the objects at hand. How can the work of a social scientist from a colonizer country contribute to postcolonialism other than being the object of postcolonial studies? Here we rupture a nativist essentialism that can be found in certain postcolonial readings[565]. Boaventura de Sousa Santos is a Portuguese scholar and an emeritus professor at the University of Coimbra, former director of the Centre for Social Studies (CES) in this same institution and main coordinator of the project *ALICE - Espelhos Estranhos, Lições imprevistas: Leading Europe to a New Way of Sharing the World Experiences*. The main idea behind the project was the decentered conception of the anti-imperial South within which Africa, Asia and Latin-America also find their place in the proposal of a broader and more liberating conversation regarding peoples and their many knowledges. It aims at bringing to light his argument that the Eurocentric world has reached a point of (political and historical) exhaustion, having not much to teach the wider world anymore, also being almost incapable of learning from the experience of the non-western and non-European world, given the colonialist, capitalist and patriarchal arrogance that still survives[566].

Coming from a background in Law studies, Santos advanced to the studies of Philosophy and Sociology of Law, with which he found the tools to better understand his reality. Advocating for a Legal Pluralism, the author questions law as this normative complex that intends to organize society and regulate its behavior in a totality of spectrums, given that the law that applies to one individual in a territory should be applied to all people, being a legal organization that aims to be one in itself. From the point of view of the preponderance of Law (*jure imperii*), Law is intended as a normative totality that will describe the conduct of people

[564] Antunes, G. S. de A. (2015), p. 155-159.
[565] Santos, B. de S. (2010), p. 240.
[566] Santos, B. de S. (2016), p. 25-29.

according to its own normative and legal parameters. Everything that happens outside this legal order, outside this normative spectrum of law, would then be anti-legal, paralegal or ablegal. It could be illegal or even illicit, if it conflicts directly with the legal system, and not just as a gap in public power[567]. Intending to advance a critique on that, already carrying a critical baggage from past experiences in Portugal, Germany and the United States, Boaventura's PhD thesis focused on the social organization and construction of parallel legality in illegal communities, more specifically the favelas (slums or squatter settlements) in Rio de Janeiro, where he experienced the struggle of the excluded against oppression, learning from the wisdom of people struggling for subsistence and for the recognition of their dignity in face of the government and the State[568].

He describes himself as a "rearguard" intellectual, not a vanguard one, going behind and with the movements, with his epistemologies affirming that there is no consummated knowledge, as it is made from the ongoing connections and processes off teaching and learning. In an article, arguing for a reformulation of the eleventh thesis, drawing from Karl Marx commentaries on Feuerbach (1845), Boaventura questions the affirmation *"Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways. The point, however, is to change it"*, asking if it would not be the case to update the sentence, to free it from a certain Eurocentric bias[569]. Believing that "we have the right to be equal whenever difference diminishes us" and that "we have the right to be different whenever equality decharacterizes us"[570], Boaventura de Sousa Santos developed a ray of concepts that will add another interesting layer to our framework of postcolonial and decolonial understandings.

3.5.1. The Abyss among us

A central experience to the development of social and political consciousness of Boaventura was, as mentioned, the field research he made in the Favela of Jacarezinho, Rio de Janeiro. He saw decent and virtuous people fighting in the most undignified situations – people who fight for dignity. From his perspective, those people detain a kind of knowledge that is not taken as valuable because those people are also not taken as valuable. They are excluded in such a radical way that goes beyond the legal mantle, and they are kept there. What Boaventura experienced made him realize that a lot of his usual Eurocentric and Left thinking could not

[567] Santos, B. de S. (2018).
[568] Santos, B. de S. (2018); Santos, B. S. (2014), p. 64-68.
[569] Santos, B. de S. (2019).
[570] Santos, B. de S. (2001), p. 201.

account for such abyssal difference. There are forms of exclusion that are not abyssal, because they still happen inside some kind of law system. However, there are exclusions beyond and with the absence of law, mainly because the subjects are, in a way, conceived as close to non-human. To him, the sole perspective on classes was not sufficient. He needed to account for the racial perspective as well[571].

To comprehend that, coming from a critique of the Sociology of Law, Boaventura developed the concept of Abyssal Thought, a guide of modern western society's thought. This was established by the logic of what Boaventura refers to as global lines, proposed at the time of maritime expansion (ending of 14th century), functioning as a system of divisions. Such divisions appear from the creation and separation of two major systems: a system that regards what one has "on this side" – on the side of the *self* – based on a tense paradigm of regulation and emancipation, and a system that regards the "other side", based on a paradigm of appropriation and violence. There is tension between the two sides and inside each side as well. The global lines that establish this logic are conceptualized as Abyssal Lines, as they create an abyss between these two systems[572]. It is exactly because of the production of "non-existence" through this modern thought that Boaventura applies this conceptual adjective[573], highlighting the abyssal exclusion that comes from it.

The Abyssal Thinking is what perpetuates the ability to nurture these great distinctions, maintaining the abyss between the sides – it is the dominant epistemology that creates the abyss. He explains that "on this side of the line", laws are in force, the search for truth and peace is constant, through the formation of knowledge and science, however "on the other side" of the line reigns the will of the strongest, violence, absence of legality, looting and felony – the justifications lead to a paradigm of appropriation and violence[574]. Interesting enough, the abyssal lines are moved and modified: examples can be identified in some cases of anti-colonial and independence struggles understood as movements of subjects from one side of the line to the other, without invalidating the structure of the episteme that builds such logic – it does not change the paradigm. Boaventura also speaks of dealing with the emptying of the old concept of the "other side", which moves these abyssal lines, with the colonizer now seeing it as an invasion, a threatening intrusion. This can be seen in the attempt to regulate the appropriation and violence paradigm with migration laws, for example[575].

[571] Leituras Brasileiras. (2018).
[572] Santos, B. de S. (2007).
[573] Santos, B. de S. (2016).
[574] Santos, B. de S. (2016), p. 52-53.
[575] Santos, B. de S. (2007).

With these Abyssal concepts in this historical invisibility of colonial violence, we find one of the expressions of how colonialism as a social and epistemological relationship survived colonialism as a political relationship[576], what resonates with Decolonial Studies and the discussions around the Colonialism a historical past and Coloniality as perduring scar on the historical present. Taking from what was presented before, with the historiographic foundation for these critical perspectives, we can understand that colonialism, evangelization, neocolonialism, imperialism, development, globalization, foreign aid, human rights, humanitarian assistance are examples of Eurocentric solutions to the world's problems (by their eyes)[577]. Immersed in this thinking that claims superiority and creates closure, Boaventura tries to understand how can Europe deal with its current state of epistemological exhaustion. To him, to achieve Social Justice we must account for Historical Justice, and within it, Racial Justice requires amendments with modernity and its colonial roots.

Postcolonial thinking contributes to the interruption of key narratives of western Modernity, such as the narrative of continuous progress and linear climb within which colonialism performs a certain positive role. Boaventura assumes that there are different colonialisms, still affirming that all of them are noxious. As above argued, western modernity operates on the basis of this abyssal lines that create radical exclusion. For the management of the status quo, 'universal' ideas born from western Modernity abyssally exclude 'the other side', which is made invisible. Postcolonial thinking also interrupts the narrative of the progressive law throughout western Modernity. An example regards how labor laws developed as a kind of progressive body of law (around the end of 19th century), but one must note that all of this happened in Europe, on 'this side of the line'. In the 'other side', the law was forced labor. There is also the interruption of the acceptance (by Liberals and also Marxists) of the core metaphor of western society as the movement from the state of nature to civil society. Boaventura points out to the fact that they grow together, created by the same forces: capitalism and colonialism. Here, we face again the issue around the denial of coevalness. This is an interesting point to differentiate how Postmodernism differentiates from postcolonialism, as the postmodern critique made a supposedly radical critique of modernity but, as the author defends, without addressing its most basic structure – the Abyssal Line. Conventional postmodern critique wanted to eliminate even the idea of social emancipation as being another modern narrative, but Boaventura stands that social emancipation is not only necessary, but it

[576] Santos, B. de S. (2016), p. 52-53.
[577] Santos, B. de S. (2016), p. 25-29.

must be reinvented by a new oppositional thinking, and that happens on the fruitful soil of Postcolonialism[578].

3.5.2. In favor of an Ecology of Knowledges

If we go back to the proposition of a reformulated eleventh thesis, we can assume the term 'philosophers', in a broad sense, references producers of humanistic and scientific knowledge, as opposed to applied knowledge/sciences. Boaventura identifies two problems here: To begin, it is not true that philosophers have dedicated their time to any reflection that had no impact in the transformation of the world. The dominant interpretations of the world are what legitimate, propitiate and facilitate social transformations. A major example of that, specifically for the construction of the so mentioned Modernity, is the Cartesian dichotomy Nature and society/humanity, two different and independent entities, like Body and Soul. If human beings have nature, human nature, it is difficult to imagine that this nature has nothing to do with non-human nature. It was Descartes the main name to give dualism the consistency of an entire philosophical system. This duality is so present in our lives that is hard to think about an alternative, even though we are conscious of how nature is in everything we are and accomplish. Why this idea predominating in the scientific and philosophical space? To the author, it is clear that this separation was a necessary condition for the expansion of capitalism. Without such, there would be not legitimacy to the principles of exploration and appropriation[579].

This dualism is built on a principle of hierarchical differentiation between the superior society/humanity and the inferior nature, that must be subjugated and explored. A radical differentiation constituted in an ontological difference, inscribed even in the plans of divine creation. Nature became an instrument, and natural resource unconditionally available. As a reflex, anything considered natural is liable to the same destiny – beings closer to nature, not fully considered humans. With this reading is possible to understand how, in some narratives, Racism comes as natural, accepted by a social ontology. The same logic can be applied to the category of 'women'. The idea of humanity came to necessarily coexist with the idea of sub-humanity, the sub-humanity of racialized and sexualized bodies. The Cartesian perspective is constitutive part of the capitalist, colonialist and patriarchal transformation of the world[580].

[578] Santos, B. de S. (2014), p. 70-71.
[579] Santos, B. de S. (2019).
[580] Santos, B. de S. (2019).

The second problematic identified by Boaventura in Marx's thesis regards how, to face the gravest problems of current times, it is not possible to conceive a transformative practice to deal with such problems without a new comprehension of the world. This new perspective has to heal and recover a common sense of mutual interdependency of the constituent parts: humanity/society and nature. We must understand that nature is inherent in humanity and that the reverse is equally true. Against such propositions there are many very well-established interests in societies built on capitalism, colonialism, and patriarchy. For that, a new understanding of the world will come through the paradigmatic transformation of society. To Boaventura, the current society only prevails through violence, repression, declared and undeclared wars, the permanent state of exception, through the unprecedented destruction of what is still taken as a natural (resource)[581].

To contribute to this effort, Boaventura presents his most recognized concept, Epistemologies of the South. These knowledges that tend to never get recognized as contributions to a better understanding of the world by holders of erudite or academic knowledge. An attempt to integrate knowledges in a common space, to interact with different knowledges. By focusing particularly on these colonial areas, Epistemologies of the South pay special attention to the system's 'sub-humans', precisely those who were considered closest to nature. The knowledge produced by these groups does not conceive the Cartesian dichotomy. This means that the social groups most radically excluded by society are those that are showing us a way out towards a future worthy for humanity and of all human and non-human natures that compose it. without overcoming this duality, of human-nature, no liberation or emancipation struggle can succeed (be it class, race, gender)[582]. The Epistemologies of the South is an attempt of epistemological rescue of knowledge born in the struggle of those who have systematically suffered the injustices of capitalism, colonialism and patriarchy[583]. In other words, it is an attempt to understand, in a way that creates credibility and importance, the non-Eurocentric experiences, informed by other cosmovision, by other symbolic universes, by other ways to see and approach life and nature. The Eurocentric knowledge, in Social Sciences and other sciences as well, has been developed to neglect and not recognize the other experiences. Such Epistemologies of the South emerge as a necessary epistemological revolution[584].

[581] Santos, B. de S. (2019).
[582] Santos, B. de S. (2019).
[583] Leituras Brasileiras. (2018).
[584] ALICE CES. (2012).

Boaventura reinforces that there is no Global Social Justice without Global Cognitive Justice, and the Epistemologies of the South are an attempt to achieve this Global justice. The South here is anti-imperial, not the South that aims to imitate the North. One that aims for alternatives to the imperialism and colonialism from the North[585]. Mind here that the South invokes a sense of geography and cartography, but here, as defended by Boaventura, it is a metaphor for the unjust human suffering caused by capitalism, colonialism and patriarchy[586]. He places the relations North/South at the core of the reinvention of social emancipation. It is important that we defamiliarize ourselves from the imperial North in order to learn from the South. The caveat, as he explains, is that the South itself is a product of empire, and thus learning from the South requires as well defamiliarization *vis-à-vis* the imperial South, that is all that in the South is the result of the colonial capitalist relation. "You only learn from the South to the extent that the South is conceived of as resistance to the domination of the North […] In other words, you can only learn from the South to the extent that you contribute to its elimination while a product of empire"[587].

As the author explains, all the understandings of the Epistemologies of the South must be considered based in four essential ideas, concepts that were previously developed by Boaventura throughout his work and investigations. The first two are the Sociology of Absences and the Sociology of Emergences. The former regards the approach that aims to explain how what is taken as non-existent is in fact actively produced as non-existent, focusing also in the knowledges and methods that are used to recover such experiences made and kept invisible. While the goal of the former is to identify and valorize social experiences available in the world, although declared non-existent by hegemonic rationality and knowledge, the latter focuses in identifying and enlarging the signs of possible future experiences, following and uncovering tendencies and latencies that are actively ignored by hegemonic rationality and knowledge. These knowledges are used to give and amplify space and voice of the ideas and novelties in the Global South, but not as an exotic subject or as a specific situation, but as proposals for the new perspectives of the general[588]. Both of them are interconnected and reference each other in their critical processes.

The third essential idea to understand properly the Epistemologies of the South is the proposition of an Ecology of Knowledges, a concept that values plurality. In much of his work,

[585] ALICE CES. (2012).
[586] Santos, B. de S. (2016), p. 32-36.
[587] Santos, B. de S. (2010), p. 231.
[588] ALICE CES. (2012).

Boaventura questions the monocultures of knowledge – he presents the example, from a very colonialist viewpoint, of Sociology being the study of 'us', while Anthropology refers to the study of 'them'. "If we are to decolonize these disciplines, there won't be disciplines at the end", he comments when regarding the decolonization of Social Sciences. As he defends, there is space for transformation of monocultures into Ecologies: an ecology of knowledge, of recognition, of temporalities, of productivities, and of scales. Knowledge has to be pluricultural, a diversity of knowledges. Taking the example of the 'founders' of Sociology – Weber, Durkheim, Marx – we can acknowledge how they cannot address, satisfactorily, the reality of present days, as well as they did not acknowledge, in their time, the vast majority of the world found in the non-European. Here, the contributions of other figures that could be taken as *other* founders are neglect and made invisible. This resonates well with the Decolonial analysis that unveils how Western-centered narratives are actually based in the contact (and even dependency) with other cultures, failing the European exceptionality in regards to stories of inventions and novelties of the West. "If you start to decenter Western social scientific knowledge and to bring in other realities and knowledges, you will see that the decolonization of the Social Sciences will be a long task because so much has been made invisible and suppressed, marginalized and forgotten[589]", even bringing the dilemma of unpronounceable or irretrievable experiences.

The Ecology of Knowledges is proposed exactly to deal with this reality of (abyssal) exclusion of other experiences, knowledges, epistemic perspectives. Assuming the many valid knowledges in the societies of the world, we manage to journey towards the end of a Cognitive Empire. Not only scientific and academic knowledge is valid, rigorous, accurate. In the valorization of those, we should be attentive to not let other kinds of knowledge be evaluated by sciences validity criteria, as this is a formula for scientific invalidation[590]. The Ecology of Knowledges is a fundamental element of the Epistemologies of the South, but it cannot be built without Intercultural Translation, the fourth essential idea here. How can make these knowledges intelligible to one another, to the different parts and movements interacting? Many times the interacting sides have the same ambitions, aspirations of progressist social transformation, but they are built and communicated in completely different ways[591]. Much of this process was developed by Boaventura with his direct experiences working in communities, grassroot movements, in direct contact with the groups he studied (with).

[589] Santos, B. de S. (2014), p. 78.
[590] Leituras Brasileiras. (2018).
[591] ALICE CES. (2012).

3.5.3. Against the destruction of knowledges

It comes clear that, by the author's analysis, the western Abyssal Thinking, generator of global cognitive injustice, can only be remedied with an Ecology of Knowledges. In an attempt to approach the "reinvention of social emancipation" as a counter-movement, thinking about these epistemologies of the peripheral and the semi-peripheral regions (Immanuel Wallerstein, World-System Theory), Boaventura created the EMANCIPA project (1999 to 2001), proposing a reinvention of social emancipation. Again, this Abyssal Thinking represents the dominant epistemology that propitiates an Abyssal Exclusion, and this can be clearly seen in Law and Sociology, as well as in many other areas of sciences and knowledges. In the struggle for better social conditions, one should not be supported by only one kind of knowledge – thus, enter the Ecology of Knowledges. Reinforcing the idea, a process of epistemological decolonization is what creates space for a cognitive decolonization. Here I can refer again to Boaventura's PhD work, in which he applies a participative but non-extractive methodology. Starting from the idea of university he proposes ideas of 'pluriversity' and 'subdiversity', alternative spaces of intercultural translation and interpretation. Here, a Homeomorphic dialogue – conversation without overlapping, without cultural preponderance – creates a base for the Boaventura's "triple D": decolonialize, demercantilize, democratize[592].

Going back to establish an understanding of the development of such concepts, we can refer to Boaventura's book *A discourse about the Sciences*[593], published in 1987. In it the author stresses the need to move away the natural sciences in relation to the human sciences, breaking with the dominant paradigm (the need to do science based on a logical or empirical positivism), or any other type of methodological framework that is rigid, abstractedly given and that cannot be modified under penalty of no longer being considered a science. Qualitative science, with its characteristics, should be considered as valid as quantitative ones. Science must always be local, taking into consideration from where speaks the one who elaborates such sciences. In a way, as he presents, it's a defense of scientific processes that derive and arrive in self-knowledge. Science must also have contact with common sense, but the researcher must be aware that knowledge of common sense without a valid methodological framework can also lead to wrong conclusions[594]. This discussion on the question of sciences already shows how Boaventura's queries were present in his early formation.

[592] Santos, B. de S. (2007).
[593] Santos, B. de S. (1987).
[594] Santos, B. de S. (1987).

Advancing in time, with the publication of *Epistemologies of the South: Justice against Epistemicide*[595] in 2009, Boaventura grasps on the concept of Global South, approaching the perspective of Latin America, Africa, and the south and southeast of Asia, offering a counterpoint to the economically dominant North, bringing examples such as the fight for Human Rights, strongly defended by the latter after the end of the Cold War, but also being the latter the biggest neglectors of Human Rights. Boaventura points to how the Global North uses the discourse around this topic to continue its colonizing impulse through the imposition of Human Rights and democracy as the only right and valid forms of government. In a philosophical analysis, the author talks about the escape from epistemic colonization, from the colonization of knowledge, from this Cartesian duality that has been imposed on us since the rise of rationality at the time of the Enlightenment. The Abyssal Exclusion, with the invalidation and destruction of knowledge, is conceptualized as Epistemicide, a key idea in Boaventura's work. Epistemicide means the decimation of local knowledge, a genocide of epistemology, of non-dominant forms of knowledge development and production. It is "the destruction of knowledge of these populations and their culture, memories, ancestries, and all the ways in which they relate to others and to nature. Their legal forms, political forms, organizations – everything – is destroyed and put at the service of the colonial occupation[596]".

The argument for the Epistemologies of the South refers to the attempt to rescue the epistemological knowledge born in the conflicts and labors of people, by those who have systematically suffered the injustices of capitalism, colonialism, and patriarchy. A knowledge born from the struggle, or born out of the struggle and used in it, allowing the emergence of the space for an Ecology of Knowledges to exist. As they often come from different origin, from different cultures, they encompass and validate multiple cultures, which does not occur without said intercultural introduction and interlocution. Boaventura stresses how Eurocentric knowledge was developed to not value other experiences. Subverting such logic propitiates an epistemological revolution, as there is no global social justice without global cognitive justice[597].

