

from "History" books and from a long tradition of political rumination and speculation). The third conclusion is that to overcome "liberalism" in its republican or monarchical form,⁶ this generation was not only capable of changing tactics, but also of performing arrangements, negotiations, which turned into a paraphernalia of political resources capable of building large platforms that finally maintained a long-lasting regime alternative to the previous parliamentary ones. Somehow ironically, and because of this, it is obvious that not only the military dictatorship born in May-June 1926 could have produced different political results away from the *New State*—further to the right, or more to the left, more democratic or more authoritarian—, but that the *New State* was a regime that from the very beginning until its downfall lacked a deep strong internal political and ideological homogeneity starting with its top leaders—namely both chiefs of governments (Salazar and Caetano) and the two most durable heads of state (Carmona and Américo Thomaz).⁷ So even if the *New State* was new and different, even if it had a clear ideological agenda and a political path, it was a byproduct of politics (action) much more than of ideology (theory), something that seems to confirm that political learning and practicing was more relevant than having and applying a doctrine born out of an ideology. It was about characters much more than about canons, about circumstances but above all about willingness and chance. And this is what the story of Pedro Theotónio Pereira here displayed shows us.

THE BEGINNINGS

When he was 18 years old, on 16 December 1920, Pedro Theotónio Pereira published his first signed editorial column in the *integralista* newspaper *A Monarquia (The Monarchy)*. "The Two Caesars" was intended to honor the former and assassinated president Sidónio Pais but, at the same time, to search for the true political reasons of his ultimate failure and of all other "Caesars" in modern and late modern European history, from Cromwell to Napoleon.⁸ Assassinated in December 1918, Sidónio Pais was at the time having serious difficulties running the large, complicated and increasingly contradictory conservative coalition that had supported him and his policies almost from the day after the 1917

PEDRO THEOTÓNIO PEREIRA: A SHORT POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL BIOGRAPHY: THE EARLY YEARS (1920–1939)¹

Fernando Martins
University of Évora

OPENING

The goal of this short paper is mainly twofold. The first one is to briefly sketch the political and ideological biography of Pedro Theotónio Pereira during his formative years—roughly from 1920 to 1932—and his early life as a man with a particular job to perform in the initial stages of the Portuguese authoritarian regime headed by António de Oliveira Salazar from 1933 to 1968 and known as the *Estado Novo (New State)*.²

The second one is to shed some light into the history of the *New State* under a somewhat fresh perspective. I intend to show how the role played by individuals, whose political biography in terms of influence was almost insignificant until very late in the history of the Portuguese Republic (1910–1926) and the military dictatorship (1926–1933) that followed it, turned suddenly and became not only important by their own merit but also vital to strengthen a regime born out of the 1933 Constitution and of Salazar's political leadership. The first main conclusion that can be drawn is that even if the *New State* had some ingredients of continuity with the past, it was truly because of the active participation of individuals such as Pedro Theotónio Pereira that the new regime can be understood as a new reality in the political and ideological Portuguese life.³ Being so, and this is the second conclusion, the *New State* was, at least in part, the accomplishment of a generation born in the early twentieth century.⁴ This was a generation⁵ that always found it painful to deal with and most of all to accept the political results produced by the 1910 republican revolution and the civil war of the early 1830's (which it "knew"

military coup. The coup and the coalition which supported the so-called "New Republic" grew out of the lack of widespread political sympathy and legitimacy that the former Republican governments supported by the Democratic Party had felt almost permanently since the 5 October 1910 revolution. These feelings were aggravated by the dramatic effects produced by the Great War and the deeply unpopular participation of Portuguese troops in the European military operations in the last three years of that conflict. Conservative republicans, Catholics and monarchists from different credos, the Portuguese Catholic Church, among others, all supported, at least initially, the "New Republic" and its leader.⁹ After his assassination Sidónio Pais grew as one of the most emblematic characters of the Portuguese conservative, monarchical, Catholic and right-wing populist milieu through the next 50 years. But in 1920, in the "Two Caesars", Theotónio Pereira intended to show that Sidónio and other well intentioned and needed "Caesars" in early modern and modern European history were above all the demonstration that charismatic rule of such splendid men were sadly ephemeral because they lacked the seeds of continuity. By being so their existence only reminded how traditional monarchy was capable of accomplishing one un interrupted mission of political and social regeneration mixing up the unique qualities of individuals (princes and kings) with the virtues of exceptional institutions and their "glorious" history.¹⁰

Despite the shortcomings of Sidónio Pais as a political leader, Theotónio Pereira, only 16 years old when Sidónio Pais was killed in Lisbon, liked to recall his example and had done that several times during his long political life. And we should not be surprised. Not only was Sidónio's experience very important to the future of the often complex and contradictory political background that supported him in 1917 and 1918, by showing that it was possible to defeat the Democratic Party and keep it away from power, but also that Sidónio and the sidonismo experience were very important to Pedro Theotónio Pereira politically and personally.¹¹