As has been mentioned before, the EMANCIPA's project began from the growing awareness that the social sciences, those mainly centered in western bases, had exhausted their ability to renew and innovate. Pursuing an approach that involved reinventing social emancipation, it began to explore the "Epistemologies of the South," fostering an

[595] Meneses, M. P. & Santos, B. de S. (2009).
[596] Santos, B. de S. (2014), p. 69.
[597] Meneses, M. P. & Santos, B. S. (2009).

understanding of knowledges and practices that have been made invisible in mainstream sciences. The project was concluded with four main publications: *Democratizing Democracy. Beyond the Liberal Democratic Canon (2005), Another Production is Possible. Beyond the Capitalist Canon (2006), Another Knowledge is Possible. Beyond Northern Epistemologies (2007),* and *Voices of the World (2010)*. As has been mentioned before, almost as a continuation and a step forward of the conclusions of EMANCIPA, professor Boaventura followed to the ALICE project, briefly explained above.

3.5.4. The case for Oppositional Postmodernism/Postcolonialism

Boaventura does define himself as a postcolonial thinker. But it is of uttermost importance to understand where he places his perspective on Postcolonialism. First, we should comprehend that he defines colonialism as a:

> system of naturalizing differences in such a way that the hierarchies that justify domination, oppression, and so on are a *product* of the inferiority of certain people and not the *cause* of their inferiority. Their inferiority is 'natural', and because it is natural, they are 'naturally' inferior, they 'have' to be governed, and they 'have' to be treated and dominated[598].

We should note, however, how this part of his definition doesn't distinguish colonialism from sexism, so we have to advance further in his conceptualization to better understand his reading. Taking Colonialism as occupation and consequentially the negation of territoriality, Boaventura affirms that Colonial domination involves the destruction of other cultures, while sexism may exist within the same culture – here Epistemicide gains space. To him it is naïve to believe that postcolonialism refers to a chronological postcolonial period, as he understands it differently: Colonialism did not end with the end of historical colonialism, because there are other ways through which the occupations continue, as one can see with Nkrumah's *Neocolonialism* (1974), regarding European states and their former colonies. Through these lens Boaventura affirms: "I see myself as a postcolonial thinker because, within the tradition of critical thinking, I cannot see capitalism as separate from colonialism[599]", what echoes some essentials of Decolonial Studies and perspectives on Decoloniality as we saw.

[598] Santos, B. de S. (2014), p. 68
[599] Santos, B. de S. (2014), p. 68-69.

The author remarks how much of the Western-centric critical thinking – From Liberalism to Marxism – has looked just at the structure of Capitalism and never really focused on the other side, which is colonial domination and also patriarchal domination. With this, we can understand that Colonialism belongs structurally to the modernity of the West and to Capitalism. Within these systems, the forms of domination never act in pure forms, but actually in a constellation of oppressions, and this is where he develops concerns with these matters reflected in his serious thinking of epistemological issues. So, with his proposal of Epistemologies of the South, he pursues a "ways of knowing from the perspectives of those who have suffered in a systematic way because of the injustices, dominations, and oppressions of colonialism, capitalism, and patriarchy". This proposal means a crucial epistemological transformation that focuses in the reinvention of social emancipation, measured up by the needs of it on a global scale, and not simply based on a Western understanding of the world[600]. In midst of all that, appears the recognition that, as long as we have capitalism, we are going to have colonialism in one way or another[601].

Boaventura's work tries to articulate a project for the what he calls the Global Left, while also keen to terms of the Global South, and at this very point we can start to perceive how his proposals differ from the ones we approached before – Postcolonialism and Decolonial studies. To him, the Global South (as a concept), as this metaphor for the systematic suffering caused by colonialism and capitalism, has a clear character of a call for resistance and for alternatives. The idea of the Left (as a concept, strongly in Eurocentric terms) refers to this critical thinking and the calling for social transformation against the status quo. They can be related, as they can also be divergent – there is cases of Western-centric leftist movements that were racist, or did not validate the struggles of peoples in the Global South.

His proposal of a 'Global Left' regards a refoundation of the left based on intercultural understanding of radical democratization of social relations among humans and also between humans and nature. This should be achieved by a transformation of unequal power relations into shared authorities in various spaces of social life (family, work, factory, home, school, etc.), in a way the means do not contradict the ends. A new left, to deal with current challenges of these first decades of the 21st century, has to be intercultural and capable of reciprocal translation between different conceptions of a better society. Boaventura finds commonality in the struggle of movements – the struggle for dignity, respect, better life, against injustices, as

[600] Santos, B. de S. (2014), p. 69-70.
[601] Santos, B. de S. (2014), p. 77.

he believes the left should be. The global character is not necessarily in accordance to any socialist internationalism, but as a response to Capitalism already being a style of life ubiquitously, a global ontology. Boaventura highlights that there is no working humanity without some social groups being labeled as subhumans – "the aspiration to a more complete humanity is, in itself, infinite, and that's probably the best metaphor to bring together the Global South with the Global Left"[602].

From this line of thought, and taking much from his experience early in his career, especially after working in his PhD, Boaventura returned to Portugal after the Carnation Revolution in 1974, being responsible for part of the reconstruction of academic institutions in his home country. Having experience and an annalistic perspective regarding Portugal, he defends that "we have to build theories suitable for our countries" – coming from the United States and having studied two types of theory, "none of them were sociologically suited to my country, because my country was neither first world nor third world[603]". This is based in Immanuel Wallerstein's World-System Theory, placing Portugal as a semi-peripheral society in Boaventura's perspective. Even though being a big colonial empire in the past – as we saw – the author notes that Portugal was an informal colony of England: most of the wealth that came from the colonies during the period of colonization would be used to pay the country's biggest external debts with England. This placed Portugal in a position of intermediate development, and to analyze that we have to note how Portuguese colonialism was very distinct in many different ways , conducting us to the basic idea that "if colonialisms are different, also should be postcolonialisms[604]".

From the viewpoint of the author, the Anglo-Saxon postcolonialism, made mainstream, regards mainly the British experience and has a culturalist program within its critique. The Latin America and African postcolonialisms, from the Portuguese and Spanish experiences, had a much more political and economic approach. Also, in the historiographic analysis Boaventura point out to the fact that, at the end of 17th century, Iberian colonialism was already "out of the game" to the Dutch and then British. Portugal, as mentioned, was an imperial center that, in financial terms, was dominated by or subordinated to the hegemonic empire of England. Debating with some postcolonial thinkers, particularly in Latin America, but and also in Europe, Boaventura criticized the reductionist assumption that there was just 'one Europe' and 'one western modernity'. Europeans living in the center and north of Europe would look to the

[602] Santos, B. de S. (2014), p. 79-80.
[603] Leituras Brasileiras. (2018).
[604] Leituras Brasileiras. (2018); Santos, B. de S. (2014), p. 71-72.

Mediterranean Europe just like the European colonizers would look to non-european people. The historical case of Portugal and Spain favors a kind of internal (proto)colonialism inside Europe, showing how the idea of a single Europe can be imprecise and generalist. In past decades, the issue of Europe with its southern countries (and now eastern) is visible with the financial difficulties and the 2008 crisis.

In discussions with Walter Mignolo – one of the main names of Decolonial thinking and proposer of the idea of Transmodernity together with Dussel, as we saw – Boaventura argues for the idea of "many other Europes inside Europe". He suggests that, inside Europe, there have been many traditions that could have been used in a more cosmopolitan way, but were not found serviceable to mainstream lines of thought, such as capitalism or colonialism. Regarding Portugal, que notes that the country's colonialism period was the longest registered, from 1415 to 1975. How could a semi-peripheral country manage that? Well, if we look to the historical register, we could agree with Sanjay Subrahmanyam and his affirmation of three Portuguese empires – the Atlantic, the African and the Indian/Asian empire – functioning independently, even though with its connections in the central point of the Metropolis. "These differences […] bring complexity into postcolonial studies because they force us to see better the complexity of the colonized/colonizer relationship that Fanon and Aimé Césaire speak about". Boaventura argues that "while in the Atlantic Ocean, the Portuguese and the Spaniards were very instrumental in creating a new kind of globalization, in the Indian Ocean the Portuguese engaged in a very old globalization already existing[605]".

His postcolonial critique brings to the foreground the specificities of Portuguese colonialism and postcolonialism, adding new layers of criticism to Eurocentrism, a concept too focused on the British empire – even in these critiques, Eurocentrism was used to destroy even 'other' Europes. Being alive during the process that marks Portuguese abandonment from its colonial political control, Boaventura reinforces his Postcolonialism, with a different and unique perspective on Eurocentrism, colonialism, and capitalism[606]. This unique perspective, according to him, goes from the postmodern to the postcolonial, stretching a little beyond both[607].

We must understand, here, how terms such as 'postmodern' and 'postmodernity' to highlight that sciences in general, presided over by an epistemological paradigm and a model of rationality, were exhausted – a crisis of paradigm, as Boaventura presented us. To him, the

[605] Santos, B. de S. (2014), p. 73-74.
[606] Santos, B. de S. (2014), p. 77.
[607] Santos, B. de S. (2010).

"postmodern science had to do with privileging scientific knowledge, while arguing for a broader rationality for sciences". This broader take regarded overcoming the Cartesian dichotomy between nature/society, object/subject, natural sciences/social sciences, sciences/ethics, and looking for a more balanced articulation between scientific knowledge and other forms of knowledge – it is a *double epistemological break*. He even criticizes the designation "postmodern", saying it is inadequate, as it defines the new paradigm as the negative/negation, also presupposing a temporal sequence. Considering the modes of development that were not homogeneous in the world, it could easily be understood as a privileged "stage" of core societies. The mainstream postmodern critique, of a western modernity centered in the United States, "ended up paradoxically celebrating the society that modernity itself had shaped", and because of that Boaventura wanted to radicalize this critique, which, "unlike modern critical theory, would not convert the idea of an emancipatory transformation of society into a new form of social oppression". He notes: "modern values as liberty, equality and solidarity have always seemed fundamental to me, as fundamental, indeed, as the critique of the violences committed in their name"[608].

That is why Boaventura comes to a new designation: Oppositional Postmodernism, with the need to reinvent social emancipation. To achieve that he draws on ideas and conceptions that were modern but had been marginalized by the dominant conceptions of modernity. "by the mid-1990s" he notes, "it was clear to me that such reconstruction could only be completed from the vantage point of the experiences of the victims, that is to say, of social groups that had suffered the consequences of the epistemological exclusivism of modern sciences". It is at this point that we contemplate the Oppositional Postmodernism in his Epistemologies of the South, understanding it as a metaphor of the human suffering caused by capitalism and other co-oppressive systems. The idea of postmodernity, in its own, "points to the description that western modernity offers of itself, thus risking concealing the description that has been presented by those who have suffered the violence imposed on them by western modernity: This 'matricidal' violence has a name: Colonialism[609]".

Here we must comprehend that, nowadays, western political culture is as indispensable as inadequate to interpret and change the world. A critique of it should be made from the inside or from an outside stance of its victims? The "post" in postmodern means the same as the "post" in postcolonial? What are the limits of a radical critique of western modernity? If we reference

[608] Santos, B. de S. (2010), p. 225-226.
[609] Santos, B. de S. (2010), p. 227.

Dussel and Mignolo again, they prefer to speak of Transmodernity as the alternative for the victims by way of resistance. This, however, is done from the outside – the idea of being outside western modernity is crucial for formulating the concept of postcolonialism to them. Parallel to that, Boaventura notes that counterposing the postmodern and the postcolonial may lead to a mistake, but also notes how the postmodern is far from addressing the concerns and sensibilities generated by postcolonialism, taken as a set of theoretical and analytical currents present in all the Social Sciences – In their understandings of the contemporary world, at theoretical and political level, they all share the experience of unequal relations between the North and the South. The postcolonial perspective "draws on the idea that the structures of power and knowledge are more visible from the margins. Hence its interest in the geopolitics of knowledge[610]".

Boaventura's oppositional postmodernism, rather than renouncing collective projects, proposes a plurality of projects, articulated in nonhierarchical forms by translation procedures, to replace the formulation of a general theory of social change. It proposes realistic, plural and critical utopias, as well as the reinvention of social emancipation. Defends a tragic optimism to substitute mainstream postmodernism's melancholy. However, it does not fall into relativism – it defends plurality and ethics constructed bottom-up. It is reflective, but immune to the obsession of deconstructing its own resistance. It proposes a passage from conformist action to rebellious action, valuing *mestizaje* and hybridization. It still criticizing universalism, the linearity of history, hierarchical totalities, and master narratives. It also maintains attention to plurality, heterogeneity, margins and peripheries, built on constructivist, but not nihilist or relativist, epistemology. To summarize: a postmodern critique that communicates with postcolonialism. With postcolonialism and dominant conceptions of postmodernism, the west and its dominant structures is put into question by both. Still, Boaventura cannot dissociate western eurocentrism or ethnocentrism underlying dominant conceptions of postmodernism. To him "even though postmodern and poststructuralist conceptions have contributed to the emergence of postcolonialism, they fail to give an adequate answer to its underlying ethical and political aspirations[611]".

If we take the phenomenon of globalization as a scenery of confrontation between hegemonic and counter-hegemonic projects, oppositional postmodernism, opposed to postmodern and poststructuralist thought, aims to overcome western modernity from a

[610] Santos, B. de S. (2010), p. 227.
[611] Santos, B. de S. (2010), p. 228-229.

postcolonial and postimperial perspective. It places itself in the margins, but inside and not outside the margins, responding to Mignolo's and Dussel's critiques. To him, western modernity has been colonialist since its origin. there has been colonialism without capitalism, as a political relation, but since the 15th century, capitalism is not thinkable without colonialism, and vice-versa. Capitalism may develop without colonialism as a political relation, but not without it as a social relation, reverberating with Quijano's Coloniality of Power and Knowledge. Mind that Capitalism and Colonialism are not the same thing, and inside postcolonial struggle, anti-capitalist and anti-colonial struggles must not be confused as well. However, neither can be successfully undertaken without the other[612].

Boaventura's oppositional postcolonialism (a consequence of the first concept) not only goes beyond postmodernism, but also beyond postcolonialism. "What is at stake is not just the counterposition between the South and the North", as he affirm that it also considers "the counterposition between the South of the South and the North of the North, and between the South of the North and the North of the North" – it includes internal colonialism as well, if we look at the above explained case of Portugal. It regards a (re)provincialization of Europe[613], but without turning into an essentialization of Europe. Boaventura approaches the challenges of counter-hegemonic globalization, pushing beyond the postmodern and postcolonial. Many movements are not contained in the decentering forms proposed by postmodernism/western modernity or by postcolonialism/western colonialism. "The creation of subjectivities that feature collective transforming actions require a new critical thought – this the postmodern refuses to do and the postcolonial does only partially[614]".

What if Europe, instead of being the solution to the world's problems, was itself a problem? Or is Europe part of a world from which it can and must learn? Is not about "demonizing" European thought, but rather recognizing its incompleteness, and also not about "romanticizing" the South, but to approach it from Sociologies of Absence and Emergence[615]. How many ideas and projects have been discarded, discredited, abandoned, demonized within Europe, for simply not serving the colonial project? Far from constituting just an immense space of victimization, the colonial world represents a multifaceted place of resistance and the art of survival. Within it resides the possibilities of multiple experiences in the world – and there could be more if it was not for the Epistemicide. We should note that claiming the need

[612] Santos, B. de S. (2010), p. 233.
[613] Chakrabarty, D. (2009).
[614] Santos, B. de S. (2010), p. 236-237.
[615] Santos, B. de S. (2016), p. 27.

for a postcolonial reading "is not to sustain an [victimist] interpretive obsession based on colonial experience, it is to recognize the very strong historical heritage of colonialism in the structures of power and knowledge in postcolonial societies[616].

Boaventura reminds us that "attempts to heal past wounds by means other than arrangements that left smoldering resentments, hurt feelings, painful emotions untouched were rare in history (of Europe)". European interpolitics was and is usually privileged to the detriment of European intersubjectivity, but it is of uttermost importance to confront the legacy of European colonial history. Europe must go through a process of unlearning and (re)learning with the Global South. "In this attempt towards the Epistemologies of the South we may find the only vision of Europe worth fighting for[617]". This plural struggle must have two dimensions: polarize the differences between the oppressors and the oppressed, and unpolarized the differences between the oppressed[618]. Going back to the idea of a new eleventh thesis, Boaventura affirms: "philosophers, social scientists and humanists must collaborate with all those who struggle against domination in order to create ways of understanding the world that make possible practices of world transformation that jointly liberate the human and non-human worlds[619]".

[616] Santos, B. de S. (2016), p. 35-36.
[617] Santos, B. de S. (2016), p. 52-53.
[618] Leituras Brasileiras. (2018).
[619] Santos, B. de S. (2019).

4. THROUGH AUSTRAL EYES

"La violencia es miedo de las ideas de los demás y poca fe en las propias."
– Antonio Fraguas Forges

Theretofore, following some introductory queries and suppositions, we came to discuss about the conceptualization of violence – and consequentially peace – based on the mainstream productions on such subjects, being those central to our understanding of said concepts. We also came to understand a little better what constitutes and grows on the Postcolonial and Decolonial theoretical perspectives of the world, approaching the margins of our social reality through this viewpoint of those taken as subalterns in international relations: The Global South. In the framework of this dissertation, our main focus is to concentrate ourselves and the present analyses inside the field of International Relations, as this offers us the limits for our discussions and approach. Flipping the board and taking a different perspective on what has been presented up till now, in this chapter I aim to approach the discussion presented regarding violence, but using the epistemological tools that were propitiated by Postcolonialism and Decoloniality.

Revisiting most of the texts and arguments from the first chapter, but using the theoretical devices and insights presented to us on the second chapter, we shall approach the concept of violence in International Relations, empirically and epistemologically, from the critical perspective of the Global South. The exercise to be here set in motion constitutes the main discussion of this dissertation, as I argued for the lack of an analysis that advances towards the thematic of violence inside the specific field of International Relations, adding to this argument that Postcolonial and Decolonial theory would be the best theoretical lenses to conduct such endeavor. The reader, coming across the previous two chapters, should have the fundaments to understand how this lack emerges and begs to be addressed – being this my biggest challenge here.

4.1. From 'Violence on' to 'Violence for' the Global South

At the introductory chapter of this dissertation, I invited you, the reader, to begin by acknowledging the phenomenon of violence, understood here as an observable and remarkable fact or event[620]. This exercise, from the very beginning and throughout this text, became an uncomplicated and simplified approach of what is understood as phenomenology in the field of Philosophy – it is the philosophy of experience, in which we focus on the phenomena instead of asking what things really are. The ultimate source of all meaning and value is the lived experience of human beings, regarding how things are perceived and experienced. Just like famous phenomenologists like Martin Heidegger[621] and Jean-Paul Sartre[622] say, we should be focusing at how we live in our "average everydayness".

Edmund Husserl, a German philosopher and mathematician who is known for establishing the school of Phenomenology, differentiated it from the Cartesian method of analysis which sees the world as objects, sets of objects, and objects acting and reacting upon one another. Husserl defends that objects, as correlates of subjective acts of consciousness, acquire the meaning they have (even the meaning of "existent") through these very same acts of consciousness, that are processed by what is experienced[623]. This Husserlian proposal levels the object and the subject, wherein the object becomes nothing more than a correlate of a subjective act of consciousness. But we are not going to deepen ourselves in that philosophical question, as this is not the aim of the present dissertation. As I said, it became a simplified exercise of phenomenology as we advanced in our theme of violence. As I came to later discover, there are productions specifically on the phenomenology of violence[624].

Nevertheless, we can already highlight some points from the brief explanation above. In our acknowledgment of the phenomenon that violence is, exactly through this simplified exercise of phenomenology, but setting our perspective through the lenses that were presented in the previous chapter, we can deepen our critique of the "average everydayness" arguing for the abyssal difference in the everydayness of different peoples and groups in the world. If we were to really apply the establishment of an *average* here, the parameters of violence in the space[625] of international relations would point out to very violent reality, considering a spectrum that goes from the most to least violent. This happens because most of the world falls

[620] Merriam-Webster. (n.d.).
[621] Heidegger, M. (2010).
[622] Sartre, J. P. (2001).
[623] Husserl, E. (2012).
[624] For future considerations: Staudigl, M. (2013) and Staudigl, M. (Ed.). (2013).
[625] Universe set, in mathematical terms, as we are using the idea of average here as well.

under the category that Global South covers, representing an enormous portion of geographical space and an even bigger difference if we are to consider populational density and demographics. It is not a majority, although, if we are to consider power balances and epistemological influence. The idea of peace then, if we were to purposely take in a reductionist interpretation of Galtung's theory, is a privilege redeemed by a small, rich and powerful portion of the world.