In 1920, when after the defeated monarchists of the 1919 uprisings were allowed to start coming back to Portugal from exile, Pedro Theotónio Pereira, then a mathematics student at the Polytechnic school in Lisbon, started actively his public life in a political and ideological movement known as Integralismo Lusitano. Born in 1913 in Belgium, deeply influenced by the

French monarchist, nationalist and traditionalist movement headed by Charles Maurras—the *Action Française*—and by the legitimist and traditionalist political ideas militarily defeated during the 1832–1834 Portuguese civil war, Integralismo Lusitano was Pedro Theotónio Pereira's first civic choice. Seduced by the movement's political and social ideas, Theotónio Pereira was moreover particularly interested in its aggressive way of making politics, confronting simultaneously the republicans and the liberal branch of the Portuguese monarchists who ruled the country almost from 1834 to 1910 (the famous *talassas*).

In 1920, as in 1918, *A Monarquia* and Integralismo Lusitano captured Theotónio Pereira's interest and attention. In that period of time, António Sardinha, Integralismo Lusitano's most charismatic leader, but also a poet, publicist, journalist, would-be historian and political thinker, also seduced Theotónio Pereira with his personal charm, intellectual aggressiveness, political experience and strong opinions. At the age of 18, Theotónio Pereira's recollections were filled with all different sorts of political events that had negatively marked his childhood and family daily life. Events such as the murder of king Dom Carlos and his elder son, the republican revolution, the persecution of Catholics and of the free and public Catholic cult that followed, the heathen debates in the "sidonian" parliament, the assassination of Sidónio, the defeat both of *Monarquia do Norte* and the Monsanto skirmishing near Lisbon in 1919, all of it helps to explain his distrust towards parliamentary institutions, but also his capability to keep on believing in a political credo that in mid-1919, or later, seemed to be further away from any substantial, or even insignificant, victory.

Simultaneously, he felt deeply attracted by Sidónio Pais and, immediately after, by António Sardinha. In Sardinha as in Sidónio Pais, Theotónio Pereira saw personal charisma and leadership qualities, but also practical political men, a kind of distinctiveness that he enduringly thought were essential and much needed to reverse Portuguese political balance born out of the Republican revolution of October 1910.

ONE STEP FURTHER

But if Integralismo Lusitano, *A Monarquia* and António Sardinha were important in Theotónio Pereira political formative years, a

little later he opted, in part as a consequence of a deep crisis that affected Integralismo Lusitano from 1922, for alternatives capable of allowing him to keep on going and doing what he really enjoyed and what most politicians can be fixated about: political intrigues that sustain a great deal of political action and reaction. After 1922, and even if Theotónio Pereira still kept very close and important political and personal ties with Sardinha¹² and what was left of Integralismo, he started to develop an important political and personal relationship with the director of one of the most influential newspapers in Catholic, conservative, monarchial and anti-parliamentary milieus in Lisbon. Fernando de Sousa, a top-railways engineer, was the editor of *A Época*. He was a septuagenarian who like Sardinha enjoyed the company of younger men and was profoundly admired and respected by them. The regular presence of Theotónio Pereira in *A Época*'s editorial office, after the extinction of *A Monarquia*, not only allowed him to do what he most appreciated but also to enlarge his contacts in opposition Catholic and traditionalist milieus, while producing a visible change in his political training and behavior (more mature and obviously more opened to the virtues of moderate portions of political dialogue).

Even if until January 1925, when Sardinha suddenly died, Theotónio Pereira kept his ties with Integralismo Lusitano, his relationship with the movement had already changed. Since 1921 he was a supporter of Sardinha—like many of his own—and a critic of Hipólito Raposo and Rolão Preto. After 1922, like Sardinha and all his fellow travelers, Theotónio Pereira thought that Integralismo political action needed a pause. The goal was to indoctrinate. But at the same time, like Sardinha and many others, on what was then mainly the complex and contradictory anti-liberal field, Theotónio Pereira started to ask for some sort of political intervention away from strict indoctrination. In a way, for him and for Sardinha, indoctrination started to be action or, at least, be dependent on some sort of political action sustained by the publishing of a hybrid journal such as *Nação Portuguesa*.

Simultaneously the most important political events experienced by Theotónio Pereira from 1922 to 1926 showed not only his new hopes and ties, but also that Catholic social and political indoctrination were as important or more important for him than the sectarianism typical of Integralismo in its purest variety. It was

then that Theotónio Pereira met Marcello Caetano. And it was also because of his proximity with young Catholic political groups that it was possible for him to go to the University of Coimbra where Theotónio Pereira finally affiliated himself with the students' branch of the Academic Center of Christian Democracy (CADC).¹³ This attitude was his first clear concession to a non-monarchical solution to the Portuguese political problem and a clear expression that in the future his political options would be subject to the political, ideological and social lessons given by Pope Leo XIII as much as to the example of Integralismo as interpreted by Sardinha. In 1924 Theotónio Pereira understood and discovered—or maybe rediscovered—the importance not only of traditional monarchial ideas and anti-parliamentary thought and action, but moreover of Christian-Democratic—Catholic—ideas and of its political and social mission for the regeneration of Portugal. Much more than Integralismo, CADC seemed capable of being one more but very important and decisive tool ready to be used to overcome the political and social situation created by the 1910 Republican revolution.

Due to his not so modest role in, and knowledge of, the Portuguese anti-republican political environment—something that was growing particularly stronger after 1924—Theotónio Pereira saw action in the 18 April 1925 defeated revolution.¹⁴ Thirteen months later he was informed about some of the political and military facts surrounding the 28 May military coup that put an end to the 1911 Constitutional regime. From then on, and even if Theotónio Pereira felt particularly happy with the main result that the military coup allowed—the end of the “Jacobin” parliamentary republi—he was at pains to understand what he interpreted, like his mates, as inconceivable military hesitations, immobility and divisions, recognizing that maybe men such as Carmona and his top political and military advisers were not sufficiently interested in breaking away with the old Republic but only in reforming it.¹⁵

In late March 1927, after the republican, military and “popular” February revolution had been defeated, Theotónio Pereira helped to create a newspaper directed by João do Amaral—a former Integralista and a close friend of the deceased Sardinha. Called *A Ideia Nacional*, it had indeed at least one explicit political project. It was intended to confederate the deeply divided conservative and nationalist family, whether monarchists or republicans.

In any case, and in the short-run, this project failed. It was politically immature and, above all, part of the military establishment in government and in the barracks saw it as dangerously monarchical and right-wing nationalist. In the end authorities found the precise excuse to close the newspaper and the far right-wing political movement that was apparently germinating in its shadow. João do Amaral and *A Ideia Nacional* was associated with the seemingly fascist aborted military coup known as "Fi-Fis".¹⁶

But at least, in a couple of years, it was obvious that something survived away from this aborted project. Not only were some of the *Ideia Nacional's* top men discreetly co-opted by the military dictatorship just before Salazar came to power in April 1928, helping, for instance, Carmona to be elected president of the Republic. But some of them would appear as political and technical personnel that immediately after April 1928, many times enthusiastically, helped Salazar in his political and governmental tasks.

WITH SALAZAR: VERY CLOSE TO GOVERNMENT AND IN GOVERNMENT

We do not know exactly what Theotónio Pereira did politically during the last five months of 1927 and the first four of 1928.¹⁷ But on the day Salazar was invested as the new and all-powerful Finance minister—27 April 1928—he received Theotónio Pereira in the house of a mutual friend where he was staying after arriving in Lisbon. They did not know each other personally and because of that their mutual friend introduced them. Apparently Salazar was interested in Theotónio Pereira because of his expertise in the field of life insurance. Some legislation on that issue just approved by the former Finance minister had in Salazar's opinion needed to be immediately canceled and promptly revised. For Salazar Theotónio Pereira was the right man to help him. He had experience as an actuarial technician in the insurance company called Fidelidade where his father was director and where he was working since early 1926 after getting a degree in Mathematics and training for about three months in an insurance company in Zurich. Theotónio Pereira was also a critic of the new legislation. This view had been disclosed in several newspaper articles published in early 1928 that Salazar read. The fact was that the new minister got the impression of Theotónio Pereira being someone technically competent and apparently politically reliable.¹⁸

The result was that Theotónio Pereira assisted Oliveira Salazar in reforming what was considered an archaic social insurance system, having done so immediately after the cancellation of the new one produced by the former minister Sinel de Cordes. This was also when Theotónio Pereira introduced Marcello Caetano to the new minister and the future successor of Salazar immediately started a technical and political cooperation with the fresh government member. Until late 1932 we can only guess that some personal and political ties between Salazar and Theotónio Pereira might have come closer. So close were they that Salazar, while still Finance Minister, invited Theotónio Pereira to help write a small but politically important part of the new Constitution that dealt with its social and economic issues.¹⁹ Nine months later, immediately after the plebiscitary approval of that document and its promulgation a new government was formed (April 11) and Theotónio Pereira was its youngest member and a very important one even if he was only under-secretary for Corporations and Social Welfare.²⁰

At the time Theotónio Pereira was, besides a member of the government, someone helping Salazar to build the corporative political and social structure of the country and of its new ruling order. But he was also while working in government being used willingly to destroy the radical and pro-fascist and pro-nazi political movement known as Nacional Sindicalismo headed by the (former) integralista Rolão Preto.²¹ Whatever its nature, the truth was that Rolão Preto's movement had a strong appeal to some of the youngest and most active nationalist supporters of the new authoritarian political situation but who, at the same time, sought action and political and ideological radicalization especially in those areas seen as the only capable way of breaking away with the old liberal and republican order. At the minimum they wished for a national corporatist revolution immediately preformed by the government. At the maximum they wanted to see Rolão Preto, their leader, as the head of National Revolution that Salazar clearly seemed incapable of heading.