For that, we must consider how important is to recognize the violence that happens on the Global South, as a reflection of the acknowledgment of the phenomenon in our International Relations' readings. This is of uttermost importance to better approach our questions regarding the conceptualization of violence in this field of studies and research. That is why I presented some essays, indexes and a database in the section 1.5 of this dissertation (*A violence to call ours),* with the objective of bringing about quantitative results and numbers that can reaffirm the statement that the Global South deals with more and bigger portions of violence, thus having more empirical substance and experience to conceptualize more precisely what is violence. To come to that, a historiographical reading of our recent history – considering the twentieth and twentieth-first century – can portray well the current situation, serving as a source to question about the processes that built this situation. We must now look at the wall. From the framework of International Relations this may come as empirically recognizable and given, but it is not that clear – It is not only about wars and armed conflicts. The Global South is empirically neglected in many levels with many different situations, and even more as we advance to the epistemic discussions of the conceptualization of this violence. We shall try to see that more clearly.

4.1.1. Wounds on the present, scars from the past

Taking the period from the beginning of the twentieth century to present days, looking at the history of the world, we can identify great events that generated enormous and various types of violence. The growing investment on defense leading to militarism, the establishment of strategic alliances, the limits over imperialism and the rise of European nationalism, together with the widespread misguided belief that war is good for nation building and that the best way to fight a modern war was to attack arranged the European scenery for a war that was believed to end all wars (1914-1918). The involvement of non-European is due to the participation of colonies, staging the war at a global level. Coinciding with the aftermath, The Russian Revolution catalyzed the emergence of Communism. A decade after the Great War occurs the

collapse of the global economic system in 1929, also propitiating the rise of dictatorship in Europe.

With Nazism and Fascism gaining strength and Communism trying to establish a strong base in USSR, the Second World War began (1939-1945), marked by the German imperialist drive, the break of alliances, the war on the pacific, The Holocaust, and the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, marking the beginning of Nuclear Age and setting the stage of the establishment of the Cold War (1947-1991). During this time a great wave of decolonization and anti-imperialist movements marked many countries of the Global South, especially in Africa and Asia. In Latin America, many dictatorships came to an end. War by proxies and the space race were disputed as the war would come to its concluding point, favoring the United States of America as a traumatized hegemonic power by the end of the twentieth century. Not long after, the Islamic terrorist group Al-Qaeda conducted a series of four coordinated attacks against the USA in 2001. The War on Terror begins, with the invasion of Iraq in 2003. In 2007-2008 a global financial crisis, followed by many armed conflicts in the Middle East. China steps up to the stage as an economic global power throughout the first two decades of the twentieth-first century.

This was a brief mention of key events of the twentieth and the twentieth-first centuries that had a global impact. My intention here is not to point to the west and blame it for violence in the world – this would be quite simplistic and naïve. But as mainstream historical records usually present, the west does have its protagonism. In regards to what have been registered about violence in international relations, one could affirm that Europe was always very bellicose, and this could be confirmed with the accounting for the registers from XVI century until present days. It is a counter argument, however, that Asia was like that, and the Americas and Africa as well – communities build rivalry and fight each other. At this point, it is taken as given. With this in mind, as the analysis permits, being so bellicose, Europe always comes together to fight a common enemy. For the critical perspective taken in this dissertation, backed by Postcolonialism and Decoloniality, we can affirm that Europe found some kind of unity in the Era of Conquests (XVI century). Luís Vaz de Camões, in his Portuguese epic poem *Os Lusíadas*[626] registers: "*Mas sou da forte Europa belicosa; Busco as terras da Índia tão famosa"*, what can be translated as "*my home is warlike Europe and I wend Seeking the far-famed lands of farthest Inde*".

[626] de Camões, L. (1880).

Coming to more contemporary times, without changing much of its character, Keith Lowe registers in her book *L'Europe barbare 1945-1950*[627] the normalization of war, vengeance and violence, corroborating with the main global events we have registered during the twentieth and twentieth-first century. What emerges, from this viewpoint, is the revealed idea of the west having an enormous destructive capacity within itself.

In somewhat tribal behavior, Europe, and later the west, has been functioning based on a simple premise: Internal pacification depends on external warfare. Here we start to question again some conceptual premises, as I question where is the draw the line of differentiation. What defines what is in and what is out? And for peace to be sustainable within, violence must be reproduced outside. The west contributed to identify Asia as the other, the strange. The west contributed to identify America as the ignored, the forgotten. The west contributed to identify Africa as the slave, the product – and in many cases, these adjectives are not exclusive to one group. The violence generated by the west throughout these centuries shaped cultures, history and societies. In this section, to contribute to this research, I could have placed a described the ways in which each kind of violence that we have seen until this very point manifests itself, connecting it exactly with what is understood as the west, its culture, its episteme. In many cases this could be point out to blame, but this fact is put here for the case of responsibility and accountability. Violence, is this broad perspective, does have a clear and recognizable subject, a clear and identifiable source.

4.1.2. Recognizing violence on the Global South

In this effort to better capture this conceptualization of violence, but seen from the theoretical viewpoint of Postcolonial and Decolonial theories, we must reach to those concepts that were presented in the first chapter. The experiences from the Global South in regards to violence functions as those new lenses we so much talked about. Taking these many ways violence is reproduced in our society, but now with this perspective of critique, we shall revisit the above mentioned authors with the objective of also recognizing the violences on the Global South that were mentioned here, but from a theoretical perspective, trying to better comprehend how they emerge in the field of International Relations.

Reaching to George Sorel's take on violence[628], for example, we approach his hypothesis that there would be a resignification of the concept. Violence, then, was believed to decrease

[627] Keith, L. (2013).
[628] Martini, J. T. S. D. (n.d.); Sorel, G. (1999).

in the resolution of political conflicts, but Decolonial studies could highlight how this affirmation would only be taken as truth in the Global North, as violence is a constant of political arrangements and conflicts in the Global South. In his book *Reflections on Violence*, the author reframes the concept of violence around the mythical narrative of the general strike of the working class[629], going beyond what he identifies as raw physical strength, trying to take away the negative moral valuation of it. In that sense, Sorel makes a clear apology for violence, but in a very singular way, what came to be controversial. Behind this mythical approach, without the negative moral weight, violence becomes the legitimate expression of the wills of the masses[630] in a very effective manner. Sorelian violence emerges as the tool to respond to the oppressing State, the oppressing bourgeoisie and the capitalist structure. The mere threat of it constitutes the myth behind this proletariat's violence, different from commonly understood violence. As mentioned by the author, it would be "a very nice and heroic thing", serving "the immemorial interests of civilization"[631]. It reverberates with this idea that violence can be valued differently depending on the subject that applies it and the reasons behind it – as the proletariat's violence of response is different from the bourgeois' violence, an idea to later be used by Césaire and Fanon. What is interesting to notice in this Sorelian mode of violence is that it was not very violent at all, in terms of direct or physical violence, as it appealed to little more than a few heroic gestures – like general strikes – exactly aimed to be violent in non-physical ways, what will serve Žižek's readings on violence later on. group.

This same exercise can be developed with the many other authors that have been cited here – Benjamin's mythical and divine violence; Marcuse's view on radical opposition, violence and counter-violence; Arendt's reflections on the difference between violence, as a means, and politics; Žižek's perspective on subjective and objective violence; Sartre's ambivalence about violence; Clausewitz viewpoint on war and violence as a mean for conflict resolution; Weil's violence regarding reason and choice; Marx & Engels revolutionary violence and conflict theory; Nixon's slow violence and the effects on ecology. All the possibilities to be better developed here shall present us more about the process of conceptualization of violence, and even better if we use these steps to imagine how Galtung started and how he developed his theories.

[629] Martini, J. T. S. D. (n.d.); Sorel, G. (1999).
[630] Sorel, G. (1999), p. 62.
[631] Sorel, G. (1999).

4.1.3. Rebuilding violence for the Global South

From the point of propositional novelty, different from approaching the violence in the south by what is defined by others, we now shift roles and hold a power and potentiality on the possibility of having Violence (as a concept) for the Global South – a concept that serves and depicts better the very experience of violence and its various types. A violence defined by the non-hegemonic selves on this other side of the wall. A conceptual construction that will be more relatable for those who suffer, and that can function as a way of expressing that "I cannot accept you telling me what hurts – I need to tell you how it really feels, so you can understand what and how it really hurts".

Taking much from the exercise that was done in the section above, but turning the tables, we would now reach to all the names that were highlighted in regards to Postcolonialism and Decoloniality. Their perspectives come from the lived experience of violence, directly or indirectly. Using their base against the names that were cited above we could start a change of analysis, not focused on the violence that happens on the Global South, but constructing an idea of violence for the Global South. It has a double meaning, as it takes the space to unveil the violence that not only happens, but that is purposely bestowed the subalterns, as if it was made for the Global South, at the same time it resists as a concept that was made to understand the Global South, provincializing the mainstream concept that was made for another subject.

4.2.Dialectics for this conceptual violence

Reaching again to phenomenology, the average everydayness experienced by most of the world is a quotidian reality of violence, in its many forms and types. Here, through the method that Husserl proposes, trying to avoid the Cartesian method of analysis, we end up unveiling how most of the world is taken as objects – to be analyzed, studied, moved, and in this process, many times being othered, disrespected, violated. In face of Cartesian dualism, *res cogitans* end up being the few that experience the least violence in our reading. The *res extensa*, through the septentrional eyes, are these objects that will experience most violence. By the logic that we established in the introduction of this dissertation, trying to defend a better way to legitimize the experience of violence, we came to the essentiality of the object. Well, if from the perspective of the septentrional "thinking selves" most of the world is seen as objects (and objectified subjects), most of the world will also be prone to experiencing violence. Before advancing on that, we must take a few steps back.

All this logical reasoning takes place on the fundaments of social sciences and human experience, as we dig back into philosophy. Being this dissertation about the conceptualization of violence and the discussions that rise from it, attempting to apply it directly and specifically to the field of International Relations, emerges the necessity of a section for theoretical and philosophical discussion. It is hard to find empiricism or materialism here, even though it can be reflected on them. However, philosophical discussions like that are basilar to any social or human science. Discussing violence and peace doesn't fall far from that.

Until this point, we came across many definitions of violence and peace, approached from various perspectives, thought and analyzed by various scholars and thinkers with different backgrounds. Here I proposed many critiques to mainstream ideas on violence, arguing for how they were restricted and inadequate. Coming from the idea that violence is undesired, as it opposite – peace – is desired, how is that the concept of violence ends up reproducing violence in itself? The relation of these two concepts, taken as opposites from the very beginning, reveals an entanglement, and the proposed questioning in regards to violence being violent creates a paradoxical issue.

Imagining that we now can recognize this violence seen and experienced on the Global South, we know how it is essential to give voice to those who are objects of such violence, exactly to reveal the violence behind the mainstream conceptualization. How should one proceed when the definition of violence reproduces violence in itself? And how can I say that it is violent the way violence is commonly defined, if it is exactly this definition that lets me identify what is violence or violent in the first place? If I end up invalidating the concept of violence in the first place in my journey to reveal how violence is violent, my critique cannot use the adjective violent to disqualify violence in the beginning of the reasoning. Thus, emerges a tension around the critique intended here. Also, as we have seen with arguments presented throughout the text, emerges the questioning of using violence to respond to violence. Is it the same? As discussed before by other authors, where should we establish the limits of using violence as a means to end violence? In what situations is it justifiable? And how is that, in the pursuit of peace, the means to achieve it are violent? How does defining what (conceptually) is violence and what is not ends up reproducing (empirical, real) violence?

In face of these questioning we find the reason of why it is important to approach the concept of violence and how we conceptualize it in a different way. Should we break the contradictions? Overcome it? Try a different path? From the viewpoint of the core argument of this dissertation, violence is (incompletely) recognized and then conceptualize, but the standards that define it are originated in the heart of colonialism as well. For that, as many of

those (critical) authors proposed, there is the need for epistemological autonomy so our ways of thinking can advance to surpass the vices of this structure. In the process of better achieving a more precise idea of violence we shall contradict these concepts, and here lies the proposal of a dialectics for this conceptual violence.

4.2.1. That which is attained through the art of speaking

The word root *Dia-* comes from Ancient Greek διά (diá), meaning "through". *Lectic* comes from λεκτικός (lektikós), which, among lots of other meanings, is comprehended as "the art of speaking". Dialectic would literally be (that which is attained) through the art of speaking, and is understood as a method of engaging with the world with the objective of understanding it through a discourse between two or more people holding different points of view about a subject, but wishing to establish the truth through reasoned argumentation. The structure and the objectives of the dialectical method changed throughout history, with many thinkers developing their take own it. We shall go through some of the most known contributions to develop a basic understanding of such method, so we can proceed to our application of it to our questions on regard to violence[632].

Beginning with Plato[633], moving onwards chronologically, dialectics can be taken, in a very broad manner, as a verbal engagement between two people – not far from what the etymology of the word unveils. It is a dual engagement between two speakers, basically. From Plato this comes to us by the means of the Socratic Dialogues (which share some etymological roots with dialectics), taking place between two speakers, most often being Socrates and somebody else. Plato believed that, through the use of language, people had the capacity to move beyond the sensuous world into some type of transcendence, where they would find answers to their most complicated questions about life, truth and the world. With the Socratic Dialogues this takes form on Socrates asking methodical questions to somebody else, and in the process both interlocutors begin to develop, from their relative position to one another, explanations to the truth that is taken as imminent within all people through the use of language alone.

From Plato, what we see is the confrontation of two speakers and their ideas that opens up the possibility to achieve this realm of answers. In all the different areas of human experience, such as art, philosophy, theology, music, economics and many others, we find a process taking

[632] Guignion, D. (2020).
[633] Plato; Hamilton, E.; Cairns, H.; Jowett, B. (1997).

place that involves tensions that are overcome in the plane of history. This tension comes from the meeting of a thesis (a starting argument) and an antithesis (a proposed contradiction – not necessarily a direct opposite, but a statement that places the thesis into question) that collide forming a new idea, the synthesis. The latter then becomes a new thesis that can then be opposed again through another confrontation forming another synthesis in a continuous cycle, a constant state of motion in search of truth[634].

Moving forward (and purposely neglecting the contributions of Kant to the discussion) we meet the contributions of G. W. F. Hegel, who is probably the most important figure when it comes do Dialectics. Throughout the course of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*[635], Hegel describes all of these various interactions between people and other people, or objects and even ideas. These interactions propitiate movement, development and change. Here, dialectics are not limited to speech – it comes from sense certainty, perception and understanding, being each of those points and stages of human interaction. We can take this, in a simplified manner, as consciousness[636].

Hegel, in his comprehensions of human interaction, says that the only way we can really achieve self-consciousness is if we are looking upon something else that is itself looking upon us. It is only through that recognition of another consciousness that we can achieve the state of self-consciousness, being this a contradiction to the *Cogito Ergo Sum* of René Descartes. Between conscious beings you can see that there is a dynamic of giving and taking in terms of our interactions, in which the interacting parts are able to grow. It regards the meeting of two self-consciousness beings that interact with one another, and by virtue of that they are able to advance to mutual newness. Over the course of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* we come across these different interactions between parts, being it objects, self-conscious beings, ideas like culture and religion. Among the parts there are always these kinds of conflicts, and these are the means to arrive at a social setting of recognition of self-consciousness among all people, what would lead to the formation of a community of the multiple parts acknowledging each other and recognizing their differences and intricacies[637].

Abigail Thorn[638], in a broad explanation but taking much from Hegel, presents Dialectics as a method of study where the split the object of study into opposing or contradictory pieces. The idea is that if we want to understand how something works, we should then understand the

[634] Guignion, D. (2020).
[635] Hegel, G. W. F. (1992).
[636] Guignion, D. (2020).
[637] Guignion, D. (2020).
[638] Thorn, A. (2018).

sources of tensions within it. If we understand the two opposing forces in something, and the tension between those forces, then we can understand what holds it together and how it might change or react if we were to expose it to certain things. Dialectics, then, is understood as the study of the unity of opposites. Again, these opposites refer to the thesis and the antithesis, both which will produce newness in the form of a synthesis. But how are we meant to use this? Thorn, from a very personal perspective, makes use of dialects as metaphors – explaining something in terms of something else. "A good metaphor should illuminate the thing that we are studying, not literally describe all its aspects"[639]. It can bring an idea home to the listener in the way that flat language may not always do.

Still, in questioning the objectivity of dialectics, we face these perpetual conflicts that can extend infinitely with the dynamic of thesis, antithesis and synthesis and so on. It is decidedly abstract, as Hegel describes this continuous relation between all people and all things. This characteristic of abstractness is what moves the discussion forward to the last names to be mentioned here. Marx and Engels criticize the excessive abstractness of Hegel, as it does not provide clearly a manner to understand the world in terms of material and quotidian relations. Both authors look at the world and see these kinds of conflicts occurring all the time, and to them these emerge specifically in form of class conflict – servants against feudal lords, upper classes against lower classes, the Bourgeois against the proletariat. The constant struggles of different antagonisms propitiate a movement of progress, and with this linear and historical movement we can actually trace this process happening by these dialectical encounters, bringing about newness with the synthesis that emerges. Different from Hegel, Marx and Engels don't quite accept that this constant process of dialectics will lead to the *Aufhebung,* the *absolute spirit* (hence, the phenomenology of the Spirit). Instead it is going to lead to a very palpable new social and economic dynamic. In a way, it regards a very teleological movement, almost in a positivistic way, where things supposedly have been getting steadily better. With this, both authors see in capitalism a new challenge to be overcome[640].

Rooted in historical materialism, Marxist philosophy[641] is mainly established by Dialectical Materialism, based on the enormous body of work produced by Marx and Engels, codified in a set of laws that could be applied to society and the natural world. Contrary to Hegel, it asserts the primacy of matter over consciousness, of material conditions over intellectual life. The dialectics of it refers to the belief that "political and historical events result

[639] Thorn, A. (2018).
[640] Guignion, D. (2020).
[641] Stalin, J. (1940).

from conflict of social forces and are interpretable as a series of contradictions and their solutions", being those conflicts caused by material needs – here, it is matter that drives history. Change, then, is asserted to be the outcome of a dialectic exercise between contradictory elements. It is from this perspective that Marx and Engels affirm that Capitalism came to being by negating and destroying feudalism (the previous social-economic system), and will in turn be negated by the rise of socialism and communism[642].

4.2.2. Hegel, Fanon, and the Master/Slave dialectical struggle

Understanding better what dialects mean, especially in the premise of their basic structure of two parts interacting to achieve a third outcome, we can start to imagine how the concepts of peace and violence would interact, or how they are the two split parts that live on a situation of tension. Taking from the Galtungian relation between the two concepts, we assume each of them as the negation and absence of the other – they are mutually excluding antagonistic concepts. The tension between them is evident but complicated as well, as we came to unveil their complex intertwinement, especially when it comes to what they define and how they are conceptualized. Mind that this is not even the issue at hand, as our objective aims at the contradictions between the mainstream concept of violence and its violent conceptualization revealed by a Postcolonial and Decolonial reading.

In the first moment, the thesis can refer to the mainstream conceptualization of violence with all its vices and problems, and the antithesis comes from the questionings in regards to these vices and problems through the lenses of Postcolonial and Decolonial theory. What emerges as a synthesis would be the already argued idea of a Violence for the Global South. On a second moment, as we will later approach, we can reach back to the mainstream conceptualization of violence as a thesis and offer exactly the idea of a Violence for the Global South as the antithesis, presenting an even more direct oppositional confrontation. What would come from the critique of the conceptualization of violence from a new idea of how violence could be conceptualized? Before diving into that, we should reference a dialectical dynamic that is present at the heart of Postcolonial and Decolonial theory, as an initial idea presented by Hegel (central to his theories), but later critically developed by Frantz Fanon.

The Master/Slave dialectic is the common name for a famous passage of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*. The original German phrase although, *Herrschaft und Knechtschaft*,

[642] Guignion, D. (2020).

is more properly translated as "Lordship and Bondage" [643]. It regards the development of self-consciousness as such from the encounter between two distinct, self-conscious beings. The process of self-recognition, here, is only fruitful by the perspective of a self-conscious *other* present in this dialogue who can present recognition to the *self*. The Hegelian dialectic suggests a coherence between parts taken as opposites such as concrete and abstract, subject and object, part and whole.

As the author explains, the figure of the 'Master' represents a consciousness that can only define itself in mutual relation to the consciousness of the 'Slave', in a process of mediation and mutual interdependence. "The consciousness for-the-Master is not an independent but a dependent, consciousness"[644]. Both Master and Slave recognize their own existence only in relation to the other. We can understand that, among its many implications, is the idea of reciprocity or a mutual dependence between the parts rather than a blanket opposition of dominance to subordination. According to Hegel's reading of this theoretical situation, "The slave ironically shares in the master's power because the master defines himself only in opposition to the slave; that is, the master needs the slave in order to legitimate his comparative privilege"[645]. How is that so?