Under these circumstances, from late 1932 until late 1934, Theotónio Pereira was the man that by building the beginnings of the new Corporative state when dealing with welfare problems and other political and economic issues had to silence and destroy Rolão Preto's movement. He did so by showing that some of the

efforts claimed by the Nacional Sindicalistas were being accomplished. At the same time Theotónio Pereira brought into the *New State* and the corporatist would-be system many of Rolão Preto's supporters. Finally, and with men like Manuel Múrias, Costa Leite (Lumbralles), and others, national syndicalists all of them until very late, Theotónio Pereira built the regime's national trade-union movement that was inspired by the original one created by Rolão Preto. Finally, when the time was ripe, Salazar destroyed it.²²

While in government as undersecretary of state (1933 to 1936), Theotónio Pereira faced and attempted to overcome all possible resistance to building a new corporatist order as displayed in the 1933 Constitution. He was compelled by his convictions which came not only out of distrust of liberalism as a political and social system but, obviously, from his Integralista and Catholic background. Meanwhile he discarded, at least publicly, the goal of a monarchic restoration, even if he kept his monarchist convictions. During the Second World War Salazar asked him to deal with some delicate matters concerning the marriage and several trips to Portugal, through Europe and to Brazil of the heir to the Portuguese throne, D. Duarte Pio of Bragança.

In late 1937, when Pedro Theotónio Pereira left the government for Spain where he was to be special agent to Francisco Franco's national junta, as before, Salazar was to him undoubtedly the fulfillment of the aborted political projects of Sidónio Pais and António Sardinha. Even if Salazar could be intermittently Theotónio Pereira's most important ally and his most stubborn adversary, he clearly did not have the charismatic aura displayed by Sidónio Pais and António Sardinha. But the point was that during the 1920's and all of the 1930's Theotónio Pereira learned how politically vital to the survival of a non-liberal and non-democratic political regime was the capacity to deal and make at least reasonable concessions to Salazar personally but, especially, to the composite system of interests that the *New State* was before its existence and especially after its imposition. It had to be so if the regime born in March 1933 wanted to strengthen itself or, at the minimum, to survive.

As undersecretary, working under Salazar's direct command, Theotónio Pereira felt obliged to get a general cooperation towards his project and what were the undisputable guidelines of the Constitution: building a corporatist state and society. Because

of that lack of cooperation and support, and also because of strong political obstacles that existed inside the government, starting with Salazar's intriguing sluggishness, twice Theotónio Pereira threatened to resign. Both times Salazar was capable of avoiding his departure, recognition that he needed men like Theotónio Pereira to keep the regime balanced between the sensibilities and factions that supported the regime—the so-called conservative republicans, nationalists, right-wing revolutionaries and monarchists from different origins, technocrats and so on. In January 1936, at a government reshuffling, Theotónio Pereira was not only invited to stay but was even promoted. He became minister of Commerce and Industry. From a sort of neophyte Theotónio Pereira became temporarily indispensable. There he proceeded with his corporatist agenda at a time when some of the regime's far right-wing supporters thought of him as the alternative to Salazar and the exact person capable of bringing the "national revolution" to its original and much needed track. In 1936 and 1937 he had an important reserve of sympathy in the country but he had, at least publicly, to call for moderation and to remember that a wise politician like Salazar was the only one capable of leading Portugal's destiny. It was obvious that Theotónio Pereira did not want to be a Caesar.²³

SPAIN AND FORWARD

At last, in late 1937, he was invited by Salazar to go to Spain. Theotónio Pereira had no known diplomatic skills but was a tall and good-looking man, a well known "nationalist" unsatisfied with his performance inside the government and, most of all, someone that was building, even if involuntarily, his own influence inside the regime with consequences that were unknown but which Salazar and several other Theotónio Pereira adversaries in the regime did not even want to take the risk to foresee.²⁴ Still if he did not perceive himself as an alternative to Salazar, the truth is that many saw him as such and did not like the idea. First of all Salazar. But also those who Theotónio Pereira had negatively impressed with the work he had done when the still feeble corporative state structures were built. At the moment he left Lisbon on his way to Salamanca a huge crowd gathered at Rossio railway station. There were Legião Portuguesa members, corporative trade-union affiliates, unknown people of the capital mobilized at random and,

obviously, military and civil authorities eager to show their sympathy or just to see him set out. During his travel through the two or three of Portugal's provinces he crossed, there were small crowds cheering him. They came from different parts of the country and gathered in several railway stations to greet the former government member.²⁵ He left behind his own political orphans who still thought of him as the much-needed substitute of Salazar at the front of the everyday more unfulfilled and almost betrayed Nationalist Revolution.

When in Spain he immediately identified himself with those "crusaders", specially the Portuguese, who were fighting the communist threat to the Christian civilization: the new "Moors", the new "Huns". He visited them, the "crusaders", not the Moors, in the battlefield wearing a Legião Portuguesa uniform—one of the Naval Brigade—but also in barracks and hospitals. At the same time he followed the political and diplomatic instructions given to him in Lisbon by Ambassador Teixeira de Sampaio and Oliveira Salazar. In June 1938 he was made ambassador. Until 1939, at least until the summer that followed the signing of the Iberian Pact (March 13), he was generally in a good mood and pleased with his mission. He was particularly cautious with Franco but still on a honeymoon with Serrano Suñer, the Spanish regime's dark emissence. At the same time he was capable of seducing and being seduced by British diplomats and started to rebuild a sort of "special" Anglo-Portuguese "relationship" that took a final shape when Samuel Hoare came to head the British embassy in Madrid in 1940. But when 1939 was approaching to its conclusion he asked Salazar to leave. Anyhow he stayed until September 1945. From late 1939 he became a completely different political character. He not only kept himself faithful to Salazar and his political project—as after all he always was—but understood that a new ideological and political reality was reshaping Europe very quickly as the Second World War approached its conclusion and started to collide with the *New State's* best interests. Spain and the Second World War made Theotónio Pereira a very different man—if not in his personal character, at least his public one. Even if he still believed in the virtues of the regime born out of the 1933 Constitution, in the leadership of Salazar and his great political skills, Portuguese traumatic and destructive experiences of Liberalism and Democracy, in Theotónio Pereira's point of view, were even now pending in his

spirit and always would be. Because of all that he kept faithful to his ideological and political beginnings. But in the wider world he not only turned ambivalent towards parliamentary democracy as performed in some third countries, but also learned the traumatic results produced by the triumph of non-democratic anti-liberal political regimes in 1930's and early 1940's. And certainly he was not only thinking of Communism and Soviet Russia. Being so, an important part of his political education and experience could not remain absolutely categorical to himself. Exactly the same happened with his view of the New State, even if frequently he went back to recall its glorious origins in late 1920's or its golden age during the 1930's; or when it seemed that the *New State* had never left its good old days when anti-liberal and anti-communist authoritarianism ruled most of Europe apparently forever.

If we keep in mind Pedro Theotónio Pereira's original political considerations as displayed in *A Monarquia* in 1920. If we take note of the kind of political action he pursued from 1923 or 1924, we have to say that he had his shortcomings, his political defeats and that ideologically he made his concessions. But definitely he remained faithful to the lesson learned from Oliveira Martins about the nature and dramatic limits of Caesarism that he evaluated when confronting the political experience of Sidónio Pais from December 1917 to December 1918. He acted with the intention of creating a non-liberal, non-democratic, non-parliamentary, nationalist and corporatist durable solution to the Portuguese problem. But he knew that even one man of exceptional qualities might be almost essential to fulfill such a goal—and from the late 1920's that man was Salazar. But something politically long-lasting had to be built. A Caesar was not enough because Portuguese problems were not compatible with regimes of exception that lasted only a couple of years or died immediately after its leader collapsed. Theotónio Pereira even refused to be—or to try to be—the Caesar of the *New State*. But the truth was that the *New State* turned to be some sort of Caesarist solution with Salazar as its Caesar and Marcello Caetano, after September 1968, as its Marc Anthony. And the *New State* after 1968, as any other Caesarism, did not survive its Caesar. Even if that was not what Theotónio Pereira saw while serving the regime born out of one almost exhausting political fight that took place during the Military Dictatorship and of a new Constitution he helped to write and put into practice.