Seeing it as a metaphorical narrative, the two characters – both understood as Consciousness – are trying to comprehend what they themselves are, what leads to the condition of self-consciousness. By discovering and engaging another *Self*, an *Other*, they find a way to gain a new perspective on the question at hand. "By discovering an Other and seeing themselves through that Other's eyes, they discover themselves". Thorn[646] highlights how self-consciousness is not an individual achievement for Hegel, what is different for Descartes. Self-consciousness emerges through interaction with others, and the manner we see ourselves is mediated by how those others see us – It is only by being acknowledged or "recognized"[647]. The desire for recognition is mutual, and from it arises the tension that leads to a "life-and-death struggle". To become aware of the *Other(ness)* is to become aware of the possibility of your own negation, as the *Other* is not bound to the *Self*'s will: "In the same way each must aim at the death of the other […] the other's reality is presented to the former as an external other, as outside itself; it must cancel that externality"[648].

[643] Hegel, G. W. F. (1992), p. 126-134.
[644] Hegel, G. W. F. (1992), p. 126-134.
[645] Graves, B. (1997); Hogan, B. (2018); Thorn, A. (2018).
[646] Thorn, A. (2018).
[647] Hegel, G. W. F. (1992).
[648] Hegel, G. W. F. (1992), p. 129; Thorn, A. (2018).

If we refer back to Jean-Paul Sartre, the philosopher talks about the 'nausea' of confronting the Other(ness). From his perspective it could be taken as shameful and awful as the Self is fixed by the Other's gaze, particularly in a situation in which "they see you as something that you don't see yourself as"[649]. Hegel, in his side, defends that neither self-consciousness can know what it means to be alive until it faces its death, a form of absolute negation. But in this tension between the two consciousness, if either kills the other then it loses recognition, as it can only be achieved through being recognized by the Other. He argues that, during the struggle, one shall value life more than being recognized, or one loses the struggle, and in this moment the Master is established – one side arrives at a (self-)conception of being dominant over the other (thus, the figure of the Slave in face of the Master). Hegel then advances to the figure of the Master feeling unfulfilled, not satisfied with the recognition of the Other who has been reduced to the character of the Slave – the Master seeks to be recognized by an equal, an independent self-consciousness. The figure of the Master finds its self-conception bound up in the Slave, who confronts its death in a different way, as it can be replaced or taken at any moment. In face of death, the Slave arrives at a conception of themselves as independent, not just an "extension of the Master's will or a piece of property". Not bound by the Other, by this dialectical process, emerges true self-consciousness[650].

Understanding dialectics as 'the study of the unity of opposites', then dialectics makes sense as the form to approach and interpret this entanglement between the figure of the Master and the figure of the Slave. Vladimir Lenin defends that "the condition for the knowledge of all process of the world, in their 'self-movement', in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites"[651] – appears what can be taken as a thesis and antithesis. And as said before, this can function as a metaphor, but for what?

> What it is all about? Who is the Master supposed to represent? And Who's the Slave? Are they literal Masters and literal Slaves? Are we talking about the Haitian Revolution? Or maybe they aren't literal masters and slaves. Maybe it's about the French Revolution? Maybe they're supposed to represent workers and capitalists? Maybe the two characters are supposed to represent nations and it's

[649] Thorn, A. (2018); Sartre, J. P. (2001).
[650] Thorn, A. (2018).
[651] Lenin, V. I. (1925); Thorn, A. (2018).

> a play about nationalism? Nationalism in the face of Colonialism? Maybe it's about men and women and the struggle for gender equality?[652].

All these examples, falling under the interpretation of the Master/Slave dialectic, can all be recognized as a Struggle for Recognition[653], and this in itself is not a metaphor. An example of that can be translated to what is taken as Identity Politics, as it is another way to refer to politics or recognition. "Oppressed groups get shown an image of themselves over and over that they just can't identify with, and so they demand recognition"[654], fixed by the gaze of the "hell that is other people"[655]. This can refer to individual level or to a larger level, referencing demographics of people being constantly portrayed as criminals, deviants, inferior, unworthy, barbaric, or whole countries and cultures being portrayed as uncivilized or backward[656].

The question that follows, proposed by Thorn is: how would these demands for Hegelian recognition be translated to in terms of concrete proposals? This is a point that is highly debated, in academic and practical levels. Note that, if we are to consider misrecognition, it is not about being offensive only, but it can lead to suffering and even death. Consider Nancy Fraser saying that "when such patterns of disrespect and disesteem are institutionalized", for example, in law, social welfare, medicine, public education, and/or the social practices and groups mores that structure everyday interaction, they impede parity of participation, just as surely as do distributive inequities"[657]. Here emerges the subject that demands for recognition should be accompanied by demands for redistribution, the latter meaning actual changes in who has material access to resources, money and power.

Thorn notes that not all struggles for recognition are "necessary equally good or grounded in reality", mentioning how this reading couldn't work to privilege a Nazi group, for example. If we recall that the Master is never being fully and satisfyingly recognized by the Slave, Hegel also notes that the tension between the two is not only unsatisfying, but actually unsustainable. These are not discourses or ideas, as we are talking about beings – in a point in time the dialectical clash will produce a synthesis. Considering that the Master centers itself in dominating the Slave, emerges two great narratives: either the Master changes its (oppressive) perspective building a new and different identity, or it will have to constantly stay aware of the

[652] Thorn, A. (2018).
[653] Honneth, A. (1996).
[654] Thorn, A. (2018).
[655] Thorn, A. (2018). Sartre, J. P. (2001).
[656] Thorn, A. (2018).
[657] Fraser, N. (2008), p. 78; Thorn, A. (2018).

possibility of riot, waiting for the Slave to rise up. The mere existence of the Slave becomes the possibility of recognition and of negation, and this only because it was "placed there". Ciccariello-Maher remarks that "for those relegated to nonbeing and condemned to invisibility, to even appear is a violent act – because it is violent to the structures of the world and because it will inevitably be treated as such"[658]. Here we touch on the violence that the mere existence of the Slave may signify for the Master, opening the avenue for a discussion between the supposed parity of violence between the two.

Hegel assumed that the two sides in the Master/Slave dialectics meet, at least initially, as equals. At this point, however, we start to gaze at the deficient metaphor this is, if we are to compare to the reality of social relations. Frantz Fanon, for example, argues that Hegel's dialectics is inadequate and defective in explanations of racial relations, particularly those following Colonialism. From his experience and work, as we saw, Fanon writes that Black colonial subjects – treated as objects – are disqualified from even entering into the dialectic of recognition in the first place[659]. In a world so materially shaped by slavery, Colonialism and white supremacy, from Fanon's eyes Hegel's dialectics are fallaciously abstract. Lacking "ontological resistance", Black subjects are hindered from the dialectical dynamic of recognition, being forced to enter into a contradiction to Hegel's views[660].

In Hegel's readings, the Slave would come to a point of turning away from the Master, concentrating in the objects of their creation that help them arrive in a new understanding of self-consciousness. What Fanon lamented although was the situation in which the colonized didn't turn away from the Master, but towards it[661]. For these reasons, and many other experiences, Fanon argues that the Slave is placed and stuck in the 'Zone of Nonbeing' – the dialectic becomes frozen, not dynamic. The tension maintains itself. It doesn't move, impeding the progress to a synthesis. For that, Fanon testifies: "I had rationalized the world and the world had rejected me on the basis of color prejudice. Since no agreement was possible on the level of reason, I threw myself back toward unreason"[662]. Ciccariello-Maher completes: "Lacking the reciprocity necessary for the dialectic to enter smoothly into motion, these disqualified nonbeings have no choice but to initiate a one-sided struggle to gain it"[663].

[658] Ciccariello-Maher, G. (2017); Thorn, A. (2018).
[659] Fanon, F. (2008).
[660] Ciccariello-Maher, G. (2017); Thorn, A. (2018).
[661] Fanon, F. (2008).
[662] Fanon, F. (2008), p. 93; Thorn, A. (2018).
[663] Ciccariello-Maher, G. (2017); Thorn, A. (2018).

This may come as a qualification for violence, but Fanon comes to highlight exactly how it must be seem differently depending on the perspective you take – the maxim "do not mistake the response of the oppressed with the violence of the oppressor[664]" here finds its perfect fit. In Fanon's experience this one-sided struggle meant nationalist anti-imperial movements. Although he argued in favor of anticolonial black nationalism, he also the one to point out that, once let off the chain, the forces of nationalism could turn into something that ended up reinforcing and mirroring the oppressions of the colonizers[665]. Fanon's readings, then, reverberates with Marx's Dialectical Materialism, as he was trying to apply some social and economic perspectives into Hegel's readings and interpretations of the world – "For Hegel there is reciprocity; here the master laughs at the consciousness of the slave. What he wants from the slave is not recognition but work"[666].

Coming from Hegel, the tension that is found and interpreted as inherent on the dynamic of the Master/Slave dialectic constitutes a violent process in itself, as it comes to a point of threat to the life, consciousness and self-recognition of the parts. Fanon, however, materializes the uneven relation that is found in society, and the response to that is violent. In face of this unbalanced dialectics, Fanon reinforces that violence allows the colonized to gain a sense of self that is not constituted by the values of the colonizer – "violence is a cleansing force. It rids the colonized of their inferiority complex, of their passive and despairing attitude"[667]. This violence comes to reverberates with the explanations given by Benjamin and Divine Violence or Žižek's affirmation of Gandhi being more violent than Hitler.

4.2.3. Lyotard's theory and the anechoic wall

In face of this understanding of the dialects we can try to apply it to the concept of violence in itself, as it has appeared naturally in previous discussions we analyzed and also because it is the proposed discussion of this dissertation. When facing the lack of debate in regards to the importance of such concept in the field of International Relations we came to observe the paradigm of how it is usually defined and how this definition makes us see how present and ubiquitous it is. Bringing the different modes and types of violence into the discussion, taken from other fields and studies, we started questioning on how the definition of violence can dictate how we identify it in the world. Even more so, inside the field of International Relations

[664] No clear reference to the author, with some mentions to Malcolm X, Angela Davis, and Paulo Freire.
[665] Fanon, F. (2007); Thorn, A. (2018).
[666] Fanon, F. (2008), p. 220; Thorn, A. (2018).
[667] Hogan, B. (2018), p. 28-29.

this came to be even more essential, as one can interpret that the field was built with the purpose of maintaining peace, and according to Galtung's perspective, this is directly correlated with dealing with violence. The concept of violence comes to be a theoretical cornerstone to International Relation.

An issue emerged in our analysis of the concept of violence in international relations and the lacking debate in regards to it in this field of studies. Trying to constellate the discussion on the concept of violence with other fields, such as Political Sciences, Sociology and Philosophy – aiming to assemble a proper reading that could serve as a seed to given discussion within the idiocrasies of the field of IR – and bringing materiality to it with data and numbers on violence in this same field, appeared the controversial case of people suffering the most from violence not being the ones mainly defining it, beyond talking about it. The manner and process of conceptualization of violence is concentrated in a mainstream epistemology, far from the materiality found in how and where this phenomenon occurs. Assuming how the phenomenology of violence influences its conceptualization, and considering the many types of violence that were described by many scholars and thinkers throughout history, it appears as inadequate to have the roots of the concept of violence far from the voices of those who most experience it.

This revealed itself to be paradigmatic, and within it International Relations weakens one of its core pillars. Not discussing violence, we neglect discussing peace. Emerges then another issue, when regarding the first on the lack of debate: Can we consider that the debate is weakened exactly because those who should have the legitimacy (by experience) to speak are not speaking? It is exactly at this very point that the theoretical contribution of Postcolonialism and Decoloniality educates us in our questioning, shifting the initial assumptions. It is not that they are not speaking, but they are not being heard. Those who deal most with violence are identified under the label of Global South, not correspondent to those who are in the epistemological center – the Global North – detainers of the concept, and how it is conceptualized. And as we saw in the beginning of this text, those who uphold the power to define a concept will have power over the objects and subjects of such concept. The separation of those who could contribute the most to the conceptualization from those who have the power over the conceptualization appears as violent, in a self-referencing violence. The status quo goes beyond its paradigmatic character, revealing itself as systematic – conventionally build and purposely maintained.

How is that violence is so present in social relations but it is not that broadly talked about? Well, it is ignored or silenced in general, and even more in International Relations, where it is

so important in practical, theoretical and epistemological levels. Coming to this point of this text, we can understand how this is can be understood as part of paradigm. It is strategic not to talk about it – not talking about violence is violent. But as we saw, it is not that it is merely not talked about. Violence serves as a tool of control to keep the Master apart from the Slave. Violence is clear in International Relations, in Politics, in the Media and in the day-to-day lives of people. What is not critically observed is how our approach to it can reproduce violence in itself. It comes to be contradictory that we see and talk about it but fail to analyze how we see and talk about it, neglecting the veiled violence behind it.

The concept of violence, being violent in itself, creates a conceptual paradox, as we have seen. It is violent because it does not usually comprehend the plurality of violences, at the same time it does not take into consideration the voices and experiences of those most 'violented'. This happens in a contradictory way, because the mainstream conceptualizations may even try to speak for these voices, creating an illusion of inclusion and universality. In a dialectical exercise how can I present the concept of violence as a thesis and the affirmation of its violent character in its conceptualization as the antithesis without the latter invalidating completely the former, and as a result, invalidating itself? In other words, how can I affirm that the concept of violence creates violence if it is exactly this concept that adjectivizes it? Will the invalidation of the concept invalidate the critique?

This is why the dialectical method must be applied here, as this reasoning should not follow a paradoxical logic, in which the affirmation of the antithesis cancels completely the thesis, that by its part propitiates the antithesis to exist and to be valid in the first place. The clash between these two parts must propitiate a synthesis that validates the conceptualization of violence and the critiques in regards to how can be violent. How can we deal with a situation in which the victim of violence wants to announce it, but it is exactly the definition of violence that invalidates the experience of the victim in the first place, creating a violence in itself? As this regards an epistemological discussion that crosses Discourse Theory, but also has direct impacts in the lives of people, we reach to the contributions of Jean-François Lyotard. The French philosopher develops most of the philosophy of language that underlies his work in his book *Le Différend*[668] (*The Differend: Phrases in Dispute* in English), taken by many scholars and also by himself as the most important of his career. His philosophy of language is exactly what will contribute to our discussion in regards to violence.

[668] Lyotard, J. F. (1983).

In this book he analyses how injustices take place in the context of language, and I must be very precise here: we will not use his philosophy of language as a whole to understand better our present issue with the concept of violence (which is found in the realm of language), but a very specific concept he has developed. According to the Dictionary of Critical Theory[669], the concept of *Différend* can be defined as a wrong or injustice that arises because the discourse (the space and form of language) in which the wrong might be expressed does not exist.

> To put it another way, it is a wrong or injustice that arises because the prevailing or hegemonic discourse actively precludes the possibility of this wrong being expressed. To put it still another way, it is a wrong or injustice which cannot be proved to have been a wrong or injustice because the means of doing so has (also) been denied the victim[670].

It regards the failure of language (in his theory), "the unstable state and instant of language wherein something which must be able to be put into phrases cannot yet be"[671]. If applied in an interpretation closer to dialectics, A Differend regards a conflict between parties that cannot be equitably resolved for lack of a rule of judgement applicable to both. Here, the parties cannot agree on a rule or criterion by which their dispute might be decided – thus, the tension between them is sustained. Woodward explains the Lyotard's Differend as opposed to a litigation, imagining a dispute which can be equitably resolved because the parties involved can agree on a rule of judgement. In face of this opposition, Lyotard distinguishes the victim from the plaintiff – "The latter is the wronged party in a litigation; the former, the wronged party in a Differend. In a litigation, the plaintiff's wrong can be presented. In a Differend, the victim's wrong cannot be presented". The victim here is not just someone who has been wronged, oppressed or constrained, but someone who has also lost the power to present this injustice, oppression or constraint. This disempowered subject may be threatened into silence, disallowed to speak. Even being able to speak, it may just be unable to present the wrong done in the discourse of the rule of judgement. The victim may not be believed, might be gaslighted, taken as mad, or not understandable. "The discourse of the rule of judgement may be such that the

[669] Buchanan, I. (2018) p. 384.
[670] Buchanan, I. (2018) p. 384.
[671] Lyotard, J. F. (1983).

victim's wrong cannot be translated into its terms; the wrong may not be presentable as a wrong"[672].

In order to diminish its abstractness, Lyotard presents various examples of Differend, being the most referenced the one regarding Auschwitz. He uses the example of the revisionist historian Faurisson demanding for proof of the Holocaust, showing how the Differend operates as a sort of vicious double bind. Faurisson would only accept "proof of the existence of gas chambers from eyewitnesses who were themselves victims of the gas chambers". However, any eyewitnesses are dead and are obviously not able to testify. In spite of that, Faurisson concludes from this that there were no gas chambers. Since Faurisson wouldn't accept evidence for the existence of gas chambers except the testimony of actual victims, he concluded from both possibilities that gas chambers didn't exist. It is a vicious double bind because the two alternatives lead to the same conclusion. "The case is a Differend because the harm done to the victims cannot be presented in the standard of judgment upheld by Faurisson"[673].

How can we identify a *Différend* in our issue with the conceptualization of violence? Well, the role of victim here is hindered from talking about the violence it experiences exactly because the concept of violence does not cover properly the victim's experience, and this can be identified as violent in itself, but again is not recognized as violence because it is not inscribed in the mainstream concept of violence – and this is kept that way purposefully. In our reading from the viewpoint of International Relations, based on Postcolonial and Decolonial readings, often the victims are those in the category of Global South, and the category itself. Lacking debate about violence and not having clear what is violence in the field, established a situation in which what is experienced in terms of violence is scarcely identified by the definitions and conceptions of those in the epistemological center. Not talking about violence directly is also part of this systematic paradigm, as it is easier to point to wars, for example, and stand in opposition to them, while other kinds of violence that preclude what is understood as peace (in Galtungian terms[674]) keep on happening in the field of the international and receive no direct attention. Another point to raise is that, in face of phenomenology, violence can be taken as less abstract than peace, and this little advantage in its concreteness rewards better any analyzes, policies and discourses. That is why the *Différend* explains and serves as an epistemic tool to maintain the concept of violence and the violence that comes from it – "The language,

[672] Woodward, A. (n.d.).
[673] Woodward, A. (n.d.).
[674] Galtung, J. (1969); Galtung, J. (1990).

the opportunity, and the means to articulate any wrong that may have befallen them is also denied them[675]".

The subject from the Global South, many times treated as a reified object, a subaltern, assuming the *Différend* in the conceptualization of violence, faces the wall that separates them, as *Others*, from those who are privileged by this constructed and maintained violent paradigm. In front of the wall not even the concept of violence – which should work to denounce these unwanted experiences that hinder the so pursued peace – functions as it was expected. And it is not the case that it does not function because it is in itself incorrect, but mainly because of the subject using the concept. Depending on who you are, where you come from, or what you represent, your experience will be unvalidated, not recognized. The violent wall is built by this violence at the same time it is such violence. It keeps the voices that could denounce it silenced, constrained, as the possibility to talk about it represents its weakening.

The subaltern can speak, but is abyssally silenced, ignored. The conception of violence appears in a double fold manner: it is violent with the subject, so there's the reason for critique in regards to the practice, but it is itself the primordial tool to serve the conceptual critique. We acknowledge it, and in the pursue to have its message heard, and even more, its presence recognized, the wall may crumble not with words or the voice, but with other forms of communication. As Martin Luther King puts it: "a riot is the language of the unheard[676]". More than "what are we failing to hear?", we should question "why are we failing to hear?".

4.3. A subaltern synthesis for Galtung's violence

Having presented the Differend that emerges from the dialectical exercise with the violence that is perpetrated by its mainstream conceptualization, we return to the theoretical questions regarding violence in the field of International Relations. How can we achieve the development of a synthesis, if the means to achieve it are obstructed by the own logic behind the process of conceptualization? Going back to what we have learned from the theoretical body of Postcolonial and Decolonial studies, making use of its teachings and tools, we focus on the detainers of power over the processes of conceptualization. In a parallel but complementary approach, we recover the proposals behind the shift from "violence on the Global South" to "violence for the Global South", now attempting to build its legitimacy beyond the clash of classical and mainstream concepts of violence with the perspectives of

[675] Buchanan, I. (2018) p. 384.
[676] Weber, P. (2020).

Postcolonialism and Decoloniality. It is more than presenting new definitions of violence and broadening our understanding of this concept, as we must approach the indispensability of breaking the Differend of violence to achieve a proper synthesis – one that will propitiate and legitimize these new understandings of violence, and consequentially peace.

This dialectical struggle to overcome the violence behind the concept of violence is not a simple task, as it requires a deep philosophical, theoretical and epistemological reasoning that can have deep and concrete consequences in the lives of many people. Because of that, what is here proposed – with this entire dissertation – must be understood merely as an approach to touch this anechoic wall through the reasoning that has been developed here. From our previous readings comes as obvious that this is not the first time someone tries to come close to understanding and unveiling violence in society. However, announcing the lack of debate regarding violence in International Relations, highlighting the essentiality of such concept to the field, I aim to find an overture for critically discussing this reality in a field that theoretically has no centralized authority nor higher power than the figure of the States, organized in a system that favors and privileges (in theory) what is understood as Sovereignty.