NOTES

1. Fernando Martins. Department of History at the University of Évora and CIDEHUS-UE. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 37th annual meeting of the Society for Spanish and Portuguese Historical Studies held in April 2006 at Lexington, Kentucky. It was part of a session entitled: "Three Faces of Portuguese Modern Authoritarianism: Variety in Harmony".
2. Salazar was head of government from July 1932 and was Finance Minister from late April 1928.
3. First of all, the *New State* adopted a different "channel of elite [governmental] recruitment", when compared with the "First Republic". Pedro Tavares de Almeida and António Costa Pinto, "Portuguese Ministers, 1851-1999: Social Background and Paths to Power" in Pedro Tavares de Almeida, António Costa Pinto and Nancy Berneio (ed.), *Who Governs Southern Europe? Regime Change and Ministerial Recruitment, 1850-2000*, London-Portland, Oregon, Frank Cass, 2003, pp. 33-34. But secondly, from the Military Dictatorship to the New State, there was only a moderate change "in the membership of the governing elite", something that is important because that was not the case when other regime changes occurred in Portugal from the 1850's to 1999. *Ibid.*, pp. 36-37. Anyhow what is truly relevant in this debate is not the geographic, social, professional and academic origins of government members in the New State when compared with the First Republic or the Military Dictatorship, but what those government members thought and what they have felt and done politically. In that sense, Theotónio Pereira was very "different" and very "new".
4. Philippe C. Schmitter saw the men who surrounded Salazar in the early 1930's as the "appearance of a new political generation." Quoting A. H. de Oliveira Marques, Schmitter reminds us that Salazar brought to power after 1928 the "generation of 1910", which was his own. That generation attained political consciousness in the moment that the Republic was founded. But in the case of Theotónio Pereira, Jorge Botelho Moniz, Marcello Caetano, Lumbrales, Henrique Teixeira, Humberto Delgado and many others, their political consciousness was clearly more precocious even if it would only be born some few years later—which was after 1917. Philippe C. Schmitter, *Portugal: do Autoritarismo à Democracia*, Lisbon, Imprensa de Ciências Sociais, 1999, p. 36.
5. Generation means not only the group of people born more or less at the same time, but those who had similar political ideas, experiences and practices. In the case of Pedro Theotónio Pereira's generation, this means that they all disliked the Republic and, previously, the memory of the Constitutional Monarchy but not of king Carlos. Because of that they fought against the institution of parliament, criticized economic and political liberalism, had deep Catholic feelings, shared a University degree and some experience in journalism. Their social origins varied, but all of them shared the same political, cultural and ideological approach to some broad Portuguese as well as Western issues of their time (from the late 1910's to the late 1930's). In this sense they were a real "peer-group".
6. For a highly illuminating questioning and discussion of the "liberal" nature of the Portuguese "First Republic" regime see Rui Ramos, "Foi a Primeira República um regime liberal?" in Manuel Baía (ed.), *Elites e Poder: A Crise do Sistema Liberal em Portugal e Espanha (1918-1931)*, Lisbon, Edições Colibri-CIDEHUS-UE, 2004, pp. 185-246.
7. One very good historical synthesis of political and ideological contradictions inside

the military dictatorship from 1926 to 1933 is Fernando Rosas, "O Estado Novo (1926-1974)", in *História de Portugal*, vol. VII, dir. José Mattoso, Lisbon, Círculo de Leitores, 1994, pp. 151-241. An older one but most useful is Douglas Wheeler, *A Ditadura Militar Portuguesa (1926-1933)*, Mem-Martins, Publicações Europa-América, 1986. See also Arnaldo Maclureira, *A Formação Histórica do Salazarismo (1928-1932). O quadro político em que se estruturou o salazarismo*, Lisbon, Livros Horizonte, 2000.

8. It seems obvious that to portray "Caesarism" Theotónio Pereira followed the ideas expounded by Oliveira Martins in his *History of the Roman Republic*. In the introductory chapter of that work Oliveira Martins characterized "Caesarism" and enumerated some of the most notable "Caesars" in history: Julius Caesar himself, Cromwell, William of Orange, Napoleon the 1st and the 3rd and, but only virtually, Gambetta. For Oliveira Martins "Caesarism" was only a provisional and exceptional but much needed political solution for republics undermined with "social revolutions". Oliveira Martins, contrary to historians such as Mommsen, was sure that "Caesarism" was not a prelude or the first stage to the transformation of a republic into an empire, nor was a "Caesar" the first "emperor" in the line of several. Oliveira Martins saw "Caesarism" in the history of the Roman Republic as a "strong government that, keeping order, protected the poor from the rich." To the Romans it was secondary if "all principles, all traditions, were smashed by the personal power of a man. The point was that that a man had the necessary genius to accomplish his task." Oliveira Martins, *História da República Romana*, vol. I, Lisbon, Guimarães Editores, 1987, pp. 21-22. Obviously, Theotónio Pereira was criticizing "Caesarism" as a viable political solution in itself and also in face of the Portuguese deep political and social problems caused by the Republic, the Great War and the failure of the political project embodied by Sidónio Pais. But in his written words Theotónio Pereira also shared the concerns of Oliveira Martins when writing his *History of the Roman Republic*. At a certain stage of the "development of human societies", Oliveira Martins underlined, "rich and poor see themselves as increasingly differentiated enemies" with the former claiming for "political rights." And the truth was that for Oliveira Martins in the mid-1880's, as for Theotónio Pereira in 1920, "any society had found a satisfactory solution" to that tragic problem. Oliveira Martins, op. cit., p. 26. But in the end Theotónio Pereira didn't look forward to any kind of Caesar or Caesarism. He looked, like his fellow travelers in Integralismo, for a strong, solid and durable political project that only could be the "traditional" ("medieval") form of monarchy.
9. Douglas L. Wheeler, *História Política de Portugal de 1910 a 1926*, Mem-Martins, Publicações Europa-América, 1985, pp. 151-161 and Vasco Pulido Valente, "Revoluções: A «República Velha» (ensaio de interpretação política)" in *Análise Social*, vol. XXVII (115), 1992, (1.^a), pp. 52-56 and 59-63.
10. Pedro Theotónio Pereira, "Os Césares" in *A Monarquia*, 16 de Dezembro de 1920, p. 2.
11. His mother, like many other women of Lisbon's "good society" was a strong and active supporter of Sidónio Pais.
12. Between July 1921 and December 1924, António Sardinha e Pedro Theotónio Pereira exchanged dozens of letters.
13. Fernando Manuel Santos Martins, "Theotónio Pereira: Uma Biografia (1902-1972)", unpublished PhD thesis, Évora, University of Évora, 2004, pp. 176-180.
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 218-225.
15. *Ibid.*, pp. 266-267.
16. *Ibid.*, pp. 264-268.