It is at this point that we return to the name of Johan Galtung, as a figure responsible for developing the field of Peace and Conflict Research from a strong critical reading of Sociology, Political Sciences and International Relations. Using much of IR's objects and perspectives of analysis, Galtung developed a theoretical framework that bases itself in the concepts of violence and peace. Interpreting Galtung's contributions as an attempt to comprehend how violence emerges and presents itself in the world, but also looking at him as part of the mainstream epistemological body that is maintained by the Global North (without neglecting his career, background or built work), I propose that his own analysis and conclusions shall function as an aperture to review his own work through the lenses of Postcolonialism and Decoloniality, opening a path to touch the discussion of violence and peace in the field of International Relations. In other words, Galtung discusses and affirms what is violence inside an analytical framework, trying to establish a structure that elucidates how it should be researched and understood in order to achieve peace – and it is through this very structure that I will open space for the arguments developed until this very point.

In the first section of this chapter the reader can see the proposal to take the mainstream conception of violence as the thesis, and the Postcolonial and Decolonial thought as the antithesis, with the synthesis coming to be a subaltern concept of violence for the Global South. This appears as an attempt to answer Spivak, trying to hear the subaltern speak. However, as we have seen, the dialectical exercise presented in the second section blocks our path with the

Differend that ins unveiled. This is an attempt to achieve a different synthesis within IR, between the mainstream concept of violence (from the Global North) and the proposal of violences for the Global South.

4.3.1. A typology of violences, then a typology of peaces

Returning to the 1969's article *Violence, Peace, and Peace Research* we start a critical review that shall lead us to the problematics around the concept of peace and its conceptualization. It is interesting to begin noting how he argues for how the word peace is overused, while I come exactly to complement that affirming that the word violence is underused, and most of the time, misused, or used in a deficient way. Coming to policy making, peace can be taken as an obvious objective, while the part that could regard violence diminishment is absent – and coming to this point, the reader should not take both as meaning the same. As he points out, seeking for peace thoughtlessly can neglect past experiences and justify dubious theories as a reasonable expectation for the future. Exactly to avoid that, violence should be the concept to provide the parts "with a one-word language in which to express values of concern", as it can be clearly avoided by the *self* and easily problematized when it regards the *other*.

Within the context of research, the author proposes a definition of peace to be established as a common ground – adding more substance and concreteness to aid in its scientific purposes. The process of conceptualization established three simple principles: First, "the term 'peace' shall be used for social goals at least verbally agreed to by many, if not necessarily by most". Secondly, "these social goals may be complex and difficult, but not impossible, to attain". Thirdly, "the statement *peace is absence of violence* shall be retained as valid[677]". The first principle already begs the questioning about the group represented by *the many* or *the most.* The last principle, taken as the most essential, works as an axiom for the whole field of Peace and Conflict Research, but it has raised some questioning in regards to it as our comprehension of peace and violence complexified throughout time. Propositions like Imperfect Peace[678] question the idea of mutual exclusion behind the interpretation of one existing in the absence of the other. Beyond that, Decoloniality[679] does not only serve to reveal how both can (co)exist, but also serves the critique of peace being sustained by the maintenance of violence. From this critical perspective, to those in power, peace only comes to be existent (to a few) by the making

[677] Galtung, J. (1969), p. 167-168.
[678] Muñoz, F. A. (2004), p. 898-900.
[679] Azevedo, W. F. (2018).

and maintenance of violence (to many). The attainability of it turns out to be selective and strategic, and most often not in negation to violence, but by the maintenance of it. Peace, in these Galtungian terms, already appears as an unfinished and defective project, if seen from subaltern eyes.

Nevertheless, the thought presented by this axiom requires a definition of violence. Quite surely, it is an unavoidable question with suggestions that will be unsatisfactory to many. Already stating for the many types of violence, he asks the reader to acknowledge "theoretically significant dimensions of violence that can lead thinking, research and, potentially, action, towards the most important problems", and this is well allocated with the intentions of this critical evaluation of Galtung's theoretical framework, while attempting to not fall into relativization or abstractness, as this would be a hinderance to any research purposes. If actions for peace conform as actions against violence, Galtung believes that one must understand violence in a broader sense to include its most significant varieties.

Violence, just like peace, is understood as a spectrum, but specific enough, to serve as a basis for research and concrete action. When affirming that his definitions "will probably not be agreed by most people, as it does not consent to common sense, but it should as well not be agreed my many, keeping its construct far from any subjectivist basis[680]", I can agree if they are bound by their own limits. Still, this argument falls under the considerations of inequality of opportunities, power and voice, reinforcing the epistemological centralization that is argued throughout this dissertation.

As a referential definition, an Archimedean Point to his theory, Galtung affirms that violence "is present when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations"[681]. How do we approach that when defining human beings may cross situations of dehumanization? One may argue for the first article of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)[682], but we still face the same problem – this critique can be interpreted as a questioning in regards to the conceptualization of human beings, but I'm actually referencing comments from Fanon, Césaire and others[683] who questioned about the dehumanizing structures of society tarnishing human relation.

Differently, if we are to understand that "violence is any avoidable insult to basic human needs, and, more generally, to sentient life of any kind, defined as that which is capable of

[680] Galtung, J. (1969), p. 168.
[681] Galtung, J. (1969), p. 168.
[682] Assembly, U. G. (1948), p. 14.
[683] Hewlett, N. (2012), p. 882; Hewlett, N. (2012), p. 882; Selis, L. M. R. & Souza, N. M. F. (2021), p. 59-61.

suffering pain an enjoy well-being[684]", the concept becomes more inclusive than what is taken as the mainstream, but still failing to recognize concepts like Slow Violence[685] and Gaia Peace[686]. Again, we have to be aware of the reach of these definitions – an extended concept of violence is indispensable, but it should be scientifically and logically built, to not be taken merely as a list of undesirables[687].

When examining the dimensions of violence, the author organizes its structure and dynamic with three parts: violence presupposes a subject, an object, and an action. As we have seen, the dynamics can change, and they are covered by six identified different dimensions[688]. Among all of them, I here focus on the fourth distinction, taken as the most important by Galtung, in which he regards the source of violence, whether or not there is a subject who acts. To quote him directly, "we shall refer to the type of violence where there is an actor that commits the violence as *personal* or *direct*, and to violence where there is no such actor as *structural* or *indirect*"[689]. There are critiques that question the balance or equal relevance of these two[690], but my focus really goes to the dynamics that propitiated this different assumption in regards to subject. Agreeing with Galtung, I do believe on the different sources of violence that take the role of the subject in this dynamic. Whatsoever, based on the Postcolonial and Decolonial reading of this dynamic, exactly assuming the heterogeneity of forms the subject can take, I argue for an analysis that starts in the phenomenology of violence experience by the object in this dynamic – in other words, I believe the most important part of this relational structure should be the object which violence was bestowed upon. The experiences of violence shall be different, but the fact of violence being present is common.

Galtung dedicates an important part of his article to approach the means of personal and structural violence, trying to make this distinction less abstract. When reviewing the former, the figure of the human being appears more clearly, as the author proposes typology of personal somatic violence, in which violence is aimed at one of two possibilities: trying to destroy the other or trying to prevent it from well-functioning. When moving to review the latter, Galtung questions on how to construct a corresponding typology for structural violence[691]. Focusing on factors like inequality and power distribution, the sciences of social structures appears as

[684] Galtung, J. & Fischer, D. (2013), p. 35.
[685] Nixon, R. (2011).
[686] Muñoz, F. A. (2004), p. 894-898.
[687] Galtung, J. (1969), p. 168-169.
[688] Galtung, J. (1969), p. 169-172.
[689] Galtung, J. (1969), p. 170.
[690] Thomas, C. (2011), p. 1828.
[691] Galtung, J. (1969), p. 174-175.

indispensable for understanding structural violence – and structures are recognizable in various levels, from small social circles to international relations.

Considering the interactions within these structures from a critical viewpoint, it comes as evident that there are factors that serve to purposefully maintain inegalitarian distributions in these systems – clear mechanisms of structural violence. Inequality, as mentioned by Galtung, "then shows up in differential morbidity and mortality rates, between individuals in a district, between districts in a nation, and between nations in the international system[692]". In face of this unbalanced situation, the underdogs response is organizing their power to bear against the topdogs. Here appears the violence (in its many forms) as retaliation, as response[693]. As questioned: how different is this violence from the first one? From Sorel's myth of General Strike[694] and Benjamin's Divine Violence[695], to Fanon's cleansing force[696] and historical revolutionary for responses liberation – can those be considered equal to the violence that aims to achieve domination?

Approaching the relation between personal and structural violence, Galtung proposes a series of questions, and invites the reader to question their differences. In the case of clear difference, does one presuppose the presence of the other? The presence of one assumes the latency of the other? Could it not be that one is the price paid for the absence of the other? All of those questions have their inherent relevance, as they reinforce the definitions of each concept and inquiries about the limits between them. However, it has to be stated that the answers for these questions will drastically change if coming from the Global North of from the Global South. Could it be that the price of structural violence in the Global South is the price paid for the absence of direct violence in the Global North? Lastly, if questioning the possibility of one type being much more important in its consequences than the other[697], we should be reminded that the intensity, constancy and proximity of the given two types, from the perspective of the constrained, does not allow much distinction in the importance of its consequences.

Galtung, in face of those questionings, sees the need to highlight that there is, indeed, difference. There is a qualitative difference between these direct actions and structural dynamics. Here, the objective consequences and not the subjective intentions are the primary

[692] Galtung, J. (1969), p. 176-177.
[693] Galtung, J. (1969), p. 177.
[694] Sorel, G. (1999).
[695] Benjamin, W. (1921),
[696] Fanon, F. (2007).
[697] Galtung, J. (1969), p. 177.

concern. Is it possible, then, to determine the distinction of violence empirically? Is it possible to identify a pure form of violence, isolated and disconnected from any other type[698]? The author presents the consideration of cross-breeding theoretical perspective on types of violence. Begging the question, Galtung then asks where it has started[699]. This would take us to the beginning of this dissertation, going back to the first philosophical registers that questioned the origins of violence – this discussion then crosses understandings on aggressiveness, instinct, and conflicts. Having said that, the reader should be capable, by now, to understand how this violence experienced in the Global South tends to have its origins tied to the same groups and reasons: those in power use violence as a means to dominate and as an end to self-endow.

When this stablished structure (which clearly benefits a group other than the Global South) is threatened, those who benefit from the structural violence it creates, will try to preserve the *status quo*, built to protect their interests. Turbulence then rises, as the conflict must come to a synthesis – the response to the initial violence is here clearly acknowledged by Galtung. Naturally comes the question: Is one type of violence necessary or sufficient to abolish the other type?[700]. Again, we return, not to the differentiation on the forms of violence, but on the intentions behind it. This then turns to be a delicate question, as it can appeal to the moral and uncontextualized thought that "any kind of violence is bad" or that "violence should not be answered with violence". Yet, oppressed peoples have a fundamental right to self-defense, and depending from which eyes you look, this will be violent of not. However, from the perspective of the subaltern, it should not be hard to understand that "nobody in the world, nobody in history, has ever gotten their freedom by appealing to the moral sense of the people who were oppressing them[701]".

Finally, arriving at the last section of his article, Johan Galtung brings on the discussion around the definition of *peace* and *peace research*. This rounds back to the beginning of this section's discussion: How is peace conceptualized from the perspective of the Global South? What Peace Research means to the Global South? After all that has been presented, within Galtung's article and beyond it, we should be able to understand that an extended concept of violence should lead to an extended concept of peace – and from the perspective I take, understanding violence before is essential to the understanding of peace for the Global South.

[698] Galtung, J. (1969), p. 179-180.
[699] Galtung, J. (1969), p. 179.
[700] Galtung, J. (1969), p. 181.
[701] Shakur, A. (2020).

When referring to the absence of direct violence and of structural violence, Galtung defines them as negative peace and positive peace, respectively.

Peace is not only a matter of reducing the possibilities of violence, but stablishing a path towards a more peaceful structure. It is noted by the author how his propositions on peace theory are directly linked with conflict theory and development theory, and this can be interpreted in many ways – here, we could reach out to mentioned names such as Karl Marx[702] or Immanuel Wallerstein[703], highlighting strong economic and social bonds with the political and theoretical discussion around peace. They are intertwined and connected, as a complexity – to achieve peace one must consider power differentials being contrasted within historically dominant ideologies and how desirable change in society is best achieved. The attempt to approach peace (and violence) by one side only risks any analysis to be shallow, lacking or misleading[704]".

At last Galtung questions the reader about the pursuit of social justice and also in the avoidance of personal violence. "does this constrain our choice of means in a way that it becomes meaningful only in certain societies, or impractical on other societies" [705]? Here the Norwegian author seems to considers again the means to achieve peace, trying to recognize its attainability and effectiveness in face of such challenges. When questioning specifically in regards to *societies*, he basically ponders if this method for peace is universal – that is to say, if it works for all societies or if only fits certain types of society. "how valuable is this recipe for peace" [706], if the choices of means to fight against structural violence are limited by the non-use of personal violence?

In the field of peace research, peace has to be constantly rejected and renewed. Here, even the three basic assumptions for the Galtungian definition of peace must reviewed: Galtung's second principle collides with his third principle – the dyadic relation of mutual exclusion between peace and violence is, in itself, unattainable. We've came across frameworks that consider their mutual existence, understanding that peace can be achieved and recognized with some shades of violence, in an imperfect form, as well as understanding that peace is achieved by some at the cost of violence upon others[707].

[702] Marx, K. (2013).
[703] Wallerstein, I. (1987).
[704] Galtung, J. (1969), p. 184.
[705] Galtung, J. (1969), p. 183-184.
[706] Galtung, J. (1969), p. 184.
[707] Galtung, J. (1969), p. 185-186.

Is it the case for giving up the use of the word *peace*, as it already encompasses so much and this usually creates problems? The poem of Marcelino Freire[708] may come as an answer to that, revealing how the use of such word may even reference everything there is but peace, depending on who you talk to. This question is especially potent in the field of International Relations, as the pursuit for peace is part of the field's ontology. Johan Galtung presents Peace research as a field concerned with the conditions for promoting both aspects of peace – negative and positive. Alongside, the fields of studies and research, together with pragmatic and grassroot peace work, keep on expanding and evolving. The author finishes reminding us that "there are more than enough people willing to sacrifice one for the other – it is by aiming for both that peace research can make a real contribution[709]".

It seems, although, that its definition has not found common acceptance, even between the epistemological center, mainstream theories or in the international community[710]. Richmond argues that International Relations has to approach a representation of peace "that recognize subjectivity and breadth, rather than trying to replicate a narrow eternal truth or reality, or to make problematic claims of universality[711]". Here we open a space for Postcolonialism and Decoloniality, "for [the true] peace continues to be an impossibility as long as we do not address coloniality[712]".

4.3.2. The pyramidal experience and the polyhedron of violences

As we have seen before, it is in his 1990's article that Galtung defines cultural violence as those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence, that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence. What happens is that societies can have not only one, but a whole set of violent aspects, and to study it a researcher needs a systematic research process[713]. Advancing his work from the 1969's article, studies of violence now deal with a double fold problematic: the use of violence and the legitimization of that use. As explained, cultural violence works establishing the moral tone of an act, or making reality opaque, making its acknowledgement difficult and consequentially its analysis. To better understand the concept, the reader can approach its negation – cultural peace – as a set of aspects of culture

[708] Costa, N. (2017).
[709] Galtung, J. (1969), p. 186.
[710] Martín, F. E. (2005).
[711] Richmond, O. P. (2008a), p. 450-451.
[712] Azarmandi, M. (2018).
[713] Galtung, J. (1990), p. 291.

that serves to justify and legitimize direct and structural peace, what would then lead to a 'peace culture'. With it, the typology of violence expands with a third category.

This pursuit for a peace culture, ironically, could lead to problematic consequences, as the temptation to institutionalize (and universalize) such culture could become a cultural imposition, thus a violent act. Cultural violence, here, gets established by making direct and structural violence look and feel right – or at least not wrong. As the author puts, "the study of cultural violence highlights the way in which the act of direct violence and the fact of structural violence are legitimized and thus rendered acceptable in society"[714]. To the reader, this may come as recognizable in some of the featured scenes in the documentary *Concerning Violence*[715], or in the historical account of the Valladolid Debate, in which Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda used theological arguments to justify the violence against American natives – the examples are many. Postcolonialism, in its origins, was particularly focused on the influence that culture had in the building of the European *Self* and the non-European *Other*, as brilliantly exposed by Edward Said's *Orientalism*[716], accounting for how the Western world perceives the Orient.

In this work Galtung also makes an exercise combining direct and structural violence, coming to recognize four classes of basic needs (those necessary to achieve potentially possible satisfaction levels): survival needs, well-being needs, identity needs, and freedom needs[717] – resembling Maslow's hierarchy of needs[718]. Interesting enough, Galtung himself points out how his table is anthropocentric[719]. A fifth class appears, adding the category for 'the rest of nature', encompassing biotic (non-life) and abiotic (life) characters. Therefore, the sum of survival, well-being, identity and freedom needs together with ecological balance are identified in an updated definition of Peace[720], now more aligned with concepts such as Slow Violence[721] and Gaia Peace[722].

With the construction of a small table, Galtung is able to schematize and present, in an organized way, the various forms violence can be manifested, expanding our understanding of direct and structural violence in relation to the different needs that were also presented, creating a wider spectrum for the typology of violence. Direct violence now ranges from the act of

[714] Galtung, J. (1990), p. 292.
[715] Olsson, G. (2014).
[716] Said, E. W. (1978).
[717] Galtung, J. (1990), p. 292.
[718] Maslow, A. H. (1943).
[719] Galtung, J. & Fischer, D. (2013), p. 36.
[720] Galtung, J. (1990), p. 292.
[721] Nixon, R. (2011).
[722] Muñoz, F. A. (2004), p. 894-898.

killing (against survival needs) to repression, detention and expulsion (against freedom needs), and also slashing and burning (against nature). On the other side, structural violence ranges from exploitation (against survival needs) to marginalization and fragmentation (against freedom needs), also accounting for pollution (against nature)[723].

With the addition of Cultural Violence, Galtung proposes the image of a violence triangle, with two of violence types at the base and one at the top or the opposite, making possible six different positions, with each representing a different perspective on how relations among these violences are established. In relation to time, direct violence appears as phenomena, an ephemeral event, while structural violence resembles a process, with ups and downs, and cultural violence with a more perennial character, given the slow transformations that cultures go through[724].

Considering the many types of violence and their effects in relation to time, the analysis on it starts talking about trauma beyond suffering, leading to a common underlying assumption between these violent relations: "violence breeds violence". From the theme found throughout this dissertation, an action leads to reaction, and it is here that Galtung mentions responsive violence. Galtung argues against the biological determinism that postulates a human's natural drive for aggression and dominance, considering high levels of variability in aggressiveness and dominance. He does not agree to take it as a drive, as the pursue for food, rest or procreation[725]. It is interesting to note how the author's arguments are interconnected, as he shows that the pursuit for vengeance and retribution are common examples of responsive violence, and right after he touches on the issue of human's natural drive for aggression. In its naturality, this can lead to an interpretation of the violence of response as animalesque and unthought, diminishing the character of those who fight back for their lives and also for their dignity as human beings.

For the reader looking to grasp on concreteness of cultural violence, Galtung dedicates a whole section of his article going through violent cultural elements and how it can, empirically or potentially, be used to legitimize direct or structural violence. Crossing cases regarding religion, ideology, language, arts, empirical sciences, and formal sciences. With all of that, the author points to western culture having so many violent features that the whole culture starts looking violent, binding all the violent aspects of existence. In an opposite movement from peace culture moving to a culture of peace, in here the transitions goes from cultural violence

[723] Galtung, J. (1990), p. 293-294.
[724] Galtung, J. (1990), p. 294-295.
[725] Galtung, J. (1990), p. 296.

to the label of a violent culture. The whole culture possesses a tremendous potential for violence that can be expressed at the more manifest cultural level and then be used to justify the unjustifiable[726].

To address this problematic situation, Galtung reaches out to the contributions of Mahātmā Gandhi, a great advocate for the *Satyagraha* and the *Ahimsa* as mentioned before in this text. According to him, the problems with violence need to be addressed with two axioms: Unity-of-life and Unity-of-means-and-ends. Both Unities regard the importance of closeness to avoid separation, while still respecting differentiation. The Indian lawyer affirms that "any Self-Other gradient can be used to justify violence against those lower down on the scale of worthiness; any casual chain can be used to justify the use of violent means to obtain non-violent ends"[727].

I have no intentions to say that Gandhi was wrong, but his perspective just as same as Galtung, at this point, lacks the elements that are so strong in relation to cultural violence in Postcolonial and Decolonial Theory. This cultural aspect was strongly and explicitly explored in Fanon's *Black skin, white masks*[728], as he writes about the effects of racism and dehumanization on the human psyche, inherent in situations of colonial domination – a clear case of cultural violence legitimized by structural violence. I could also mention, in a broader stroke, all the foundation of Decoloniality, as a pursuit to decolonize relations that were built upon the cultural violence that sustains the concept of Modernity. Going even further, Boaventura's concept of Epistemicide[729] translates well one of the main mechanics that we could identify in Cultural Violence. And here, as I have argued before, I invite the reader to observe this descriptions and to analyze who tends to be the victims of these violences.

Concluding the article, the reader should have clear that from an institutionalized violent structure and an internalized violent culture emerges direct violence as something common and acceptable. Galtung argues that violence can start at any corner in the violence triangle, and is easily transmitted to the other corners, in a self-sustaining dynamic. At this point, the theoretical framework presented by Galtung matures and complexifies, without losing relevance and applicability for research purposes – on the contrary, the triangular logic of violence being sustained by a base and supporting another type of violence that would be found on the top of this triangle functions organically, and the examples presented in this article make them even more palpable the materiality of his arguments, as a foundation for his theory, is

[726] Galtung, J. (1990), p. 300-301.
[727] Galtung, J. (1990), p. 302.
[728] Fanon, F. (2008).
[729] Meneses, M. P. & Santos, B. de S. (2009).

exactly what propitiated the structure of Peace Research. Nonetheless, I see the need to propose a critical perspective to make a shift in this geometrical reading of violence.

The debate proposed in this dissertation is based on the important and abyssal distinctions between the Global South and the Global North, between the West and rest of the world, between the center and the periphery – and it is not mine the intention to differentiate, really. Just to highlight it. The evidence and the arguments are scattered throughout this dissertation. The violence that sustains this abyssal line seems to be ingrained in every aspect of human life, as we came to understand how this triangle works to keep itself standing. And everyone is affected by these violences – on the phenomenology of it, the experience of every human, of every community, of every group and every nation should contribute to an analysis and critical perspective of any particular to general situations. Different from taking it as an argument for subjectivity that could flirt with relativization, it is in reality the understructure of an argument that assumes the ubiquity of violence, the impossibility of its absence, and thus the phenomenology of it. The argument for a Violence for the Global South does not neglect the experience of it for the Global North.

Notwithstanding, the experience of the Differend is exclusive for the base, for the margins. This "conceptual violence", then, appears as a distinctive key. Here the shift is made, and the triangle falls flat on the ground, revealing the need for the visual of a three-dimensional analysis. The violences experienced are not only different in forms, in types, but clearly are different in intensity and in distribution. While some feel the effects of it, (many) others suffer the effects of it. Taking the experiences of violence as ubiquitous, but considering how unequal it is in a geographical distribution, in a social structure of classes, in the differences created between the mainstream *Selves* and the *Others*, we create an image of a pyramid, built basically by the layering of inumerous triangles of violence, going from a base to represent the experience of the Global South to the apex, to represent the experiences of the Global North. Here again, assuming the dialectical relation between peace and violence, the inconceivability of their mutual excluding character, the plurality of violences to be experienced, together with the Differend that emerged from its conceptualization and the difference that was built and maintained between the Global South and the Global North by this same violence that developed and grew, the figure of this pyramidal perspective on violence comes to critique Galtung's conception of violence – not as a mistaken model, but as an uncomplete framework from the perspective of those subalternized.

Figure 1. From the triangle to the pyramid of violence[730]



Note: The pyramid does not lose its vertices representing Direct, Structural and Cultural Violence as in the two-dimensional figure of the triangle. The layering of triangles, from large ones to smaller ones, conducted by an axle representing the differences between the Global South and the Global North is what builds this new tridimensional representation. The area of any extracted layer would represent the intensity and distribution of this violence. The Differend represents a cut to clearly differentiate the violence experienced in the North and in the South.

Also, as a reflection of this complexification, the proposal on typology of violence could be expanded beyond a triangular definition. Assuming all the types of violence that were presented until this very point, and accepting the argument on the phenomenology of violence, the conceptualization of violence morphs into a polyhedron, also another three-dimensional figure to capture its types, forms, but also its intensities and distributions. This, although, serves more as an image to capture the variability and plurality of violent experiences, and not so much as an analytical relational tool for research. These different faces of this polyhedron come to represent even the different means and ends for the experience of violence, accepting even some controversial perspectives on it. For Galtung, as registered in his contributions, "violence is a pathology, to be treated as such"[731]. For many others, however, violence can be seen as the medicine, as the cure, and should be treated as such. The polyhedron, then, capsules all the different violences that were presented throughout this dissertation, reaching beyond Galtung's specifications.

[730] The image was created by the author, used in the final evaluation of this dissertation and then added here.
[731] Galtung, J. & Fischer, D. (2013), p. 40.

4.3.3. New challenges in the conceptualization of violence

Being the biggest contributor to the field of Peace Research, and being the most referenced in the field as well[732], many people followed Johan Galtung to advance with his work, and together with those many came to criticize and present counter arguments on what Galtung defended. As presented before, this echoes with this dissertation purposes. Challenges on the conceptualization of violence appeared, especially with the world changing in such a pace as it happened in the last years of the century, and from this point on, until present times. Much had to be reviewed, and Galtung kept himself updated – the contrast between his 1969's and his 1990's text is notable. From my personal perspective, we shall attempt to contribute a little more, but now under the analytical framework of Postcolonialism and Decoloniality.

As presented before, the text *A Question of Values: A Critique of Galtung's Peace Research*, written by Peter Lawler in 1989, is one of the most notorious I found contemporary with Galtung's mentioned articles. For Lawler, having been the only prominent figure in the field in all this time required Galtung's work to be approached more critically[733]. His main argument focused on the weaknesses of the integrity of Peace Studies, since there was a lack of greater self-contemplation in the normative character of the field, contributing to a perspective in which values were already presupposed and research started from this point on. Having no clear values for the field's perspective, it had prerogative for its questioning. Beyond that, there should not be possibilities for a foundation of universal values or critical principles, but this is exactly what Galtung presented in Lawler's viewpoint[734].

The second part of Lawler's text highlights the sociological basis of the Norwegian author, in which he points out a path built on positivism and how this approach transfers some of its flaws and vices to Peace Studies. It tries to establish itself as a science, as it attempts to carry alone the definition of peace. Contrary to the traditional focus on relations between States, the field of Peace Research began with a global focus, with its field of identification being "global problems in a global perspective"[735], and at this point he could not disguise the fact that he assumed that the pursuit of positive peace was a self-evident and universal normative project[736]. When questioning about peace, following the reasoning of Peace Studies, Lawler extends his criticisms to what is interpreted as violence, and this is more evident in the sixth part of the

[732] Galtung, J. & Fischer, D. (2013), p. 5.
[733] Lawler, P. (1989), p. 27.
[734] Lawler, P. (1989), p. 29.
[735] Lawler, P. (1989), p. 40.
[736] Lawler, P. (1989), p. 44.

text, in which he shows how part of the Galtugian argument was criticized by some Marxist perspectives, especially with regard to structural violence[737].

For those critics, Galtung's approach neglected the relevance of political-economic issues in the relations between the developed and underdeveloped worlds. Thus, in his attempt to preserve a symmetrical approach to violent conflict, the author was accused of an "idealistic universalism". From the point of view of the oppressed, an argument that favored greater integration of the international system was one that defended the maintenance of a *status quo* that reflected the interests of the dominant states and those benefiting from the world capitalist economy. Against this, the defenders of such criticisms called for an area of Peace Studies that would side with the exploited and violated by the various latent conflicts of interest that characterized global politics[738].

This dissertation coincided in many aspects with the critiques raised by Lawler. Interpreting Postcolonial and Decolonial studies as post-modernist movements, the negation of any universality comes as a direct reflection of the struggle to provincialize Europe and the West[739]. Also, assuming the so called self-evident and universal normative project of Galtung's positive peace, in the previous section we saw that this critique was later responded in his 1990's article, echoing the problem that can emerge from the cultural beliefs of a value that could be desired as universal. I do not necessarily see a lack of values, but a postcolonial reading of Galtung's framework comes to agree with the Marxist arguments presented by Lawler, especially regarding the beginning of his project on Peace Studies. The proposal of a Peace Studies that would side with the exploited and violated is basically what I attempted here, especially raising awareness towards the weight of violence to these people if compared to the weight of peace. A conceptualization of a violence for the Global South does not only highlight the Marxist's critique on political-economic issues with capitalism, but also points to colonialism, patriarch and any time of oppressive system that perpetuates violence with its modes of domination.

Moving to the second article I presented, we proceed to Jean Cartier-Bresson's *Understanding and Limiting Violence, an introduction*. At the beginning of the text, when regarding the end of the Cold War, the author presents the "utopian agenda from the early 1990s[740]": more friendly relations between States, limitation of the exploration and exploitation of conflicts in third world countries. The World Bank and the UN in conducting a new

[737] Lawler, P. (1989), p. 45.
[738] Lawler, P. (1989), p. 45
[739] Chakrabarty, D. (2009).
[740] Cartier-Bresson, J. (2003), p. 249.

diplomacy, including networks of non-state actors, and rejecting alliances with dictators, the right of intervention by the UN to allow the transition of states for the liberal democratic model.

Despite such expectations, cases of interstate conflicts, civil wars, genocides, rebellions, and resurgent terrorism coexisted. All this while the issue of violence in underdeveloped and developing countries gained prominence in forums on good governance in a globalized world economy[741]. From this analysis emerges the proposal to initiate a debate on the relationship between different types of violence and the issues regarding development from the beginning of the 1990s.

The text follows with methods for studying different forms of violence, citing perspectives of rational choice and fieldwork, as well as dealing with economic, political and ethnic causes to explain what triggers acts of violence. It deals with the consequences of political acts that can be configured as violent, and what means exist to end these acts and rebuild societies. Cartier-Bresson advocates an approach that rejects a monolithic and aggregating concept of violence that contributes to ideological constructions of the main threats to security issues today. This argument ends up asserting that the greatest threats are the result of ideological constructions, which in turn are the result of a monolithic and aggregating interpretation of the concept of violence[742].

Jean Cartier-Bresson makes a great contribution to the analysis of violence, especially when regarding the avoidance of a monolithic and aggregating concept. This basically reinforces the need for type differentiation, especially if you are aiming for research purposes. As the author also notes, it is exactly these monolithic and aggregating concepts of violence that represent the main threats to security issues – interesting enough, the greatest threat appears as ideological constructions, what could be interpreted as cultural violence. Another major contribution here regards the argument around different developments followed by different types of violence, as this resonates directly with the argument of the pyramidal model. The coexistence of peace and violence, breaking the "utopian agenda from the early 1990s", together with the consideration of development differences when considering countries, contributed to the arguments and conclusions of this work, already leading the line of thought to a perspective more towards International Relations.

Looking to understand better the problematics that have appeared after Galtung's proposal of Peace Studies, its conceptualization of violence and its influence in International Relations,

[741] Cartier-Bresson, J. (2003), p. 250.
[742] Cartier-Bresson, J. (2003), p. 250.

we proceed to Claire Thomas's *Why don't we talk about 'violence' in International Relations?* The field obviously deals with it directly and indirectly, coming to a point of the author affirming that it is what IR is about. However, her inquires regards the camouflaged use of the term, questioning why the word is not used more often and why the meaning of this concept is not discussed more often. The concept is there, only omitted or hidden[743].

One of the most elaborated points is precisely on the argument that these alternative words, to avoid the use of the word violence, are not just a vocabulary whim. The author claims that this strategy helps to fend off the destructive, dangerous and highly personified idea of violence. Being a concept that is not clearly defined, it is therefore disputed. Addressing the issue of its used and conceptualization, Thomas notes that "the language used to 'tell the story' about violence is important not only to communicate this story clearly, but also because it affects the story itself". There is a focus on the debate about the meaning of the concept, but the author also seeks to identify where, how and why this concept is so contested. Furthermore, despite focusing on the descriptive issue, there is no way to deny the normative character of the concept and the issues it raises[744]. More importantly to note, the author arguments in favor of a particular, stricter definition of the concept.

Approaching the traditional theoretical frameworks of International Relations, the author points out to how these schools rarely used such a term as they already considered the implicit illegitimacy of violence, while concentrating and dealing with the "legitimate" uses of violence by the State. To establish that she works with the Galtungian definition of direct violence, as something illegitimate and as a generalized condition (*state of violence*)[745]. As a foundation to all these frameworks, she raises the problem of its normative character, as although most people agree that violence should be condemned, a problem arises when questioning whether all violence should be equally condemned. When violence is perceived as legitimate, it is often referred to in a different, leaving the specific term *violence* to imply illegitimacy. The question of legitimacy, on the other hand, creates an opening for disagreement over which authorities, or which uses of violence, are legitimate. There are critics who argue that state violence is illegitimate and that violence used to prevent state oppression is legitimate, as we have seen here[746].

[743] Thomas, C. (2011), p. 1816.
[744] Thomas, C. (2011), p. 1817.
[745] Thomas, C. (2011), p. 1818-1821.
[746] Thomas, C. (2011), p. 1822-1825.

Another important argument coming from Claire Thomas regards its instrumental approach. She defends that the use of violence is not focused as a purpose, but as an instrument in order to achieve a certain objective. This perspective favors the idea that the act of violence is perpetrated by an agent, who at some point has the option, with their reasons, of getting involved in the violent act or not, which places a greater scope in what represents the concept of direct violence compared to structural violence. The author says that the latter must not be dismissed, and that it is important to recognize the structures and beliefs (cultural violence) that allow the use of violence to continue so easily. Still, violence has to be an act performed by someone or some people. From this viewpoint, violence cannot be compared as inverse to world peace or social justice, as they are in completely different categories – the latter being an end state to which one can choose to aspire. Consequently, the study of violence in international politics should treat the concept as an instrument, always used to achieve another objective[747].

The conclusions point to a need to recognize how violence harms individuals, and that hiding this behind euphemisms or the use of other terms makes it harder to approach. To the author, broader definitions of the concept are not be helpful. It is important to establish links between structural injustice and violence, but this does not require labeling all these things as violent. Thus, she advocates a more restricted definition of the concept. In the field of international politics and analyses of international relations, the most useful manner to conceive violence is as the use of physical force to inflict injury or damage,[748]. A research agenda looking at violence needs to encompass the violence of daily life as well as the violence of war. What is obvious to her is that the effects of each one result in the suffering of individuals, and that the expansion of the concept to also include social injustice ends up opening the discussion to deal with everything and, hence, with nothing[749].

Claire Thomas' article is one of huge relevance for our readings here, as it brought together perspectives on International Relations as well on the concept of violence. Questioning why don't we talk about violence in International Relation appears as a central inquiry of this dissertation, and just like Thomas, we came to agree that this is part of a strategy to keep the discussions regarding violence unexposed. The 'story' we use to approach such phenomenon tell us a lot about how we perceive it but also about how we build such stories – and here lies all the questioning around the issues of legitimacy, the anechoic wall and power over

[747] Thomas, C. (2011), p. 1828.
[748] Thomas, C. (2011), p. 1834-1835.
[749] Thomas, C. (2011), p. 1836.

epistemologies. Those in power to dictate what is violence and what is not are then the biggest perpetrators of violence.

This, however, goes against another argument that Claire Thomas presents, when regarding how the concept of violence should not have a broad definition. From my Postcolonial and Decolonial critique, it is exactly the attempt to establish a concept that is too centered in a closed definition that has been reinforcing the presented vices and problems. A not so broad definition eases the process of research, but it can also contribute to its incompleteness. Especially considering the field of International Relations, a concept that is too tight, too focused in direct violence, will reproduce the conceptualization coming from the epistemological center, from the Global North. At this argument, Claire Thomas presents the problematic of the article but points to a direction that is almost in its entirety different from ours.

At last, approaching the question of how violence is taken in International Relations, we take the text by Colin Wight, *Violence in international relations: The first and the last word*. The author mentions that much of the academic discipline of International Relations revolves around the concern with the prevalence of war and the search for peace. Based on Steven Pinker's book, Colin Wight argues that the claim that violence in the world has declined is somewhat audacious. For the author, Pinker's approach fails to understand the interplay between continuity and change when exploring the role, place, function and ethical judgment of violence in international society. The analysis may point out that incidences of violence have decreased, but it fails to understand the nuances of how violence has been reconfigured or how attitudes towards it have changed[750].

Given this scenario, therefore, an opportunity arises to reconsider the role, place and function of violence in International Relations. Wight's first approach places the discipline with a limited understanding when it comes to theorizing about change. Throughout the text, the author deals with the continuity of violence in society, briefly describing what he understands by violence and explains why violence is a constitutive part of the political[751]. After that, he deals with what has changed when considering violence in international relations[752]. Among his concluding arguments, he highlights that the control of violence and the ability to subject those who use it to moral evaluations and standards is perhaps one of the most significant transformations in international relations in the last century – basically

[750] Wight, C. (2019), p. 173.
[751] Wight, C. (2019), p. 178-185.
[752] Wight, C. (2019), p. 185-189.

mentioning international law. In here, violence is part of politics, as the last resort over intractable political disputes. The problem lies precisely in the fact that the entities responsible for building a global institutional order are the ones that perceive violence as their last resort[753]. In politics violence will always have the last word[754].

Wight's arguments may be interpreted as an appeal to the theoretical and epistemological change that the field of IR has been (constantly) going through. Assuming the deep relation between violence and politics is not exclusive to him, but it adds a layer of framework that reaches to the classics of International Relations theory. Change, however, is a key aspect of Postcolonial and Decolonial theories, not as something that happens, but as something that is necessary and desired, and this reflects in our discussions around the conceptualization of violence. The definition must be broadened, and the conceptualization must be more just and inclusive. Violences for the Global South are here a indicative of this notion of change, towards an idea of International Relations that can function according to mutual respect and deep partnerships.

Bringing together the critiques of this articles, we can gaze at the existing theorical gaps to previous ideas of violence – and consequentially peace – in the field of International Relations and its object of study. At the beginning of this dissertation, this served to show some justifications for the arguments I had regarding my first hypothesis. Now, they also present to fertile ground for the critiques coming from Postcolonialism and Decoloniality to grow in their perspective on the question on violence. the texts presented here do not comprise the entire discussion on the concept of violence in International Relations, but they present a structural framework for understanding how such discussion has evolved ever since Galtung's main contributions.

4.3.4. When fists are heavier than words – the issue at hand

Almost at the end of his 1969's article, Galtung questions "if our choice of means in the fight against structural violence is so limited by the non-use of personal violence that we are left without anything to do in highly repressive societies […] then how valuable is this recipe for peace?"[755]. This questioning finds an even wider spaces to echo after the series of critiques that have been presented here. How valuable is this recipe for peace presented by Galtung?

[753] Wight, C. (2019), p. 189.
[754] Wight, C. (2019), p. 173.
[755] Galtung, J. (1969), p. 184.

What is its value in the face of a reality so different from what is drawn by the mainstream conceptions of peace and violence?

Johan Galtung dedicated his life to the study and research of peace, and in his path he came across different peoples, groups, situations and societies. Much of the learning he had throughout his life is reflected in the development and maturation of his theoretical framework. Being redundant here: my intensions are not to invalidate Galtung's contributions, but to extend them to cover the people and experiences he maybe intended to cover. Violence here, as a concept, becomes plural and inclusive, but definitely not universal, aware of the ones who suffer the most violence has to say, assuming also that the different typologies on violence should respect the prerogative of not silencing those who suffer, not incentivizing the anechoic wall, not reinforcing the othering of alterity. It comes to validate the previous definitions of violence, but also carefully provincializing[756] it.

But what happens if all this framework has no value in face of the real experiences of the peoples of the world? What is its value in face of reality, if the theoretical thinking of Peace Research does not reflect the experiences of pain and violence? What is Peace research for if not to deal with problems like this wall, this abyssal difference? What should do those who scream and cry on the other side of the wall?

The questioning of violence being used to deal with violence opens a completely different space of discussions. They are not going to be explored here, but they are worth mentioning, especially if my intention is to approach the question of violence from the perspective of those who are characterized as subalterns in the international field. How do we break the Differend? Vengeance? Retribution? These ponderings are not strange to us nor to this dissertation. Many authors have argued for the proportionality in the response against violence, based on the naturally given right to those oppressed having a fundamental right to self-defense. Beyond that, more than standing in a defense mode, proactive action is necessary to tackle the origins of violence. Revolutionary issues emerge, as a proper response to the problems but also as a disproportionate mode to overcome a reality by using its tools. Will it be different?