17. It is strongly possible that like his friend Marcello Caetano, he had at least played a role helping Carmona to be elected President in spring 1928.
18. "Pedro Theotónio Pereira. [...] através da sua formação teórica e profissional, pela experiência que acumulou no lançamento e consolidação dos seguros de vida [na Companhia Fidelidade]], apercebeu-se da importância estratégica da 'previdência social' para a resolução dos problemas económicos, sociais e financeiros que o país conhecia." *Ibid.*, p. 228 and pp. 353–370.
19. *Ibid.*, pp. 356–357. See also, regarding the political and ideological realities behind the 1933 Constitution, António de Araújo, "Na génese da Constituição política de 1933 (Apointamentos sobre o sistema de governo)" in *O Direito*, year 133rd, number 4, 2001, pp. 811–862; *Ibid.*, "Nos alvares da Constituição política de 1933: notas à margem de um manuscrito de Salazar" in *Estudos de Homenagem ao Conselheiro José Manuel Cardoso da Costa*, Coimbra Editora, 2003, pp. 109–202; *Ibid.*, "Dúvidas e incertezas sobre as Origens da Constituição Política de 1933" in *Anuário Português de Direito Constitucional*, vol. 3, Coimbra, Coimbra Editora, 2003, pp. 175–189. Finally, *Ibid.*, "O Conselho Político Nacional nas origens da Constituição de 1933" in *Estudos de Homenagem ao Conselheiro José Manuel Cardoso da Costa*, 2nd volume, Coimbra, Coimbra Editora, 2005, pp. 9–64. See also Fernando Rosas, "As grandes linhas da evolução institucional" in Fernando Rosas (coord.), *Portugal e o Estado Novo (1930–1960)*, col. "Nova História de Portugal", vol. 12, dir. Joel Serrão e A. H. de Oliveira Marques, Lisbon, Ed. Presença, 1992, pp. 867–113.
20. During the public discussion about the shape that the new Constitution might take old integralists such as Afonso Lucas, Hipólito Raposo and Pequito Rebelo presented not only their truly nationalist, corporatist and revolutionary project of a new Constitution, but they also criticized very strongly the solution defended by Salazar and its government. António de Araújo, "Na génese da Constituição política de 1933 (Apointamentos sobre o sistema de governo)", *op. cit.*, pp. 848–853.
21. Fernando Manuel Santos Martins, *op. cit.*, chapters 5 and 6 (*passim*). For different opinions about the political and ideological origins and characteristics of Preto's movement see António Costa Pinto, *Os Camisas Azuis. Ideologia, Elites e Movimentos Fascistas em Portugal. 1914–1945*, Lisbon, Editorial Estampa, 1992, *passim*. José Manuel Quintas maintains that Nacional Sindicalismo was not a fascist-type or a nazi-type political movement and that its ideology was quite different from Mussolini's and Hitler's political parties. See José Manuel Quintas, "Uma breve nota acerca do fascismo português" (web site address: "http://www.lusitana.org/il_jmq_nota_fascismo.htm"), accessed on 1 January 2007) and *idem*, "Francisco Rolão Preto" (web site address: "http://www.lusitana.org/il_frp_francisco_rolao_preto.htm"), accessed on 1 January 2007).
22. António Costa Pinto, *op. cit.*, pp. 232–265.
23. But did he want to be the new regime leader? Costa Brochado answered with a yes. See Costa Brochado *Memórias de Costa Brochado*, Lisbon. Liv. Popular Francisco Franco, 1987, pp. 139–143 and *passim*.
24. It is highly possible that the state corporatist structure, dependent on Theotónio Pereira, was responsible for the late August 1936 demonstration that forced the creation one month later of the Legião Portuguesa, the *New State* "fascist" militia. Letter from Theotónio Pereira to Oliveira Salazar (5 September 1936). Comissão do Livro Negro Sobre o Regime Fascista, *Correspondência de Pedro Teotónio Pereira para Oliveira Salazar*. Vol. 1. (1931–1939), Lisbon, Presidência do Conselho de Ministros, 1987, p. 57 (document 28). It's also important to note that during the initial phase of the Spanish Civil War Theotónio Pereira supported a much stronger involvement of

the Portuguese government in that conflict. *Idem*, *ibidem*, p. 47 (document 27a) and pp. 54–56 (document 27c). For the origins and making of the Legião Portuguesa see Luís Nuno Rodrigues, *A Legião Portuguesa. A Milícia do Estado Novo. 1936–1944*, Lisbon, Editorial Estampa, 1996, chapter 2.

25. Fernando Manuel Santos Martins, *op. cit.*, pp. 493–498.

Santa Barbara Portuguese Studies
Copyright © 2008 by the Center for Portuguese Studies,
University of California at Santa Barbara.
All rights reserved.

Volume IX: 2007

ISSN 1077-5943

EDITOR

João Camilo dos Santos

ASSOCIATE EDITOR

Harvey L. Sharrer

EDITORIAL BOARD

Francis A. Dutra

Élide Valarini Oliver

Eduardo Paiva Raposo

ADVISORY BOARD

Vitor Manuel de Aguiar e Silva

Onésimo Teotónio Almeida

Arthur L-F. Askins

Abel Barros Baptista

Georges Boisvert

Ivo Castro

Inês Duarte

Joaquim-Francisco Coelho

António Costa Pinto

Francisco Gota Fagundes

Perfecto C. Fernandez

Helder Godinho

Russel Hamilton

Randal Johnson

Eugénio Lisboa

Helder Macedo

Wilson Martins

Kenneth McPherson

George Monteiro

Marta Peixoto

Aníbal Pinto de Castro

Isabel Pires de Lima

Roderich Ptak

Anne-Marie Quint

Lutz Francisco Rebelo

Carlos Reis

Silvina Rodrigues Lopes

Affonso Romano de Sant'Anna

Arnaldo Saraiva

António Carlos Secchin

Candace Slater

Douglas Wheeler

Frederick G. Williams

ASSISTANT EDITORS

Marcelo Moreschi, Ellen Oliveira, Ricardo Vasconcelos

ASSISTANT EDITOR FOR VOLUME IX

Ricardo Vasconcelos

EDITORIAL CORRESPONDENCE

João Camilo dos Santos, *Santa Barbara Portuguese Studies*

Center for Portuguese Studies, University of California at Santa Barbara,

Santa Barbara CA 93106-1150 / FAX: 805-893-8341

Email: jeanilo@spanport.ucsb.edu

ORDERING: Individuals \$25.00 Institutions \$40.00

Shipping costs (approximately one to three items):

Surface Mail: \$3 (United States); \$8 (Foreign);

Airmail: \$8 (United States); \$12 (Foreign).

Address your orders to *Santa Barbara Portuguese Studies*, Center for Portuguese

Studies, University of California at Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara CA 93106-1150.

Checks should be made payable to the Center for Portuguese Studies. Further

information about the journal and the publications of the Center may be ob-

tained by contacting the Center for Portuguese Studies or connecting to our web

page: <http://www.portcenter.ucsb.edu>

Book production by Sasha "Birdie" Newborn at Bandanna Books

Cover art: José Laranjo, London, UK.

SANTA BARBARA PORTUGUESE STUDIES
Vol. IX: 2007

Published on an annual basis by the Center for Portuguese Studies
at the University of California, Santa Barbara

LITERATURA MARGINAL (organização de Arnaldo Saraiva)	
<i>Arnaldo Saraiva, A crise da literatura e a literatura marginal</i> ou marginalizada	5
<i>Antônio Henrique Weitzel, Literatura oral brasileira</i>	16
<i>Candace Slater, The literatura de cordel in today's Brazil</i>	45
<i>Pere Ferré, O romanceiro em Portugal (1960-2007)</i>	72
<i>Maria de Fátima Barbosa de M. Batista, Do oral ao escrito:</i> limites entre o romance oral e o folheto de cordel	94
<i>Richard Vernon, Escaping the Garden: the Querelle des</i> <i>femmes in 18th-century literatura de cordel</i>	102
<i>Braulio do Nascimento, O conto popular no Brasil</i>	120
<i>Carlos Nogueira, Para uma poética da poesia oral</i> infantil e juvenil	129
<i>Pedro Eiras, Rondas de lobos – do conto popular à ficção</i> portuguesa contemporânea	153

OUTROS ESTUDOS

<i>Juliet Perkins, The presence of Ruy Belo in</i> <i>José Cardoso Pires' Alexandra Alpha</i>	173
<i>João Carlos Vitorino Pereira, Le désir au féminin et le morale</i> <i>dans O Brasileiro Soares, de Luis de Magalhães</i>	191
<i>Hannah Wojciehowski, O dente de bugio: relics, religion and</i> rivalry in 16th-century Ceylon and Goa	234
<i>Fernando Martins, Pedro Theotônio Pereira: a short</i> political and ideological biography. The early years (1920-1939)	254
<i>Álvaro Garrido, Henrique Tenreiro: an oligarch of the</i> Portuguese corporatist system. Essay of a political biography (1936-1974)	270