Let's go back to Fanon for a while. His book[757] has in its name a reference to *L'internacionale*, directing itself to those condemned by the system. In his book Europe (but we can interpret as the West) is no more the subject, but the object (a dialectical shift): it is analyzed and condemned to unveil, to those subalternalized, its mechanisms of alienation.

[756] Chakrabarty, D. (2009).
[757] Fanon, F. (2007).

From the relation between oppressors and oppressed, death is the only foreseeable future. For those colonized, the death of such relations – emancipation – is what would dissolve the original domination. From death itself emerges resurrection, as it comes as an opportunity to dismantle the first violence, the one that is colonial and dehumanizing. It is quite menacing to read such affirmations, but Fanon works his way into the text so we can have the same astonishment with the contradictions and abuses of colonialism. For that, in front of such contradictions, the author's proposal could not admit a less dramatic resistance than the irrepressible violence of those colonized[758].

Fanon takes us in a hermeneutic journey. At the end of his text, already convincing his readers of the legitimacy of "vindictive violence", he presents the argument of how we should overcome such reactivity, going for a directive, emancipative and political violence. Fanon's position on violence works as an antithesis of the colonial violence. Beyond the colonization of the bodies and the minds, to exactly destroy such reality, Fanon saw an alternative in armed fight and struggle. From his tactical perspective, Fanon opposes the idea of a process led by a political party (as the thinking head) responsible for guiding the masses (as the moving body). He defended a certain ontological priority for popular insurrection. Violence, for each humiliated body, permits its transformation into one link of a revolutionary chain. Within it, militant direction emerges from the formation of masses[759].

In a perspective applied for international relations[760], this responsive violence is necessary for national construction, according to Fanon. If we expand, at this point, our understanding of violence to all the types we have come across, this response comes from various fronts, in various forms. For it Fanon asks his people to abandon Europe as a civilizing model, and that they dare to invent and discover new thoughts. Again, emancipation of the colonized would come from a violent process of purging the white man from both the psyche and the materiality of the colonial world. In this process, is there space for freedom being achieved by reconciliation[761]?

If the objective is to break the cycle perpetrated by the triangle of violence, aiming in reality that strives for a peace culture, will hearing the voices be enough? Is it possible to achieve peace without violence? And how this logic of means and ends differs from those already part of the Global North mainstream, in a position of privilege? What must be

[758] Selis, L. M. R. & Souza, N. M. F. (2021), p. 61-70.
[759] Selis, L. M. R. & Souza, N. M. F. (2021), p. 61-70.
[760] Fanon, F. (2007), p. 75-85.
[761] Selis, L. M. R. & Souza, N. M. F. (2021), p. 70-77.

considered is that there is nothing justifiable about domination. Again, as must be repeated: the violence of the oppressed is part of achieving liberation, while the violence of the oppressor is part of achieving domination. In face of that, Fanon would agree that the violence of the oppressed is frequently a 'necessary evil'. Violence, as a means of response, is the cry of a people who are so desperate they have no other realistic way of achieving emancipation. Here we could start discussing alternatives, as it is common and expected: when the violence is towards the metropolis, the center, those in power, then emerges the need for alternative paths – isn't this homogenous to kicking the ladder? Will the prohibition of violence impede the necessary change? Is revolution only possible through violent means? I do see value in opening a channel of investigation and conversation regarding that a new interpretation of peace, the means to achieve it, and discussions around pacifism and non-violence. For now, although, we should mind the words of Stokely Carmichael: "In order for nonviolence to work, your opponent has to have a conscience[762]".

4.4. The world seen from below

When asked for the most important advice he could give to young scholars of International Relations who wanted to specialize in peace and conflict studies, Galtung replied in a straightforward manner: "Stop studying international relations, a misnomer for inter-state studies, by using Anglo-American texts, given their track record of colonialism-imperialism and continued warfare". This, in itself, sets the tone in regards to Johan Galtung's relation with the field of International Relations. He came to develop a critical perspective of it as he advanced in his work and in his critical view. His advice continued with suggestions to travel a lot, to talk with people, asking them about their history, their nations and their states. Ask about conflicts and ask about solutions. "Study history for creative solutions. Try to understand their deep cultures hidden in the collective subconscious. Pay much attention to culture and nation, less to threats/bribes and states[763]".

International Relations is a field that has been going through a continuous process of diversification. Before, a huge focus in Liberalism, Realism, and in a minor way, Marxism – if we are to consider the mainstream schools of thought and the major debates. After the 1980s, advancing towards the end of the Cold War, the discipline became broader in an epistemological and ontological way. This broadening has in its foundation the emerging

[762] Bates, K. G. (2014).
[763] McKay, A. (2014).

critiques directed at the excluding behavior of the discipline. A major difference between Postcolonialism and Decoloniality, from our point of view, appears at the clear limitations of this critique towards the excluding behavior of IR, as we criticize the power structures and the Eurocentrism of the discipline, for example, but to do that we use European scholars. Not that is invalid – far from that – but the character of having a Eurocentric critique of eurocentrism shows us the deep-rooted coloniality of international politics, and looking through the lens proposed here, it shows us the deep-rooted violence that sustains and that is reproduced by this structure[764].

From a certain point of view, this structure is maintained in this mainstream because of the process of crystallization of coloniality in international politics. Bringing the idea that was presented to us by names such as Mignolo, Grosfoguel and Dussel provides us the tools to problematize key aspects of this issue in the field, while also providing a reading of what was marginalized and silenced. If we focus on the subject of international law, for example, we can gaze at how its first steps were taken out of the unique problems created by the encounter between the Spaniards and the indigenous people. As was mentioned before, the Valladolid Debate can be understood as one of the first discussions at legal level regarding human rights. Francisco de Vitoria's *On the American Indians*, published in 1532, reveals an effort to extend and apply "existing legal doctrines developed in Europe to determine the legal status of indigenous people". However, from a critical point of view, it is possible to question if Vitoria was not reconceptualizing these doctrines or even inventing new ones to deal with the new problem of indigenous people, creating a system for two distinct cultural orders[765].

In face of the prejudice against Amerindians, Vitoria defended that "before the arrival of the Spaniards these barbarians had real dominion, in both public and private matters" as any other Christian – different from most of his contemporaries, he understood Amerindians as rational human beings, validating that the base for universal law that could cover every human was the recognition of reason. He was against the Spanish invasion, arguing against the supposed legitimacy of it. However, through the lens of coloniality, aware of its double movement, it is possible to see how problematic Vitoria's position can be. Yes, he recognized the reason on Amerindians, but exactly because of that they are protected at the same time they are subjected to this same system, established as "*Jus Gentium*" – a system of rules, by the way, in which they had no participation in its elaboration. He was against the idea of invasion

[764] Blanco, R. & Delgado, A. C. T. (2021), p. 125-131.
[765] Blanco, R. & Delgado, A. C. T. (2021), p. 125-131.

questioning its legitimacy on legal grounds. Still, he did not question the conceptions of Amerindians as such. Their still barbarians, by his own words[766].

That can also be read as another example of *Différend*: how am I going to criticized the legitimacy of legal standards based on a process that functions on these same legal standards? And even though this example regards an important case at the 16th century, is it too hard to see this same pattern in present days? This is not exclusive of the past. Currently, these are made operational through the notions of development, modernization and democratization aimed at the periphery of the international scene. Looking closely at the structure of the contemporary international scenario, it is evident that the peripheral zones of the international system still live under a regime of "global coloniality"[767].

Another critical point that we came across regards the focus on the idea of liberty/freedom as one of the main ambitions of modern politics, included in the field of International relations. As multiple groups call for it, what ends up being established in the contradictory character of the discourses regarding the same object – and just like it happens with peace, because of these contradictions, fighting for freedom leads to multiplication of violence and disrespect to freedom itself. From the critical point of view, many of these contradictions are understood to be part of the way Liberalism defined freedom as a "universal value" (for the West, as we can now better understand). This can be easily seen in the colonial roots of the liberalism defended by John Stuart Mill – his universality would comply with the imperial and colonial project[768].

If we shift the board in which this game is played, still fighting from freedom but criticizing liberalism, we can remember how anticolonial movements of the XX century were strongly motivated by a desire of auto-determination. This would come, in given circumstances, only by recovering national liberty/freedom. From a Postcolonial view point we can reference Frantz Fanon, who promoted the need to decolonize not only the bodies, but also the minds of colonial subjects marked by the violence of colonization. This violence, as explained in his book *The Wretched of the Earth*, reveals the hypocrisy of liberal humanism: dehumanization of the colonized subject through violence. At that we also recover the realization that the end of the processes of formal colonization of peoples did not represent the end of colonial violence on bodies and minds marked by coloniality. His response to that: colonial violence against the

[766] Blanco, R. & Delgado, A. C. T. (2021), p. 138-148.
[767] Blanco, R. & Delgado, A. C. T. (2021), p. 138-148.
[768] Selis, L. M. R. & Souza, N. M. F. (2021), p. 57-61.

colonizer as political resistance. The reconstruction of a new humanism would involve the violent exorcism of the colonizer[769].

How does that reflect in the ways international politics are done today? How does that reflect on the way International Relations are approached at present times, with current issues? If we change perspectives, what is the importance of International Relations for those on the periphery of the international system? What kind of International Relations are we talking about when we speak out from the periphery? How is the world seem from below? Flavia Guerra Cavalcanti proposes a perspective in these regards, challenging the modern western epistemology that is deep-rooted in our manners of thought – consequentially in International Relations. In a process of negation of the West, but also as a product of it, Cavalcanti references the Anthropophagic Manifest written by Oswald de Andrade, a Brazilian poet novelist and cultural critic[770].

The Anthropophagic Movement basically proposed to "swallow" the European cultural legacy and "digest" it in the form of a typical Brazilian art. The manifest should not be read as a defense of a Brazilian identity diametrically opposed to the European one. It protests against an uncritical imitation, but defends the partial, creative, productive imitation of the new. In a dialectical perspective, reconfigures the division between the *self* and the *other*, between the subject and the object. By an idea of cultural hybridism, this consumption (devouring, as cited) of the other is not the same as the separation and opposition of the other. Not the annihilation, but exaltation and appreciation of the other[771].

From a perspective of International Relations, the anthropophagy qualifies as an epistemology based on the geo-historical site of Latin America. From the margins, this states that the subalterns are not a copy of Europe, nor do they adopt modern Western epistemology as a form of knowledge – this, from a critical perspective. Anthropophagy comes as a potential to rethink the premises of the more traditional currents that structure the discipline of International Relations. The Manifest rises up against logical knowledge, speculative, European rationalism. Oswald's anthropophagy proposes a few ideas preliminary to Walter Mignolo's thoughts, in some ways. From the 'Clash of Civilization' is corroborated this ideal of fixing oneself on an identity, which also opposes his identity to that of the other, a question central to International Relations. Lacking fluidity, in a world in which, in order to maintain my identity, I must necessarily oppose the other, many international conflicts rise. To oppose

[769] Selis, L. M. R. & Souza, N. M. F. (2021), p. 57-61.
[770] Cavalcanti, F. G. (2021), p. 239-247.
[771] Cavalcanti, F. G. (2021), p. 247-255.

that, the contribution of the Anthropophagic Manifest to International Relations resides in the *Tupinambá way of being* (referencing the Amerindians), accepting its roots but also in favor of opening up to others; the absorption that exalts the *other*[772].

Coming to a very specific perspective from Postcolonial and Decolonial readings, how could we use Amerindian perspectivism to rethink the international, the relationship with the other in the international system? In the field of international relations, this proposal to think of the relationship first and then the entities derived from the relationship is already present in constructivist theories, especially in the post-structuralist ones. In here, Amartya Sen is cited pointing out the link between the fixation of identities (with the formation of stereotypes) and the potential for violent conflicts, as violence is fostered by cultivating a sense of inevitability about an allegedly unique – and often belligerent – identity we supposedly have. Ironically, topics such as cannibalism and anthropophagy, which would appear in the speeches of the sixteenth century as barbaric and part of violent cultures, can today point us precisely the way to avoid the violence that rises in the confrontation between fixed identities. Part of the crisis of multiculturalism is due to the closure of some in their own cultures, which ends up transforming multiculturalism into a mere coexistence of cultures, each closed in its identity[773].

However, applying a critical reading of what has been present right above, we can ask: this change of paradigm really has the potentiality to change how the "game is played"? Addressing clearly what is violence, in an open and inclusive way, serves to fight violence? Does it have to be developed in a violent way? With these new lenses (new ways of seeing the world), we open space to see better and for the development of new eyes (and new "I"s – new selves), that also make use of these new lenses and can now see naturally better. The synthesis by the exercise proposed in above mentioned chapters and sections will propitiate a more comprehensive concept of violence, proposing even a new reading of Johan Galtung's theory.

In the field of International Relations, nurtured by Postcolonial and Decolonial frameworks and perspectives, the world seem from below finds a path in the convergence of International Relations and Peace and Conflict Studies. Postcolonialism and Decoloniality will provide the critical standpoint to look at peace and violence more thoroughly. Recognizing better the abuses, and having the vocabulary to point it out, we might start to build and write a new History, a new Episteme, a new way of approaching International Relations. Can we have a theoretical body that focuses in violence in International Relations? All other theories use

[772] Cavalcanti, F. G. (2021), p. 247-255.
[773] Cavalcanti, F. G. (2021), p. 247-255.

concepts central to theories in a positive way (what we want to achieve). Can we have one that is more grounded in using a central concept to a theory in a negative way (what we do not want)?

4.5. The Missing Peace

In this last section we go back to a discussion presented in the beginning of this dissertation, to the core of this work being International Relations. If we are to review the reasons of existence for the field, the pursuit for what is taken as peace might lie in the heart of the work done – in matters of international political analysis, economic analysis, historical analysis, diplomacy, private and public sectors. Nothing is done in the pursuit of war (as an ends). War, here, as many have argued, becomes a means. In my perspective, these means have been excessively justified by those in power and hugely made invisible in regards to its disadvantages and its contradictions. International Relations, from my perspective, has in the phenomenon of war its biggest challenge, its most clear denial. But no, the absence of war does not mean peace.

With a clear and major concept of violence, placing it at the center of the field and its analyses, we might propose a logical shift: Not pursuing peace or being a pacifist, but pursuing the diminishment of violence, in its plural definitions. Here rise again many exercises in regards to the critical view of (oppositional) postmodern thought, together with critiques to capitalism, colonialism, patriarch and other kinds of oppression that are hugely reproduced in international relations, as an object of study and as the field, objectively and epistemically. The restructuring of what we understand as violence, together with the issues and challenges with its conceptualization, shall find in International Relations a fruitful soil to discuss and pursue what we mean by peace, towards a pluriversal peace building[774].

Considering the premise of the Galtungian dyad, if the change in the concept of violence affects directly the concept of peace, considering all the arguments that were presented in this dissertation, putting down the wall that sustains this violent separation and differentiation, then we may start to believe in the possibility of a peace that gets closer to what our utopic projections expect – a peace that now considers the words and voices of the constrained, of the subaltern, of the Global South. Emerges the "missing peace" of this puzzle. Appears the detail that might move a little how international relations are done, how the field of Peace and Conflict studies are done, creating bigger intersectionalities, including concepts of no-violence

[774] FitzGerald, G. (2021).

and non-violence. The focus now shifts to the proposal of a field that aims at a threeside foundation, a new triangle of purposes for the theoretical frame that may come from the convergence of International Relations and Peace and Conflict studies: Peace Development, Conflict Management and Violence diminishment.

Abigail Thorn, in her video on Hegel and Identity Politics[775], references the last words of Fanon's book *Black Skin, White Masks* at the end of her essay. I also borrow these words to finish this chapter, believing this message could be the start of a new one, as I think Fanon was hoping for:

> "Superiority? Inferiority? Why not the quite simple attempt to touch the other, to feel the other, to explain the other to myself? Was my freedom not given to me then in order to build the world of the You? At the conclusion of this study, I want the world to recognize, with me, the open door of every consciousness" [776].

[775] Thorn, A. (2018).
[776] Fanon, F. (2008).

5. CONCLUSION

"Cortar o nó em vez de levar tempo a desatá-lo é dar provas de impaciência. A violência é precipitação em um excesso de velocidade da ação. Ela violenta o tempo que é necessário para o crescimento e maturação das coisas."
– Jean-Marie Muller, O princípio da não-violência (1995)

5.1. New eyes for new lenses: The proposal for a new chapter

A fifth chapter was intended for this dissertation, but its content was dispersed in two ways: some of the discussions that I had in mind were moved to the last two sections of the fourth chapter, while other ideas will be briefly laid here. The reader shall take these points as suggestive further steps that could be taken as future research from this conclusive section, or parallel discussions that could emerge from the immensity of the theme approached here. Because of that, I here dispose my overture and prompt for future discussions, studies and researches that could conduct.

With the double fold dynamic of this dissertation's chapters names and their themes, the reader might notice how the fifth chapter would connect with the third one, just like the second connected with the fourth. Before, I proposed "new lenses for new eyes", appealing to the imagery of lenses that influence directly our optics, our ways of looking at the world – you change the lenses, you see it differently. The eyes emerge as the observant subject, here representing the novelty of people and communities from the Global South (and their perspective) being recognized. The homophone wordplay makes reference to the idea of *self*, so important to the discussions that we had here. A lot of the violence that we discussed and analyzed was legitimized by the simple mental process of differentiation between "them and I", "me and the rest", "the self and the other". And do not misinterpret my words, as the focus of this dissertation does not regard the philosophy on the limits of the self, of the individual, and the processes of differentiation – here I take that as given and natural.

The problem that was highlighted, however, regards the situations in which this differentiation process becomes vicious and noxious, contributing to the disrespect towards what or who does not regard or represent what is understood as 'me' (the self). I am here careful

to not reproduce the idea of 'dehumanization' as this is not only about the *other* being another human being: as we saw, thinking about the processes and types of violence, the objects of violences can be various. Here lies an important part to understand how peace would be achieved, as the journey towards it cannot be anthropocentric. When dealing with Peace Development, Conflict Management and Violence diminishment, the subject of analysis found in the figure of a human being must be in relation to other human beings, social signs such as the figure of communities and nations, and also non-human subjects, like animals, ecosystems, and nature in general. All of those are important pieces to achieve peace. Differentiation may be understood as instinctive, logical and/or typical, but Othering – the phenomenon in which individuals or groups are defined and labeled as not fitting in within the space that regards or represents the *self/selves*, thus not being respected – should be understood as malicious and cruel, violent in itself.

When shifting the pieces for said not-written-chapter, I aimed for something different when proposing "new eyes for new lenses". After going through all the discussions proposed here, understanding how the concept of violence can reproduce violence and how it can affect directly the field of International Relations, my idea was to see what would appear beyond, or next steps to be taken. New selves and ideas regarding the differentiation between the *self* and the *other* might come from this synthesis regarding violence. The rethinking and remaking of these concepts shall influence old forms of self-reference, also presenting new perspectives, new eyes. Using these lenses – violence sensitive lenses – we start to identify more easily others as equals, considering the differences but not neglecting the worthiness of respect and dignity. If we want peace and understand the processes in which it is diminished, we will make our efforts to avoid violence, and having violence as the focal point of attention, we might be more sensitive towards it. New eyes (again with the homophone wordplay), thus, makes reference to our new selves and perspectives together with *other*'s new selves and perspectives that are considered after the question of violence is taken into consideration.

From that, new lenses shall emerge. Coming from the proposition of a different way to look at the world – from a perspective that nurtures and open spaces for other perspectives – novelty might come around. Critiques and reformulations, starting from this common point. A careful consideration of the phenomenon of violence and its presence in our day-to-day lives and activities, with its various forms, may come as a proposition to reanalyze our ways of relating to ourselves, between ourselves and with the world. Looking at a social system of reproduction of violence, and actively critiquing its products, consequences, and structure around this concept of violence might catalyze some changes.

5.1.1. Reviewing International Relations and the violence within

I am certain that the research regarding the topic of violence has much to offer to the field of International Relations, and I say that after coming across just a few of them. To add to that, it does not necessarily have to be related to Peace – as we discussed, we might need some analytical perspectives that proposes something different from a peace that is violence-centered or a violence that is peace-centered. IR has for long been a field with other conceptual concerns, discussing more about power, liberty, economy and international law than questions of peace and violence. Considering it, the influences of a proper field of Peace and Conflict Studies and Research appears as central to the approach of a new perspective, as we saw. Having parts of its foundational bricks in the field of IR, Peace and Conflict Studies went to a different direction, absorbing and developing other knowledges, even though we might see it as walking parallel to the former. A return to the field of IR and its main topics, but with these new lenses, seems to offer a news space to be explored.

With the proposed critique in this dissertation, drawing from a theoretical background that is present in International Relations (even though in the margins), I tried to highlight a key point that is not exclusive to the periphery, bringing a conceptual discussion that was already part of the sibling field of Peace and Conflict studies. Violence is a common concept, theme and topic to the two fields. A focus on the concept of violence and in the consequences of its conceptualization comes as an opportunity to review and critique some stake pillars of the field of International Relations. Coming from the discussions that were proposed here in this dissertation, I find opportunities in reviewing the history of international relations through the lenses of violence, and also the reasons and consequences of the formation and development of it (and in it) as a field of studies. The issues in regards to violence and war might come as quite obvious (the epitome of violence), but from a critical perspective, and with the new lenses proposed here, war and armed conflicts certainly will look different. Central concepts of the field such as anarchy, State, diplomacy, international system, sovereignty might also suffer some minor to major changes if looked through the lenses of violence. What about IR theories? I do believe that a revised concept of violence and the centrality of it in theoretical discussions might influence how we understand Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism, just to cite the mainstream theoretical frameworks.

With the new tools, new concepts and ideas, there is even more space to criticize how this discipline was born to be global and international, but ends up being mostly European and American. The discussions around universality find great soil for debate in International

Relations. Can the field of IR, as a discipline, change and adapt without losing its most distinctive characters, or are exactly those key points that need to change when we see the world with these violent-sensitive lenses? Is there a way to build a new theoretical framework from the viewpoint of violence in International Relations? Is the field, in itself, a violent discipline? And its actors? Many questions, and certainly many more answers.

5.1.2. A puzzle of many Peaces

The "missing peace" emerged as a part of what was forgotten, hidden or avoided – a type of peace that considers truly the voices of those who suffer and listen to what really hinders their peace – especially in the field of International Relations, for the case of this dissertation. From the restructuring of our understanding about violence, if we were to follow Johan Galtung's dyadic logic, the concept of peace would also go through some modifications, as the two concepts are connected and interdependent. A new perspective on violence leads to a new perspective on peace as well. I repeat: we might need some analytical perspectives that proposes something different from a peace that is violence-centered or a violence that is peace-centered. In spite of that, considering Galtung's proposed relation of the two concepts, if you change one you end up changing the other. So, if we are to follow the idea of a Violence for the Global South, we here open the analytical space for a Peace for the Global South.

What would mean a "Peace for the Global South"? There are two aspects to consider at this point. With this dissertation the reader should have come to the point of understanding, through Postcolonial and Decolonial supplements, that violence is more predominant in the countries belonging to the category of Global South. The concept of peace comes as a rare, strange or limited, and the pursue for it, as a global ideal, does not appraise these groups, these peoples. Peace, in its mainstream universality, comes as inadequate and unsatisfactory. Peace, in this common sense and acritical conception, mainly coming from the Global North and mainly defended by Global North institutions, should be provincialized[777].

The response to that, as the second aspect to consider, appears with the plurality of Peaces. This does not only regard the opposition to each type of violence, but considers, in the lenses of International Relations, the idiocrasies that must be consider for each analysis, and the multitude of analyses that must be taken into consideration. This affect relational processes that are naturally part of the field, in commerce and diplomacy. Also, with the expansion of the concepts of peace (coming from Peace and Conflict Studies) we welcome many other readings

[777] Chakrabarty, D. (2009).

on it and open space for them in the field of International Relations. The issue that IR appears to address emerges as a puzzle that needs many different approaches from different perspectives, and this is already very characteristic of the field. What appears as new is the consideration of its "main objective" – Peace – as flawed, if not critically approached. As there are many violences to consider, there are also many peaces to consider, and only taking them into account will truly facilitate our way towards what supposedly is the core aims of international relations.

Discussions on education and culture for peace might find a place on methodological debates. No-violence and Nonviolence might come as alternative or substratum to negotiations, mediations, and decision spaces in the international system. Organizations focused in peace might leverage in the international scenery as influent actors. Much could change with the consideration of many different peaces, but this would have to be better analyzed.

5.2.To not really conclude…

Considering all my efforts to contain the limits of my queries, and the methodological concern to not lose the objectivity of my research, I can affirm that I was able, as a researcher and as an student, to attain satisfactorily to the inquires I had regarding the thematic of violence in International Relations, even though much behind of what the theme came to develop into, always inviting me to go deeper and further. To better put it here, the presented hypothesis was validated in the boundaries of this dissertation, while opening a ray of other questioning that came to require more hypothesis. I'm comfortable to affirm that the Global South, as an entity, as a critical movement, as a concept, as an idea and ideal, can produce different readings on how direct, structural and cultural violence emerges, its reasons, values, consequences and significances, if we are to be bound by Galtung's framework. Assuming this as valid, as a repercussion, its definitions of (negative and positive) peace also have the potentiality to be changed – even if only in a slightly way. My theoretical conjectures, founded in previous readings, personal interests and past experiences, pointed to a shift in Johan Galtung's theories regarding the dyad peace-violence[778] if they were to depart and develop from the experiences of those who are silenced and most suffer in the international society – from those who are "violenced", from those who are constrained, if I may.

On the introduction of this dissertation the reader had a contact with how my personal interrogations in regards to violence conducted me to seeing a gap in the field of International

[778] Galtung, J. (1969).

Relations: the lack of discussions happening at a theoretical level, and even further, the absence of those who (theoretically speaking) suffer most from violence making theory about it. The problems to define it was approached, as we came across the issue of legitimacy, who conceptualizes it and the process of its conceptualization. On the first chapter the reader must have had contact with how violence, and consequentially peace, are approached in the epistemological mainstream of IR, with the contribution of a myriad of authors leading to the reference taken as central in this dissertation: Johan Galtung. The second chapter is written around the emergence of postcolonial and decolonial theory, also presenting their main scholars and authors, exploring its main arguments and tools to approach reality. Within the third chapter the reader will find the intersection of chapter one and two, basically arguing on how the readings of violence would change if they were legitimized as coming from the people who have the most experience with the phenomenon of violence. The dialectical exercise here presented is of uttermost importance, as the dynamics of the dyad peace-violence would certainly change – the recognition of the Differend of violence and the proposal of the Pyramidal model are established as main arguments. On the fourth chapter of this work, even though scattered, the reader found how these changes can have an impact in the world, especially for addressing more directly what can be taken as violence and how we are going to deal with it.

The theoretical framework of post-colonialism and decoloniality seemed to me as the best tools to do that, as they are concerned with accounting for the political, aesthetical, economic, historical, social, metaphysical, epistemological and ontological impact of colonial rule around the world after the 16th century, aggravated throughout the 18th and the 19th century. From this perspective, I could even say that they focus on the consequences of the violence bestowed upon the colonized peoples of international society. In an attempt to reconnect with the knowledge on the periphery of the epistemological mainstream that has been pushed aside, forgotten, buried or discredited by the forces of modernity, coloniality and capitalism, I argued not for an antagonistic counterpoint to the conceptualization of Galtung (what I take as mainstream here), but for a theoretical perspective sufficiently distinct to be studied as its own theoretical body. An argument for plurality, but one that overcomes the current lines of interpretation of violence. Mainstream violence must be provincialized (the west and mainstream violence can, on this situation, be taken as synonyms). Looking at international relations through the eyes of the constrained, giving them voice to speak out and clear about what is violence, how is it felt and how it affects their societies and day-to-day life, seemed to

me as novelty, something that could propose new perspectives and readings in the field. Again, I would have to reach further in my research to affirm this in a satisfactory stance.

Whatsoever, there is something missing, and I take this as a palpable. In the intersectionality between the field of International Relations and the field of Studies and Research on Peace and Conflict, a little is developed on regards to international law, Human Rights, peacemaking, peace building, peace enforcement, international organizations, causes and consequences of conflicts, and more. What I found, whatsoever, is a lack of theoretical engagement in this common space between the two areas. When it comes to theory, there has not been much space for exchange – and this is one of the stances in which the contributions of Johan Galtung come to be highlighted. His theoretical approach to concepts as peace and violence and his endeavor into the academic and scientific scenario, using much of what was understood as international relations as a foundation, positioned himself as a pioneer of a movement, one that would institutionalize peace as an object of studies, giving birth to a new field. Without doubt peace had been discussed and approached for a long time, as we saw in chapter one – the philosophy of peace has always been present and relevant, making a feature appearance in a the most diverse areas of human and social studies. How International Relations and Peace and Conflict studies could come together to produce a theoretical body regarding peace and violence in a way that is fruitful for both fields?

In the little that has been developed in this intersectionality, in regards to theoretical research and studies, many discussions about peace could emerge – and here I must be clear in my affirmation. Don't take me wrong: The discipline of International Relations discussed, has been discussing and will discuss what peace means and represents to the field – even if some try to avoid it, I believe that peace is part of the ontology of this field, as it was a main reason and objective in its birth. Then, the field of Peace and Conflict research comes to develop its own structure to analyze the same object of study, and from that point follows its own steps, building its own academic path, without forgetting its relation with International Relations, but also driving far from it, away from it. Even considering the relation of these two parallel academic developments, the moments in which these two lines came into contact are scarce, especially in regards to theoretical discussions. This is quite impressive, from my point of view, taking into account the enormous development that each of the disciplines has been through in the past decades. The little that emerges are discussions concentrated in the dyadic relation peace-war, mostly taking into account classical perspectives of IR theory.

Presenting a new dyad, Johan Galtung opened new possibilities[779]. Relating peace and violence in such a structured manner, arguing for the complexity of a typology of such concepts, was something new at that time. In face of its novelty I have asked "that is interesting! What happens if I take this new object of studies (dyad peace-violence) and apply it to International Relations?". The resulting silence here is ominous: the fleshly dyadic relation seems to fade or crumble, and its dialectical character is unmade. Peace then crosses the room uneventfully, not because it is ignored or unheard of, but quite the contrary. It is taken as if it was always there, and exactly because of this its presence is modestly considered. Its subjectiveness, even more so, don't appeal to the concrete character of other conceptions and key terms in the field. The positivist melody that is paradigmatically played in this academic courtyard makes this dance too complicated to some, and meaningless to others. Across the room sits quietly the companion that was abstracted at the entrance. Violence is ignored, or as I believe, silenced, hidden. It comes as granted that no one wants violence here – more unwanted, although, is the recognition of its presence, and consequentially the recognition of its relationship with all of those present, as if it was a usurer. Violence, as taken by many, is the core politics, of power, of International Relations.

Classical perspectives of International Relations produce sterile debates with the field of Studies and Research on Peace and Conflict. I affirm that because classical perspectives, from the first debates of IR, take the object of study from Peace and Conflict and utilizes them to reaffirm their own theoretical discussions, not going further and engaging with the propositions and ends of the field of Studies and Research on Peace and Conflict. The possibility of complementarity is lost into this positivist utilitarian approach – The possibility of International Relations revaluating and engaging with core principles of its creation and teleology is supplanted with its modus operandi, its mainstream, its status quo, so engaged with the means of a lost or altered end, to its processes and structure.

From my perspective, the prolific space that emerges as a possibility for a constructive debate comes around with the emergence of post-positivistic theories of International Relations. The epistemological criticism or rejection of positivism seems to be a characteristic of what propitiates peace from the perspective of social and human sciences, as taken in the Field of Studies and Research on Peace and Conflict, to flow more organically and fruitfully into the field of IR – this exactly because, in the development of the former, discussions of peace had already developed a transdisciplinary character that can only echo with what had

[779] Galtung, J. (1969).

been produced after the reflectivist turn in theories of the latter. Taken from the perspectives and contributions of Johan Galtung, and all the production of the field that came after him, the dyad peace-violence can enter the field of International Relations carried by the hands of its new debates, propitiating new answers for "What is peace in IR?", "What is peace for?", new questions as "What is violence in IR?", and new discussions in regards to the typology of each concept and its influences and concrete consequences.

Among many of the readings that were here presented, and accordingly with the argument that I tried to develop, peace was intrinsically part of International Relations as an ends to means that was being adjusted in a constant process of adaptation, and violence came to be so intrinsic to it as well, as a means to ends that was being adjusted as the discipline progressed in time. The dyad presented by Johan Galtung is fundamental, but taken for granted or ignored by the field of International Relations, and bringing the dyad to the spotlight could nurture new production and perspectives, as the field of IR advances. My personal interests found locus in the intersectionality between the two fields, and this very point of entanglement could breed many new researches and studies. My eyes, in the middle of all of that, found in the conceptualization of violence a fertile soil for this dissertation (approaching now the end). Even before coming to the realization of this truncated relationship between the two mentioned fields of study, with all that was explained above, I started the current research quest as a reflex of my curiosity on how violence was seen and developed in International Relations.

Repeating myself, I could not find much in regards to how violence is taken in the field of International Relation, especially as a concept. Violence is not approached clearly, and in midst of many key terms such as Power, State, Law, War, Peace, Diplomacy, and its diverse sets of definitions and conceptualizations, one left aside is Violence. So ubiquitous and influential, violence is widely neglected, and broadly ignored. If we are to validate the fact that violence as a concept, in some manner, has been approached in International Relations, it should be stated that is has been merely developed. I hope to have made this clear. The bibliography on it is scarce, contrary to the uncountable production on regards to violence, as a concept, in other areas – some even complementary to IR as Political Sciences, Law and the mentioned field of Peace and Conflict Studies. As argued in regards to peace, this could be because of the intrinsic subjectivity of approaching it as a concept, or because it is taken as given in the field, as so essential that mentioning it would be useless. Coming to the conclusion of this work, and taking this argument of violence's subjectivity and essentiality in IR as valid, I argue that it is exactly this that makes it so important to be addressed. Placing violence in the center of debates,

theories and propositions, clearly and objectively conceptualized as a principle, means and/or ends, has the potentiality to shift perspectives in International Relation.

Looking at the intersectionality between the field of International Relations and the field of Studies and Research on Peace and Conflict, trying to make sense of how the conceptualization of violence would emerge, I had to make sense of how the phenomenon of violence was present empirically – as I mentioned in the beginning of this text, I wanted to get near the concept with curious eyes, trying to make a new sense of it, trying to understand how it interacts with the world and the uses it has, trying to look it through new perspectives, guided by the preconceived ideas and the constructed hypotheses I have. I found many people interested in doing the same, approaching violence as how it was present in their realities, in their fields, writing to understand it and sometimes proposing ways to overcome it. The contributions of my tutors and advisors here were key, as I they would point out many names recognized for their work – with many using the word violence, but not really trying to conceptualize the term in itself.

Looking to extract the meaning of violence from each reading felt like a herculean task (for my level). A big challenge was crossing so many readings and texts through my attempt to ground it in International Relations, and here I can highlight one of the points that emerged in my path to this conclusion. Many of the readings I did were "lost" in my attempt to match it to IR exactly because I was epistemically centered in classical readings of theories of International Relations – trying to grasp direct, cultural and structural violence but only in regards to sovereign States and international actors, bound by positivistic lens, made my field of vision narrow and the products of such analyses shallow – an analysis of violence in mainstream debates deals with the risk of being weak. One point that caught my attention, even before and exactly because of this epistemological influences, came with the realization that the majority of those names that I was reading to capture how violence presented itself in IR came from in Europe and North America – naturally, as those places are taken as the birthplaces of the field as a discipline.

Why is that, when it comes to violence, I can't find the perspective of the people that are most neglected in international relations? Well, the discrepancies between the Global North and the Global South are evident – we don't need postcolonialism and decoloniality to present such a clear and evident reality. Outside of the field of IR I came across many names, and all of them addressing the violence that was suffered, and the scars of this violence in their histories, societies and realities. Still, no one addressing what was violence, as a concept, from their perspective. This interested me, as I mentioned in the introduction, because it seemed to

me like something was off in this logic: In the pursuit to achieve peace, we must define peace to have a clear idea of what is desired. Taking the contributions of Johan Galtung to approach that, the definition of violence comes hand-to-hand to the definition of peace, so we can have a clear idea of what is not desired. A difference here is that, conceptually, peace tends to have this character of what must be or what is desired to be (deontology), while violence is grounded in past and present experiences that are not wanted, that must be avoided. In a global scale, aiming to see things from the point of view of international relations, I questioned why I could not find theoretical production in regards to how violence was described and conceptualized in the places that, by definition and evidence, deal more constantly with that. It makes sense to me that, in hearing what these people have to say, we can better adjust our strategies to include them in the search for peace.

But no. The Global South exists as a definition exactly to highlight the difference that creates this abyssal difference with the Global North. These differences are, as mentioned, present in every aspect of human life – and to us, regarding the production of knowledge, the epistemological barrier that separates these two sides hinders what is produced outside of the epistemological center, concentrated in the hegemonic control of science of the Global North. Here we face the wall… A dialectical defiance then emerges, as I saw a difficulty to approach violence and talk about it, especially from the experience of the South, as a reflex of this reality of violence. It is coherent to hear someone talk about violence if this may be violent towards its very definitions? Violence is so present and ubiquitous that impedes subjects to talk about violence. A concept found that seems to fit exactly to this situation is Lyotard's *Différend*[780], as "a wrong or injustice which cannot be proved to have been a wrong or injustice because the means of doing so has (also) been denied the victim", or to put in another way, a "wrong or injustice that arises because the prevailing or hegemonic discourse actively precludes the possibility of this wrong being expressed". Violence, at the international level, is scarcely discussed, and this fact can be seen as a violence in itself, as the possibility to talk about it represents its weakening.

One of the core questions I had was: how would be taken an analysis of the concept of violence, specifically the one presented by Johan Galtung, in the field of International Relations, through the perspective of the Global South? As part of a conclusive note of this work, I defend that the typology of violence and peace presented in the articles of 1969 and 1990 would not necessarily change in means of its structure, as the work of Johan Galtung

[780] Lyotard, J. F. (1983).

comprehends different levels of violence and the way it manifests itself in society, but they would serve for a much more exhortatory purpose than a solely descriptive analysis. I propose that the postcolonial approaches would magnify even more the consequences of violence, while a decolonial approach would certainly highlight its profound relation with modernity. The concept of violence, taken from the perspective of the south, would certainly appeal to coloniality as the subject that inflicts violence onto the conceptual *other,* even in consideration of Structural and Cultural violence, that tends to have a hidden perpetrator. Of course, I would not only focus on the violence experienced in the Global South, but the experiences from the South would be the basis for a new reading, a more inclusive and broader understanding of violence.

If we are willing to go a step further, we could try to grasp onto what would change with this different analysis. Imagining that we start to look into violence in International Relations through the eyes of those that are constrained, and defining peace in relation to that, emerges a paradigm that could really be committed to peace, finding in the field of International Relations an opening to approach that on the international level. My former "bedside" book for International Relations was, for a while, Jackson and Sørensen's *Introduction to International Relations*[781]. On its first pages, going through the main theories of IR and its values, the reader can find Realism having its emphasis in Security, Liberalism with an emphasis in Liberty, Theories of International Society having its emphasis in Order and Justice, and Theories of International Political Economy with an emphasis in well-being. Such affirmations in regards to IR theories are debatable, even to the introductory level, but I bring this here to present a thought: Which IR theory has its emphasis in Peace? My reading tells me that all of them could make their case to say that peace is a priority, but none has peace as its main emphasis. The application of theoretical developments from the field of Study and Research of Peace and Conflicts could bring up a whole new body of study to analyze the International Relations. Having violence as a clear concept, one that does not commit the error of speaking for others, could propitiate a true reading of what peace could be, influencing directly in public policies, public opinion, education and academically speaking, in the whole body of the discipline of International Relations.

I can conceive of the existence of many flaws in this argument, even though I tried to protect myself from most of them. Here I feared the relativization of concepts and the critique of seeing "violence everywhere", in a very postmodern way like Boaventura criticized.

[781] Jackson, R. & Sørensen, G. (2010).

Violence is a concept and term that is vast in its own, and it is very problematic to try to cover it in a dissertation for a master thesis. There are many texts and authors that could have contributed even more to the argument here presented. Another point is that my intention was never to present a new typology, a new definition of violence, but to talk about the importance of it, and how it can potentially change how we look and approach things. Many authors have talked about violence, and the many forms it took, but I tried to grasp on the conceptual side of it, so I could connect all of them theoretically in a common bond. There is as well an opening for problematization of having peace and violence so related (Critique of violent-centered peace and peace-centered violence.). Here must be presented most of the arguments about Peace Studies that are not violence-centered – I could reach for many arguments inside the field that try to be dissociative in relation to this dyadic proposal.

Maybe the change on the concept of violence will propitiate a key for new possibilities, in which we do not fight violence with violence, as it is even more recognizable (again, facing the paradox of violence being violent, but needing the definition of violence firsthand). This new language that rises from letting those who suffer talk about what they suffer and how they suffer may open possibilities for a common ground for greater and unconstrained voice, if what we're looking for is really peace and the avoidance of violence. Now, looking at the world through the eyes of the constrained, having learned more about the experience of the subaltern, I can finally end this dissertation questioning you: “When I say violence, what comes up in your mind?”.

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